Quebec referendum, 1995

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Bill on the referendum and eventual declaration of independence.
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Bill on the referendum and eventual declaration of independence.


The 1995 Quebec referendum was the second, nearly identical referendum in the Canadian province of Quebec (see 1980 Quebec referendum) that put to public vote the political roles of Quebec and Canada, whether Quebec should secede from Canada and become an independent state. One minor difference was that whereas the first vote was on a proposal to negotiate something termed 'sovereignty-association', the second one was on 'sovereignty' along with an optional partnership offer. The referendum took place in Quebec on October 30, 1995, and the motion to pursue Quebec's independence was defeated by an extremely small margin, 50.58% "No" to 49.42% "Yes".

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[edit] Background

After the failed 1980 Quebec referendum, sovereignty was considered a dead issue. However, events in the following years would lead to the revival of the sovereigntist cause. In 1982, the Canadian Constitution was patriated. However, the Quebec government did not sign onto this document. While the constitution still applies to Quebec, efforts were made in future years to amend the constitution to have it be accepted in Quebec. Both the Meech Lake Accord and Charlottetown Accord failed.

In 1990 Lucien Bouchard, then a federal Progressive Conservative cabinet minister, led a coalition of Liberal and Progressive Conservative members of parliament (MPs) to form a new federal party devoted to separatism, the Bloc Québécois. In 1993, Quebec elected 54 Bloc MPs to parliament, which made it the second largest party during that session and giving it the role of Official Opposition.

In Quebec, the 1994 provincial election brought the Parti Québécois back to power, led by Jacques Parizeau. He promised to hold a referendum on sovereignty.

See also: Quiet Revolution and Quebec sovereignty.

[edit] The question

Audio: Listen to the question as spoken first in the National Assembly of Quebec by Jacques Parizeau

The question posed on the ballot was: "Acceptez-vous que le Québec devienne souverain, après avoir offert formellement au Canada un nouveau partenariat économique et politique, dans le cadre du projet de loi sur l'avenir du Québec et de l'entente signée le 12 juin 1995?"

The English translation was also on the ballot: "Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership within the scope of the bill respecting the future of Quebec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?"

The text of "The 1995 tripartite agreement on Sovereignty" [1] (the "June 12 agreement"), signed by Jacques Parizeau of the Parti Québécois, Lucien Bouchard, then leader of the Bloc Québécois and Mario Dumont of the ADQ, was sent to every household in Quebec weeks before the vote. Many federalists argued that the question was unclear.

[edit] The participants

Chrétien speaks on television before the vote.
Chrétien speaks on television before the vote.

[edit] Federalists

Campaigning for the "No" (or "Non") side were those in favour of Quebec remaining a part of a united Canada.

Key federalists:

Bouchard speaks on television before the vote.
Bouchard speaks on television before the vote.

[edit] Sovereignists

Campaigning for the "Yes" (or "Oui") side were those in favour of Quebec secession and negotiating a limited relationship with the rest of Canada.

Key sovereigntists:

[edit] The campaign

Early polls indicated that 67% of Quebec people would vote "No", and for the first few weeks, the sovereignist campaign led by Parizeau made little headway. Jean Chrétien mostly stayed out of the debate leaving Johnson to be the main federalist representative. But early federalist gaffes included Paul Martin arguing Quebec would lose a million jobs if it separated and federalist speaker Larry O'Brien declaring that federalists should not only defeat, but "crush" sovereignists. These well-publicized missteps breathed new life into the separatist movement.

Seeing that the 'yes' side was making little progress, the more-popular Lucien Bouchard rose to a more prominent role among sovereignists, appointed by Parizeau as chief negotiator in "partnership" talks following a "yes" vote. In December of 1994, Lucien Bouchard had come close to death from necrotizing fasciitis ("flesh-eating disease"). To stop the spread of the disease and to save his life, doctors had to remove one leg. It was given extensive coverage in the media and his recovery and subsequent public appearances on crutches brought a massive wave of sentiment for his terrifying ordeal. Some observers, both in Quebec and the rest of Canada state that it had a profoundly positive effect on the campaign for the separatist cause.

Under Bouchard, the numbers continued to change and new polls showed a majority of Quebecers intending to vote "Yes". Even Bouchard's stumbles had little effect: remarks three weeks before the vote that Quebecers were the "white race" with the lowest rate of reproduction did not stall the momentum. Days before the referendum it looked as though the sovereignists would win. Chrétien promised a new deal for Quebec within Canada if Quebecers voted to stay. A massive rally was held in downtown Montreal where Canadians, who had benefited from up to 90% discounts on train and plane tickets from federal public institutions, came to express their support for a 'no' vote. Jean Chrétien gave a televised address, and Lucien Bouchard gave a rebuttal.

[edit] Preparing for the outcome

[edit] Yes side

In the event of a victory, Parizeau has said he intended to return to the Quebec National Assembly within two days of the result and seek support for the Sovereignty Bill, which had already been tabled. He said that he would then expect to negotiate with the federal government. That negotiation failing, he would declare an independent Quebec. The speech he had intended to give following a victory of his government's option was made public [2].

[edit] No side

Very little planning was made for the possibility of a loss by the "No" side. Some members of the federal cabinet are reported to have met to discuss possible scenarios, including referring the result to the Supreme Court, the idea being that the constitution does not provide for a province to separate from Canada. Also, senior civil servants were considering the impacts of a "yes" vote on issues, such as boundaries, the federal debt and whether or not then prime minister Jean Chrétien could keep his post (he was elected in Quebec).

The Minister of National Defence, David Collenette, made preparations to increase security at some federal institutions. He also ordered the military's CF-18 aircraft out of Quebec to prevent them from becoming a potential bargaining item.

[edit] Aboriginal peoples in Quebec

Traditional Cree and Inuit lands in Northern Quebec
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Traditional Cree and Inuit lands in Northern Quebec

In preparation for a Yes side victory, aboriginal peoples in Quebec strongly affirmed their right to self determination. First Nations Chiefs all articulated that forcing them to join an independent Quebec would violate international law. In the final week of the referendum campaign, they would insist on being full participants in any new constitutional negotiations resulting from the referendum. They would vote overwhelmingly against Quebec independence on the eve of the referendum [3]

The James Bay Cree of Northern Quebec were particularly vocal in their resistance to the idea of being included in an independent Quebec. Grand Chief Mathew Coon-Come issued a legal paper titled Sovereign Injustice that sought to affirm the Cree right to self-determination in keeping their territories in Canada [4]. On 24 October 1995 they organized their own referendum asking the question: "Do you consent, as a people, that the Government of Quebec separate the James Bay Crees and Cree traditional territory from Canada in the event of a Yes vote in the Quebec referendum?" With a 77% participation rate, the 96.3 % of Crees voted to stay in Canada. [5] The Inuit of Nunavik held a similar local vote asking "Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign?", with 96% voting No.

[edit] The results

Again sovereignty was rejected, but by a smaller margin, with 50.58% voting "No" and 49.42% voting "Yes". A record 94% of 5,087,009 registered Quebecers voted in the referendum. Sovereignty was the choice of Francophones by a majority of about 60% (see in 9. Further Information below, 'By the numbers'), but the heavily populated Montreal region voted "No", which also carried the far North, the Outaouais, and the Eastern Townships. 'Yes' carried in 81 out of 125 ridings, but most were far smaller than the populous Montreal region.

No: 2362648 (50.58%) Yes: 2308360 (49.42%)
  Total votes % of votes
Valid ballots 4,671,008 98.18%
Rejected ballots 86,501 1.82%
Participation rate 4,757,509 93.52%

[edit] Disputes over the conduct of the referendum

[edit] Rejected ballots

After the election, controversy arose over whether the scrutineers of the Chomedey, Marguerite-Bourgeois and Laurier-Dorion ridings had intentionally discarded numerous 'No' ballots without valid reasons.

A few months after the referendum, the Directeur général des élections du Québec (DGEQ) launched an inquiry to shed some light on these alleged irregularities. Under the supervision of Alan B. Gold, Chief Justice of the Quebec Superior Court, all ballots of the three ridings plus a sample of ballots from 34 other ridings were examined.

A Quebec Court judge acquitted a deputy returning officer of illegally rejecting 53 per cent of the ballots cast in his Chomedey polling district during the 1995 referendum.

The report of the DGEQ concluded that some ballots had indeed been rejected without valid reasons. The majority of the rejected ballots were 'No' votes, in proportion to the majority of the valid votes which were also 'No' votes in these ridings. The report concluded that on the whole, the irregularities were isolated. Two scrutineers were sued by the DGEQ, but in 1996 were found not guilty by the Quebec Court. It found that the scrutineers had committed no criminal acts, and the rejected ballots were not rejected in a fraudulent or irregular manner by the scrutineers. The evidence brought in front of the court did not sufficiently address the issue to allow the conclusion that there had been a systematic plot to steal ballots. The judgement was upheld by the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal.

Among the information made publicly available by the DGEQ were the number of rejected ballots during elections and referendums in Quebec since 1970. The following table presents the available data:

Vote Year Rejected ballots Party nominating the scrutineers
2003 General Elections 1.25% Parti Québécois
1998 General Elections 1.13% Parti Québécois
1995 Referendum 1.82% Parti Québécois
1994 General Elections 1.96% Liberal Party of Quebec
1992 Referendum 2.18% Liberal Party of Quebec
1989 General Elections 2.63% Liberal Party of Quebec
1985 General Elections 1.52% Parti Québécois
1981 General Elections 1.06% Parti Québécois
1980 Referendum 1.74% Parti Québécois
1976 General Elections 2.05% Liberal Party of Quebec
1973 General Elections 1.81% Liberal Party of Quebec
1970 General Elections 1.95% Union nationale

Source: Directeur général des élections du Québec

In 2000, Alliance Quebec's lawyer Michael Bergman sued the DGEQ for not allowing the lobby group to have access to all ballots. The lobby group is acting out of a conviction that the "No" ballots were rejected as part of a systematic plot by the PQ government to steal the referendum of 1995.

In May of 2005, former PQ cabinet minister Richard Le Hir, who has left the sovereignty movement, claimed that the PQ government actively tried to sway the vote by sending "scrutineer shock troops" drawn from pro-sovereignty labour unions into polling stations in areas with large concentrations of Anglophone and allophone voters. These scrutineers were to obstruct and reject valid No votes in order to "neutralize the adversary". Le Hir says that the strategy resulted from a belief in the PQ that the citizenships of recent immigrants had been "fast-tracked" in order to increase the No vote. PQ officials of the time denied that there was any such plan and stated that Le Hir's allegations are untrue. This was followed by an ad hominem or personal attack in the media, to discredit Mr. Le Hir's credibility by a PQ member.

[edit] Spending limits

Under the Referendum Act of Quebec, all spending had to be authorized and accounted for under the Yes or No umbrella committees after the decree was issued on October 1. Both committees had an authorised budget of $5 million each.

Spending by any person or group other than the official committees is illegal after that date. Violation of this law can lead to fines of up to $30,000. Failure to pay the fine can lead to prison. The Referendum Act was passed by the National Assembly of Quebec prior to the referendum of 1980.

Provincial laws do not apply to the federal government, which spent over 30 million dollars during the month of October to promote federalism, including holding public rallies and giving away Canadian flags. It was later recalled in the sponsorship scandal as a complaint from Quebecers. However no illegal behavior was seen in those acts since provincial laws do not apply to the federal government.

[edit] Canadian Unity Council involvement

Some eight weeks before the referendum vote of 1995, a Montreal-based lobby group called Option Canada was established. The group was composed of businessmen and political organizers of three federalist political parties - the Liberal Party of Canada, the Quebec Liberal Party and the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada. The group was incorporated on September 7, 1995 according to government records.

Option Canada was founded by executives of the Canadian Unity Council according to registration papers filed with both the federal and Quebec governments.

A Committee to Register Voters Outside Quebec was created to help citizens who had left Quebec in the two years before the 1995 vote register on the electoral list. Since 1989, a clause of the Quebec electoral laws allows for ex-residents of Quebec to signal their intention of returning to Quebec and also to vote by mail. The Committee, which operated during the referendum campaign, handed-out pamphlets including the DGEQ form to be added to the list of voters. The pamphlet gave out a toll-free number as contact information which was the same number as the one used by the Canadian Unity Council.

After the referendum, the Chief Electoral Officer of Quebec, Pierre F. Côté, filed 20 criminal charges of illegal expenditures and opened an inquiry on Option Canada.

Following a ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada issued on October 17, 1997 (see Libman vs. Quebec-Attorney General), some sections of Quebec's referendum law were judged unconstitutional. Quebec's Chief Electoral Officer consequently had to interrupt the conduct of his inquiry and drop the charges.

[edit] Unity Rally

The No-side committee organised a rally in Montreal for October 27, three days before the referendum vote[citation needed]. An estimated 150 000[citation needed] Canadians from all provinces of Canada were gathered at the Place du Canada for what was called the Unity Rally. Many federalist politicians participated in the event, notably Ontario Premier Mike Harris, New Brunswick Premier Frank McKenna, Nova Scotia Premier John Savage, and Prince Edward Island Premier Catherine Callbeck. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, Conservative Party leader Jean Charest and Quebec Liberal Party leader Daniel Johnson spoke to the crowd for the occasion. The event was planned by Minister of Fisheries and Oceans Brian Tobin. The Canadian Unity Flag was first seen at this rally.

To rally Canadians of all provinces, the organizers were able to obtain important reductions on plane tickets from Air Canada and train tickets from Via Rail. The total amount of the price reductions was estimated at C$4.8 million.[citation needed] This amount was not authorized nor entered in the expenditure report of the No Committee. This, according to Quebec law, is a case of referendum fraud.[1]

[edit] Citizenship and Immigration Canada

The statistics compiled by the analysts of Citizenship and Immigration Canada demonstrate that some 43 855 new Quebecers obtained their Canadian citizenship in the year of 1995. About one quarter of these (11429) were given during the month of October. It was the first time that Quebec residents received more citizenship certificates than Ontario residents. It has not occurred again since. Looking into the data for a longer period of time, we see that the increase in certificate attributions jumped by 87% between 1993 and 1995. The year of 1996 saw a drop of 39% in the attributions of citizenship certificates. [2]

These allegations have led many people in the Quebec sovereignty movement to allege that the 1995 referendum was won by the "Yes" side. In June of 2005, the Parti Québécois gave itself a new party program which states that if the people of Quebec vote them in power, they will reform the electoral law so that it becomes necessary to present an electoral card with photo in order to vote and also invite UN officials to supervise the referendum process.

[edit] Electoral list

In 1998, PQ activists from the Montreal region brought a list of 100 000 names before the DGEQ. According to them, the 100 000 voters were registered on the electoral list for the 1995 referendum but were not registered with the Régie de l'Assurance-Maladie du Québec (RAMQ), the Quebec public health insurer. After exhaustive verifications, the DGEQ found that 56 000 out of the 100 000 did not have the right to vote and should be removed from the list in the future. No mention was made whether these voters had voted illegally in the referendum.

The same year, PQ activists from the Eastern Townships region also brought a case of referendum fraud before the DGEQ. As a result of the inquiry, 32 international students studying at Bishop's University in Lennoxville were fined after being found guilty of voting illegally in 1995.

[edit] After effects

[edit] PQ leadership changes

The day after the referendum, Jacques Parizeau resigned as the leader of the Parti Quebecois due to the controversy caused by his remarks blaming the sovereigntist defeat in the referendum on "money and the ethnic vote." These comments stirred an almost immediate backlash as being racist and anti-Anglophone. The ensuing leadership race selected Lucien Bouchard as his successor. Bouchard became Premier on January 29, 1996. Over the course of the next few years, support for sovereignty and for any sort of constitutional change declined markedly (the "Post-Referendum Syndrome"). Despite winning reelection in 1998, the PQ chose not to hold another referendum, waiting for "winning conditions." The PQ would lose the 2003 provincial election to Jean Charest's Liberals.

[edit] The Clarity Act

Before the referendum, federalists promised reform of the federal system to be more accommodating to Quebec's concerns. After the referendum, only limited reforms were made, such as a federal law requiring the approval of certain regions (including Quebec) to amend the constitution. Rather, the federal government strategy to gain support for federalism in Quebec focused more on what Chrétien called "Plan B", to try to convince voters that economic and legal obstacles would follow if Quebec were to declare itself sovereign. This culminated in the federal government's 2000 Clarity Act which stated that any future referendum would have to be on a "clear question" and that it would have to represent a "clear majority" for the federal Parliament to recognize its validity. The meaning of both a "clear question" and a "clear majority" is left unspecified in the act, but it is suggested that international law supports greater support than a 'simple' 50% + 1 majority and would require 60% support or more would be required to qualify as sentiment enough to justify separation. Skeptics suggest that the inclarity of the Clarity Act's phrasing may allow the federal government to decide upon its own definitions and parameters even after a referendum is held. Supporters of the act counter that the spirit of the act and the need for any Acts of Parliament that follow the Clarity Act to be seen as legitimate, mandate the establishment of the parameters allowed by the Act once the government of a province signals its intent to pursue a referendum on sovereignty, but before the vote itself is held.

[edit] Sponsorship

Following the narrow victory, the Chrétien government established a pro-Canada advertising campaign. The aim was to sponsor hunting, fishing and other recreational events, and in doing so promote Canada within Quebec. While many of the events sponsored were legitimate, a large sum of money was mismanaged. Auditor General Sheila Fraser released a report in November 2003, outlining the problems. This eventually leads to the establishment of the Gomery Commission to investigate the so-called Sponsorship Scandal. This scandal gets extensive coverage in Quebec and leads to a rise in sovereignty. However, Bloc Quebeçois leader Gilles Duceppe has promoted the belief that Canada was trying to "buy" federalism and using it as an excuse to channel dirty money into Liberal-friendly pockets.

[edit] Future referenda

Should the Parti Québécois take back power in the next election (predicted to be in 2007 but not later than 2008), which is what the polls anticipate as of 2005 [6], the party platform adopted during the 2005 Parti Québécois National Council stipulates that the PQ government will hold a referendum as soon as possible during the next mandate. Polls in 2005 had put popular support for sovereignty at 50% and 54%. [7] [8] Following the Quebec breakthrough of the Conservative Party of Canada in the 2006 Federal Election, new polls have tracked a decrease in support for the 1995 referendum question on Quebec "sovereignty with an offer of partnership to the rest of Canada" dropped from 46 per cent to 44 per cent and that support for Quebec becoming an independent country dropped from 40 per cent to 37 per cent.[9]

Some feel it is undemocratic to continue holding referenda until the province says "Oui" on an issue that has already been rejected in the 1980 Quebec referendum and the nearly identical 1995 Quebec referendum, both of which ended in "No". Some feel it is very democratic to ask if people have collectively and recently changed their mind.

A tactic of the Parti Quebecois in referenda is to seek speedy French recognition of Quebec as a separate and independent new country. This is a controversial strategy, playing on historical nationalistic rivalries of the English and the French in Europe, seen by some as opportunistic and anachronistic, but by others as convenient and natural.

[edit] Further information

  • CBC documentary - "Breaking Point" - aired 2005
  • Robin Philpot (2005). Le Référendum volé. Montreal: Les éditions des intouchables. ISBN 2-89549-189-5.
  • Paul Jay documentary - "Neverendum Referendum"
  • Chomedey scrutineers... ...'under orders' - William Marsden p. A8 in The Gazette, Montreal, Thursday, November 2, 1995
  • By the numbers - Daniel Drolet p. A4 in The Ottawa Citizen, Wednesday, November 1, 1995

[edit] See also

[edit] References

[edit] External links

Support for Sovereignty - Myths and Realities] PDF

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