Portuguese Colonial War

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Portuguese Colonial War
Part of Wars of Independence and Cold War
A Portuguese F-84 being loaded with ammunition in the 1960s, at Luanda Air Base
Date 1961–1974 Location Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique Result The war prompted the Portuguese Carnation Revolution, which granted independence to all the colonies.
Combatants
Portugal	Angola (1961-74): MPLA, UNITA, FNLA Guinea-Bissau (1963-74): PAIGC Mozambique (1964-74): FRELIMO
Strength
169,000 70,000 in Angola 42,000 in Guinea-Bissau 57,000 in Mozambique	20,000 6,500 in Angola 7,000 in Guinea-Bissau 6,500 in Mozambique
Casualties
8,290 dead	?

The Portuguese Colonial War, Ultramar War ("Overseas War") or, among some guerrilla sympathizers, Guinea-Bissauan Revolution, was fought between Portugal's military and the emerging nationalist movements in Portugal's African colonies between 1961 and 1974. During the 1960s various armed independence movements became active in these areas, most notably in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea. An increasingly expensive military effort costing up to half its government's revenue forced Portugal to withdraw: it was unable to defeat the guerrillas, and the fighting ended in a high-priced stalemate.

The conflict began in Angola on 4 February 1961, in an area called the Zona Sublevada do Norte (ZSN or the Rebel Zone of the North), consisting of the provinces of Zaire, Uíge and Cuanza Norte. The liberation movements wanted national self-determination, while for the Portuguese, their belief in a multi-racial, assimilated overseas empire justified going to war to prevent its breakup. As the war progressed, Portugal rapidly increased its mobilized forces. By the early 1970s it had reached the limit of its military capacity. Growing popular discontent over the war led to the Carnation Revolution on 25 April 1974 in Lisbon, Portugal, an event which changed Portugal's political direction and allowed the war to end. Portugal's new leaders began a process of democratic change at home and acceptance of its former colonies' independence abroad.

Portugal had been the first European power to establish a colony in Africa when it captured Ceuta in 1415 and now it was the last to leave. The departure of the Portuguese from Angola and Mozambique isolated Rhodesia, leading to the end of its white minority rule.

Contents 1 Political context 2 Armed conflict 2.1 Angola 2.2 Guinea-Bissau 2.3 Mozambique 2.4 Role of the Organisation of African Unity 3 Opposition 4 Economic consequences of the war 5 Bibliography

[edit] Political context

There had always been opposition and resistance movements in the European colonies in Africa and Asia. During the twentieth century, nationalist feelings were strengthened by World War I and World War II. Many soldiers who fought in these conflicts were recruited in the colonies and were aware of the paradox of their colonial masters celebrating victory at the same time as their native lands lay under foreign rule.

Following World War II the two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, encouraged — both ideologically and materially — the formation of nationalist resistance groups. At first the United States offered to support the nationalists in Angola but backed down when Portugal threatened to leave NATO. The nationalists then sought money, expertise and weapons from the Soviet Union, Cuba and China.

It is in this context that the Asian-African Conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955. The conference presented a forum for the colonies, most of them newly independent and facing the same problem - pressure to align with one or the other superpower in the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the conference the colonies were presented with an alternative. They could band together as the so-called Third World and work both to preserve the balance of power in Cold War relations and to use their new sense of independence for their own benefit by becoming an influence zone of their own. This would lessen the effect of the colonial and neo-colonial powers on the colonies, and increased their sense of unity and desire to support each other in their relationships with the other powers.

In the late 1950s, the Portuguese Armed Forces saw themselves confronted with the paradox generated by the dictatorial regime of Estado Novo that had been in power since 1926: on the one hand, the policy of Portuguese neutrality in World War II placed the Portuguese Armed Forces out of the way of a possible East-West conflict; on the other hand, the regime felt the increased responsibility of the keeping Portugal's vast overseas territories under control. There the postwar tension approached the level of the separatist fights in the colonies of the Imperial Europe. With all this, the same leaders that declared Portugal neutral in the war for the European liberation, chose to have Portugal join the military structure of NATO, in a subtle desire to ally with the victors. This was to the detriment of military preparations against nationalist threats in Portugal's colonial territories that the political regime considered essential for the survival of the nation.

This integration of Portugal in the Atlantic Alliance would form a military élite that would become essential during the planning and implementation of the operations during the Overseas War. This "NATO generation" would ascend quickly to the highest political positions and military command without having to provide evidence of loyalty to the regime. The Colonial War would establish, in this way, a split between the military structure -- heavily influenced by the western powers with democratic governments -- and the political power of the regime. Some analysts see the "Botelho Moniz côup as the beginning of this rupture, the origin of a lapse on the part of the regime to keep up a unique command center, an armed force prepared for threats of conflict in the colonies. This situation would cause, as would be verified later, a lack of coordination between the three general staffs (Army, Air force and Navy).

[edit] Armed conflict

[edit] Angola

Main article: Angolan War of Independence

In Angola, the rebellion of the ZSN was taken up by the União das Populações de Angola (UPA), which changed its name to Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) in 1962. On February 4, 1961, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola took credit for the attack on the prison of Luanda, where seven policemen were killed. On March 15, 1961, the UPA, in a tribal attack, started the massacre of white populations and black workers born in other regions of Angola. This region would be retaken by large military operations that, however, would not stop the spread of the guerrilla actions to other regions of Angola, such as Cabinda, the east, the southeast and the central plateaus.

[edit] Guinea-Bissau

In Guinea-Bissau, the Marxist African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) started fighting in January 1963. Its guerrilla fighters attacked the Portuguese headquarters in Tite, located to the south of Bissau, the capital, near the Corubal river . Similar actions quickly spread across the entire colony, requiring a strong response from the Portuguese forces.

The war in Guinea placed face to face Amílcar Cabral, the leader of PAIGC, and António de Spínola, the Portuguese general responsible for the local military operations. In 1965 the war spread to the eastern part of the country and in that same year the PAIGC carried out attacks in the north of the country where at the time only the minor guerrilla movement, the Front for the Liberation and Independence of Guinea (FLING), was fighting. By that time, the PAIGC started receiving military support from the Socialist Bloc, mainly from Cuba, a support that would last until the end of the war.

In Guinea the Portuguese troops mainly took a defensive position, limiting themselves to keeping the territories they already held. This kind of action was particularly devastating to the Portuguese troops who were constantly attacked by the forces of the PAIGC. They were also demoralized by the steady growth of the influence of the liberation supporters among the population that was being recruited in large numbers by the PAIGC.

With some strategic changes by António Spínola in the late 1960s, the Portuguese forces gained momentum and, taking the offensive, became a much more effective force. Between 1968 and 1972, the Portuguese forces took control of the situation and sometimes carried attacks against the PAIGC positions. At this time the Portuguese forces were also adopting subversive means to counter the insurgents, attacking the political structure of the nationalist movement. This strategy culminated in the assassination of Amílcar Cabral in January 1973. Nonetheless, the PAIGC continued to fight back and pushed the Portuguese forces to the limit. This became even more visible after PAIGC received anti-aircraft weapons provided by the Soviets, especially the SA-7 rocket launchers, thus undermining the Portuguese air superiority.

[edit] Mozambique

Main article: Mozambican War of Independence

Mozambique was the last territory to start the war of liberation. Its nationalist movement was led by the Marxist-Leninist Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which carried out the first attack against Portuguese targets on September 24, 1964, in Chai, province of Cabo Delgado. The fighting later spread to Niassa, Tete at the centre of the country. A report from Battalion No. 558 of the Portuguese army makes references to violent actions, also in Cabo Delgado, on August 21 1964.

On November 16 of the same year, the Portuguese troops suffered their first losses fighting in the north of the country, in the region of Xilama. By this time, the size of the guerrilla movement had substantially increased; this, along with the low numbers of Portuguese troops and colonists, allowed a steady increase in FRELIMO's strength. It quickly started moving south in the direction of Meponda and Mandimba, linking to Tete with the aid of Malawi.

Until 1967 the FRELIMO showed less interest in Tete region, putting its efforts on the two northernmost districts of the country where the use of landmines became very common. In the region of Niassa, FRELIMO's intention was to create a free corridor to Zambézia. Until April 1970, the military activity of FRELIMO increased steadily, mainly due to the strategic work of Samora Machel in the region of Cabo Delgado.

[edit] Role of the Organisation of African Unity

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was founded May 1963. Its basic principles were co-operation between African nations and solidarity between African peoples. Another important objective of the OAU was an end to all forms of colonialism in Africa. This became the major objective of the organization in its first years and soon OAU pressure led to the situation in the Portuguese colonies being brought up at the UN Security Council.

The OAU established a committee based in Dar es Salaam, with representatives from Ethiopia, Algeria, Uganda, Egypt, Tanzania, Zaire, Guinea, Senegal and Nigeria, to support African liberation movements. The support provided by the committee included military training and weapon supplies.

The OAU also took action in order to promote the international acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE), composed by the FNLA. This support was transferred to the MPLA and to its leader, Agostinho Neto in 1967. In November of 1972, both movements were recognized by the OAU in order to promote their merger. After 1964, the OAU recognized PAIGC as the legitimate representatives of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde and in 1965 recognised FRELIMO for Mozambique.

[edit] Opposition

The government presented as a general consensus that the colonies were a part of the national unity, closer to overseas provinces than to true colonies. The communists were the first party to oppose the official view, since they saw the Portuguese presence in the colonies as an act against the colonies' right to self determination. During its 5th Congress, in 1957, the illegal Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) was the first political organization to demand the immediate and total independence of the colonies. However, being the only truly organized opposition movement, the PCP had to play two roles. One role was that of a communist party with an anti-colonialist position; the other role was to be a cohesive force drawing together a broad spectrum of opposing parties. Therefore it had to accede to views that didn't reflect its true anticolonial position.

Several opposition figures outside the PCP also had anticolonial opinions, such as the candidates to the fraudulent presidential elections, like Norton de Matos (in 1949), Quintão Meireles (in 1951) and Humberto Delgado (in 1958). The communist candidates had, obviously, the same positions. Among them were Rui Luís Gomes and Arlindo Vicente, the first would not be allowed to participate in the election and the second would support Delgado in 1958.

After the electoral fraud of 1958, Humberto Delgado formed the Movimento Nacional Independente (MNI, translated as the Independent National Movement) that, in October of 1960, agreed that there was a need to prepare the people in the colonies, before giving them the right of self-determination. Despite this, no detailed policies for achieving this goal were set out.

In 1961, the nº8 of the Military Tribune had as its title "Let's end the war of Angola". The authors were linked to the Juntas de Acção Patriótica (JAP), supporters of Humberto Delgado, and responsible for the attack on the barracks of Beja. The National Liberation Front of Angola (FPLN), founded in December 1962, attacked the conciliatory positions. The official feeling of the Portuguese state, despite all this, was the same: Portugal had inalienable and legitimate rights over the colonies and this was what was transmitted through the media and through the state propaganda.

In April 1964, the Directory of Democratic-Social Action presented a political solution rather than a military one. In agreement with this initiative in 1966, Mário Soares suggested there should be a referendum on the overseas policy Portugal should follow, and that the referendum should be preceded by a national discussion to take place in the six months prior to the referendum.

The end of Salazar's rule in 1968, due to illness, did not prompt any change in the political panorama. The radicalization of the opposition movements started with the younger people who also felt victimized by the continuation of the war. The universities played a key role in the spread of this position. Several magazines and newspapers were created, such as Cadernos Circunstância, Cadernos Necessários, Tempo e Modo, and Polémica that supported this view. It was in this environment that the Armed Revolutionary Action (ARA), the armed branch of the Portuguese Communist party created in the late 1960s, and the Revolutionary Brigades (BR), a left-wing organization, became an important force of resistance against the war, carrying out multiple sabotages and bombings against military targets. The ARA began its military actions in October of 1970, keeping them up until August of 1972. The major actions were the attack on the Tancos air base that destroyed several helicopters on March 8, 1971, and the attack on the NATO headquarters at Oeiras in October of the same year. The BR, on its side, began armed actions on 7 November 1971, with the sabotage of the NATO base at Pinhal de Armeiro, the last action being carried out 9 April 1974, against the Niassa ship which was preparing to leave Lisboa with troops to be deployed in Guinea. The BR acted even in the colonies, placing a bomb in the Military Command of Bissau on 22 February 1974.

Furthermore, the alliance of the business and financial sectors, middle classes and worker's movements made an important mark on the policy of the regime in 1973. They now were supporting the independence of the colonies, a few months before the Carnation Revolution.

[edit] Economic consequences of the war

The State Budget during the 1960s and the 1970s clearly expressed the Portuguese financial sacrifice in order to keep fighting in Africa. Obviously the country's expenditure on the armed forces ballooned since the beginning of the war in 1961. The expenses were divided into ordinary and extraordinary ones; the latter were the main factor in the huge increase in the military budget, making war in the colonies a severe financial burden. Since the rise of Marcello Caetano, after Salazar's incapability, spending on military forces increased even further.

[edit] Bibliography

• Becket, Ian et all., A Guerra no Mundo, Guerras e Guerrilhas desde 1945, Lisboa, Verbo, 1983
• Marques, A. H. de Oliveira, História de Portugal, 6ª ed., Lisboa, Palas Editora, Vol. III, 1981
• Mattoso, José, História Contemporânea de Portugal, Lisboa, Amigos do Livro, 1985, «Estado Novo», Vol. II e «25 de Abril», vol. único
• Mattoso, José, História de Portugal, Lisboa, Ediclube, 1993, vols. XIII e XIV
• Pakenham, Thomas, The Scramble for Africa, Abacus, 1991 ISBN 0-349-10449-2
• Reis, António, Portugal Contemporâneo, Lisboa, Alfa, Vol. V, 1989;
• Rosas, Fernando e Brito, J. M. Brandão, Dicionário de História do Estado Novo, Venda Nova, Bertrand Editora, 2 vols. 1996
• Vários autores, Guerra Colonial, edição do Diário de Notícias
• Jornal do Exército, Lisboa, Estado-Maior do Exército