Politics of Noam Chomsky

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Noam Chomsky is a widely known intellectual, political activist, and critic of the foreign policy of the United States and other governments. Chomsky describes himself as a libertarian socialist, an advocate of anarcho-syndicalism and is often considered to be a key intellectual figure within the left wing of American politics.

[edit] Political views

Chomsky being interviewed
by Francine Stock for BBC4

Chomsky is one of the best known figures of radical American politics. He defines himself as being in the tradition of anarchism, a political philosophy he summarizes as challenging all forms of hierarchy and attempting to eliminate them if they are unjustified. He especially identifies with the labor-oriented anarcho-syndicalist current of anarchism, and is a member of the IWW. He has described himself as a "fellow traveller" to the anarchist tradition, and sometimes refers to himself as a libertarian socialist.

Chomsky has also stated that he considers himself to be a conservative (Chomsky's Politics, p. 188) of the Classical liberal variety. He has further defined himself as a Zionist, although he notes that his definition of Zionism is considered by most to be anti-Zionism these days, the result of what he perceives to have been a shift (since the 1940s) in the meaning of Zionism (Chomsky Reader).

His main modes of action include writing magazine articles and books and making speaking engagements. Chomsky is also a Senior Scholar with the Institute for Policy Studies.

Chomsky is considered "one of the most influential left-wing critics of American foreign policy" by the Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers. [3]

[edit] Chomsky on terrorism

In response to U.S. declarations of a War on Terrorism in 1981 and 2001, Chomsky has argued that the major sources of international terrorism are the world's major powers, led by the United States. He uses a definition of terrorism from a U.S. Army manual, which describes it as, "the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological". Thus he posits that terrorism is an objective description of certain actions, whether the agents are state or non-state. In relation to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan he stated:

"Wanton killing of innocent civilians is terrorism, not a war against terrorism" (9-11, p. 76).

On the efficacy of terrorism:

"One is the fact that terrorism works. It doesn't fail. It works. Violence usually works. That's world history. Secondly, it's a very serious analytic error to say, as is commonly done, that terrorism is the weapon of the weak. Like other means of violence, it's primarily a weapon of the strong, overwhelmingly, in fact. It is held to be a weapon of the weak because the strong also control the doctrinal systems and their terror doesn't count as terror. Now that's close to universal. I can't think of a historical exception, even the worst mass murderers view the world that way. So take the Nazis. They weren't carrying out terror in occupied Europe. They were protecting the local population from the terrorisms of the partisans. And like other resistance movements, there was terrorism. The Nazis were carrying out counter terror".

As regards support for condemnation of terrorism, Chomsky opines that terrorism (and violence/authority in general) is generally bad and can only be justified in those cases where it is clear that greater terrorism (or violence, or abuse of authority) is thus avoided. In a debate on the legitimacy of political violence in 1967, Chomsky argued that the "terror" of the Vietnam National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) was not justified, but that terror could in theory be justified under certain circumstances:

"I don't accept the view that we can just condemn the NLF terror, period, because it was so horrible. I think we really have to ask questions of comparative costs, ugly as that may sound. And if we are going to take a moral position on this— and I think we should—we have to ask both what the consequences were of using terror and not using terror. If it were true that the consequences of not using terror would be that the peasantry in Vietnam would continue to live in the state of the peasantry of the Philippines, then I think the use of terror would be justified. But, as I said before, I don't think it was the use of terror that led to the successes that were achieved" [4].

Chomsky believes that acts he considers terrorism carried out by the U.S. government do not pass this test, and condemnation of U.S. policy is one of the main thrusts of his writings. He has also criticized stay-behind operations such as Gladio, NATO's secret paramilitary anticommunist organizations during the Cold War.

[edit] Criticism of United States government

Noam Chomsky at a peace rally in Boulder, Colorado, in 2003

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Chomsky has been a consistent and outspoken critic of the United States government, and criticism of the foreign policy of the United States has formed the basis of much of Chomsky's political writing. Chomsky gives two reasons for this. First, he believes that his work can have more impact when directed at his own government, and second, the United States is the world's sole remaining superpower and so, Chomsky believes, it acts in the same offensive ways as all superpowers. However, Chomsky will sometimes criticize other governments such as that of the Soviet Union in passing.

One of the key things superpowers do, Chomsky argues, is try to organize the world according to the interests of their establishment, using military and economic means. Thus, he proposes that the U.S. government involved itself in the Vietnam War and the larger Indochina conflict because the socialist aspirations of North Vietnam, the Pathet Lao, and the Khmer Rouge ran contrary to U.S. economic interests. He has also criticized U.S. policy with regards to Central and South American countries and military support of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

Chomsky has repeatedly emphasized that the overall framework of U.S. foreign policy can be explained by the domestic dominance of U.S. business interests and a drive to secure the state-capitalist system more generally. Those interests set the political agenda and the economic goals that aim primarily at U.S. economic dominance. Though the general framework of foreign policy planning can be explained on economic grounds it does not explain every intervention, many of which are negligible or even counterproductive from the point of view of short term economic interests. His conclusion is that a significant part of the United States' foreign policy is based on stemming the "threat of a good example" (which he says is another name for the domino theory). The "threat of a good example" is that a country could successfully develop outside the U.S. sphere of influence, thus presenting a model for other countries, including countries in which the United States does have strong economic interests. This, Chomsky says, has prompted the United States to repeatedly intervene to quell "independent development, regardless of ideology" in regions of the world where it has little economic or safety interests. In one of his most well-known works, What Uncle Sam Really Wants, Chomsky argues that this particular explanation accounts for the United States' interventions in Guatemala, Laos, Nicaragua, and Grenada, countries that pose little or no military threat to the U.S. and have few economic resources that could be exploited by U.S. business interests.

Chomsky claims that the U.S. government's Cold War policies were not primarily shaped by anti-Soviet paranoia, but rather toward preserving the United States' ideological and economic dominance in the world. In his book Deterring Democracy he argues that the conventional understanding of the Cold War as a confrontation of two superpowers is an 'ideological construct.' He maintains that the actual events of the Cold War era lead to this interpretation. He insists that in order to understand the Cold War a good historian would look at the underlying motives of the major powers. Those underlying motives can only be discovered by analyzing the domestic politics, especially the goals of the domestic elites in each country. In the U.S.S.R. "the Cold War served to entrench the power of the military-bureaucratic elite" (Deterring Democracy, p. 20.) and in the U.S. the Cold War served to entrench the '"military-industrial complex" in essence, a welfare state for the rich with a national security ideology for population control". (Deterring Democracy, p. 21.) Chomsky understands the U.S. economic system as being primarily a state-capitalist system, in which public funds are used to research and develop pioneering technology (the computer, the internet, radar, the jet plane etc.) largely in the form of defense spending, and once developed and mature these technologies are turned over to the corporate sector where civilian uses are developed for private control and profit (Z Magazine February 1993, "The Pentagon System", [5]). U.S. Cold War policy was guided by the "twin goals of reinforcing the private interests that largely control the state, and maintaining an international environment in which they can prosper." (Deterring Democracy, p. 28.) "Putting second-order complexities to the side, for the U.S.S.R. the Cold War has been primarily a war against its satellites, and for the U.S. a war against the Third World" (Deterring Democracy, p. 34.). As he wrote in Uncle Sam: "What the U.S. wants is 'stability', meaning security for the upper classes and large foreign enterprises".

While he is almost uniformly critical of the United States government's foreign policy, Chomsky often expresses his admiration for the civil liberties enjoyed by U.S. citizens. According to Chomsky, other Western democracies such as France and Canada are less liberal in their defense of controversial speech than the US. However, he does not credit the American government for these freedoms but rather mass social movements in the United States that fought for them. The movements he most often credits are the abolitionist movement, the movements for workers rights and union organization, and the fight for African-American civil rights. Chomsky is often sharply critical of other governments who suppress free speech, most controversially in the Faurisson affair but also of the suppression of free speech in Turkey.

[edit] Criticism of United States democracy

Noam Chomsky maintains that a nation is only democratic to the degree that government policy reflects public opinion. Within this framework, Chomsky asserts that the basis for a democratic society in the United States has disappeared.^[1] He asserts that recent presidential elections are funded by concentrations of private power and run by the public relations industry, which focuses discussion primarily on the qualities and the image of a candidate rather than on issues.^[2] Professor Chomsky makes reference to several studies of public opinion by pollsters such as Gallup and Zogby and by academic sources such as the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland (PIPA). Quoting polls taken near the 2004 election, Chomsky points out that only a small minority of voters said they voted because of the candidate’s "agendas/ideas/platforms/goals."^[3] Furthermore, studies show that the majority of Americans have a stance on domestic issues such as guaranteed health care that is not represented by either major party.^[4] Chomsky has compared U.S. elections to elections in countries such as Spain, Bolivia, and Brazil, where he claims people are far better informed on important issues.^[5] In the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, Chomsky has advised, “if it's a swing state, keep the worst guys out. If it's another state, do what you feel like.”^[6]

[edit] Views on Globalization

Chomsky made early efforts to critically analyze globalization. He summarized the process with the phrase "old wine, new bottles", maintaining that the motive of the élites is the same as always: they seek to isolate the general population from important decision-making processes, the difference being that the centers of power are now transnational corporations and supranational banks. Chomsky argues that transnational corporate power is "developing its own governing institutions" reflective of their global reach [6].

According to Chomsky, a primary ploy has been the co-optation of the global economic institutions established at the end of World War II, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, have increasingly adhered to the "Washington Consensus", which requires developing countries to adhere to limits on spending and make structural adjustments that often involve cutbacks in social and welfare programs. IMF aid and loans are normally contingent upon such reforms. Chomsky claims that the construction of global institutions and agreements such as the World Trade Organization, GATT, NAFTA, and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment constitute new ways of securing élite privileges while undermining democracy. [7]

Chomsky believes that these austere and neoliberal measures ensure that poorer countries merely fulfill a service role by providing cheap labour, raw materials and investment opportunities for the first world. Additionally, this means that corporations can threaten to relocate to poorer countries, and Chomsky sees this as a powerful weapon to keep workers in richer countries in line.

Chomsky takes issue with the terms used in discourse on globalization, beginning with the term "globalization" itself, which he maintains refers to a corporate-sponsored economic integration rather than being a general term for things becoming international. He dislikes the term anti-globalization being used to describe what he regards as a movement for globalization of social and environmental justice. Chomsky understands what is popularly called "Free trade" as a "mixture of liberalization and protection designed by the principal architects of policy in the service of their interests, which happen to be whatever they are in any particular period" [8].

In his writings, Chomsky has drawn attention to globalization resistance movements. He described Zapatista defiance of NAFTA in his essay "The Zapatista Uprising". He also criticized the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, and reported on the activist efforts that led to its defeat. Chomsky's voice was an important part of the critics who provided the theoretical backbone for the disparate groups who united for the demonstrations against The World Trade Organization in Seattle in November of 1999. [9]

[edit] Views on socialism and Communism

Noam Chomsky, attending a Latin American social sciences conference, as part of a larger group (not shown) pictured in a brief encounter with Carlos Marti and Fidel Castro in Havana in 2003. (See [2] AP/Cristobal Herrera).

Chomsky is deeply critical of what he calls the "corporate state capitalism" that he believes is practiced by the United States and some western states. He supports many of Mikhail Bakunin's anarchist (or libertarian socialist) ideas, requiring economic freedom in addition to the "control of production by the workers themselves, not owners and managers who rule them and control all decisions". He refers to this as "real socialism", and describes Soviet-style socialism as similar in terms of "totalitarian controls" to U.S.-style capitalism, stating that each is a system based in types and levels of control, rather than in organization or efficiency. In defense of this thesis, Chomsky sometimes points out that Frederick Winslow Taylor's philosophy of Scientific Management was the organizational basis for the Soviet Union's massive industrialization movement as well as the American corporate model.

Chomsky has identified Bakunin's comments regarding the totalitarian state as predictions for the brutal Soviet police state that would come. He agrees with Bakunin's statement that "...[i]f you took the most ardent revolutionary, vested him in absolute power, within a year he would be worse than the Czar himself", which lends to the conclusion that the tyrannical Soviet state was simply a natural outcome of the Bolshevik ideology of state control. He has also defined Soviet communism as "fake socialism", and said that contrary to what many in America claim, the collapse of the Soviet Union should be regarded as "a small victory for socialism", not capitalism.

In his 1973 book For Reasons of State, Chomsky argues that instead of a capitalist system in which people are "wage slaves" or an authoritarian system in which decisions are made by a centralized committee, a society could function with no paid labor. He argues that a nation's populace should be free to pursue jobs of their choosing. People will be free to do as they like, and the work they voluntarily choose will be both "rewarding in itself" and "socially useful". Society would be run under a system of peaceful anarchism, with no state or other authoritarian institutions. Work that was fundamentally distasteful to all, if any existed, would be distributed equally among everyone.

Though Chomsky was critical of the Soviet Union's approach to implementing socialism, asserting that "Lenin and Trotsky proceeded to create the basic proto-fascist structures converted by Stalin into one of the horrors of the modern age" [10], he was less critical of Communist movements in Asia, noting what he considered to be grassroots aspects of both Chinese and Vietnamese communism, such as in his 1968 essay, "Objectivity and Liberal Scholarship", where he claimed there were "certain similar features" with the Spanish anarchist movement of the 1930s (which he greatly admires), while at the same time cautioning that "the scale of the Chinese Revolution is so great and reports in depth are so fragmentary that it would no doubt be foolhardy to attempt a general evaluation".

In December 1967, during a forum in New York, Chomsky responded to criticisms of the Chinese revolution as follows, "I don't feel that they deserve a blanket condemnation at all. There are many things to object to in any society. But take China, modern China; one also finds many things that are really quite admirable". Chomsky continued, "[t]here are even better examples than China. But I do think that China is an important example of a new society in which very interesting positive things happened at the local level, in which a good deal of the collectivization and communization was really based on mass participation and took place after a level of understanding had been reached in the peasantry that led to this next step" [11].

In contrast, he said of Vietnam: "Although there appears to be a high degree of democratic participation at the village and regional levels, still major planning is highly centralized in the hands of the state authorities" [12]. In a speech given in Hanoi on April 13, 1970 and broadcast by Radio Hanoi the next day, Chomsky spoke of his "admiration for the people of Vietnam who have been able to defend themselves against the ferocious attack, and at the same time take great strides forward toward the socialist society". Chomsky praised the North Vietnamese for their efforts in building a society of material prosperity, social justice and cultural progress. He also went on to discuss and support the political writing of Le Duan.

[edit] Views on anarchism

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According to Noam Chomsky, the variety of anarchism which he favors is

". . . a kind of voluntary socialism, that is, as libertarian socialist or anarcho-syndicalist or communist anarchist, in the tradition of, say, Bakunin and Kropotkin and others. They had in mind a highly organized form of society, but a society that was organized on the basis of organic units, organic communities. And generally, they meant by that the workplace and the neighborhood, and from those two basic units there could derive through federal arrangements a highly integrated kind of social organization which might be national or even international in scope. And these decisions could be made over a substantial range, but by delegates who are always part of the organic community from which they come, to which they return, and in which, in fact, they live.

QUESTION: So it doesn't mean a society in which there is, literally speaking, no government, so much as a society in which the primary source of authority comes, as it were, from the bottom up, and not the top down. Whereas representative democracy, as we have it in the United States and in Britain, would be regarded as a from-the-top-down authority, even though ultimately the voters decide.

CHOMSKY: Representative democracy, as in, say, the United States or Great Britain, would be criticized by an anarchist of this school on two grounds. First of all because there is a monopoly of power centralized in the state, and secondly -- and critically -- because the representative democracy is limited to the political sphere and in no serious way encroaches on the economic sphere." "The Relevance of Anarcho-syndicalism", Noam Chomsky interviewed by Peter Jay, The Jay Interview, July 25, 1976.

[edit] Mass media analysis

a still from the film Manufacturing Consent

Another focus of Chomsky's political work has been an analysis of mainstream mass media (especially in the United States), which he accuses of maintaining constraints on dialogue so as to promote the interests of corporations and the government.

Edward S. Herman and Chomsky's book Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media explores this topic in depth, presenting their "propaganda model" of the news media with several detailed case studies in support of it. According to this propaganda model, more democratic societies like the U.S. use subtle, non-violent means of control, unlike totalitarian systems, where physical force can readily be used to coerce the general population. In an often-quoted remark, Chomsky states that "propaganda is to a democracy what the bludgeon is to a totalitarian state" (Media Control).

The model attempts to explain such a systemic bias in terms of structural economic causes rather than a conspiracy of people. It argues the bias derives from five "filters" that all published news must pass through which combine to systematically distort news coverage.

The first filter, ownership, notes that most major media outlets are owned by large corporations.
The second, funding, notes that the outlets derive the majority of their funding from advertising, not readers. Thus, since they are profit-oriented businesses selling a product — readers and audiences — to other businesses (advertisers), the model would expect them to publish news which would reflect the desires and values of those businesses.
In addition, the news media are dependent on government institutions and major businesses with strong biases as sources (the third filter) for much of their information.
Flak, the fourth filter, refers to the various pressure groups which go after the media for supposed bias and so on when they go out of line.
Norms, the fifth filter, refer to the common conceptions shared by those in the profession of journalism. (Note: in the original text, published in 1988, the fifth filter was "anticommunism". However, with the fall of the Soviet Union, it has been broadened to allow for shifts in public opinion).

The model therefore attempts to describe how the media form a decentralized and non-conspiratorial but nonetheless very powerful propaganda system, that is able to mobilize an "élite" consensus, frame public debate within "élite" perspectives and at the same time give the appearance of democratic consent.

Chomsky and Herman test their model empirically by picking "paired examples" — pairs of events that were objectively similar except in relation to certain interests. For example, they attempt to show that in cases where an "official enemy" does something (like murder a religious official), the press investigates thoroughly and devotes a great amount of coverage to the matter, but when the domestic government or an ally does the same thing (or worse), the press downplays the story. They also test their model against the case that is often held up as the best example of a free and aggressively independent press, the media coverage of the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War. Even in this case, they argue that the press was behaving subserviently to "élite" interests.

Critics of Chomsky and Herman's mass media analysis, including author and historian Victor Davis Hanson of the conservative Hoover Institution severely disagree with Chomsky and Herman's theories. They see the idea of "Manufacturing Consent" as nothing more than a recycling of the Marxist idea of "false consciousness", (as in Herbert Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man), where the masses have been so manipulated that they have neither the perspective or intellect to see beyond the propaganda and require superior intellects like Chomsky's to point out to them the real truth. Arch Puddington of the Hoover Institution also claims he sees virtually no empirical evidence in media coverage, specifically regarding the mass media's treatment of Cambodia and East Timor, to back the claims made in Manufacturing Consent.

Stephen J. Morris, a critic of Chomsky's position on Cambodia, evaluates Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model by reviewing their analysis of media coverage during the rule of the Khmer Rouge. Chomsky and Herman argue that the "flood of rage and anger directed against the Khmer Rouge" peaking in early 1977, was a concrete example of their "propaganda model" in action. They argued that the media was singling out Cambodia, an enemy of the United States, while under-reporting human rights abuses by American allies such as South Korea and Chile. A study performed by Jamie Frederic Metzl (Responses to Human Rights Abuses in Cambodia, 1975 – 80) analyzes major media reporting on Cambodia and concludes that media coverage on Cambodia was more intense when there were events with an international angle, but had largely disappeared by 1977. Metzl also contradicts Chomsky and Herman by claiming that of all the articles published regarding Cambodia, less than one in twenty dealt with the political violence being perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge.

[edit] Chomsky and the Middle East

Chomsky "grew up...in the Jewish-Zionist cultural tradition" (Peck, p. 11). His father was one of the foremost scholars of the Hebrew language and taught at a religious school. Chomsky has also had a long fascination with and involvement in left-wing Zionist politics. As he described:

"I was deeply interested in...Zionist affairs and activities — or what was then called 'Zionist,' though the same ideas and concerns are now called 'anti-Zionist.' I was interested in socialist, binationalist options for Palestine, and in the kibbutzim and the whole cooperative labor system that had developed in the Jewish settlement there (the Yishuv)...The vague ideas I had at the time [1947] were to go to Palestine, perhaps to a kibbutz, to try to become involved in efforts at Arab-Jewish cooperation within a socialist framework, opposed to the deeply antidemocratic concept of a Jewish state (a position that was considered well within the mainstream of Zionism)." (Peck, p. 7)

He is highly critical of the policies of Israel towards the Palestinians and its Arab neighbors. His book The Fateful Triangle is considered one of the premier texts on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict among those who oppose Israel's policies in regard to the Palestinians as well as American support for the state of Israel. He has also accused Israel of "guiding state terrorism" for selling weapons to apartheid South Africa and Latin American countries that he characterizes as U.S. puppet states, e.g. Guatemala in the 1980s, as well as U.S.-backed paramilitaries (or, according to Chomsky, terrorists) such as the Nicaraguan Contras. (What Uncle Sam Really Wants, Chapter 2.4) Chomsky characterizes Israel as a "mercenary state," "an Israeli Sparta," and a militarized dependency within a U.S. system of hegemony. He has also fiercely criticized sectors of the American Jewish community for their role in obtaining U.S. support, stating that "they should more properly be called 'supporters of the moral degeneration and ultimate destruction of Israel'" (Fateful Triangle, p.4). He says of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL):

"The leading official monitor of anti-Semitism, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, interprets anti-Semitism as unwillingness to conform to its requirements with regard to support for Israeli authorities.... The logic is straightforward: Anti-Semitism is opposition to the interests of Israel (as the ADL sees them) .... The ADL has virtually abandoned its earlier role as a civil rights organization, becoming 'one of the main pillars' of Israeli propaganda in the U.S., as the Israeli press casually describes it, engaged in surveillance, blacklisting, compilation of FBI-style files circulated to adherents for the purpose of defamation, angry public responses to criticism of Israeli actions, and so on. These efforts, buttressed by insinuations of anti-Semitism or direct accusations, are intended to deflect or undermine opposition to Israeli policies, including Israel's refusal, with U.S. support, to move towards a general political settlement" [13].

See also Middle East Politics, a speech given at Columbia University in 1999

[edit] Criticism of intellectual communities

Chomsky has at times been outspokenly critical of scholars and other public intellectuals; while his views sometimes place him at odds with individuals on particular points, he has also denounced communities for what he sees as systemic failings. Chomsky sees two broad problems with academic intellectuals generally:

They largely function as a distinct class in many respects and so distinguish themselves by using language inaccessible to people outside the academy and is in fact more or less deliberately exclusionary to the end of class distinction and hierarchy within the academic class. In Chomsky's view there is little reason to believe that academics are more inclined to engage in profound thought than other members of society and that the designation "intellectual" obscures the truth of the intellectual division of labour: "These are funny words actually, I mean being an 'intellectual' has almost nothing to do with working with your mind; these are two different things. My suspicion is that plenty of people in the crafts, auto mechanics and so on, probably do as much or more intellectual work as people in the universities. There are plenty of areas in academia where what's called 'scholarly' work is just clerical work, and I don't think clerical work's more challenging than fixing an automobile engine—in fact, I think the opposite... So if by 'intellectual' you mean people who are using their minds, then it's all over society" (Understanding Power, p. 96).
The corollary of this argument is that the perquisites enjoyed by intellectuals make them more ideologised and obedient than the rest of society: "If by 'intellectual' you mean people who are a special class who are in the business of imposing thoughts, and framing ideas for people in power, and telling everyone what they should believe, and so on, well, yeah, that's different. These people are called 'intellectuals'—but they're really more a kind of secular priesthood, whose task is to uphold the doctrinal truths of the society. And the population should be anti-intellectual in that respect, I think that's a healthy reaction" (ibid, p. 96; this statement continues the previous quotation).

Chomsky is elsewhere asked what "theoretical" tools he feels can be produced to provide a strong intellectual basis for challenging hegemonic power, and he replies: "'if there is a body of theory, well tested and verified, that applies to the conduct of foreign affairs or the resolution of domestic or international conflict, its existence has been kept a well-guarded secret,'" despite much 'pseudo-scientific posturing'". Chomsky's general preference is, therefore, to use plain language in speaking with a non-elite audience:

But the right reaction [Chomsky is answering to an objection that 'plain language is not enough when the frame of reference is not available to the listener'] is not to resort to obscure and needlessly complex verbiage and posturing about non-existent 'theories'. Rather, it is to ask the listener to question the frame of reference that he/she is accepting, and to suggest alternatives that might be considered, all in plain language. I've never found that a problem when I speak to people lacking much or sometimes any formal education, though it's true that it tends to become harder as you move up the educational ladder, so that indoctrination is much deeper, and the self-selection for obedience that is a good part of elite education has taken its toll [14].

The inference here appears to be that "complex verbiage" conceals ideological commitments.

Chomsky therefore rejects much "theoretical" work as "pseudo-science" according to the definition already given:

What has changed in the interim, to my knowledge, is a huge explosion of self- and mutual-admiration among those who propound what they call 'theory' and 'philosophy,' but little that I can detect beyond 'pseudo-scientific posturing.' That little is, as I wrote, sometimes quite interesting, but lacks consequences for the real world problems that occupy my time and energies (Rawls's important work is the case I mentioned, in response to specific inquiry) (ibid).

Chomsky further elaborates a sort of smell test:

There are lots of things I don't understand -- say, the latest debates over whether neutrinos have mass or the way that Fermat's last theorem was (apparently) proven recently. But from 50 years in this game, I have learned two things: (1) I can ask friends who work in these areas to explain it to me at a level that I can understand, and they can do so, without particular difficulty; (2) if I'm interested, I can proceed to learn more so that I will come to understand it (ibid).

It is largely in reply to the latter comments that intellectuals claiming to be politicised reproach Chomsky for denying himself the use of "theoretical" tools they view as indispensable. Slavoj Žižek may be taken as exemplary for the following remark:

With all my admiration for Noam Chomsky, I partially disagree with him. It's an underlying premise of his work that you don't have to do any theory - just tell all the facts to the people. The way ideology works today is much more mysterious - not more complex, one can always say this, things are always more complex, it means nothing just to say this. People just do not want to know too much. There's an active refusal to know. If you ask average citizens with enough of their own worries, they'd say, "Don't even tell me this. We pay taxes so the government can do all the dirty things that I don't want to know about".

Žižek, who should be noted not to agree with many of the intellectuals cited below, can be taken at least to account for Chomsky as just described: Chomsky may be able to talk about politics and ideology to large audiences outside of academia (Chomsky's reputation as a radical may be founded on this degree of democratic commitment as much as anything else), but Žižek asks whether Chomsky's disinterest in the particular complexities of theoretical ideology critique can be justified, either in reference to his audience or to the dominant powers in politics, society, or economics (in this sense Chomsky's democratic radicalism would be circumscribed by the limits he sets on "theoretical" discussion). It is left to the reader to determine whether Chomsky is justified in arguing: "To put it differently, show that the principles of the 'theory' or 'philosophy' that we are told to study and apply lead by valid argument to conclusions that we and others had not already reached on other (and better) grounds; these 'others' include people lacking formal education, who typically seem to have no problem reaching these conclusions through mutual interactions that avoid the 'theoretical' obscurities entirely, or often on their own" (Chomsky, op. cit.).

Chomsky has further specified these arguments in terms of the roles assumed by intellectuals in France and the United States.

[edit] Intellectuals in America

Chomsky's extensive criticisms of a new type of post-WW2 intellectual he saw arising in the United States were the focus of his book American Power and the New Mandarins. There he described what he saw as the betrayal of the duties of an intellectual to challenge received opinion. The "new Mandarins," who he saw as responsible in part for the Vietnam War, were apologists for United States as an imperial power; he wrote that their ideology demonstrated

the mentality of the colonial civil servant, persuaded of the benevolence of the mother country and the correctness of its vision of world order, and convinced that he understands the true interests of the backward peoples whose welfare he is to administer.

[edit] Intellectuals in France

Chomsky has declared a limited interest in commenting on the Parisian intellectual community; the following disclaimer may be taken as indicative: "I wouldn't say this if I hadn't been explicitly asked for my opinion — and if asked to back it up, I'm going to respond that I don't think it merits the time to do so" (ibid). Chomsky's lack of interest arises from what he sees as a combination of difficult language and limited intellectual or "real world" value, especially in Parisian academe: "Sometimes it gets kind of comical, say in post-modern discourse. Especially around Paris, it has become a comic strip, I mean it's all gibberish ... they try to decode it and see what is the actual meaning behind it, things that you could explain to an eight-year old child. There's nothing there." (Chomsky on Anarchism, pg. 216). This is exacerbated, in his view, by the attention paid to academics by the French press: "in France if you're part of the intellectual elite and you cough, there's a front-page story in Le Monde. That's one of the reasons why French intellectual culture is so farcical — it's like Hollywood" (Understanding Power, pg. 96).

Chomsky is particularly sharp in giving his opinion on the major figures of post-structuralism: "try asking somebody to explain to you the latest essay of Derrida or somebody in terms that you can understand. They can't do it" (Chomsky on Anarchism, pg. 217); "...when I read, you know, Derrida, or Lacan, or Althusser, or any of these — I just don't understand it. It's like words passing in front of my eyes: I can't follow the arguments, I don't see the arguments," (Understanding Power, pg. 231). Chomsky has not presented "in depth" critiques of specific philosophers of this genre, however, and has disclaimed interest in undertaking such a study:

There are more important things to do, in my opinion, than to inquire into the traits of elite intellectuals engaged in various careerist and other pursuits in their narrow and (to me, at least) pretty uninteresting circles. That's a broad brush, and I stress again that it is unfair to make such comments without proving them: but I've been asked, and have answered the only specific point that I find raised. When asked about my general opinion, I can only give it, or if something more specific is posed, address that. I'm not going to undertake an essay on topics that don't interest me (ibid).

Finally, it is important to note that Chomsky is not uniformly dismissive of French intellectuals. In particular, Chomsky made a 1971 appearance on Dutch television with Michel Foucault, the full text of which can be found in Foucault and his Interlocutors, Arnold Davidson (ed.), 1997 (ISBN 0-226-13714-7). Of Foucault, Chomsky wrote that:

with enough effort, one can extract from his writings some interesting insights and observations, peeling away the framework of obfuscation that is required for respectability in the strange world of intellectuals, which takes on extreme forms in the weird culture of postwar Paris. Foucault is unusual among Paris intellectuals in that at least something is left when one peels this away (quoted in Noam Chomsky: A Life of Dissent)

[edit] Chomsky's influence as a political activist

[edit] Opposition to the Vietnam War

Chomsky linking arms at an anti-war demonstration; c. 1968

Chomsky became one of the most prominent opponents of the Vietnam War in February 1967, with the publication of his essay "The Responsibility of Intellectuals" [15] in the New York Review of Books.

Allen J. Matusow, "The Vietnam War, the Liberals, and the Overthrow of LBJ" (1984) [16]:

"By 1967 the radicals were obsessed by the war and frustrated by their impotence to affect its course. The government was unmoved by protest, the people were uninformed and apathetic, and American technology was tearing Vietnam apart. What, then, was their responsibility? Noam Chomsky explored this problem in February 1967 in the New York Review, which had become the favorite journal of the radicals. By virtue of their training and leisure, intellectuals had a greater responsibility than ordinary citizens for the actions of the state, Chomsky said. It was their special responsibility "to speak the truth and expose lies" ...[Chomsky] concluded by quoting an essay written twenty years before by Dwight Macdonald, an essay that implied that in time of crisis exposing lies might not be enough. "Only those who are willing to resist authority themselves when it conflicts too intolerably with their personal moral code", Macdonald had written, "only they have the right to condemn". Chomsky's article was immediately recognized as an important intellectual event. Along with the radical students, radical intellectuals were moving "from protest to resistance".

A contemporary reaction from Raziel Abielson, Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at New York University [17]:

"...Chomsky's morally impassioned and powerfully argued denunciation of American aggression in Vietnam and throughout the world is the most moving political document I have read since the death of Leon Trotsky. It is inspiring to see a brilliant scientist risk his prestige, his access to lucrative government grants, and his reputation for Olympian objectivity by taking a clearcut, no-holds-barred, adversary position on the burning moral-political issue of the day...."

Chomsky also participated in "resistance" activities, which he described in subsequent essays and letters published in the New York Review of Books: withholding half of his income tax [18], taking part in the 1967 march on the Pentagon, and spending a night in jail. [19] In the spring of 1972, Chomsky testified on the origins of the war before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by J. William Fulbright.

Chomsky's view of the war is distinct from orthodox anti-war opinion which holds the war as a tragic mistake. He argues that the war was a success from the US point of view. According to Chomsky's view the main aim of US policy was the destruction of the nationalist movements in the Vietnamese peasantry. In particular he argues that US attacks were not a defence of South Vietnam against the North but began directly in the early 1960s (covert US intervension from the 1950s) and at that time were mostly aimed at South Vietnam. He agrees with the view of orthodox historians that the US government was concerned about the possibility of a "domino effect" in South-East Asia. At this point Chomsky diverts from orthodox opinion- he holds that the US government was not so concerned with the spread of state Communism and authoritarism but rather of nationalist movements that would not be pliant to US economic interests.

[edit] Alleged marginalization in the mainstream media

Despite Chomsky's prominence during the Vietnam War, by the end of the war Chomsky and his supporters claimed that he was becoming increasingly marginalized by the mainstream media in the U.S. Chomsky's supporters, who regard him as a dissident, often criticize this alleged marginalization [20] [21], arguing that he is kept out of the public spotlight because his comments are too unsettling for corporate broadcasters to dare advertise.

Despite the criticisms, interviews with Chomsky or his writings have still occasionally appeared in popular media outlets in the United States such as CNN, Time Magazine, Foreign Policy and others, and his recorded lectures are regularly replayed by NPR stations in the United States that carry the broadcasts of Alternative Radio, a syndicator of progressive lectures. Critics of Chomsky have argued his mainstream media coverage is adequate, and not unusual considering the fact that academics in general often receive low priority in the American media.

Over the years Chomsky has gained some supporters in prominent American publications. In 1979, Paul Robinson wrote in the New York Times Book Review, "Judged in terms of the power, range, novelty and influence of his thought, Noam Chomsky is arguably the most important intellectual alive today". This quote has since become one of Chomsky's most well-known titles, and is frequently used by fans to describe the professor. However, in his article Robinson did go on to describe Chomsky's political writings as "maddeningly simple-minded".

A 1995 Boston Globe profile by Anthony Flint, "Divided Legacy", described Chomsky's increasing marginalization [22]:

"The New York Review of Books was one soapbox for Chomsky — but only until 1972 or so. Chomsky says that's because the magazine's editorial policy abruptly shifted to the right around then. But he couldn't seem to find a home with other publications, either. He went from huddling with newspaper editors and bouncing ideas off them to being virtually banned. The New Republic wouldn't have him, in part because of his unrelenting criticism of Israel. The Nation? Occasionally. But for the most part, mainstream outlets shunned him. Today, his articles on social and political developments are confined to lesser-known journals such as the magazine Z.

More dismissively, Paul Berman wrote in Terror and Liberalism (2003): "In the United States, the principal newspapers and magazines have tended to ignore Chomsky's political writings for many years now, because of his reputation as a crank" [23].

When CNN presenter Jeff Greenfield was asked why Chomsky was never on his show, he explained that Chomsky might "be one of the leading intellectuals who can't talk on television. […] If you['ve] got a 22-minute show, and a guy takes five minutes to warm up, […] he's out".^[7] Greenfield described this need to "say things between two commercials" as the media's requirement for "concision". Chomsky has elaborated on this, saying that "the beauty of [concision] is that you can only repeat conventional thoughts", and that if the media were better propagandists they would let dissidents on more because the time restraint would stop them properly explaining their radical views and they "would sound like they were from Neptune". For this reason, Chomsky rejects many offers to appear on TV, preferring the written medium.

Since Chomsky's 9-11 became a bestseller in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, Chomsky has attracted more attention from the mainstream American media. For example, The New York Times published an article in May 2002 describing the popularity of 9-11 [24]. In January 2004, the Times published a review of Chomsky's Hegemony or Survival by Samantha Power [25], and in February, the Times published an op-ed by Chomsky himself, criticizing the Israeli West Bank Barrier for taking Palestinian land [26].

[edit] Worldwide audience

Noam Chomsky in Chennai, India, in November 2001

Despite Chomsky's alleged marginalization in the mainstream US media, Chomsky is one of the most globally famous figures of the left, especially among academics and university students, and frequently travels across the United States, Europe, and the Third World. He has a very large following of supporters worldwide as well as a dense speaking schedule, drawing large crowds wherever he goes. He is often booked up to two years in advance. He was one of the main speakers at the 2002 World Social Forum. He is interviewed at length in alternative media [27]. Many of his books are bestsellers, including 9-11 [28].

The 1992 film Manufacturing Consent, shown widely on college campuses and broadcast on PBS, gave Chomsky a younger audience. In a 1995 article in Revelation, Alex Burns described the film as a "double edged sword--it brought Chomsky's work to a wider audience and made it accessible, yet it has also been used by younger activists to idolise him, creating a 'cult of personality'" [29].

Chomsky's popularity has become a cultural phenomenon. Bono of U2 called Chomsky a "rebel without a pause, the Elvis of academia". Rage Against The Machine took copies of his books on tour with the band. Pearl Jam ran a small pirate radio on one of their tours, playing Chomsky talks mixed along with their music. R.E.M. asked Chomsky to go on tour with them and open their concerts with a lecture (he declined). Chomsky lectures have been featured on the B-sides of records from Chumbawamba and other groups [30]. Many anti-globalization and anti-war activists regard Chomsky as an inspiration.

Chomsky is widely read outside the US. 9-11 was published in 26 countries and translated into 23 foreign languages [31]; it was a bestseller in at least five countries, including Canada and Japan [32]. Chomsky's views are often given coverage on public broadcasting networks around the world- a fact supporters say is in marked contrast to his rare appearances in the US media. In the UK, for example, he appears periodically on the BBC [33].

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is also a supporter of Chomsky and his work. He held up Chomsky's book "Hegemony or Survival" during his speech to the U.N. general assembly in September of 2006.

[edit] Criticisms of Chomsky

Due to the contentious nature of his writings and beliefs, Chomsky has acquired many critics. For more information, see the criticisms of Noam Chomsky.

[edit] Bibliography

[edit] Political works

Some of the books are available for viewing online [34].

Chomsky, Noam (1969). Perspectives on Vietnam [microform].
Chomsky, Noam (1969). American Power and the New Mandarins. New York: Pantheon.
Chomsky, Noam (1970). At War with Asia. New York: Pantheon.
Chomsky, Noam (1971). Problems of Knowledge and Freedom: The Russell Lectures. New York: Pantheon.
Chomsky, Noam and Howard Zinn (Eds.) (1972) The Pentagon Papers. Senator Gravel ed. vol. V. Critical Essays. Boston: Beacon Press; includes index to vol. I-IV of the Papers.
Chomsky, Noam (1973). For Reasons of State. New York: Pantheon.
Chomsky, Noam and Edward Herman (1973). Censored full text Counter-Revolutionary Violence: Bloodbaths in Fact and Propaganda. Andover, MA: Warner Modular. Module no. # 57.
Chomsky, Noam (1974). Peace in the Middle East: Reflections on Justice and Nationhood. New York: Pantheon.
Chomsky, Noam (1978). Human Rights' and American Foreign Policy.
Chomsky, Noam (1978). Intellectuals and the State.
Chomsky, Noam (1979). Language and Responsibility. New York: Pantheon.
Chomsky, Noam and Edward Herman (1979). Political Economy of Human Rights (two vols.). Boston: South End Press. ISBN 0-89608-090-0 & ISBN 0-89608-100-1.
Otero, C.P. (Ed.) (1981, 2003). Radical Priorities. Montréal: Black Rose; Stirling, Scotland: AK Press.
Chomsky, Noam (1982). Towards a New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There. New York: Pantheon.
Chomsky, Noam (1983, 1999). The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians. Boston: South End Press. ISBN 0-89608-601-1.
Chomsky, Noam (1985). Turning the Tide: U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Struggle for Peace. Boston: South End Press.
Chomsky, Noam (1986). Pirates and Emperors: International Terrorism and the Real World. New York: Claremont Research and Publications.
Chomsky, Noam (1987). On Power and Ideology: The Managua Lectures. Boston: South End Press.
Peck, James (ed.) (1987). Chomsky Reader. ISBN 0-394-75173-6.
Chomsky, Noam (1988). The Culture of Terrorism. Boston: South End Press.
Chomsky, Noam and Edward Herman (1988, 2002). Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. New York: Pantheon.
Chomsky, Noam (1989). Necessary Illusions. Boston: South End Press.
Chomsky, Noam (1989). Language and Politics. Montréal: Black Rose.
Chomsky, Noam (1991). Terrorizing the Neighborhood: American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era. Stirling, Scotland: AK Press.
Chomsky, Noam (1992). Deterring Democracy. New York: Hill and Wang.
Chomsky, Noam (1992). Chronicles of Dissent. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.
Chomsky, Noam (1992). What Uncle Sam Really Wants. Berkeley: Odonian Press.
Chomsky, Noam (1993). Year 501: The Conquest Continues. Boston: South End Press.
Chomsky, Noam (1993). Rethinking Camelot: JFK, the Vietnam War, and U.S. Political Culture. Boston: South End Press.
Chomsky, Noam (1993). Letters from Lexington: Reflections on Propaganda. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.
Chomsky, Noam (1993). The Prosperous Few and the Restless Many. Berkeley: Odonian Press.
Chomsky, Noam (1994). Keeping the Rabble in Line. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.
Chomsky, Noam (1994). World Orders Old and New. New York: Columbia University Press.
Chomsky, Noam (1996). Class Warfare. Pluto Press.
Chomsky, Noam (1997). (Ed.) The Cold War & the University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years Authors: Ira Katznelson, R. C. Lewontin, David Montgomery, Laura Nader, Richard Ohmann, Ray Siever, Immanuel Wallerstein, Howard Zinn ISBN 1-56584-005-4
Chomsky, Noam (1999). The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo .
Chomsky, Noam (1999). The Fateful Triangle: United States, Israel and the Palestinians. Pluto Press. ISBN 0-7453-1530-5.
Chomsky, Noam (1999). Profit Over People. Seven Stories Press.
Chomsky, Noam (1999). The Umbrella of US Power: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Contradictions of US Policy. Seven Stories Press. ISBN 1-888363-85-1.
Chomsky, Noam (2000). A New Generation Draws the Line: Kosovo, East Timor and the Standards of the West. Verso Books. ISBN 1-85984-380-8.
Chomsky, Noam (2000). Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs. Cambridge: South End Press.
Chomsky, Noam (2001). Vietnam Inc. Phaidon Press. ISBN 0-7148-4152-8.
Chomsky, Noam (2001). 9-11. Seven Stories Press. ISBN 1-58322-489-0.
Mitchell, Peter and John Schoeffel (ed.) (2002). Understanding Power: The Indispensable Chomsky.
Chomsky, Noam (2002). Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda. Seven Stories Press. ISBN 1-58322-536-6.
Chomsky, Noam (2002). Pirates and Emperors, Old and New: International Terrorism in the Real World. Pluto Press. ISBN 0-7453-1980-7.
Chomsky, Noam (2003). What Uncle Sam Really Wants. Pluto Press. ISBN 1-878825-01-1.
Chomsky, Noam (2003). Understanding Power: The Indispensable Chomsky. Vintage. ISBN 0-09-946606-6.
Chomsky, Noam (2003). The Prosperous Few and the Restless Many. Pluto Press. ISBN 1-878825-03-8.
Chomsky, Noam (2003). Hegemony or Survival. Metropolitan Books. (Part of the American Empire Project).
Chomsky, Noam (2004). Middle East Illusions. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. ISBN 0-7425-2977-0.
Chomsky, Noam (2004). Getting Haiti Right This Time: The U.S. and the Coup. Common Courage Press. ISBN 1-56751-318-2.
Chomsky, Noam (2005). Chomsky On Anarchism. AK Press. ISBN 1-904859-20-8.
Chomsky, Noam (2005). Government in the Future. Seven Stories Press. ISBN 1-58322-685-0.
Chomsky, Noam (2005). Imperial Ambitions: Conversations on the Post-9/11 World. Metropolitan Books. (Part of the American Empire Project). ISBN 0-8050-7967-X.
Chomsky, Noam (2006). Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy. Metropolitan Books. ISBN 0-8050-7912-2.

[edit] About Chomsky

Rai, Milan (1995). Chomsky's Politics.
Salkie, Raphael (1990). The Chomsky Update.
Barsky, Robert (1997). Noam Chomsky: A Life of Dissent, MIT Press.
Horowitz, David, et al. (2004). The Anti-Chomsky Reader.
Sperlich, Wolfgang, B. (2006). Noam Chomsky. Reaktion Books, London. [35]

[edit] References

^ http://www.chomsky.info/interviews/20041021.htm
^ http://www.chomsky.info/articles/20041029.htm
^ http://www.chomsky.info/articles/20041029.htm
^ http://www.chomsky.info/talks/2005012502.htm
^ http://www.chomsky.info/interviews/20041021.htm
^ http://www.chomsky.info/interviews/20041021.htm
^ 'He may be one of the leading intellectuals who can't talk on television. You know, that's a standard that's very important to us. If you've got a 22 minute show, and a guy takes five minutes to warm up -- now I don't know whether Chomsky does or not -- he's out. One of the reasons why Nightline has the "usual suspects" is that one of the things you have to do when you book a show is know that the person can make the point within the framework of television. And if people don't like that, they should understand that it's about as sensible to book somebody who will take eight minutes to give an answer as it is to book somebody who doesn't speak English.' [1]