Political power
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Political power (imperium in Latin) is a type of power held by a person or group in a society. There are many ways to hold such power. Officially, political power is held by the or holders of the sovereignty. Political powers are not limited to heads of states, however, and the extent to which a person or group holds such power is related to the amount of societal influence they can wield, formally or informally. In many cases this influence is not contained within a single state and it refers to international power.
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[edit] Separation of powers
Charles de Montesquieu claimed that without following a principle of containing and balancing legislative, executive and judiciary powers, there is no freedom and no protection against abuse of power. This is the separation of powers principle.
[edit] Division of Power
A similar concept, termed Division of Power, also consists of differentiated legislative, executive and judiciary powers. However, while Separation of Power prohibits one branch from intefering with another, Division of Power permits such interference. For example, in Indonesia, the President (who wields executive power) can introduce a new bill, but the People's Consultative Assembly (holding legislative power) chooses to either legalize or reject the bill.
[edit] Political Science Perspectives
Within normative political analysis, there are also various levels of power as described by academics that add depth into the understanding of the notion of power and its political implications. Robert Dahl, a prominent American political scientist, first ascribed to political power the trait of decision-making as the source and main indicator of power. Later, two other political scientists, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, decided that simply ascribing decision-making as the basis of power was too simplistic and they added what they termed a 2nd dimension of power, agenda-setting by elites who worked in the backrooms and away from public scrutiny in order to exert their power upon society. Lastly, British academic Steven Lukes added a 3rd dimension of power, preference-shaping, which he claimed was another important aspect of normative power in politics which entails theoretical views similar to notions of cultural hegemony. These 3 dimensions of power are today often considered defining aspects of political power by political researchers.
A radical alternative view of the source of political power follows the formula: information plus authority permits the exercise of power. Political power is intimately related to information. Sir Francis Bacon's statement: "Nam et ipsa scientia potestas est" for knowledge itself is power, assumed authority as given. Many will know that unless someone with authority listens and acts, there is no political power.
It is said democracy is the best method of informing those entrusted with authority. They are best able to use authority without ignorance to maximize political power. Those who exercise authority in ignorance are not powerful, because they do not realize their intentions and have little control over the effects of using their authority.
Post-modernism has debated over how to define political power. Perhaps, the best known definition comes from the late Michel Foucault, whose work in Discipline and Punish (and other writings) conveys a view of power that is organic within society. This view holds that political power is more subtle and is part of a series of societal controls and 'normalizing' influences through historical institutions and definitions of normal vs. abnormal. Foucault once characterized power as "an action over actions" (une action sur des actions), arguing that power was essentially a relation between several dots, in continuous transformation as in Nietzsche's philosophy. His view of power lent credence to the view that power in human society was part of a training process in which everyone, from a Prime Minister to a homeless person, played their role within the power structure of society. Jürgen Habermas opposed himself to Foucault's conception of discourse as a battlefield for power relations, arguing that it should be possible to achieve consensus on the fundamentals rules of discourse, in order to establish a transparent and democratic dialogue. Thenceforth, he argued against Foucault and Althusser that power was not immanent to discourse, and that philosophy could be completely distinguished from ideology.
More recently, there has been a move among academics to differentiate power from a new concept of luck. Under some conditions (particularly the when examining the third dimension of power) it becomes necessary to determine who obtains a favourable result through the wielding of genuine power and who is simply "lucky". An example might be an ethnic minority who receive favourable treatment while not intentionally seeking it. A person promoted through positive discrimination would be considered "lucky" rather than "powerful". The eventual aim of such discrimination would be to eventually convert some (or all) of that luck into power. Some groups remain serially lucky without ever obtaining power.
Note: The 3 dimensions of power may also be known as the 3 Faces of Power.
[edit] Source
- Langton, Rae (Fall 1993). "Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts", Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 22: no.4, p.293-330