Talk:Operation Market Garden

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[edit] Operation Priority!

Why in the world does it say that 'several weeks prior to the operation', the port of Antwerp was taken? Isn't that complete BS as Antwerp only fell during the Battle of the Scheldt, immediately after Market Garden?

The article is accurate. The port of Antwerp was taken, intact and without a fight, prior to M-G. The intro to the article describes the dilemma the Allies then faced: Either immediately take the Scheldt so as to get the port into operation, or gamble that the Ruhr could be entered before the supply situation deteriorated further. Unfortunately the gamble was lost; the supply crisis continued; Antwerp did not unload an allied supply ship until November. It must be said the supply crisis had several causes - having Antwerp closed wasn't the only fault in the logistics system. DMorpheus 16:26, 13 November 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Improvements needed!

Uh.....should this be featured in its present state? Much good info, but the entire tone is very chatty and loose, especially in the conclusion -- it feels far more like an essay/opinion piece towards the end than a neutral encyclopedia article. Jwrosenzweig 19:05, 23 Apr 2004 (UTC)

At the very least, it needs a 'commander/date/stuff table' a picture! --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus 17:13, 24 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Language still needs maturation. It not only still reads "chatty and loose" ("desperately" "staggeringly" etc.) but it sounds almost as if it were written while watching the movie version, IMHO. --Buckboard 08:28, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

I agree completely. It's not completely accurate either. I have started some (hopefully) improvements and welcome help. DMorpheus 21:57, 19 April 2006 (UTC)

[edit] pictures

Pictures are really needed for this page ... especially maps and diagrams and the ones of hundreds of paratroopers coming down onto the bridge. LUDRAMAN | T 21:06, 24 Aug 2004 (UTC)

[edit] Listed on Wikipedia:Featured article removal candidates

Comment on that page. --mav 00:47, 12 Sep 2004 (UTC)

Having read Ryan's book, I am sufficiently motivated to fix this article in order to have its FA status renewed. Which other major sources of info does anyone have to recommend? Pcb21| Pete 19:49, 5 Oct 2004 (UTC)

[edit] nvm=

I thought I found possible vandalism Lotsofissues 07:16, 13 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Well, XXX Corps on highway 69 gave me a smile, anyway. -- ALoan (Talk) 10:20, 13 Apr 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Primadonna Generals

Isn't that a bit POV? Tfine80 8 July 2005 23:26 (UTC)

Its not even accurate. Mongomery was a Field Marshall and the Canadian First Army was part of his 21st Army Group so that statement is saying he was competing with himself for supplies. Omar Bradley was Mongomery's opposite number in the U.S. 12th Army Group. Patton was one of Bradleys subordinates.

'Clearly the primary concern for the Allies should have been the advance of the Canadian army to remove the remaining German forces from the area and open Antwerp.' is hardly a masterpiece of NPOV either. Perhaps in hindsight this is arguable but the whole reason for the attack was that German resistance appeared to have collapsed.

This article has many other factually dubious and/or POV statements. It could do with editing. I might have a go once I dig some of my books out. --Shimbo 9 July 2005 14:18 (UTC)

That paragraph jumped off the page when I read it, too. Certainly not NPOV. puskarm 18 July 2005 22:02 (UTC)

[edit] The ferry at Driel

The article says two things about the ferry at Driel :

""" Day 5: ... The situation north of the river was obviously too hostile to land, so a new drop zone on the south side across from the 1st was selected near the village of Driel. The landings went well, but the ferry they planned to use to reach the British had been sunk. Their force was largely wasted as a result.

And :

""" In fact, had the Market Garden planners realized that a ferry was available at Driel, Frost's paratroops might well have secured that instead of the Arnhem bridge, making a profound difference in the campaign.

In fact Driel was not an option at all actually, or had the ferry been sunk by the german forces after day 1?

From memory, the ferry was sunk about the fourth day by its owner who thought that the Germans were going to use it. Later Driel was the only option not because of the (sunken) ferry but because it was the only place near Oosterbeck where a road went all the way to the river. If the equipment had been available then the engineers could have built a bridge there so the British armour could get across and relieve the paratroopers.--Shimbo 13:40, 21 August 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Casualties

In the section "Conclusions/casualties", I'm having a hard time making sense of how the numbers are supposed to add up (specifically the American 'Grand Total'). Anyone know what they should read? Istvan 18:04, 5 February 2006 (UTC)

Uff.. i took me many time to get it. it seams that many contributors have add the correct number of american KIA. But in the grand total casualties figure thay have just rounded up the figure. But someone must sum the wounded and the POW casualties to the total.

I'm confused the casualty table. Why are some of the cells blank (e.g., British WIA) whereas other cells have "unknown". It seems that all the cells should have values or "unknown". Also, the way the grand total column works is awkward and should probably be revised. Is there a reason the numbers have blanks instead of comma thousand separators? --Toms2866 22:23, 25 April 2006 (UTC)

I am confused too the table itself is a mess. This have been comented before, many times. Note: Acording to Operation Market Garden by Stephen Badsey the casuaties seccion (page 85) tells:

 ".............giving a total of 16,805 Allied Casualties. German Casualties like his units strenghts,cannot be accuratelly given for this period of the war. Generalmarshall Model estimated Army Group B casualties in Market Garden at 3,300 but others calculations place them high as 2,000 dead and 6,000 wounded........"

So i will change the battlebox error there, iam announcing it now before doing the change. If you have any reply, feel free to talk it here. Miguel

[edit] the radios and "iron ore"

The speculation here may be true--but the supporting article is so poorly documented that it has zero credibility for me--like a bad episode of "Myth Busters". The problems with the radios was a major obstacle--to debunk it, even partly, with this fluff is not credible. Nothing, for instances, addresses other logical questions--The Germans were able to coordinate--how did they do it? Does Arnhem have no TV or radio/wireless? Are there problems with broadcast too? If not, why just the VHF radios? Does their police force, fire departments, etc have the same problems? The article deserves better than what is there now. --Buckboard 08:42, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

I agree. What's really odd is that the radios miraculously started working several days in, at least according to the article. Did someone magically get rid of all the iron ore or does the cause of the radio failure really lie elsewhere? DMorpheus 00:50, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

[edit] More inline citations

Old FARC comments have been addressed (battlebox, pictures) - and in order for this article to improve, Wikipedia:Inline citations would be much needed.--Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus Talk 01:48, 15 April 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Additions to Article?

No Mention of the bridge not surviving the war, or the fact that the replacement bridge was named for Col. Frost. Also of interest, that Arnhem was liberated by the Canadian Army. There is also an Airborne museum in Arnhem that focuses on the battle.

Might any of this be worth adding?

Motorfix 01:39, 23 April 2006 (UTC)

Sure, why not? I think the article on Frost mentions the bridge naming but that is not to say it shouldn't be here also. DMorpheus 17:55, 23 April 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Move to different section of Article

"quote:In fact, with the failure at Arnhem, the battle merely produced a salient leading nowhere. Elite Allied Airborne units took heavy losses holding open the salient over the next month. Months later, 21st Army Group was fighting only a few miles away in the Reichswald. "

I don't feel this belongs under Legacy. Perhaps elsewhere in the Article but not here.

Motorfix 19:40, 23 April 2006 (UTC)

Agreed, even though I put it there originally, it would fit elsewhere better. I wanted to include the often-forgotten fact that the US Airborne Divisions stayed in the line, holding a useless salient, taking fairly heavy casualties for no purpose. DMorpheus 15:31, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
I agree that the points that the salient was held and that this lead to heavy casualties (heavier than Market Garden itself I believe) are valid, although this was not strictly part of 'Operation Market Garden' which is what this article is about. Perhaps it would be better in The Netherlands in World War II or US 82nd Airborne division. However I don't agree with the interpretation you make. The salient didn't 'lead nowhere' - it was a substantial part of the Netherlands. The occupied territory was used as a base for further operations to liberate the Netherlands, so it wasn't 'useless' and defending it didn't have 'no purpose' unless you think liberating the Netherlands from Nazi occupation was pointless. Shimbo 19:37, 25 April 2006 (UTC)


You are correct that it wasn't a part of Market-Garden - that's why it was in the 'Legacy' section, although perhaps it should have been in some sort of 'conclusion' or 'aftermath' section instead. It's common (and useful IMO) in wiki articles to say a word or two about the aftereffects of a major operation.
Obviously liberating the Netherlands from fascism was not useless, but there are many ways available to do that. Winning the war quickly was the best way, so, to the extent that the failure of M-G meant that other, better opportunities were given up, the salient was actually worse than useless. The existence of the salient doubled the frontage of the 21st Army Group with obvious effects on their ability to mass forces anywhere. The wastage of two top-quality Airborne divisions was a direct effect of this doubling of the frontage. DMorpheus 20:13, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
You may well be right, my point is that it is debatable and hence POV. It's not right to put "holding the salient was pointless" in the article as a fact, there should be reference to a source expressing that POV. The Band of Brother book has a chapter on the post Market Garden battles - there might be something in there. Shimbo 02:47, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
Eisenhower's Lieutenants makes the case that it was actually counterproductive, in much stronger terms than I have stated here. It gets into much more detail, of course, but basically argues that several other options were available and that the choice of M-G precluded those (the opportunity cost). The additional frontage for 21st Army Group made all their operations much more difficult. They couldn't even hold on to what they had taken without keeping two Airborne divisions in the line in deliberate defensive positions, which is something Airborne units are not equipped to do. Band Of Brothers is useful in showing the tactical-level effects of that decision. Since Airborne Divisions lacked any medium or heavy artillery, they constantly took a beating from German artillery. A regular US Infantry Division had 50-odd tubes of 105mm and 155mm howitzer support, plus Corps heavy batteries; an Airborne Div had only 75mm pack howitzers. I'm not just making this up ;) and yeah, I should have cited the source ;) DMorpheus 13:58, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

A few observations: The objective of Market Garden was not to create a salient. The salient itself, may or may not have been wasteful and counter productive, but at this point in the war, they would not have willingly surrendered ground to the Germans. It would have been political suicide to give up ground gained in Market Garden. The order of the day, would be to hold. Eisenhower himself had the power to make changes, and he didn't. The comments in his book are written after the fact.


Motorfix 15:47, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

I am sorry if I was unclear - Eisenhower didn't write Eisenhower's Lieutenants. You're right that it would have been politically impossible to give up the ground liberated from the Nazis (the case of Strasbourg proves this, I think), but in a purely military sense it has been argued in that book that the results of M-G were counterproductive.
You're also correct that the objective was not to take a salient (useful or not) but to get 21st Army Group over the Rhine, outflank the west wall, and penetrate into Germany; ultimately to get to the Ruhr area. Since none of those objectives were gained, it was disengenuous of Montgomery to claim "90% success" for the operation.DMorpheus 15:59, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

Agree with you there. Cheers, Motorfix 19:46, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

I agree too, the article will be stronger with a quote from Eisenhower's Lieutenants to contrast with Montgomery's statement. Shimbo 20:22, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Good article nomination feedback

I removed this from the nominations list, because at 51kb I feel it's too long for one person to be able to review it effectively, and it's likely to sit there for weeks waiting for someone to tackle it. I see from its FA removal that all that was considered wrong with it was the lack of infobox and references. As it has both of these now, I'd suggest seeking peer review and then taking it back to WP:FA. Worldtraveller 19:37, 5 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Siegfried Line Picture

I don't see the relevence of this recent addition, especially as this article is already over the recomended size.Shimbo 23:09, 9 May 2006 (UTC)

On a strategic level it's very relevant. The objective of M-G was to bypass the siegfried line and cross into the Ruhr without having to assault the fortifications. Other Allied forces (e.g. US 5th Armored Div) were already penetrating the line, so the strategic significance is that other opportunities to get through the line and into Germany were lost due to the priority assigned to M-G. DMorpheus 02:47, 10 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Tactical Airpower "decisive"?

This is in the article:

This was a tragedy as this was the 1st Airborne's only link with the swarms of RAF fighter-bombers circling overhead, whose support in the coming days could have been decisive, but they could not now be directed against targets on the ground. The pilots were under orders not to attack on their own initiative, which was sadly as essential order given the unpredictable nature of airborne warfare, with no particular front line and so no easy means of distinguishing friend from foe.

My problem with this is - has tactical airpower ever been decisive in a Second World War battle? Can anyone give an example of close air support turning the tide of a tactical battle? I don't believe this is accurate and should be removed from the article - the fighter bombers may have had an operational effect on reinforcements, etc, but tactically I don't see how they could have been "decisive" since they never were in any other battle.Michael Dorosh 04:08, 31 May 2006 (UTC)

For lightly armed airborne troops with no artillery support facing armored opposition, having CAS certainly would have helpful in Arnhem. The inability for ground forces to direct the aerial resupply was also a major problem. Would ground-direction of aerial assets proved decisive in Arnhem? That's speculation - the British airborne was in deep trouble against unexpected Panzer units. I think ...could have been decisive is reasonable wording. In this particular context, decisive means: could the Arnhem forces held out for several more days until XXX arrived? Perhaps. There are some examples of WWII CAS that were decisive, or at least major factors. During the invasion of Italy, Allied CAS by the Nortwest African Air Forces (NAAF) played a major role in several instances, including a decisive repulsion of a counter-attack by Panzer divisions and delay of German reinforcements. German CAS (esp. Stuka dive bombers) was a major (but not decisive) factor during the Blitzkrieg as German ground forces advanced far ahead of artillery support. Eisenhower stated that had the Germans possessed aerial superiority, it may have been decisive in Normandy - a reasonable opinion given the concentration of Allied traffic from the beachheads. But your point is well taken - ground forces generally decided ground battles in WWII. Much of the tactical airpower (on both sides) was spent against the opponent's tactical airpower in the battle to own the skies. Once the aerial contest was decided in a particular area, usually the issue on the ground was already apparent. Once the Allies owned the skies after June 1944 (and thus tactical air power was fully available for CAS), most ground issues were predestined anyway or weather negated Allied CAS (e.g., bulge). Just my opinions - I'd like to hear other opinions. --Toms2866 15:36, 31 May 2006 (UTC)
WW2 fighter-bombers rarely had much success destroying tanks, despite claims to the contrary. They just did not have accurate-enough weapons systems. What they excelled at was isolation of the battlefield, as you have both said. For example, in Normandy, Allied tactical air so limited German mobility that they could not reinforce over land as fast as the allies could reinforce over open beaches. That was quite an accomplishment.
Could they have played a similar interdiction role in M-G? I don't see why not, despite lack of radio contact. After all, any truck they saw in Arnhem was German wasn't it? All roads north of the Rhine were open hunting areas. The problem was more complex south of Arnhem, but this edit concerns Arnhem itself.
Combat in cities is at *very* close range, so the idea that CAS could have intervened directly in the battle is, I think, optimistic. Look at Stalingrad - the 62nd Army deliberately adopted a tactic of 'hugging' the Germans (staying at very close range) so as to prevent the German air support and artillery support from being effective.
I would therefore vote with Dorosh that the edit does not make a lot of sense, for two reasons. One, the lack of radio contact didn't prevent the CAS from doing any of the things it could have done; perfect radio contact would not have enabled them to destroy German AFVs. The 1st Airborne committed lots of much bigger mistakes so singling out the radios-CAS issue doesn't make much sense to me. Two, as noted above, it is speculation and thus original research that does not belong here.

DMorpheus 20:04, 31 May 2006 (UTC)

I agree that the article should soften the emphasis on fighter-bomber close air support. The following passages from Christopher Hibbert's book Arnhem (ISBN 1842127276) may be useful references:
The official German explanation for the British defeat were that the landings were insufficiently concentrated; that Allied Intelligence was apparently unaware of the presence of II Panzer Korps in the area northeast of Arnhem; that bad flying conditions not only prevented the resupply and reinforcement of the Allied troops but also prevented the break-up of German supply and reinforcement columns moving towards the battle area; and, finally, that the British Airborne Division landed too far in advance of the 2nd Army's front and could not be expected to hold out for the time it would take before the tanks of XXX Corps were able to reach the Neder Rijn. pp225
He goes on to elaborate on these and other points. With regard specifically to air support, Hibbert has this to say:
But if the hundreds of tons of supplies, which despite the weather were dropped over the Arnhem area, had fallen into British hands and if the method of summoning close air support had not been limited to two unserviceable wireless sets the British Division might even so have survived. pp229
Perhaps these passages can suggest an appropriate perspective with regard to air support over Arnhem.--Toms2866 00:10, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Aftermath section

The concluding sections seemed a bit scrambled and very, very wordy and tended to be repetitive. I've condensed it considerably, hopefully without deleting information not already contained in the article. It also badly needed some subheadings to break things up. I think the latest extensive edits are excellent info but they should really be cited as the article is not sourced.Michael Dorosh 01:55, 4 June 2006 (UTC)

I've also broken up each day into subsections and considerably condensed the text - it was very conversational and wordy, though I must say the research is excellent and was a very useful contribution. There is a slight tendency to cheer for the Allies which must be removed - ie words like "luckily" etc. It is okay to say "luckily for the Allies", but to say just "luckily" is to take sides - in contravention of the Neutral Point of View policy.Michael Dorosh 03:19, 4 June 2006 (UTC)

I think the article is shaping up nicely thanks to major efforts on the part of my fellow editors in the last week or so. Would be nice to see some day by day maps or something of the sort to add some visual interest.Michael Dorosh 21:32, 5 June 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Latest edit - "too editorialized"

The latest addition reads fine, Mark. Looking good. Thanks for adding so much useful info to the article!Michael Dorosh 22:09, 5 June 2006 (UTC)

[edit] "Tactical British Victory"?

In what sense? This operation was a failure on all levels. DMorpheus 13:15, 18 June 2006 (UTC)

I think a historical source is needed for this conclusion rather than we editors doing "original research." Certainly Montgomery viewed it as a tactical victory in being 2/3 successful or whatever the quote is. His detractors tend to be less kind about the final result. Strategically it achieved little; tactically, they moved the front 50 miles or so, but at terrible cost. The main objective of the battle went unfulfilled and cost heavily. Tough call, what do the historians say?Michael Dorosh 14:55, 18 June 2006 (UTC)
I agree we editors should not be doing original research, which is one of the reasons why the 'tactical British victory' comment bothered me so much. It's ridiculous. Moving the front forward 50 miles in a very narrow salient was a *disadvantage* to 21st Army Group. Eisenhower's Lieutenants makes this point very clear, as well as noting the opportunity cost of the operation. It's in the article now.
Also, even if we agreed there was some tactical success, those were Allied successes, not just British sucesses. DMorpheus 14:06, 19 June 2006 (UTC)
Good points all around. As for the salient, does Weigley discuss the implications of holding the island during the winter, and using it as a base for the assault into the Rhineland in February? Either way, if the article discusses the result, then I agree the infobox should reflect that discussion.Michael Dorosh 14:13, 19 June 2006 (UTC)


Quite right. It was an all-or-nothing operation to gain a crossing over the Rhine: no crossing=failure; the territory captured was neither here or their. I'm not sure how people will take this, but I've amended the result to an Allied failure as I think that is the most accurate description. Victory or defeat is perhaps best left to battles where armies are swept from a field. MAG1 20:10, 6 July 2006 (UTC)

We are really splitting hairs here. The mission failed; we all seem to agree on that. The territory gained was a disadvantage to the Allies, not a neutral factor at all. The 21st Army Group *doubled* its frontage as a result of the salient. Two elite Airborne Divisions were slowly bled to help hold it; other US divisions were eventually sucked in also. It made a big difference in 21st Army Group's ability to mass combat power for any other operation. DMorpheus 20:19, 6 July 2006 (UTC)

I have to say, the position of only considering the Allied performance, and drawing from that that this operation was an 'Axis Victory' is ignoring the Germans' situation. No matter what anyone says, the Germans lost ground and sustained heavy casualties in the engagements. Regardless of how useless you think that ground was, it was lost all the same. The Germans did not manage to decisively 'defeat' the Allied forces outside of Arnhem, either, and were pressed into using troops that could have been committed to the Eastern Front. Thus, I believe that the result should be listed as 'Indecisive' or 'Inconclusive'. 68.234.47.231 02:54, 19 August 2006 (UTC)


Please read the comments above or any of the better books on this operation. It was in no way 'indecisive' - on the contrary, the operation had a huge effect on th eoutcome of the campaign for NW Europe. DMorpheus 22:50, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

Outside of Arnhem, Allied forces were not driven from the field, they did not have any massive surrender, they were not completely overrun or overpowered, the casualties did not decidedly favor the Germans, and their forces did not lose control of the bridges taken. In contrast, during the Germans' counterattack they committed troops that could have been used elsewhere, they took casualties comparable to that of the Allies, their forces were driven back or forced to surrender in many cases, and they never regained control of the lost ground. Only in Arnhem did the Germans meet with great success, and even that came at a cost for some of their best divisions at a time when quality manpower was very short (whereas the Allied elite divisions were much more replaceable). In fact, considering the casualties and the Germans' vast numerical inferiority by this time in the war, the Operation might have been something of an Allied success. However, I would definitely not classify it as such, as they did lose the British airborne. Also, I did read the above posts, and I can't agree with this more: "Victory or defeat is perhaps best left to battles where armies are swept from a field."68.234.47.231 21:41, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

It is original research to form our own judgments about the outcome. The major published work routinely describe this as an Allied loss, German defensive success, huge lost opportunity for the Allies, etc. The contention is mostly over *why* , not *what*. DMorpheus 22:57, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

Well, could we at least put a note saying that the results are disputed in the information box and link to the section stating Montgomery's opinion (Reflections)? Surely Montgomery would be considered a Primary source.68.234.47.231 00:37, 21 August 2006 (UTC)

Yes, Montgomery is a primary source. So are Gavin, Ridgway, Taylor, Eisenhower, Dempsey, Brereton....all of whom were clear that this was a very damaging Allied loss. The lost strategic opportunities were by far the biggest negative outcome. Take ten major works covering this battle and all of them will have a section on the *failure* of M-G. I can't recall a single campaign history that calls this a success. So I suppose this is 'disputed' in the same sense that evolution is disputed. Actually you will find far more people disputing evolution than the outcome of this battle. DMorpheus 15:17, 21 August 2006 (UTC)

I think that Montgomery's opinion is absolutely worth noting, regardless, as it was his operation. Also, I did not say that this was an Allied success (I said it might have been, were it not for other things), but I do think that to not recognize the negative impact this had on the Germans is ignoring their desperation. Alternative plans mostly called for an assault on the Siegfried line, which would have ended in many-to-one ratios of casualties favoring the Germans, as was demonstrated during the Battle of Hurtgen Forest (which, by the way, is classified as an Allied Victory on Wikipedia despite saying this in the article: 'An American historian, who served in the Hurtgen, has described it as “a misconceived and basically fruitless battle that should have been avoided”.'). 68.234.47.231 01:15, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

No way could the words "Market Garden", "British" and "success" exist together. On the other hand, "US", "Allied" and "defeat" are also incompatible here. The 81st and 101st achieved their objectives (gloriously but overdue at Nijmegen) and held them. The Poles likewise, I don't think the withdrawal from Driel was forced. Only the 1st Airborne was actually defeated. It might be pedantic, but I think of M-G, overall, as a failure rather than a defeat of all the Allied forces. Folks at 137 12:32, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

Folks at 137 and MAG1's assessment is entirely acceptable to me. DMorpheus himself states precisely that 'Take ten major works covering this battle and all of them will have a section on the *failure* of M-G'. It seems to be a consensus. 68.234.47.231 01:47, 23 August 2006 (UTC)

I have just heard that the German took heavy casualties in Market Garden (8,000) thats false, there where much more german casualties at the Battle of the Bulge(70,000)and in Operation Overlord like (200,000), that where heavy losses. The allies in contrast took appalling losses in Market-Garden (17,000) if we consider the ratio of 1:1 in the bulge and 1:2 in Overlord.
The german army fought well considering the war was being lost by the Reich, and the allied plan was completly a surprise for Modell and Hitler. Modell was a genious preparing the defenses and calling for reinforcements in just some days. The German air force (Lufftwaffe) fought well shooting down many gliders and aircraft, much of the polish air tranported hevy guns where destroyed before reaching the drop site.

Operation Market-Garden or the Battle of Arhem was not a simple battle of the Western front. It was the second biggest allied massive deploment of paratroopers in open field (First D-Day) with more than 20,000 air transported personel and many comandos. The german army had their crack divitions too, including 2 SS Panzer Divitions like they allies counterpart, of the best fighting quality.
During the invasion the allies used their air armada of nearly 983 planes including 800 B-17s to destroy all the german anti aircraft positions. Making a clear way to the dakotas and the gliders. WHAT CONTINUED IS KNOW HISTORY.... Miguel

[edit] Communications

I think that the article should mention something about how the troops in Arnhem could have just used the phones in the houses, as mentioned in A Bridge too far.Defy You 01:42, 12 July 2006 (UTC)

They did, and it does (unless someone edited it out), the first communication Urquart and Frost had was via public telephone. DMorpheus 01:44, 12 July 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Prince Bernhard Quote

Is such a flippant comment necessary? I realise that it acts as a balance to Montgomery's quote, but wouldn't it be better to explain that Montgomery actually admitting to a mistake is far more damning than anything a controversial member of the Dutch monarchy could offer? --Harlsbottom 02:10, 27 August 2006 (UTC)

Keep it and let the reader decide whether or to what extent it is flippant. I myself find it poignant. DMorpheus 18:35, 27 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Allied Failure

As with above ("Tactical British Victory"?), why don't we call the Result of the Operation a "Strategic Axis Victory" or a "Tactical Axis Victory". LCpl 22:05, 9 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] "over 34,876 men"?

This seems like a very specific number to then need the modifier "over". Does this mean MARKET comprised 34,877 men? 34,999? How do we arrive at such a specific number without being able to arrive at the actual number? Binabik80 04:53, 1 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Jeremy Clarkson

He did a program about his father-in-law, who was awarded the Victoria Cross for his actions at Arnhem. Is this worth a mention in the popular culture section? Damburger 17:26, 18 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Jan van Hoof

No mention of the guy who disabled the explosives that were supposed to blow up the bridge at Nijmegen?

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