Operation Storm

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This article is about a 1995 Croatian army operation. For a Polish Second World War partisan operation, see Operation Tempest.
Operation Storm
Part of the Croatian War of Independence
Date August 4 – August 7, 1995
Location Croatia
Result Croatian victory
Combatants
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina Republic of Serbian Krajina
Commanders
Zvonimir Červenko Mile Mrkšić
Strength
150,000 soldiers,
350 tanks,
800 artillery pieces,
50 rocket launchers,
30 aircraft and helicopters		 40,000 soldiers,
200 tanks,
350 artillery pieces,
25 rocket launchers,
20 aircraft and helicopters
Casualties
174 soldiers killed,
1,430 wounded		 (1) 600 soldiers and 677 civilians killed (Croatian sources)
(2) 1,934 people killed,
at least 1196 civilians of which 524 women and 14 children (Serbian sources)
Croatian War of Independence
Plitvice Lakes - Borovo Selo - Vukovar - Gospić - Otkos 10 - Orkan 91 - Miljevci - Maslenica - Medak Pocket - Flash - Storm

Operation Storm (Croatian: Operacija Oluja, Serbian: Oпeрaциja Oлуja) was a large-scale military operation carried out by Croatia, in conjunction with the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to recapture areas of central Croatia held by Krajina Serb forces. After only four days of fighting, it ended in a decisive victory by the Croatians. The operation led to the displacement of approximately 200,000 Krajina Serbs. [1]

In Croatia August 5 is celebrated as a national holiday, Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day, while in Serbia it is marked by commemorations to the killed and exiled.

Contents

[edit] Background

In January 1992, a ceasefire agreement was signed by Presidents Franjo Tuđman of Croatia and Slobodan Milošević of Serbia to suspend fighting between the Croatian Army and rebel Croatian Serbs, supported by the Yugoslav People's Army, in the predominantly Serb-populated Krajina region and eastern Croatia. The ceasefire gave the Croatian army time to regroup, retrain and re-equip.

During the next three years, Croatian military operations in the Krajina were mostly limited to probing Serb defences[citation needed] while Serb paramilitary operations concentrated on shelling nearby Croatian towns[2] of which the most internationally notable were the attacks on Zagreb during May 2 and 3, 1995[3][4]. The notable Croatian military exception was Operation Medak Pocket of September 1993, during which Croatian forces overran a small area in the mountainous region of Lika but caused an international incident in the process.

The HV (Hrvatska vojska) played a more active role in western Bosnia, acting in concert with the Bosnian Croat HVO to combat Bosnian Serb forces. This had several advantages for the Croatians: it helped to prop up the Bosnian Croat statelet, it gave Croatian army commanders valuable combat experience and it put the Croatians in a good strategic position to threaten the Croatian Serbs' supply lines in Bosnia.

[edit] Timeline

[edit] Build-up to Operation Storm

By 1995, the military effectiveness of the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs had eroded considerably. Both had effectively been disowned by Belgrade, having refused Milošević's attempts to push them into settling the conflict. They had been unable to maintain or resupply their forces. Morale and efficiency were low, and many of the Serb troops were poorly trained. They were also seriously undermined by internal political conflicts and poor military leadership.

The Croatian Serb army, the VSK, was also significantly undermanned. It had only about 55,000 soldiers available to cover a front of some 600 km in Croatia plus a rear defence of 100 km along the border of the Bihać pocket in Bosnia. 16,000 of the VSK's troops were stationed in eastern Slavonia, leaving only some 39,000 to defend the main part of the RSK. In reality, only 30,000 of the theoretical 55,000 were capable of being fully mobilised.

By contrast, the Croatian and Bosnian armies (the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) had greatly strengthened their forces. They had re-equipped with modern weaponry — despite the arms embargoes in force — and had obtained Western military training and technology with the covert support of the United States. They also had strategic advantages, with much shorter lines of communication than their enemies. These advantages were demonstrated in Western Slavonia in May 1995, when the Croatian Army rapidly overran a Serb-held area in Operation Flash.

In July 1995, the Croatian and Bosnian armies collaborated to capture the crucial western Bosnian towns of Glamoč, and Bosansko Grahovo, along with Livno's western villages. This cut vital Croatian Serb supply lines and effectively meant that the Croatian Serb capital of Knin was surrounded on three sides. The Krajina Serbs attempted to break the encirclement with an attack into the Bihać pocket, but this was repulsed by the pocket's Bosniak defenders.

During the last week of July and the first few days of August 1995, the Croatian Army undertook a massive military build-up along the front lines in the Krajina and western Slavonia. The Croatian Serbs recognised the weakness of their position and appealed to Belgrade for military support, but were rebuffed, with the Serbian state-run media condemning the Croatian Serb leadership for its "militarism".

Another important and perhaps not as widely recognised issue was the role of the United States in the Operation. Prior to the Operation, they wre actively involved in tracking General otovina's movements and that of his army. Under NATO's flag they assisted in clearing Serb blockades and with logistical and communications issues. This occured as a result of their wish to push the Serbs to the negotiating table, in Daytion, Ohio.

[edit] August 4, 1995

Map of Operation Storm
Enlarge
Map of Operation Storm

At 0500 on August 4, around 150,000 Croatian Army troops attacked at about 30 separate points along a 300 km front. The Croatian 4th and 7th Guards Brigades broke through the lines of the already demoralized Serb forces and rapidly advanced deep into Krajina Serb territory. Knin was subjected to an intensive artillery bombardment, but much of the Krajina Serb leadership had already left for Serbia and Bosnia.

On the same day, aircraft from the United States Air Force bombed two Croatian Serb surface-to-air missile radar sites near Knin and Udbina. The attack was described by NATO as being a self-defence action undertaken after the radars had locked onto the USAF aircraft, which were patrolling Croatian and Bosnian airspace as part of Operation Deny Flight to enforce no-fly zones. [2]

[edit] August 5, 1995

Knin and most of the Dalmatian hinterland fell to Croatian forces, with only sporadic resistance encountered from the VSK. The towns of Gračac, Ljubovo, Žitnić, Vrlika, Kijevo, Dubica, Drniš and Benkovac were also captured. Serb forces launched artillery attacks on Dubrovnik in the far south and Vinkovci in the far east of Croatia, apparently in retaliation, rather than for any significant military purpose.

The 5th Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina attacked the VSK from the rear, crossing the border in multiple places near the Bihać pocket in western Bosnia and linking up with the Croatian army near the Plitvice Lakes well inside Croatia. Large refugee columns formed in many parts of Croatian Serb territory,after Krajina Defence Council requested all it's civilian population to evacuate so virtually the entire Serb population fled into Bosnia along corridors established by the Croatian military.

[edit] August 6, 1995

On August 6, the 1st Guards Brigade and allied units of the Bosnian Army's 5th Corps continued to advance into Krajina Serb territory near Slunj (north of Plitvice) and reached the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The towns of Petrinja, Kostajnica, Obrovac, Korenica, Slunj, Bruvno, Vrhovine, Plaški, Cetingrad, Plitvice and Glina all fell during the course of the day. The only strong resistance was encountered in the town of Glina (south of Sisak). The Croatian-held town of Karlovac was subjected to retaliatory shelling by the VSK, and Bosnian Serb aircraft attacked a chemical plant in the town of Kutina. President Tuđman staged a triumphal entry into Knin, where the Croatian flag was raised above the fortress that dominates the old town.

[edit] August 7, 1995

Fighting continued on August 7 but at a much lower intensity than on the previous days. Two Serb aircraft were shot down near Daruvar and Pakrac, and the towns of Turanj and Dvor na Uni were captured. Croatian and Bosnian army units linked up at Zirovać, to the east of the Bihać pocket. The Bosnian town of Velika Kladusa, which had been the "capital" of the self-proclaimed breakaway Republic of Western Bosnia, was captured by Bosnian forces. In the evening, Croatian Defence Minister Gojko Šušak declared the end to major combat operations, as most of the border with Bosnia was controlled by the Croatian Army and only mopping-up actions remained to be completed.

[edit] August 8, 1995 onwards

Serb refugees after the operation.
Enlarge
Serb refugees after the operation.

The last mopping-up actions took place on August 8 with the unopposed capture of Gornji Lapac, Donji Lapac and Vojnić. On August 9, the VSK's 21st Corps surrendered en masse to the Croatian Army.

By this time, virtually the entire Serb population of the Krajina was on the move, crossing into Serb-controlled territory in Bosnia. The exodus was complicated by the presence of armed Krajina Serb soldiers among the civilian refugees. A large refugee column that was moving on the Glina-Dvor road during August 1995 suffered casualties on two occasions: one report mentions Croatian army shelling of the column, and another mentions the Serbian military making way through the road without regard to civilians. The Croatian government claimed that around 90,000 Serb civilians had fled [3], while Serbian sources claimed that there were as many as 250,000 refugees. The United Nations put the figure at 150,000-200,000. The BBC reports the number to be 200,000 ([4] and [5])

On August 11, the Croatian government announced that 174 Croatian soldiers had been killed in the offensive and 1,430 wounded.

Although the VSK was known to be less capable than the Croatian Army, its lack of serious resistance proved a surprise to many observers. The Croatian Army had reportedly expected at least a week's fighting. However, other than the fighting around Glina, the Krajina Serb military response proved little more than symbolic in most places. The VSK largely collapsed, many of its soldiers deserting and joining the civilian exodus and others carrying their weapons into Bosnia. Around 5,000 were said to have surrendered and handed in their weapons to Croatian and UN forces.

Operation Storm did not target the Serb-inhabited area of Eastern Slavonia, along the border with Serbia, which was the easternmost end of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (though geographically disconnected from the other Serb-held areas of Croatia). Although there were fears of a direct military confrontation between Croatia and Serbia in Eastern Slavonia, large-scale armed conflict was not resumed in that region.

[edit] Aftermath

In the days immediately following Operation Storm, Croatian Army and Ministry of the Interior (MUP) units conducted a series of follow-up operations in the Krajina region. The majority of the Croatian Army forces withdrew from the area in August 1995, but military operations continued until November 1995. Some of these operations constituted sweeps to flush out a number of remaining Serb forces in the area, particularly in the north of the Croatian Krajina.

Croatian forces also conducted widespread actions against Serb civilians and property which were later condemned by prosecutors at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It was reported that Croatian forces undertook an extensive campaign of looting and destroying Krajina Serb property. According to the Croatian Helsinki Committee 677 Serb civilians have been killed in the operation. Serbian sources put the number at 2500. The ICTY Chief Prosecutor found that the Croatian forces operated in "'arson squads' using inflammable fuels, incendiary bullets and explosives… [leaving] some towns and numerous villages completely destroyed." The intention of this campaign, according to the Prosecutor, was to make it impossible for the Krajina Serb population to return.

The ICTY has alleged that hundreds of Krajina Serbs were murdered or disappeared in the wake of Operation Storm. A few notable cases included the murder of five (possibly six) Serb civilians in the hamlet of Grubori in the Plavno valley north of Knin on August 25, and the murder of 18 Serb civilians in the villages of Varivode, Gosici and two other hamlets in the former Sector South in the September of 1995. There were also numerous individual murders or murders of several people from the same household. By November 1995 the UN peacekeeping force in Croatia, UNPROFOR, had documented the deaths of more than 200 people in the area.

Across the entire region, Serbs were displaced en masse. In Knin, the Croatian Army rounded up and interned all the male inhabitants of fighting age, releasing them after a week[5]. In the town of Obrovac, on the other hand, the entire population had already left during the first day of the operation. When Croatian Radiotelevision reporters entered the town soon afterwards they found a single old man. After that, many of those people packed whatever they could and went on the road together with their families.

Prime Minister of Croatia Ivo Sanader said, "Storm is a brilliant historical military and police operation that we can be proud of, the operation which liberated central parts of the occupied Croatia." Furthermore, he states that if a sovereign country is occupied, it has the right to liberate its territory.[6]

[edit] Later events

Following the death of President Tuđman in 1999, the Croatian authorities began to undertake investigations of the activities of Croatian forces in the wake of Operation Storm. According to Croatia's Ministry of Justice, state prosecutors filed around 3,000 lawsuits against a total of 811 people for crimes allegedly committed during and after the operation. Several dozen people were convicted to jail sentences (up to 20 years according to Croatian law). Amnesty International has criticized the Croatian courts for inadequately investigating the war crimes allegations and failing to protect evidence as well as encouraging impunity for human rights violations.

The ICTY issued indictments against three senior Croatian commanders, Colonel General Ivan Čermak, Colonel General Mladen Markač and Brigadier (later General) Ante Gotovina. The three indictees were said to have had personal and command responsibility for war crimes carried out against Krajina Serb civilians. It was later disclosed by the ICTY prosecutor, Louise Arbour, that had he not died when he did, Croatia's President Tuđman would probably also have been indicted.

Čermak and Markač were handed over to the ICTY, but Gotovina fled. He was widely believed to be at liberty in Croatia or the Croat-inhabited parts of Bosnia, where many view him as a hero, and his continued freedom was attributed to covert help from — or at least a "blind eye" turned by — the Croatian authorities. The US Government offered a $5 million reward for the capture of Ante Gotovina and he became one of the ICTY's most wanted men. The issue was a major stumbling block for Croatia's international relations. Its application to join the European Union was rebuffed in March 2005 due to the Croatian government's perceived complicity in Gotovina's continued evasion of the ICTY.

On December 8, 2005, Gotovina was captured by Spanish police in a hotel on Tenerife in the Canary Islands. He was transferred to Madrid for court proceedings before extradition to the ICTY at The Hague.

[edit] Battle figures

According to a Croatian source[6]:

[edit] Croatian forces and allies

Croatian Army (HV):

  • 150,000 strong
    • 80,000 soldiers in brigades, 70,000 in home guard regiments (domobranske pukovnije)
    • 2nd echelon, 50,000
    • 3rd echelon, 25 brigades
  • 350 tanks
  • 800 heavy artillery pieces
  • 45-50 rocket launchers
  • 18 MiG-21 "Fishbed" fighter jets
  • 5 Mi-8 "Hip" transport helicopters
  • 12 Mi-24D "Hind" attack helicopters

Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH):

  • 5th Corps

[edit] Serbian forces and allies

Army of the "Republic of Serbian Krajina" (VSK)

  • 40,000 strong
    • 20,000 1st echelon
    • 10,000 2nd echelon
    • 10,000 3rd echelon
  • 200 tanks
  • 350 heavy artillery pieces
  • 20-25 rocket launchers

Army of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia

  • 10,000 strong (?)

[edit] References

  1. ^ Croatia: Operation "Storm" - still no justice ten years on by Amnesty International
  2. ^ SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, Section K, Point 161 by United Nations Economic and Social Council
  3. ^ Milosevic Allegedly Angered by Zagreb Shelling by Institute For War and Peace Reporting
  4. ^ THE TRIBUNAL ISSUES AN INTERNATIONAL ARREST WARRANT AGAINST MILAN MARTIC a press release by The Hague, 8 March 1996
  5. ^ Ratko Gajica of SDSS on Nedjeljom u dva, in 2005.
  6. ^ [1] Croatian prime minister
  • RSK, Vrhovni savjet odbrane, Knin, 4. avgust 1995., 16.45 časova, Broj 2-3113-1/95. The faximile of this document was published in: Rade Bulat "Srbi nepoželjni u Hrvatskoj", Naš glas (Zagreb), br. 8.-9., septembar 1995., p. 90.-96. (the faximile is on the page 93.).

Vrhovni savjet odbrane RSK (The Supreme Council of Defense of Republic of Serb Krajina) brought a decision 4. August 1995 in 16.45. This decision was signed by Milan Martić and later verified in Glavni štab SVK (Headquarters of Republic of Serb Krajina Army) in 17.20.

  • RSK, Republički štab Civilne zaštite, Broj: Pov. 01-82/95., Knin, 02.08.1995., HDA, Dokumentacija RSK, kut. 265

This is the document of Republic headquarters of Civil Protection of RSK. In this document it was ordered to all subordinated headquarters of RSK to immediately give all reports about preparations for the evacuation, sheltering and taking care of evacuated civilians ("evakuacija, sklanjanje i zbrinjavanje") (the deadline for the report was 3. August 1995 in 19 h).

  • RSK, Republički štab Civilne zaštite, Broj: Pov. 01-83/95., Knin, 02.08.1995., Pripreme za evakuaciju materijalnih, kulturnih i drugih dobara (The preparations for the evacuation of material, cultural and other goods), HDA, Dokumentacija RSK, kut. 265

This was the next order from the Republican HQ of Civil Protection. It was referred to all Municipal Headquarters of Civil Protection. In that document was ordered to all subordinated HQ's to implement the preparation of evacuation of all material and all mobile cultural goods, archives, evidentions and materials that are highly confidential/top secret, money, lists of valuable stuff (?)("vrednosni popisi") and referring documentations.

  • Drago Kovačević, "Kavez - Krajina u dogovorenom ratu" , Beograd 2003. , p. 93.-94.
  • Milisav Sekulić, "Knin je pao u Beogradu" , Bad Vilbel 2001., p. 171.-246., p. 179.
  • Marko Vrcelj, "Rat za Srpsku Krajinu 1991-95" , Beograd 2002., p. 212.-222.

[edit] External links

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