Operation Linebacker II

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Operation Linebacker II
Part of Vietnam Conflict
B-52 over the DRV
Date December 18 to December 30, 1972 Location Democratic Republic of Vietnam Result American Victory
Combatants
United States (U.S.)	Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)
Commanders
General John W. Voght, Jr.	Unknown
Casualties
33 killed in action, 41 taken prisoner	1,318 civilian, military casualties are unknown

Vietnam War

Ap Bac – Binh Gia – Song Be – Dong Xoai – Ia Drang – Long Tan – Dak To – Tra Binh Dong –Ong Thanh – 1st Tet – Khe Sanh – 1st Saigon – Lang Vei – Hills 881 & 861 – 2nd Tet – Hamburger Hill – Binh Ba – Ripcord – Lam Son 719 – FSB Mary Ann – Easter '72 – An Loc – Kontum – Phuoc Long – Ho Chi Minh – Buon Me Thuot – Xuan Loc – 2nd Saigon – Barrell Roll – Rolling Thunder – Pony Express – Steel Tiger – Commando Hunt – Linebacker I – Linebacker II – Chenla I – Tiger Hound – Lima Site 85 – Tailwind – Chenla II – Cambodia

Operation Linebacker II was a U.S. Seventh Air Force and U.S. Navy Task Force 77 aerial bombing campaign conducted against targets in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) during the final period of the American commitment to the Vietnam Conflict. The operation, conducted from December 18 to December 30, 1972 (hence its unofficial nickname - the "Christmas Bombings") saw the heaviest bomber strikes of the Southeast Asian conflict. Linebacker II was a resumption of the Linebacker bombings conducted from May to October, except that the emphasis of the new campaign shifted to attacks by B-52 Stratofortresses rather than tactical fighter aircraft.

Contents 1 The Walk Out that Never Was 2 Planning 3 First Phase 4 Interim Phase 5 Final Phase 6 Back to the Negotiating Table 7 Summary and Conclusions 8 U.S. Air Order of Battle 9 Notes 10 References

[edit] The Walk Out that Never Was

Main articles: Vietnam War, Easter Offensive, and Operation Linebacker

On October 8, 1972, U.S. National Security Advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger and North Vietnamese Poliburo member Le Duc Tho met in Paris. They were there to discuss new proposals by both nations, hoping to reach mutually agreeable terms for a peace settlement. The North Vietnamese presented a plan which included proposals for an Administration of National Concord, that would organize general and local elections within South Vietnam. Political power would be shared by three groups, the Saigon government, the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG), and a "third force" group to be mutually agreed upon by the other two parties. Nothing could be accomplished by the new administration without the approval of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu.

Both combatant Vietnamese governments would remain intact, as would their separate armies. American forces would withdraw, but the U.S. did not have to cease its aid to the Thieu regime. Both sides would be able to resupply their forces on a parity basis, a cease-fire would be put in place, American POWs were to be returned, and no new PAVN forces would be infiltrated. The U.S. would also extend post-war reconstruction assistance to the DRV. The only bone of contention was Tho's refusal to guarantee a negotiated cease-fire in Laos and Cambodia, but he promised to use his influence to promote one. Kissinger was satisfied with the terms and so notified President Richard M. Nixon, who gave his approval to the settlement. The finalized agreement was to be signed in Hanoi on October 31.

Kissinger then flew on to Saigon to discuss the terms with Thieu on the 18th. The South Vietnamese president was not happy with either the new agreement or with Kissinger, who he felt had betrayed him. Although Kissinger knew Thieu's negotiating positions, he had not informed him of the changes nor had his approval been sought. Kissinger "had negotiated on behalf of the South Vietnamese government provisions that he, Thieu, had already rejected."^[1] Thieu completely castigated the agreement and proposed 129 textual changes to the document.

He then went one step further and released an altered version of the text that made the South Vietnamese provisions look even worse than they were. The DRV leadership, believing that they had been hoodwinked by Kissinger, responded by broadcasting the actual text of the agreement. On November 20, Kissinger presented the South Vietnamese revisions and 44 additional changes demanded by the U.S. These new demands included: That the DMZ be accepted as a true international boundary; That a token withdrawal of PAVN troops take place; That the DRV guarantee an Indochina-wide cease fire and; That a strong international force (the ICCS) be created for supervising and enforcing the cease-fire.

Once the North Vietnamese read the new demands, they began to retract their own concessions and wanted to bargain anew, leading Kissinger (who fully understood their position) to proclaim that they were "stalling." The talks, scheduled to last ten days, ended on December 13 with both parties agreeing to resume negotiations. Five days later the U.S. bombed Hanoi.

Many historians of the Southeast Asian conflict follow the lead of President Nixon, who claimed that Hanoi's representatives had walked out of the talks, refusing to continue.^[2] Nothing could have been be further from the truth. Both sides had proclaimed their agreement to continue the negotiations. The goal of President Nixon was not to convince Hanoi, but Saigon.

[edit] Planning

Nixon and Kissinger. The Department of Defense and its budget, and Congress.

In the wake of Operation Linebacker, the U.S. had available a force of 207 B-52s available for use in Southeast Asia. This deployment, however, utilized nearly half of the Air Force's manned bomber fleet and Strategic Air Command (SAC) commanders were initially reluctant to risk the highly expensive aircraft and their highly trained crews in such an operation. One reason for bringing in the B-52s was the September through May monsoon in the DRV, which made visual bombing operations by tactical fighter bombers difficult. The B-52s were equipped with their own radar bomb navigation systems. The supporting fighter-bombers would strike targets with either [[laser-guided bombs or utilizing LORAN radar-guided bombing systems.

54 bombers (all B-52Ds) were based at U-Tapao RTAFB, Thailand, while 153 were based at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam (55 B-52Ds and 98 B-52Gs). Linebacker II was marked by top-down planning by the SAC headquarters at Omaha, Nebraska. Due to the restrictive time frame imposed by President Nixon (only three days), SAC's plan had all of the B-52s approaching Hanoi in three discrete waves per night, using identical approach paths at the same altitude. The aircraft were to fly in nose-to-tail, three-plane formations known as "cells" for more effective electronic warfare (EW) jamming coverage. Once the aircraft had dropped their bombs, they were to execute what SAC termed "post-target turns" (PTT) to the west. These turns had two unfortunate consequences for the bombers: 1. The B-52s would be turning into a strong headwind, slowing their ground speed by 100 knots (185 km/h) and prolonging their stay in the target area and; 2. The PTT would point the emitter antennas for the B-52s' EW systems away from the radars they were attempting to jam, degrading the effectiveness of the cells, as well as showing the largest radar cross-section to the missile guidance radars. The aircraft employed, however, had significantly different EW capabilities; the B-52G carried fewer jammers and put out appreciably less power than the B-52Ds. Because of these factors the campaign would be ultimately be conducted in three phases as tactics and plans were altered.

[edit] First Phase

The first three Linebacker II missions were flown as planned by SAC on three consecutive nights beginning on December 18. On the first night 129 bombers were launched, 87 of them from Guam.^[3] Three were shot down - two B-52G's from Andersen and a B-52D from U-Tapao, all out of the first wave. 39 other aircraft of the Seventh Air Force, Task Force 77, and the Marines supported the bombers by providing F-4 fighter escorts, F-105 Wild Weasel SAM-suppression missions, Air Force EB-66 and Navy EA-6 radar-jamming, chaff drops, KC-135 refueling capability, and search and rescue aircraft. During the initial mission, the North Vietnamese fired 220 SAMs at their attackers, shooting down three aircraft. Only one of the downed crews could be rescued.^[4]

On the second night 93 sorties were flown by B-52s, and although 185 SAMs were fired and a number of the bombers were damaged, none were lost. The combination of repetitive tactics, degraded EW systems, and limited jamming capability led to the loss of six aircraft on the third night, December 20, when 99 bombers were sent in.^[5] Two B-52Gs and a B-52D were lost by both the first and third waves of the mission, during which over 300 SAMs were fired.^[6] Once again, only two of the three downed crews could be rescued.

[edit] Interim Phase

The differences between the radar jamming gear of the different B-52 models called for a change. Omaha let the more modern aircraft stationed at U-Tapao carry the ball. The tactics employed, however, did not change. Two days before Christmas the targets of the bombers were changed to SAM sites and MiG bases. Air Force F-111 Aardvarks were sent in before the arrival of the bombers to strike the airfields and reduce the threat of enemy fighters. They were so successful in these operations that their mission was changed to striking SAM sites. While the B-52s and F-111s attacked by night, the tactical aircraft of the Air Force, Navy and Marines attacked by day, averaging nearly 100 sorties per day.^[7] Losses for the tactical aircraft were extremely light, fewer than a dozen were lost during the entire campaign. It was not difficult to deduce why. The North Vietnamese air defenses were waiting for the arrival of the bombers.

The morale of the crews began to plummet, especially at U-Tapao, whose crews were carrying the ball for missions between December 21 and 23rd. Sick calls increased and Dana Drenkowski, an F-4 pilot who had formerly flown B-52s, two doctors he talked to "specifically used the term 'mutiny' to describe what was happening."^[8]

[edit] Final Phase

The wing commander at U-Tapao sent a message to SAC headquarters sharply criticizing its tactics and its control of the operation. As a result, SAC turned planning over to its subordinate Eighth Air Force headquarters on Guam. The commander of the Eighth, General Gerald W. Johnson, then ensured that the U-Tapao commander, Brigadier General Glenn R. Sullivan, who had originally requested the tactical changes, was not mentioned in the official history of the operation.

The overall tactics were reconsidered and additional jammers were installed in the B-52Gs. An immediate change in tactics was also made by reducing the separation between cells and between the times each reached the target area. Two bombers were shot down the first night of the truncated raids, but subsequent missions saw neither losses nor battle damage. These missions were followed by a 36-hour pause in the bombing during the Christmas holiday. 124 B-52 missions were also flown against People's Army of Vietnam forces in South Vietnam. 22 crews were transferred from Guam to Thailand to bolster U-Tapao's crew strength.

SAC authorized a revision in tactics. 120 bombers targeted against Hanoi, Haiphong, and Thai Nguyen. The number of supporting aircraft was increased to 113. On December 26, the revised tactics came fully into play: instead of multiple waves, all bombers would be in and out of the Hanoi area within 20 minutes, they would approach the target area from multiple directions and at different altitudes, and they would exit by varying routes. The steep PTTs were also eliminated. Ten targets, in both the Hanoi and Haiphong areas, were struck by bombers approaching in seven separate streams, four of which came in off the Gulf of Tonkin. 78 bombers took off from Andersen in one time block, the largest single combat launch in SAC history, while 42 others came in from Thailand. In addition to the change in tactics, the number of supporting aircraft was also increased to more than 100 per mission, providing chaff drops, escort fighters, Wild Weasel SAM suppression, and electronic countermeasures support.

The DRV air defense system, though still capable, was overwhelmed by the number of aircraft it had to track in such a short period of time and by a dense blanket of chaff laid down by the fighter-bombers. Almost 950 SAMs had been fired previously, and the strain on the remaining DRV inventory showed, since only 68 were fired during the mission. Two B-52s were hit and crash landed at U-Tapao. Two of U-Tapao's B-52s turned back due to mechanical difficulties, but their cells continued the mission. As a consequence, a B-52 in each cell was lost, including one that crash-landed at its base, killing most of its crew.

On the following night 60 bombers flew the mission, with some attacking SAM sites. One B-52 was destroyed while attacking one of the launch sites while a second was so heavily damaged that its crew ejected over Laos, where it was rescued. The missions continued for the next two nights, each by 60 bombers, and both were virtually unopposed by the North Vietnamese.

[edit] Back to the Negotiating Table

On December 26, the communists proposed that negotiations continue. Nixon replied that he wanted the talks to resume on January 2 and that he would halt the bombing if Hanoi agreed. They did so and Nixon suspended aerial operations north of the 20th parallel on December 29. He then informed Kissinger to accept the terms offered in October, if that was what it took to get the agreement signed. Senator Henry Jackson (D) Washington, tried to persuade Nixon to make a televised address in order to explain to the American people that "we bombed them in order to get them back to the table."^[9] It would, however, have been extremely difficult to get informed observers in the U.S. to believe that he "had bombed Hanoi in order to force North Vietnamese acceptance of terms they had already agreed to."^[10]

Now the only stumbling block on the road to peace was President Thieu. Nixon tried to placate him by writing on January 5 that "you have my assurance of continued assistance in the post-settlment period and that we will respond with full force should the settlement be violated by North Vietnam." By this time, however, (due to congressional opposition) Nixon was in no position to make such a promise. The possibility of obtaining the requisite congressional appropriations was nil. The South Vietnamese president, however, still refused to agree. On the 14th Nixon made his most serious threat: "I have therefore irrevocably decided to proceed to initial the Agreement on January 23, 1973...I will do so, if necessary alone.^[11] One day before the deadline, Thieu bowed to the inevitable and consented to the agreement.

On January 9 Kissinger and Le Duc Tho returned to Paris. The agreement struck between the U.S. and the DRV was basically the same one that had been reached in October. The additional demands that had been made made by the U.S. in December were generally discarded or went against the U.S. The DMZ was defined as provided for in the Geneva Accords of 1954, and would in no way be recognized as an international boundary. The demanded withdrawal of PAVN troops from South Vietnam was not mentioned at all in the text of the agreement. Kissinger did, however, obtain a "verbal agreement" for a token withdrawal of 30,000 North Vietnamese troops.

The demand for an inclusive, Indochina-wide cease-fire was simply discarded in the written agreement. Once again, Kissinger had to be satisfied with a "verbal understanding" that a cease-fire would be instituted in Laos simultaneous with, or shortly following, that in South Vietnam. An agreement on Cambodia (where the North Vietnamese had no influence whatsoever over the Khmer Rouge) was out of the question. The size of the ICCS was finally decided by splitting the difference in the number demanded by both parties at 1,160 personnel. The Paris Peace Accords were signed at the Majestic Hotel in Paris on January 27, 1973.

Having fought a war to defend South Vietnam's independence, the U.S. was now denying its legitamacy.^[12]

John Negroponte, one of Kissinger's aides was more caustic: "We bombed the North Vietnamese into accepting our concessions."^[13]

[edit] Summary and Conclusions

A total of 741 B-52s had been dispatched to bomb the DRV during Linebacker II, with 725 actually completing their missions. 15,000 tons of bombs were dropped on 18 industrial and 14 military targets (including eight SAM sites). 212 additional B-52 missions were flown in South Vietnam during the same time period. Ten B-52s had been shot down over the DRV, four others crashed in Laos or Thailand, and one crashed at its base. 33 U.S. aircrew members were killed or missing, 33 became prisoners of war, and 26 were rescued.

769 additional sorties were flown by the Air Force and 505 by the Navy and Marine Corps in support of the bombers. Approximately 700 additional attack sorties were flown by fighters of the Seventh Air Force and 228 by Task Force 77 within South Vietnam. 12 aircraft were lost (two F-111s, three F-4s, two A-7s, two A-6s, an EB-66, an HH-53 rescue helicopter, and an RA-5C). During these operations, ten Americans were killed, eight captured, and 11 aircrew members were rescued.^[14]

Damage to the DRV's infrastructure was severe. Civilian casualties were comparatively low, with 1,318 claimed by the DRV government.

The bombings were protested around the world. The United Kingdom, Italy and Sweden oficially condemned the bombings, but other European nations maintained their silence. Some elements in the Western media misreported the extent of casualties and damage inflicted on the DRV, which contributed to anti-war unrest.

[edit] U.S. Air Order of Battle

• Task Force 77

USS America , Carrier Air Wing 8 (F-4), (A-6), (A-7)

USS Enterprise , Carrier Air Wing 14 (F-4, (A-6), (A-7)

USS Midway , Carrier Air Wing 5 (F-4, (A-7)

USS Oriskany , Carrier Air Wing 19 (F-8), (A-7)

USS Ranger , Carrier Air Wing 2 (F-4, (A-6), A-7)

USS Saratoga , Carrier Air Wing 3 (F-4, (A-6), A-7)

• Seventh Air Force

8th Tactical Fighter Wing, Ubon RTAFB, Thailand (F-4)

+two squadrons from 4th TFW, Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina

+one squadron from 33rd TFW, Eglin AFB, Florida

354th Tactical Fighter Wing, Korat RTAFB, Thailand (A-7)

388th Tactical Fighter Wing, Korat RTAFB, Thailand (F-4), (F-105G)

432d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Udon RTAFB, Thailand (F-4), (RF-4)

+two squadrons from 366h TFW after its departure from Da Nang AB, RVN

474th Tactical Fighter Wing, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand (F-111)

43d Strategic Wing, Andersen AFB, Guam (B-52D)

72d Strategic Wing (Provisional), Andersen AFB, Guam (B-52G)

307th Strategic Wing, U Tapao RTAFB, Thailand (B-52D)

[edit] Notes

1. ^ Lippsman & Weiss, p. 14.
2. ^ These include Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, p. 652, Marc Leepson, Dictionary of the Vietnam War p. 228, John Morocco, Rain of Fire p. 146, and Harry Summers, The Vietnam Almanac, p. 228.
3. ^ Morocco, p. 148.
4. ^ Morocco, p. 150.
5. ^ Morocco, p. 150.
6. ^ ?
7. ^ Morocco, p. 154.
8. ^ Morocco, p. 152.
9. ^ Ambrose, p. 411.
10. ^ Ambrose, p. 411.
11. ^ Ambrose, p. 413.
12. ^ Karnow, p. 650.
13. ^ Ambrose, p. 413
14. ^ BAT-21

[edit] References

Published Government Documents

• Gilster, Herman L. The Air War in Southeast Asia: Case Studies of Selected Campaigns. Maxwell Air Force Base AL: Air University Press, 1993.
• McCarthy, Brig. Gen. James R. and Lt. Col. George B. Allison, Linebacker II: View from the Rock. Washington DC: Air Force Monograph Series, 1979.
• Nalty, Bernard C. Air War Over South Vietnam: 1969–1975. Washington DC: Center of Air Force History, 1995.
• Schlight, John, A War Too Long. Washington DC: Center of Air Force History, 1993.
• Tilford, Earl H. Setup: Waht the Air Force did in Vietnam and Why. Maxwell Air Force Base AL: Air University Press, 1991.

Secondary Sources

• Ambrose, Stephen E., The Christmas Bombing in Robert Cowley, ed. The Cold War: A Military History, New York: Random House, 2005.
• Drendel, Lou, Air War over Southeast Asia: Vol. 3, 1971–1975. Carrollton TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1984.
• Karnow, Stanley, Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking Books, 1983.
• Lippsman, Samuel, Stephen Weiss, et al, The False Peace: 1972-74. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1985.
• Littauer, Raphael and Norman Uphoff, The Air War in Indochina. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972.
• Morocco, John, Rain of Fire: Air War, 1969–1973. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1985.