Oblique order
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The Oblique Order (or declined or refused flank) is a military tactic where an attacking army focuses its forces to attack a single enemy flank.The force commander concentrates the majority of his strength on one flank and uses the remainder to fix the enemy line. That allows a commander with weaker or equal forces to achieve a local superiority in numbers. The commander can then try to defeat the enemy in detail. It was the most famously used by the armies of Frederick the Great of Prussia. Oblique order required disciplined troops able to execute complex maneuvers in varied circumstances.
In the oblique order attack, commander of the army would intentionally weaken one portion of the line to concentrate their troops elsewhere. They would then create an angled or oblique formation, refuse the weakened flank and attack the strongest flank of the enemy with a concentration of force. Once the critical flank was secure, the commander would wheel their troops 90 degrees to roll up the enemy line and the angled formation would continue to advance.
First recorded use of the tactic similar to oblique order was at the Battle of Leuctra, when the Thebans under Epaminondas defeated the Spartans. Philip of Macedon studied under Epaminondas and his descendants, including Alexander the Great, used its variations in their campaigns.
Prussian generals of Frederick the Great used the tactic with their own manner. Prussian attacking army sent a strong advance force of infantry directly towards the enemy. The frontline troops occupied the attention of the enemy and the rest of the troops would maneuver behind it. They could also exploit any locally available obstacle, hindering terrain or the smoke of cannon and musket fire to mask maneuver. Prussian cavalry would be stationed to cover the flank of the main body.
The main body of the army would then spread their forces to one side in and deploy in an echelon (or the "oblique order"), spreading their firepower and attacking the stronger enemy flank with increasing pressure. The protective cavalry would then exploit any enemy collapse. This tactic decided the Battle of Leuthen in Frederick's favor.
[edit] Battle of Leuthen
The Austrian army, led by Charles of Lorraine, was formed into a line five miles wide, with one flank resting on the Schweidnitz River and Kiepern Hill. Charles had decided to form his army in such a lengthy formation mainly due to his wariness of being outflanked, which Frederick had done in previous battles against Austrians such as Daun. However, this unwieldy formation would not be able to quickly respond to any penetration along any part of its front. Frederick deployed his army from marching order behind a covering line of hills and concentrated his army near Kiepern Hill and the small town of Sagschutz, while sending a small body of troops from his advance guard to distract the Austrian cavalry reserve to the other side of the field from the Schwerpunkt at Sagschutz. The ponderous Austrian army's left flank was quickly turned as the Prussian cavalry (under Ziethen and the main Prussian body smashed into the lines at Sagschutz. The huge Austrian main body began to wheel around towards the Prussians, who were swinging to their left to begin dismantling the Austrian army, and a heavy firefight began in the town of Leuthen, punctuated by a heavy cavalry engagement which saw the Austrians fleeing from the scene, their army shattered.
The main Austrian body's extreme unwieldiness, combined with Frederick's cavalry feint, made the choice of an echeloned formation perfect. However, the Prussian masterpiece was marred by the heavy losses suffered in the fighting, characteristic of a concentration in battle. With so few troops remaining, Frederick was hard put to stay in the field in the Seven Years' War, which was compounded by the losses suffered at such battles as Zorndorf, Kunersdorf, and Torgau. Though Napoleon would later call it a "masterpiece of maneuver and resolution"[1], the strategic impact of such a costly use of troops kept Frederick from making territorial gains in the War and prolonged its length.
[edit] References
- ^ Dupuy and Dupuy (1977), pp. 671
