Talk:Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom

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To-do list for Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom:

 edit - history - watch - refresh
  • Create Trident section in history
  • Finish timeline, get references.
  • Ask the guy that did the nice scale diagram on the US version of this page to do one for here.
  • Create civil defence section
  • Special relationship with US section
  • storage of nukes overseas
  • Correlate everything with AWE history section
  • Include memory hole stuff

This is the talk page for discussing improvements to the Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom article.


Contents

[edit] SOURCES

An abridged copy of the papers presented at the Royal Aeronautical Society Symposium on Chevaline 2004 and subsequently published as ISBN 1-85768-109-6 is available as a free email download (approx 450kb zipped-up) from Brian.Burnell Contact via wiki email facility on User page. Brian.Burnell 01:09, 19 August 2006 (UTC)


[edit] Models and table

I just added a link [1] to a well researched table of UK nuclear weapons systems / bomb models. At some future point, someone with some bandwidth should take that and its source materials and expand the article out. Georgewilliamherbert 06:51, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Good Article Nomination

This is a nice article but I am hesitant to approve it with so many sections listed as being stubs. Several sections are both stubs and have links to a Main Article this is probably redundant since a section with a main article should be little more than a stub. Eluchil404 21:46, 17 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Failed GA

  1. No references.
  2. Presence of section stubs.

Cheung1303 04:50, 22 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Modern Perspectives

I have added a section regarding the recently released documents for the 1979 Warsaw Pact plan "Seven Days to the River Rhine", and have noted the lack of nuclear strikes on France and the United Kingdom. A relevant news story is: http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,2763,1651315,00.html#article_continue

I have also noted how the UK and French strategies regarding "Counter Value" nuclear strikes may have influenced the lack of strikes on both nations. I cannot claim inspiration or originality regarding this position, as I have seen it put forth on several discussion fora.

--Wbd 17:03, 7 June 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Mais Oui citation request

Was already there in the following section headed 'Number of Warheads'. Two citations were supplied; the Strategic Defence Review and one other. Brian.Burnell 18:11, 6 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Blue Streak POV

'Failure' was a common misconception based on folk-tales with no research evidence in support. What evidence there is suggests that the reason for cancellation was not because of project 'failure' but because military requirements had changed and had been changing rapidly. Like all similar land-based liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles sited close to coastlines, or the Eastern European launch sites of the USSR, Blue Streak was vulnerable to a pre-emptive attack, because of the time needed to fuel the weapon. An added factor was the unsuitability of British geology and geography for silo construction. Such sites need to be in the centre of large land-masses, remote from large population centres; not possible in a small overcrowded island. The same military logic led to the removal of UK-based Thor IRBMs and Jupiter IRBMs based in Italy and Turkey. Because they were just too vulnerable. Blue Streak went on to a successful second career as the first-stage booster for a European collaborative programme of civil satellite launches. The withdrawal of Jupiter IRBMs was implicated in a tit-for-tat deal after the Cuban Missile Crisis. But the Jupiters were militarily worthless anyway. Use of the word 'failure' suggests to me a partisan POV. Brian.Burnell 18:36, 6 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Modern Perspectives and Counter Value Strikes

All of this POV section was based on the false premise that UK targetting policy was a so-called 'Counter-Value' strategy. Consequently the whole passage was speculative and promoting a POV, which was not sustained by any evidence. It is now known from material declassified in relation to the Chevaline project, and elsewhere, that the UK never adopted any strategy other than one designed to 'decapitate' the Soviet leadership in Moscow. The 'Moscow Criteria' referred to elsewhere in this article and duly cited to hard evidence of its veracity demolishes the speculation about 'Counter-Value', entertaining though it was. Brian.Burnell 16:00, 10 August 2006 (UTC)

I have edited and re-added the material regarding modern perspectives. At any rate, an attack on Moscow counts as a counter-value attack- I was explaining the concept of "counter value" by citing examples, not stating them as utter fact, as counter value was not well-explained elsewhere. That is not POV, that is a clairification for someone who may not be aware of the term.
    • "An attack on Moscow counts as a counter-value strike"
    • No it does not. The Moscow Criteria outlined to ONLY circumstances where targets in the Moscow area was contemplated. As a decapitating strike on the Soviet government apparatus to obliterate it and leave the remainder of the USSR without government, possibly leading to the regimes collapse elsewhere. That is not defined as a counter-value strike. Your personal views are not relevant here. The whole section was stricken because it was based on the false premise that UK targetting policy was a counter-value strategy; when it was never that, even going back to the days when the weapons were delivered by aircraft. The whole raison-etre for the extremely expensive Chevaline project was so that the decapitating strike on the Soviet leadership would remain possible. Without a decapitating strike strategy, and substituting a counter-value strategy, the whole expensive Chevaline fiasco would have been unnecessary; because a counter-value strike would could be launched at a less heavily defended target other than Moscow. That was never the strategy. Hence the £1B wasted on Chevaline.


I take offense at your statement regarding my adding of POV material. While I may have over-stepped, my "speculation" was based on considered analysis by others more expert in their understanding of the Cold War environment.
The entire section should not have been removed, but re-written for a more clear view. I have done some looking to find my examples, and have sourced Tanknet, a discussion group with several experts on the Cold War for my material:

http://63.99.108.76/forums/index.php?showtopic=13477&hl=seven+days+to+the+river+rhine

No, I can't source as well as other people can, as I don't have full access to archives or scholars. Perhaps the other writers, rather than just removing my "speculation", could assist in sourcing.


A golden rule (not really a rule but an aspiration) worth adhering to is this: if you can'y source it, don't include it in the text. If you do its your choice, but others will judge your edits accordingly, and ascribe a lower value to them than those that adhere to the (non) rule.


  • Try PRO DEFE 19/190 or DEFE 25/335 for a clear exposition of what the so-called Moscow Critera actually means. If I can help you short-cut, it means a decapitating attack on the Soviet leadership not on the Soviet people. The basis being that almost all the critical highly centralised Soviet apparatus of Government was based inside or around the Moscow outer ring road, and these were the UK nationally selected targets, not NATO's, which would have struck at multiple other targets. Although you must make your own judgement about whether the UK would ever go to war with the USSR alone. That is the ONLY scenario where the Moscow Criteria would apply. As for the collateral damage to the Moscow population; well that is an inevitable consequence of an attack on military targets located close to major population centres. That doesn't make the Moscow Criteria a plan to attack the Russian people. Its merely a consequence of how the USSR arranged its government apparatus. Equally, the MoD in London is a legitimate military target, even though the consequences for others don't bear thinking about. Email me using the Wiki email facility and by return of email I'll supply a copy of yer actual declassified Moscow Criteria target map. It can't be uploaded to Wiki for copyright reasons. Brian.Burnell 09:10, 25 August 2006 (UTC)
    • Well, I disagree to some degree, but that is probably due to a philosophical difference regarding what I would consider both a decapitating and counter-value strike (as I feel that the implications of the removal of both civilian governance and communications/transportation networks fall far beyond the basics of the removal of the military fighting capacity or the head of military governance).
      • What contributors philosophical differences are are not relevant, nor is our personal view of what contstitutes a counter-value or a decapitating strike means. Each term has an established definition. Its not our function here to try to substitute a different meaning, based on our personal preferences. That will confuse the non-specialist reader; precisely the people that Wikipedia exists to serve. Our task, insofar as we can manage it is to record verifyable information. Our task is not to engage in debate. There are other places for that. 194.223.81.75 10:07, 26 August 2006 (UTC)
    • At any rate, I don't have the ability to source to Wikipedia's satisfaction the information I have supplied, and while I don't feel that this should occur, I have edited it out. The information I have heard regarding strikes beyond Moscow is not reliable according to the standards set, and therefore will not be added by me, at least not until some sourcing or statements appear in the form expected by Wikipedia.
  • You shouldn't be offended because others have sought to help you. Wikipedia is an encyclopedia. It isn't a soapbox. Where material was edited out it was edited out in good faith because it was unsourced and unverifiable (unless you are a senior military officer writing incognitio, which seems unlikely). On the other hand, bearing in mind that this subject is bedevilled by military secrecy, some speculation is almost inevitable to fill in the gaps; but only where it is made crystal clear that it is speculation. Many distinguished academics have themselves fallen into this trap, Hugh Trevor-Roper and the Hitler Diaries come to mind. And no-one has the unfettered access to scholars that you claim others have. Some of the most misleading and inaccurate speculation actually comes from those sources. Some of the material re-instated recently needs to be removed because it is both POV and highly speculative. Brian.Burnell 09:10, 25 August 2006 (UTC)
    • That may be true, but you must also remember that Wikipedia policy states that it is not preferable to remove whole sections in a revert, but to pare away the problematic parts. I disagree with the final statement you make, of course. I'm not quite sure how the entire removal of a section that I addded, without some offer of assistance in re-tuning it, followed by a talk statement that ended with the quip "entertaining though it was", is helping me, however.
    • My statements were no more soapbox-ish than any other statement on the article- to which, they may have made implications that perhaps I should have been more careful to ensure that they did not make, but beyond that, were not attempts to display unfounded speculations, at least not without the appropriate phraseology employed to ensure that the reader would understand that they were extrapolations.


      • Its true that there are other parts of this article that are 'soapboxish' as you put it. But its a lengthy article, and we have to start somewhere and work through it as time permits. But yours wasn't the only one. See the note below about Gordon Brown. This isn't the place to promote the case for current contenders for the Labour Party leadership. I see that there has been no response to my inquiry about deletion. Brian.Burnell 09:28, 26 August 2006 (UTC)


I have also added the Guardian's contrary position that nuclear strikes were omitted owing to a desire by the WP forces to not go beyond the Rhine River. While not added, the Guardian also noted that in the plans the attack was a defensive measure following a NATO attack that had been repulsed.


  • Personally, I don't see the relevance of these to this article, which is not in essence about military tactics. Although I don't have any reason to doubt the genuineness of the Guardian's sources. To me, it seems this section belongs elsewhere; perhaps in an article about Warsaw Pact intentions. Brian.Burnell 09:10, 25 August 2006 (UTC)
    • I feel that this section, while seemingly irrelevant, is one of the few items that presents a WP viewpoint on one scenario of attack into NATO and how the United Kingdom would be treated in such an attack, and has one significant feature that it for one reason or another omits nuclear strikes on France and the United Kingdom. It is to be hoped that in future more information regarding plans will eventually emerge, but showing at least one possible contingency indicates the conceptualizations of uses of force that existed amongst the Soviet-bloc states at the time.


      • I take your point about illustrating the French position in relation to Nato. But it will be confusing to some readers (those who come to Wiki for a reliable reference source) unless fully explained, because the Moscow Criteria bears no relation to Nato's target plans. The Moscow Criteria was a plan for a solely British strike at Moscow; unlikely though that seems.
While I appreciate your pointing out of material which wasn't fully encyclopaedic (which is necessary for the production of quality materials), not all of it should have been removed, and I do not like the assertion that I was acting contrary to Wikipedia standards. I think that some statement about this plan and how it omits strikes on the United Kingdom and France is warranted in this article.


  • As said earlier, you are making assumptions about other peoples intentions that are unfounded. No one is perfect, and Wiki is comprised of imperfect people who produce work that is also imperfect. Striving to better it is good. Being offended where no offence is intended pisses others off, and is not good, but we have to live with it. Can I remind you of what Wiki policy actually is. See the text that appears below under 'Please Note'.


Its considered 'bad form' to remove other peoples comments from Talk Pages. Remove your own if you feel inclined to, but not those of others. Editing content is for the main article page only. 194.223.81.75 10:07, 26 August 2006 (UTC)
   
Talk:Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom
 If you don't want your writing to be edited mercilessly or redistributed by others do not submit it.
   
Talk:Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom
    • I had a difficulty with the tone taken in the initial talk message, not about the edit itself. Perhaps offense was too strong a word, and I apologize for using it, but the statement made it seem that I was fully culpable in commiting a violation of Wikipedia standards and the total removal implied a wholesale failure on my behalf. I also have some issue with the tone you are taking now- surely you can see that someone might feel somewhat perturbed by the statement "Being offended where no offence is intended pisses others off, and is not good, but we have to live with it". It's the "but we have to live with it" portion which is an annoyance, implying that I am somehow at fault, and I disagree with that.


      • It does annoy me somewhat when others claim to be offended by a legitimate critique based on the fact of what appears in print. It was not a critique of you personally. I wouldn't do that. But I am entitled to legitimately comment on what others write. Its a part of the give and take of free expression. Taking personal offense where none was stated or implied does piss me off. It (to me) implies that you felt the critique was dishonest. And being annoyed by that is a part of what I am. To suggest that I shouldn't feel annoyed by that feels like an attack on my character. But this is not what Wiki is supposed to be about. One guiding principle is that we should assume good faith unless proven otherwise. That applies everyone. The remark about taking offence triggered a defensive reaction in me because it appeared to be an attack on my motivation and honesty. If you don't like the 'tone' ...... well only you can resolve that. You can't expect others to adjust their personality to suit you. We have to take each other as we find them, and assume good faith. If you can't do that then its not my problem, but yours. Lets try to put this personality thing aside and concentrate on the article. Brian.Burnell 09:28, 26 August 2006 (UTC)


  • And if there is any, I would like to see any material that supports the contention that France adopted a policy similar to the UK's Moscow Criteria. It seems very likely that France did, given their situation and likely resources. But where is the evidence?
    • I know that we are not supposed to cite Wikis for evidence, but this is the best translated one I could find: Force_de_frappe, specifically:
    • "Stratégie du faible au fort ("Weak-to-strong strategy"); the idea behind is that a full-scale nuclear war would be lost by both opponents, and that a stronger opponent, having more to lose, would therefore refrain from proceeding further".
    • This is supported in other french postings across the web, but I don't have access to their initial sources. I am making an assumption that this is correct, based on the De Gaulle quote "Dans dix ans, nous aurons de quoi tuer 80 millions de Russes. Eh bien je crois qu'on n'attaque pas volontiers des gens qui ont de quoi tuer 80 millions de Russes, même si on a soi-même de quoi tuer 800 millions de Français, à supposer qu'il y eût 800 millions de Français."
    • Assuming that De Gaulle really meant it, and that the succeeding governments followed it, then it represents a clear case of a "counter-value" strategy.
      • That was never British policy. Brian.Burnell 09:28, 26 August 2006 (UTC)
      • Well, I have to bow to your superior knowledge of French strategy; although I still am unable to see how relevant it as to 'Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom', except perhaps as a comparison. Brian.Burnell 09:28, 26 August 2006 (UTC)
Finally, I cannot verify your assertion that the only strike plan was to Moscow, but am using it in this section. I do not believe that all materials regarding the United Kingdom's position have in fact been fully declassified, and in some cases may never


  • Again you make a dangerous assumption that that MAY be other declassified target plans, but you have no evidence to support that. You may be right. But you have no way to verify your belief. So that belief is unsuitable and too POV for an encyclopaedic historical account of nuclear weapons and the UK. But its OK for these Talk pages, because beliefs expressed here are not expected to conform to encyclopaedic standards. The only verifyable targetting plans known of originate either from official sources, or from declassified material; whether directly accessible, or second-hand through the press; although much press coverage is biased, misinformed, speculative, or just plain disinformation. You have to make a judgement of it based on known hard evidence. And the fact is that only those highly placed in government actually know; and their thought processes are unverifyable. So you have to tread carefully to avoid the traps set for the Trevor-Ropers. I hope that you are finding this helpful rather than critical. BTW, the verification for the UK strike plans can be found in the sources cited above. Brian.Burnell 09:10, 25 August 2006 (UTC)
    • There is a contrarian view that could be presented at this point that would suggest that the declassified materials are not in fact either complete or accurate representations, and that the official statements may or may not be fully committed to terminological exactitude regarding the status of plans that may or may not exist, and therefore, as a result, may be considered verifiable, but like the press, not be fully reliable.
      • That's rather akin to saying that nothing the Civil Service or government says is truthful. Now I know that there are people who genuinely believe in such conspiracy theories. But thats all they are. Theories. Archived sources from fifty years ago; that is documemts that were written by Civil Servants for internal circulation are not in the same category as government public relations handouts claiming that WMDs are 45 minutes from launch. I don't accept your argument as having any validity, and its hard to think of any reputable researcher or writer who would. Although there may be some. Brian.Burnell 09:28, 26 August 2006 (UTC)
    • I hope that my statements here have helped to clear up my basic understanding and position on the matter. I am not trying to cause trouble or difficulty to either you or the Wikipedia structure at large, but merely attempting in my own small way to somehow create something of perhaps some benefit to someone within the guidelines set out.
      • Lets not make this a personal thing. These issues are too important.
    • --Wbd 15:04, 25 August 2006 (UTC)

--Wbd 15:06, 24 August 2006 (UTC)

Removed Section Arghh...I've somehow gone very wrong here. I have removed the entire section and agree with your critique. Please accept my apologies for the troubles caused, as I have caused you and others trouble undeservedly. Whatever viewpoints that were NPOV that I placed in the article do not belong, and those that were POV definitely needed removal.

Thank-you for pointing these issues out.

--Wbd 16:51, 26 August 2006 (UTC)


I'm happy to be able to help. But if I'd had the foresight to illustrate it with the Chevaline example sooner it could have been acheived with less anst for both of us. Maury Markowitz has recently completed an excellent rewrite of the Chevaline article that I can recommend for its insight into targetting strategy. Regards Brian.Burnell 15:05, 29 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Trident and Gordon Brown

I have serious doubts about the suitability of this passage for inclusion. Wikipedia is not a political pamphlet, its an encyclopaedia, and a passage promoting a recent speech by a prominent politician seems to me to be too much like political posturing for my personal taste. Perhaps the best place for it might be a biog of Brown? Would others out there like to justify its continued inclusion? Brian.Burnell 17:18, 10 August 2006 (UTC)

  • After a two month period waiting for any objections to removal of the passage about Gordon Brown's recenr speech there are no objections at all lodged here. So ... I'll remove it for the reasons listed above. Apart from it being not to my personal taste, a speech by a politician with no previous governmental responsibility for nuclear weapons or defence matters, at a time when he and others are hustling for promotion to the top job in government is hardly suitable material for an encyclopaedia. When, or if, Brown becomes Prime Minister, the situation obviously changes. But until then he is just another contender on the hustle, and Wikipedia isn't the hustings. Someone might want to insert a suitable piece in Brown's biog page though. That is a more suitable place for it. Brian.Burnell 17:38, 7 October 2006 (UTC)


[edit] Probably the first use of Microsoft Windows ....

It may be true that a Windows-based system has been installed recently, but there is no evidence presented that this minor change is in any way related to replacement plans for Trident (if they yet exist). It is quite normal in the lifespan of all weapon systems for aged components to be replaced; often by more modern components than before. The reason for this can be no more sinister than that the older components are no longer being produced. One example being Windows XP SP1, whose upgrades and support will cease in Oct 2006 for all users, military and civilian. The passage is simply not relevant to the debate about Trident replacement, which is unlikely to take effect before 2025. Use of the word 'probably' is also indicative of the provenance of the passage. Wikipedia is an encyclopaedia, not a soapbox. It requires content to be verifiable. Speculation, however well-intentioned does not belong here, because by its very nature, speculation is not verifiable. Brian.Burnell 10:31, 8 September 2006 (UTC)

Couldn't agree more. The contributor of this section has some sort of agenda, i.e. allowing personal opinions to effect editing. Mark83 16:43, 8 September 2006 (UTC)
Thanks Mark. Its good to know that there are like minds out there. Unfortunately though, contentious topics do attract contributions with a thinly-disguised agenda. Brian.Burnell 23:01, 9 September 2006 (UTC)
Nevertheless, it remains the case that, while the UK parliament has discussed and approved updates to numerous submarine systems, those didn't include the Vanguard command system (Hansard, various); that the proposal to update that command system came not from MoD requirement but rather from one supplier (BAE Systems), thus able to oust the equipment of the original supplier (Ultra) - remember that the original equipment was designed to see out the full service life of the Vanguard boats; that conversion from a proven bespoke software system (which has no extraneous software, and no security issues) to a commercial system (which has both, in plenty) is a dramatic engineering change, especially for a nuclear weapons platform; and that when asked about these proposals in October 2004, the UK's minister told parliament that no decision had been made (Hansard), but nevertheless chose to award the contracts the next month (BAE news releases). Clearly, the GBP24M awarded to BAE Systems for submarine command systems updates is small money compared with the cost of full programmes for Trident replacement or extension; but it must have come from somewhere, and given the political sensitivity of the nuclear programmes, it is odd that money was spent on this without parliament's foreknowledge and approval. Shlgww 07:27, 10 September 2006 (UTC)
It may well be true that these changes TO Trident are a 'dramatic engineering changes' as you claim; and on these software related topics I have to bow to your superior knowledge. However, it is clear that changes TO Trident in the middle of its lifespan are demonstrably not related to a debate in Parliament and the press about plans for Tridents eventual replacement. If and when Trident is retired, all the systems (including these software changes) needed for it to function now and in its remaining life will be thrown on the scrapheap with the missiles. You seem unwilling to grasp that that is why your otherwise informative contributions are not relevant to this section. There is probably a more suitable place for them elsewhere on Wikipedia, perhaps a newly created page. If there isn't one, then there should be, or its waiting for someone like you to create it. But here, these contributions simply sow confusion, and are not verifiable; and without exception, that is the test to apply. Brian.Burnell 15:27, 10 September 2006 (UTC)
Agreed that this information relates to Trident now, rather than Replacement for Trident, so I shall create a correctly linked and verifiable version and put it in a suitable place. (mildly comical that you use Win XP SP1 as your example of ageing software above, since it's actually the still older Windows 2000 which has gone into the replacement Vanguard command systems. Hey ho.) Shlgww 15:48, 11 September 2006 (UTC).
I don't claim to be knowledgable about software. Its another planet to me. You could also insert the links you wanted others to see in External References as hyperlinks, ISBN or internal links to the SCMS or Windows for Warships pages. Their presence there is not dependent on references to them in the main article text, just an encouragement to others to do some further reading. Brian.Burnell 20:29, 11 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Removal of irrelevant material 2

This page is titled Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom and its purpose is to give an overview of British nuclear weapons history from inception to the present day. What is not its purpose is to duplicate the Trident missile page, although the Trident system should of course feature in any well-balanced article about the United Kingdom's nuclear weapons. Nor is its purpose is to be a platform for a section about ship/submarine control software. However well-written or informative that section may be, it is irrelevant to the subject matter of Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom and should be located elsewhere. On a dedicated page. From a careful reading of the text (and its links to other places) inserted here on the Windows control system it becomes clear, even to a non-specialist, that this has nothing whatsoever to do with either nuclear weapons, or their delivery systems, or their targetting or launch procedures. The Windows system is a purely ship and submarine control system that is NOT unique to the Vanguard class SSBNs, but is a system common to many types of vessel, some conventionally-powered, some not; some are armed with conventional weapons only, some like the Vanguard class are not; some are nuclear-powered submarines, and some are surface vessels, eg, frigates and destroyers. Some are of the British Royal Navy, and others are Dutch, Italian, German etc. These states do not possess nuclear weapons or nuclear-powered vessels, yet use this Windows-based operating system for some of their ships. Nor is this page the appropriate place to elaborate on the merits or lack of merit of the Windows operating system, that has no connection whatsoever with British nuclear weapons.

It is absolutely clear that this section on Windows for Warhips is completely irrelevant to the Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom page. The page is not a vehicle for those with some kind of axe to grind about a topic that should be located elsewhere. The Windows section unbalances this page and it is a misuse of this article to repeatedly place it here after having the issues discussed earlier at great length, and solutions suggested for suitable links to a dedicated page. In that sense it is bordering on vandalism IMHO. Brian.Burnell 09:43, 15 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] BAE Systems is one of the ....

The reference to BAE Sytems is likewise unverifiable. No citable source is offered for the assertion that BAe is "one of the most powerful lobbyists ...". It may well be a perfectly reasonable view to hold; but Wikipedia is not a soapbox for such views, or of opposing views. The proper place for these is elsewhere, perhaps in a political pamphlet. Wikipedia is for encyclopaedic, verifiable content. Of course no contributor can ever be free of political bias, especially about such a contentious issue as Trident. But unless we strive to avoid using Wiki as a soapbox it will quickly degenerate into a forum where two opposing viewpoints crowd out all information that does not support their viewpoint. I note that the above passage ref 'Trident and Gordon Brown' posted one month ago dated 10 Aug 2006 has not attracted a single comment from contributors in favour of retaining it. Brian.Burnell 10:31, 8 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Removal of irrelevant material

There is no evidence that the changes referred to are in any way connected with plans to replace Trident, which will not expire of old age until around 2025. There is no evidence that replacement plans even exist. Any assertion that there are such plans can only be speculation and unverifiable to the standards that Wikipedia requires. The software changes referred to are possibly no more than a routine replacement of worn-out equipment such as happens as a matter of course with all aging machinery. See above at 'Probably the first use of Microsoft Windows ...' If there is any hard evidence that the replacement software is in any way a neccessary precursor for replacement of the whole missile and submarine system then produce it, and the deleted material can be reinstated as compliant with Wikis requirements for verifiable encyclopaedic content. Wiki is not a soapbox for POV. Brian.Burnell 23:21, 9 September 2006 (UTC)

Well, because of the highly classified nature of these programmes, it is a little difficult to produce hard evidence of this kind from public sources. The few openly available references I am able to produce (Hansard, company news releases, etc) you keep removing, which makes it difficult for others to look up what limited source material is available. Shlgww 07:28, 10 September 2006 (UTC)

Of course they are difficult to source. I too have worked on highly classified nuclear weapons projects and understand the difficulties about sourcing. But contributions that are unable to be verified are often only the writers own speculation (although I don't suggest that yours is untrue). Remembering the very many differing acounts published about the Chevaline project provides numerous examples of misplaced, misguided speculation by distinguished academics. Because these publications came from apparently knowledgable sources they were then repeated ad nauseum elsewhere. Most of it we now know to be untrue and very wide of the mark after declassified documents were placed in the archives. That's a remarkably common tale in this area of contributions. The golden aspiration is don't assert what you cannot verify. What you cannot verify is only opinion, speculation; or even disinformation. The military authorities are exceedingly adept at that technique. The trick is to not swallow the PR whole. Because it is so difficult to source to hard evidence, a useful editorial gambit is to admit that so the readers understand that it is unverified. That can be done by the gambit of offering the material as "Dr, Prof, the Rt Hon, etc says that XYZ is ....." and sourcing the published opinion. That way, the reader understands the uncertain nature of the information, and its a practice usually accepted in moderation by Wikipedia. Brian.Burnell 15:27, 10 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Current British Posture

Has never been one of massive retaliation. The UK has never possessed sufficient bombs to permit that strategy. Since Polaris, and probably earlier, strategy has followed three paths. First, the UK strategic and tactical weapons since 1960 or earlier were assigned to NATO, and SACEUR determined targetting plans (with input from UK staffs). That was true of the V-bombers weapons and is still true today. Second, in the unlikely situation where the UK launched a strike without allied support, the only strategic strategy was the so-called 'Moscvow Criteria' where the intention was to decapitate the Soviet leadership concentrated around Moscow, leaving the remaining USSR untouched and hopefully detached from the regime. To do that it was necessary to defeat the ABM defences protecting Moscow (but nowhere else). That was the raison-d'etre for the Chevaline project, that was not needed for any other targetting plan. It seems unlikely that that targetting strategy has changed significantly; although we are unlikely to have hard evidence for many years yet. Thirdly, the free-fall bombs deployed with the RAF and Royal Navy were also able to be used as a sub-strategic weapon against less well-defended targets on the periphery of the USSR or elsewhere. Nothing has changed since these bombs were retired, and their functions as a sub-strategic deterrent have been assigned to Trident missiles equipped with a suitable low-yield warhead. Note though that the 'sub-strategic' WE.177 warheads ranged from a minimum of 10 kilotons to 200 kt and 450 kt, depending on model used. Note also that 'sub-strategic' can mean many things; eg. there are declassified plans in the PRO for a tactical (or sub-strategic) strike from Navy carriers at ports on the coast of Burma should the UK's committments to SEATO be invoked by a Chinese attack into Vietnam or SE Asia. Burma is not usually regarded as worthy of such a strike, and doubtless there were other plans. Brian.Burnell 16:18, 29 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] How times have changed

The phase was inserted in good faith to illustrate how public opinion as expressed by the quality press, has changed since the 1954 decision to develop a British thermonuclear weapon. Although it could perhaps have been better phased, the purpose of illustrating changing public opinion is a perfectly legitimate objective in the context of the narrative. Hopefully, the changes made and the additional references provided will meet with Palpatine's approval. Brian.Burnell 17:38, 7 October 2006 (UTC)

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