Talk:Noumenon

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I completely rewrote the article. No disrespect for anything other than your philosophical presumptions, guys--but you really shouldn't write articles about stuff that you don't know about. --Larry Sanger

Yeah, but do you have to gloat about it? --Ed Poor

I'm not gloating, I'm disgusted! I'm not trying to lord it over anybody. I really honestly think that people should not write about stuff that they don't know about. I don't do it (or, I'm not aware of doing it) in other fields; why do other people who don't know about philosophy think they can write about it? --Larry Sanger

I am no Kant scholar, but I think he would have taken issue with the description of the noumenal realm as "a basic reality underlying observable phenomena". In the Critique of Pure Reason, he states, "[t]hat ... which we entitle 'noumenon' must be understood as being such only in a negative sense" (B309)--that which is "not an object of our sensible intuition" (B307). The definition given here is positive and uses the words "basic" and "underlying"--language used to describe phenomena, and which cannot rightly be applied to noumena. I would like to replace this definition to make it consistent with the Kantian sense in which the term is generally used unless anyone would disagree...

I think I agree with the above proposition. A statement that the noumenon "underlies" anything or forms its "basis" would seem to me to establish a causal link between the noumenon and other things, which, to my knowledge, is a link Kant would not have made between it and anything else. However, I'm not entirely sure of this; I'm rereading Kant lately, and if anyone else finds a definite refutation of this then he or she should let us know. Otherwise, I vote that we use a definition more reflective of the above statements. (A final request, though-- let's not change anything because of what we think Kant would have taken issue with, especially when textual evidence of his position is readily available.)

Because everybody thinks they know about philosophy. It's only because I've actually studied it for a few years that I've learned enough to really understand the scope of my own ignorance. For everybody else, they don't know enough about to realize that they don't know anything. --LDC

Please leave the link to [[Phenomenon (Kant). I don't know if Larry will actually write an article, but it is an appropriate link from the article as written which addresses mainly the use of noumenon as used by Kant. Fredbauder 16:07 Oct 25, 2002 (UTC)

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Regarding the article on Noumenon: I've barely read Kant, so maybe its my fault, but can someone please explain to me what the text in the article means when it says Max Born solves the enigma of Kant's Ding an Sich with the statement One person cannot convey the concept of the color red, but two people can agree (on the color). Is this really what Kant meant by Noumenon? It doesn't seem right to me. Its also strange to say that he "solved" the enigma--I did read Hegel, and I know that both Hegel and Gottlieb Fichte, as well as other German Idealists, made arguments refuting the notion of the thing-in-itself. Hegel says there is no thing-in-itself that is beyond understanding. Does this article need to be changed and corrected? Brianshapiro

I'm removing that paragraph...169.207.87.118 is writing about something he doesn't understand. Obviously, philosophers generally recognize some kind of distinction along the lines made by Kant and Locke but disagree about whether noumenon or "unobservables" are "unknowable" as Kant says they are. B 16:28, May 5, 2004 (UTC)

Contents 1 Noumena 2 Noumenon and Buddhism 3 Noumenon / Transcendental Object / Thing in Itself 4 Etymology 5 Indeterminacy (Philosophy) 6 Removed because it's "erroneous and personal"? Defend your assertion, please! 7 Removed sentence 8 Discordianism? 9 Some removed material 10 Nietzsche's critique and science 11 Occam's Razor

[edit] Noumena

Philosophy is hard to restrict to people who have 'studied' it. Philosophy, along with all arts, fine arts, and social sciences, pertain to everyone. And the proletariat can hardly be expected to go deeply into all fields of enquiry. People like Larry (who rewrote the article, I think) should keep up the good work, without delusions of intellectual grandeur. Humans shouldn't be relegated to the world of noumena!

I agree. My studies of Physics involved a great deal of discussion of philosophy, and so have my wife's studies of art history. Not everyone qualified to discuss the topic needs to be an actual philosopher. MichaelCrawford 00:21, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

Well, insofar as there can be a philosophy of pretty much anything, the boundaries between philosophy and any subject are somewhat blurred. But if you're trained in art history or physics then it's not a given that you'll produce good philosophy just because there are some philosophical issues that naturally arise from your subject matter. (I mean, just empirically, there are many examples of bad philosophy done by famous scientists, and that's in issues on their own turf.) For despite the overlap, philosophy is nonetheless its own subject and has its own modes of inquiry. These have to be studied and practiced with as much effort as any other subject. It doesn't do just to say that it pertains to everyone - physics also pertains to everyone (quite literally) but that doesn't mean I'm going to go comment on the mechanics of heat diffusion in a plasma unless I know an awful lot about it. And knowing a lot about it will probably take a few years of study. Until then, I'll obviously defer to a physicist. I don't see why the same is not true of philosophy, particularly with respect to articles on similarly technical vocabulary, such as 'noumenon'. zenpea 10:21, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Noumenon and Buddhism

Wondering if there is space or reason to put a subnote about the very common error of attributing this term and to a degree, Transcendental Idealism as being what the Buddhist notion of the two truths and emptiness is about. (20040302)

[edit] Noumenon / Transcendental Object / Thing in Itself

First, one might wonder how Kant could say noumenon and phenomenon stand in any kind of relationship insofar as the categories of relation cannot be applied to noumenon. But of course, if the form of logical judgments are distinguished from the categories of understanding, it's easy to show that whilst we can *judge* that they stand in a logical relation, we can only make *negative* claims about the metaphysics underlyling it (e.g. that the relationship is not one of inherence/subsistence, cause/effect or community/reciprocity). Perhaps this element of the connection between noumenon and phenomenon could be made clearer in the article?

Second, Perhaps you might also mention the scope of overlap between the following distinctions: noumenon / thing-in-itself / transcendental object. Are they the same thing? Is there any merit to claims we should treat them differently? I reckon that, in general, flagging these kinds of debates in philosophy articles might be useful, given the amount of students who rely on wikipedia. 05:51, 29 March 2006 (UTC) zenpea

I've tried to provide a reasonably simple explanation of your first point in paragraph 4. 06:35, 13 April 2006 128.233.146.88

The article, in the "Kant's usage" section, claims that Kant asserted that we are sensibly cognizant of representations of unknown somethings. Then the article has the words "what Kant refers to as the transcendental object." Kant used the phrase transcendental object only once in his book. This was in the first edition (A109). There, it designated only an unknown X that is always the same and has no individual characteristics. The transcendental object is actually the unity of the observing subject's consciousness in its knowledge of an experienced world. Kant, therefore, used the erroneous triple distinction of representation, object, and thing-in-itself. This was criticized in Schopenhauer's criticism of the Kantian philosophy. Schopenhauer claimed that there is no represented (transcendental) object. There is only a distinction between representation and thing-in-itself.Lestrade 14:00, 20 June 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

[edit] Etymology

The etymology of "noumena" is perfectly fine, but the explanation of "noesis" seems abysmally bad. "Noesis" is indeed from the same root as "noumena"; it is an abstract noun made with the regular formative suffix "sis." It just means "thought." I'm going to delete this sentence in the article, unless anyone can support the "tendency towards the new" interpretation. Andrew Ollett 20:15, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

Good catch. — goethean ॐ 20:28, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Indeterminacy (Philosophy)

I am re-adding my article on indeterminacy in philosophy since critics of Kant's noumenon consider it to be indeterminate for reasons expressed in that article. If someone wishes to remove it, then he or she should discuss the reasons for doing so here. Thanks, Tastyummy 06:23, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

First off, it isn't your article. It is Wikipedia's. Second, I removed it because that is a redirect that will be deleted. I've moved the original's name to Indeterminacy (Philosophy). Third, the body of the article already links to it. So it doesn't need to be placed in the See also section. I strongly suggest you familiarize yourself with Wikipedia's policies.Aey 06:29, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

It is my article in that I wrote it in its entirety a few days ago. I have given Wikipedia all rights to it, but I assert my right to take pride in my own work. I apologize for the mixup over the redirection thing, though. The body of the article only links to indeterminacy's disambig, which itself links to several articles. I thought it would be useful to the reader not to have to go through an extra step, no? (If not, no problem here.) Thanks for your advice; I do try generally to follow Wikipedia policies. Please let me know if there is any further problem. Tastyummy 06:34, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

The link is broken. I'm too new to know how to fix this quickly, although I'll try to figure it out. If you know how, please do so, since I'll have to look up how that kind of link works. Tastyummy 06:37, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

Nevermind. Fixed already. Thanks. Tastyummy 06:38, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Removed because it's "erroneous and personal"? Defend your assertion, please!

I find it interesting that my statement that Nietzscheanistic criticism of the Noumenon arguably precursed the scientific method was recently removed due to its being an "erroneous personal argument". I'd love to see the evidence that I am in error in asserting that Nietzsche's critique of the noumenon did, in fact, precurse the scientific method:

The following quotation is from Beyond Good and Evil, the "Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy" edition, in the chapter entitled "On the prejudices of philosophers":

"'[...]Things of the highest value must have another, separate origin of their own, -- they cannot be derived from this [...] world[...] Look instead into the lap of being, the everlasting, the hidden God, the 'thing-in-itself' -- this is where their ground must be, and nowhere else!'

-- This way of judging typifies the prejudices by which metaphysicians of all ages can be recognized: this type of valuation lies behind all their logical procedures. From these "beliefs" they try to acquire their "knowledge," to acquire something that will end up being solemnly christened as 'the truth'[...]"

Nietzsche's argument against the thing-in-itself focuses, throughout his work, on its intangibility, its indeterminacy, that it is unobservable, et cetera. And science can only deal with observable phenomena, or processes which can be logically deduced from observable phenomena, and which thus are, in their own way, observable. How is Nietzschean thought, then, in its opposition to the possibility of faith-based "knowledge", not precursive of a scientific worldview in those regards?

It seems to me that the user who deleted the section I had written was, in fact, himself making an argument that was both erroneous and personal: without giving any further reason than that he thought it was incorrect, he deleted my statement. I, for my part, can provide evidence that the statement I have made here is correct. The reason I suggest that the other user's removal of the section was on personal grounds was, quite simply, that no other grounds are immediately evident: I certainly am not making the argument "for personal reasons"-- whatever that even means-- any more than does a physicist argue that the atom is composed of protons, neutrons, and electrons "for personal reasons": I am presenting an evidentially-based argument as such: you will note that I say that Nietzsche arguably precursed the scientific method, and not that he definitely did, and that to support my argument I refer to Nietzsche's treatment of the inobservable in general, which is supported in all of Nietzsche's works. The above citation is further evidence that I'm not just making this up: read Nietzsche yourself if you doubt this. I have read almost all of his works available in English translation several times; if there is evidence that I have been wrong about Nietzsche in all the years that I have studied his works, I would like to see it immediately.

I am reverting this article to the previous edit, and if there are evidential grounds that the section I am re-adding is "erroneous" or "personal", then I implore the offended readers to discuss this evidence before re-deleting them.

Thank you,

Tastyummy 08:13, 28 August 2006 (UTC)

One further note: this argument isn't original, by any means, and I am not the only person of the above opinion. In Darwin's Dangerous Idea, by Daniel Dennett, the author quotes Hollingdale:

"[...]Nietzsche considered that evolution presented a correct picture of the world, but that it was a disastrous picture. His philosophy was an attempt to produce a new world-picture which took Darwinism into account and was not nullified by it."

You now have user:tastyummy quoting Dennett, quoting Hollingdale, quoting Nietzsche. Dennett, as a bright, is a proponent of a naturalistic worldview, and his extensive quotation of Nietzsche throughout the aforementioned work indicates that he, too, finds Nietzscheanistic thought precursive of scientific analysis. This is clearly not "personal", whether or not it's "erroneous".

Tastyummy 09:06, 28 August 2006 (UTC)

Dennett is brilliant, and has made a career of stirring the pot with controversial philosophical assertions. I suggest if he's going to be used in "Nietzsche's critique of noumenon", it be accurately quoted or paraphrased, and cited to the appropriate work by Dennett. ... Kenosis 23:59, 30 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Removed sentence

I've removed this sentence due to the fact that it does not accurately represent Nietzsche's place in 19th Century philosophy with respect to scientific method. ... Kenosis 23:52, 30 August 2006 (UTC)

• Nietzscheanistic criticism of the noumenon found, for example, in his Beyond Good and Evil, was arguably a precursor of the scientific method in that both rely heavily on quantifiability and definition for proof of a statement of fact, and in that both find fault with the Noumenon's lack of quantifiability, observability, etc.... 23:52, 30 August 2006 (UTC)

Kant's use of noumenon sets up modern scientific method to stick with phenomena (the empirically "observable"). Nietzsche's approach had absolutely nothing to do with it. ... Kenosis 23:56, 30 August 2006 (UTC)

Kant's noumenon only "sets up the modern scientific method to stick with phenomena" to the extent that it is a wonderfully-lucid way of "describing" the indescriptible. Kant himself was no scientist, and his assertion that the noumenon lies behind all phenomena is utterly unscientific since there is absolutely no evidential support for its existence. And even if we do consider Kant as having "set up the scientific method" by writing works in support of the kind of reasoning science attempts to avoid, it was Nietzschean and other criticism of Kant that allowed the scientific method to emerge from Kant's epistemological "primordial soup". And Nietzsche had much to do with the scientific method besides: he questioned the truth of various "scientific facts" of his day which lacked evidential support, such as his age's formulations of atomism, which have subsequently been shown time and time again to have been incomplete and fundamentally flawed physical models; and Nietzsche managed to work this out without particle accelerators, or cloud chambers, or any other machinery more complicated than his own pen: he simply saw the logical flaws in many unscientific arguments by identifying components of models like his day's atomism with the thing-in-itself. Just because he didn't call it "science" doesn't mean he wasn't a scientific thinker, or at least, as I actually said to begin with, a precursor to scientific thought: Consider that in science a hypothesis must be testable. Long before the scientific method was formulated, Nietzsche noted passingly that "that a theory is refutable is, frankly, not the least of its charms". (-from Beyond Good and Evil, ch. 1, sec. 18)

He was also one of the first people of any real philosophical influence to consider the motivations of human behaviours in terms of instinctual drives; this line of thinking heavily influenced Freud, who in turn continues to influence much of modern psychology. Nietzsche's critique of the Cartesian Cogito was one of the earliest psychologies to consider the human mind as a sum of other discrete phenomena, and not as the single "subject", "I", et cetera: and psychology is a true emperical science to the extent to which it can predict quantifiable human behaviours, such as drug addiction. Few people before Nietzsche had the courage to say, in a Christian West, that humans were no more and no less than animals and that their motivations only appeared to be special because their observers themselves were "human, all-too-human". Where Nietzsche saw the Thing in Itself in a philosophy, he saw the object of a philosopher's faith:

"From these beliefs [in phenomena's origination in the thing-in-itself], they ["the metaphysicians"] try to acquire their "knowledge", to acquire something that will end up being solemnly christened as "the truth".

"I have gradually come to realise what every great philosophy so far has been: a confession of faith on the part of its author[...]" -both from Beyond Good and Evil, first chapter.

This sort of questioning of non-evidentially based arguments and explanations is an integral part of the scientific process. If we as a civilisation had continued, as Kant did, to argue for the existence of phenomena without evidence for their existence, we wouldn't have anything you or I would call science; we'd only have theology and its ilk! Nietzscheanistic criticism of the Noumenon is a mirror of the scientific method: if the scientific method must, as you say, (and I'll agree here,) "stick with phenomena", then it was Nietzsche, and not Kant, who deserves credit for "setting up" science! How can you say that Nietzsche had "nothing to do with it"? For better or for worse, Nietzsche profoundly impacted Western philosophy, and his criticism of Kant is reiterated throughout his work: this is historical fact! Whether or not you agree with Nietzsche, how can you say he had "nothing to do with" the process via which science moved away from "studying" the Noumenon, if you've already said that science deals only with phenomena? Nietzsche, unlike Kant and all of the Idealists who came before him, (--and, for that matter, the immense number that came after him--), questioned the "existence" of something for which there was no tangible evidence but which was nonetheless taken to be "self-evident" by virtually all philosophers in his day. Arguments about the origin of complex ideological structures found in Nietzsche's book, On the Genealogy of Morals, are comparable in many respects to modern work in memetics-- and Dennett agrees here, as well, so, again, this isn't only my personal opinion.

Unfortunately, all you have provided so far in this discussion has, in fact, been your personal opinion. You have not given a single shred of evidence for your assertion that Nietzsche "had nothing to do with" the scientific method. Furthermore, even if Kant had been remotely scientific in his thinking-- which, in my personal opinion, certainly wasn't the case, although I'm at least willing to admit that that statement is one of personal opinion and not of fact-- this is no argument against the validity of my comparison between specific elements common to Nietzschean and scientific thought: observability, for example: Nietzsche tried only to deal with what was observable, as does science. Any statement about something that is utterly inobservable is necessarily untestable, and, thus, not a valid scientific hypothesis. And Nietzsche made many errors, as did every philosopher I've ever read, and as do I: but this does not invalidate his work's influence any more than scientific criticism invalidates Kant's historical influence.

If my statement that Nietzsche arguably precursed the modern scientific method in certain very specific ways is, in fact, demonstrably wrong, then, by all means, prove it! Elaborate on your theory that Kant was more influential on scientific thought than was Nietzsche by providing some historical evidence, and perhaps-- heaven forbid-- by actually quoting Kant! "That a theory is refutable is not the least of its charms", quoth Nietzsche, but quoth Kant:

"It is a call to reason to undertake anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge, and to institute a tribunal which will assure to reason its lawful claims, and dismiss all groundless pretensions, not by despotic decrees, but in accordance with its own eternal and unalterable laws. This tribunal is no other than the critique of pure reason. I do not mean by this a critique of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all knowledge after which it may strive independently of all experience."

Nietzsche praises disprovability in a theory, while Kant states outright in his Critique of Pure Reason that he intends to "institute a tribunal which will assure to reason its lawful claims[...]"-- how is this in any way scientific? Certainly, both Kant and the scientist seek knowledge, but science is a process of constructive doubt, and not of the "construction" of "knowledge" out of a grandiose sense of self-excellence. And Nietzsche had an overly-high opinion of himself, as well-- but he spoke of his ideas on provability, et cetera, as though they were obvious, and not as though he had made some incredible discovery as Kant thought he had done.

Furthermore, how is Kant's assertion that knowledge can derive from anything other than experience in any way scientific? The scientific process is one in which conclusions are drawn from empirical data. There's no need whatsoever to mention the Noumenon in any scientific hypothesis: as is mentioned already in the article on the Noumenon, Occam's Razor neatly slices it out.

Some of what I've said about Kant on this discussion page, and not in the article, such as my implication that his assumption that he could actually create an immutable system of knowledge was arrogant and silly, has simply been my personal opinion. But all of my statements about Nietzsche's precursion of scientific thought are supported by historical evidence and eminent modern philosophers. If you have any real evidence for Kant's being more influential in science than Nietzsche, why not make a section elsewhere in the article on the argument that the Noumenon is part of scientific thought, instead of simply removing an argument that disagrees with it? You'll notice that I haven't messed with anything Kant actually said, even though I passionately disagree with him; I have appropriately placed criticisms of his ideas in properly-labeled sections so that people can think about these ideas for themselves. If you think Kant's argument isn't detailed well enough in the article, by all means, fix it! But don't remove an argument unless you can give more reason for doing so than "because it was wrong" (or, equally vacuously, "because it had nothing to do with it the scientific method, because I said so..."). Let's be constructive: I'm writing about a philosophical argument that I happen to agree with, but what I've written could just as easily have been written by someone who disagrees with it: again, note that I state at the beggining that the connection for which I provide evidence is arguable, and not that it is certain: why not make a section for counter-criticisms? This would provide the reader with more information overall, instead of taking it away. And what, exactly, do you mean by saying that Dennett needs to be cited here, anyway? I only quoted Dennett to show that my statement wasn't original research, but every last sentence on Wikipedia needn't cite a source, and certainly not if the subject isn't even really controversial. But just to make you happy, I'll include Nietzsche's own words in my next edit.

I am, of course, reverting this article once again. If my well-supported statement of an arguable connection between Nietzsche and science is again removed without stated evidential grounds for its being incorrect, I will contact an administrator about this.

Have a nice day, everyone.

Tastyummy 04:00, 1 September 2006 (UTC)

Update: I just reverted the article (except for the recent spelling fix) and then added a citation about Karl Popper from the wikipedia article on him as well as a quote from Nietzsche cited at Project Gutenberg. This should show quite clearly where I'm getting my evidence that Nietzsche was, to some extent, a scientific thinker.

Again, if someone else thinks he wasn't, I request that he or she kindly provide some evidence for this before removing what I've written.

Tastyummy 04:31, 1 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Discordianism?

I removed the link in the "see also" section to Discordianism. I can sort of see a connection between this statement

"[Discordianism] can be viewed as a simple rejection of reductionism and dualism, even falsifiability — not in concept different from postmodernism or certain trends in the philosophy of mathematics."

and the article on the noumenon as it currently stands either via the dualism of noumenon and phenomenon or via Nietzsche's and Popper's statements on falsifiability.

However, there are certainly many more ideologies which reject falsifiability and/or dualism than Discordianism (since, as its own article asserts, such rejection is "not in concept different from postmodernism or certain trends in the philosophy of mathematics"). Postmodernism, as a much more influential movement than Discordianism, would deserve a place here too if Discordianism does (and if, indeed, postmodernism in general actually and necessarily includes this position), as would such diverse "isms" as Dadaism and nihilism. But linking to every concept that is related to the Kantian noumenon only in rejecting an aspect of one of its criticisms would be a pretty monumental task.

It would be preferable-- but nevertheless not, in my opinion, terribly necessary-- to link to "dualism", for example, since the separation of the noumenon and phenomenon can be seen as a type of dualism; however, even this isn't specifically relevant to this article since, to be fair in using this connection as justification for adding this link, we'd then have to attempt to provide a link to dualism in all other articles on philosophical positions that either imply or are criticised by some given dualistic view of things. And as far as falsifiability goes, I've now linked to it in the body of the article; if this was the connection you saw between Discordianism and the Kantian noumenon, I'd suggest adding Discordianism to some kind of category for falsifiability in general, since Discordianism doesn't seem to relate specifically to the concept of the noumenon in its treatment of falsifiability in general (and if I'm wrong on this point, then the article on Discordianism ought to be changed to reflect this connection, since it currently describes Discordianism as a philosophical position in rather vague terms).

I think the person who linked to it here should create (or use) some category for ideologies (or, for that matter, religions) that are critical of dualism and/or falsifiability. I actually think that this is probably too general a category to be useful-- anything that purports to be "monistic" and to access "absolute" (unfalsifiable) truth would have to go in there, for example-- but that's a problem that should be addressed in the article on Discordianism. The "citation needed" tags on its statements about postmodernism and the philosophy of mathematics are there because that the statement wasn't clearly demonstrated to whoever placed them, and they're not being clearly demonstrated to me either. While the concept of the noumenon can indeed be connected to Discordianism, it can also be connected to Hinduism, or to Platonism, or even to sponges via the following sequence of already-existing links: Noumenon -> Natural world -> Animal -> Porifera (which redirects to "sea sponge", which includes a disambiguation page that links to other types of sponge). For a page to be put in the "see also" section of an article, it should be specifically relevant to the subject matter of that article and not just connected with via very general concepts, unless the article is a category, list, etc.

If I'm missing something here, and there really is a relevant and specific connection between Discordianism and the thing-in-itself that isn't shared by hundreds of other philosophical worldviews, please fix the article on Discordianism to include this connection before linking to it here.

Thanks,

Tastyummy 02:00, 8 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Some removed material

I've removed the following material in keeping with the request for citations in the article represented by the template at the head of the article. I inserted this material some months ago, but I wouldn't know where to source it because it's my explanation. Here's what I removed: ... Kenosis 19:51, 12 October 2006 (UTC)

• "Kant, here, is using a metaphor that is the opposite of "understand" ("to stand under"), saying instead that to "transcend" a direct observation or experience is to use reason and classifications (the forms of thought we engage in, including organizing and manipulating words and/or other symbolic representations) which strive to correlate with the phenomena we observe. By Kant's view, we can make sense out of phenomena in these various ways, but can never directly know the noumena, the "things-in-themselves," the actual objects and dynamics of the natural world. In other words, by Kant's Critique, our minds may attempt to correlate in useful ways, perhaps even closely accurate ways, with the structure and order of the universe, but cannot know these "things" directly. Rather, we must infer the extent to which thoughts correspond with things by our further observations of the manifestations of those things that can be seen, heard, touched, smelled, tasted, and/or measured in some way by instrumentation, that is, of phenomena." ... 19:51, 12 October 2006 (UTC)

The rest of the second paragraph I left intact, such as the references to the specific classes of transcendental aesthetic. They can be sourced quite easily (cite to the Critique of Pure (Speculative) Reason or some appropriate secondary source). ... Kenosis 19:51, 12 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Nietzsche's critique and science

I've realised that I may have spent more space in trying to make a point about Nietzsche than in writing an article on the noumenon. Looking back at it, I feel like I've all but written "Nietzsche was a scientist". This was not my intention. Nietzsche was a "proto-scientist", and he was definitely a psychologist, etc., but so, too, in his way, was Kant. While, in my opinion, Nietzsche's critique of Kant was a direct step toward modern scientific thought, it was necessitated by Kant's own work, as Kenosis said earlier. Despite the fact that I do think Kantianism has had a negative influence on philosophy, I'm trying not to put my personal opinions on WP without evidence supporting them. If I've failed to do this, please bring it to my and other editors' attention.

I'm going to modify the section on his critique anyway, since elements of Nietzsche's own philosophy (i.e., his Will to Power) are arguably noumenal themselves ("This, too, is will to power and nothing more[...]"-- Nietzsche's attempted monism can sometimes be reformulated as noumenon/phenomenon, so it's not fair to make it sound like Nietzsche figured the whole thing out. (You can make a Nietzscheanistic criticism of Nietzsche on the grounds that he contradicted his own critique of the noumenon: "The causa sui is a type of logical rape and abomination" (from Beyond Good and Evil) versus the "self-propelled wheel" of the total affirmation of life (from Zarathustra) is an example of this. And while he did influence science, he was not a scientist; I'll make it clear that Nietzscheanism and Popper's falsificationism are not interchangeable and that the two critiques are really quite separate, even though Nietzsche's quote on falsifiability does, I think, deserve to remain in his criticism, as he did make it before Popper formulated his epistemology.

I'm trying to revamp the "criticisms" sections to make them as NPOV as possible; if anyone thinks other work needs to be done to achieve this, please discuss it here. The Kantian noumenon and noumenality in philosophy in general are a touchy subject among philosophers, but I think that if we work together we can turn this into an article of outstanding quality.

I also might add a Wittgenstein quote, "of that of which we cannot speak, we must remain silent," if I can track down the source.

This article also needs to be updated to reflect Hegel's use of the term. I haven't read much Hegel, but I'll try to track down a lecture of his I once read in which he "criticised" Kant's Critique of Pure Reason at length but fails to eliminate noumenal elements from his phenomenology. I'm also going to discuss Kant's influence on Derrida and Hegel in the "Influences on Modern Philosophy" section, since it's really quite important to much of their work, for better or for worse.

Good night/morning/afternoon/evening, wherever you are, Tastyummy 08:54, 13 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Occam's Razor

I see that someone's re-inserted the assertion that Occam's Razor is noumenal into the section on criticism of the noumenon via Occam's Razor. I will continue to argue against this for the simple reason that Occam's Razor, being, as it is, a descriptible principle, is phenomenon rather than noumenon. If, as this article currently says, "for Kant, the noumenal realm is radically unknowable", (and with this I agree), then unless Occam's razor is unknowable it is not the noumenon or "part of" the noumenon, whatever that would mean. If Occam's Razor is a principle necessarily expressed in words, which are observable, then it is phenomenon. If it demonstrably relates to observable things-- i.e., if there is a causal relationship between it and anything empirical, such as a theory X derived in part from the elimination of redundant elements from a more complex, but no more informative, theory Y, etc.-- then it is phenomenon.

Even the word "noumenon" is phenomenal; it is a word, which is observable. Unless Occam's Razor is not descriptible, it is not noumenal.

Unless I am mistaken, this is consistent with the rest of the article as it stands as well as with Kantianism; if there is an opposing claim, please discuss it here.

Thanks,

Tastyummy 16:37, 30 October 2006 (UTC)