Talk:Northern Expeditions
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I wasn't aware of this article; with that being the case, I'll try to fold what I've written so far into this article when I get a chance, and I won't add any more at this point. --Nlu 08:24, 20 November 2005 (UTC)
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[edit] Text from (former article) Zhuge Liang's northern campaigns
Zhuge Liang, as the regent of Shu Han, conducted five expeditions against the stronger Cao Wei -- under the theory that Shu Han, as the weakest of the three states during the Three Kingdoms period, if it had not tried to change the balance of power, would eventually be swallowed up by Cao Wei anyway, even though it was allied with Eastern Wu. However, although Zhuge was a talented administrator of the empire and strategician, he proved to be far less able as a general, and while his forces did not suffer any crushing defeats, they also failed to accomplish much against Cao Wei.
In the popular historical novel The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, these campaigns were described as "six advancements from Mount Qi" (六出祁山). (Mount Qi is in modern Longnan, Gansu.) However, in actuality, there were only five campaigns, and only two of them involved Mount Qi.
[edit] Prelude
After the death of Shu Han's founding emperor, Liu Bei, in 223, the will of Liu Bei left the regency of his son, Liu Shan, in Zhuge Liang's hands. While Zhuge already had substantial powers and was effective in organizing Shu Han's government into an efficient and clean organ before Liu Bei's death, his status as regent allowed him to carry out more reforms. Soon after Liu Bei's deaths, the southern commanderies of the empire (largely inhabited by non-Han) rebelled, but Zhuge took no action, and instead rested the people and saved the food supplies for future use. In 225, he advanced south and was able to pacify the southern commanderies by first defeating the rebels in battle and then pardoning them. For the rest of Zhuge's life there would be no further southern rebellions, and the southern commanderies contributed much manpower and resources to his efforts north.
Having pacified the south, Zhuge now looked to the north and planned an attack against Cao Wei. It appeared to be quite an impossible task -- Cao Wei was several times larger in size and population than Shu Han, and it had a number of talented generals. Zhuge understood this, but at the same time believed that Shu Han nevertheless needed to change the balance of power, or else Cao Wei would eventually destroy it. In 227, he advanced with his troops to the key city on the empire's northern region, Hanzhong (漢中, in modern Hanzhong, Shaanxi) and set up his headquarters there, preparing for his expeditions. It was before he advanced to Hanzhong that he wrote the famous First report on the reasons for the expedition (前出師表, qian chushi biao).
Prior to Zhuge's being able to launch any actual attacks, he was able to persuade Meng Da, a Cao Wei general who had previously served Liu Bei but who defected to Cao Wei's first emperor Cao Pi after engaging in a personal conflict with Liu Bei's adopted son Liu Feng, to return his allegiance to Shu Han. However, Meng's defection was discovered by Cao Wei, and he was defeated and killed by Sima Yi in early 228.
[edit] First campaign
Notwithstanding Meng's defeat, Zhuge proceeded to plan his first attack against Cao Wei in early 228. As he did, his general Wei Yan suggested to him a daring plan -- that Wei would lead a small detachment and advance through a treacherous canyon (Ziwugu, 子午谷) through the Qinling (秦嶺) mountains to make a surprise attack on Chang'an, where the headquarters of Cao Wei's western defense forces, then commanded by Xiahou Mao (夏侯楙), were. Wei believed that Xiahou, who was not known for his abilities but received the command because he was the uncle of Cao Wei's emperor Cao Rui by marriage, would be surprised and would flee, and then Zhuge would be able to advance with his larger force through a less treacherous canyon (Baoxiegu, 褒斜谷) and arrive at Chang'an unopposed. Zhuge felt that the plan was too dangerous and did not accept it. Rather, he planned to proceed by an easier road against the Longyou (隴右, modern eastern Gansu) region, before he would attack Chang'an. (Cao Wei would become aware of Wei's plan and would guard against it for the rest of Zhuge's life, so there was no second chance to try it.)
Zhuge then announced that his plan was to go through Baoxiegu to attack Mei (郿縣, in modern Baoji, Shaanxi), causing Cao Wei's general Cao Zhen to indeed guard against his attack at Mei, but instead, he attacked Mount Qi, with Ma Su as the second in command. The Cao Wei forces were caught unprepared and were apprehensive of Zhuge. The commanderies of Tianshui (天水, roughly modern Tianshui, Gansu), Nan'an (南安, roughly modern Dingxi, Gansu), and Anding (安定, roughly modern Qingyang, Gansu) all defected to Shu Han. Cao Rui proceeded to Chang'an himself to be apprised of the situation, while sending Zhang Tai (張邰) to face Zhuge. At this time, Ma Su made a tactical blunder -- placing his forces on top of the hill, with no water. As Zhang arrived, he cut off Ma's water supplies, and then, after the Shu Han forces began to suffer distress due to the lack of water, he attacked them, causing the Shu Han formation to collapse. Zhuge was forced to withdraw back to Hanzhong. Even though Ma was a friend of his, Zhuge felt that his offense was a capital offense, and so had Ma executed. (This was over the objection of Jiang Wan, who felt that Ma was a talented tactician who made one simple mistake and should be allowed to learn from the mistake.) The three commanderies that had defected to Shu Han were suppressed into submission by Cao Zhen's forces.
After the first campaign, Zhuge made public declarations blaming himself for the defeat, and requested that LIu Shan demote him. Liu Shan gave him a formal demotion but permitted him to remain as regent. Zhuge's public self-humiliation brought pity and forgiveness from the people, who remained at high morale.
It was during this first campaign that Jiang Wei, a Cao Wei military officer, defected to Zhuge. Zhuge became impressed with Jiang's fortitude and strategical approach, and Jiang would become an important assistant for Zhuge from that point on.
[edit] Second campaign
In the winter of 228, having heard that Cao Wei's forces, under Cao Xiu, had recently been defeated by Eastern Wu's prince Sun Quan and presuming that the Cao Wei defenses on the western borders must be weak, Zhuge planned a second rebellion. Many officials opposed the move, believing that it was too soon. Zhuge wrote his Second report on the reasons for the expedition (後出師表, hou chushi biao) to refute those reasons. (It was in this report that the famous phrase "the Han and the thief cannot stand together" (漢賊不兩立, Han zei bu liangli) was coined.) He made it even more explicit what his rationale was for conducting these campaigns -- that Liu Bei had, throughout his lifetime, gathered many specialized troops from all over China to serve under him, and that these troops were aging; in the future, it would be even more difficult for Shu Han to make any advancements against Cao Wei.
Around the new year of 229, Zhuge advanced north and surrounded Chencang (陳倉, in modern Baoji, Shaanxi), but Cao Zhen had anticipated this move months earlier and ordered Chencang's defenses fortified, and Zhuge was unable to successfully siege the city. Chencang's defender Hao Zhao (郝昭) was also a talented defender, and he anticipated many of Zhuge's moves against the city. For twenty-some days Zhuge sieged the city, but eventually ran out of food supplies and withdrew, before the relief forces led by Zhang Tai could arrive.
[edit] Third campaign
In the spring of 229, Zhuge conducted perhaps the most successful of the five campaigns -- as he sent Chen Jie (陳戒) to attack Cao Wei's commanderies of Wudu (武都) and Yinping (陰平) (together making up roughly modern Longnan, Gansu), while leading his forces to cut off Cao Wei's relief forces, led by Guo Huai (郭淮), from reaching the two commanderies. Chen was therefore able to capture the two commanderies and annex them for Shu Han. It was after this campaign that Zhuge allowed himself to be promoted back to regent.
[edit] Fourth campaign
In the spring of 231, Zhuge, after ordering Li Yan to guard the headquarters at Hanzhong and be in charge of maintaining supply lines, led his forces to attack Mount Qi. Cao Zhen was originally going to lead the Cao Wei forces to try to relieve Mount Qi, but fell ill and died, and Cao Wei's emperor sent Sima Yi instead. Sima, knowing that Zhuge would have food supply problems, chose not to engage Zhuge, but rather waited out for Zhuge to withdraw himself. He was unable, however, to keep some of his commanders from attacking Zhuge anyway, and Zhuge defeated each one, but Sima prevented major losses. In the summer of 231, having run out of food supplies, Zhuge withdrew. (It was in this campaign that Cao Wei's general Zhang Tai suffered a serious knee injury that eventually killed him.)
After the campaign was over, Li Yan was revealed as having committed a fraud against Zhuge -- by informing Zhuge that there was in fact no problems with food supplies while trying to blame the problems with food on others. Zhuge, after collecting documents that showed Li's inconsistencies, deposed him and had him put under house arrest, although hinting to him that if he repented, Zhuge might allow him to return to service. (This would not happen, however, as Zhuge died in 234 without having pardoned Li, and Li, hearing news of Zhuge's death, became so distressed that he died as well.)
[edit] Fifth campaign
[edit] Aftermaths
[edit] Sources
What are the references/sources of this article? Sarazyn • TALK • DE 09:39, 20 July 2006 (UTC)