Northern Expeditions
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 |
This article does not cite its references or sources. Please help improve this article by introducing appropriate citations. (help, get involved!) This article has been tagged since November 2006. |
| Northern Expeditions | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the wars of the Three Kingdoms | |||||||
|
|||||||
| Combatants | |||||||
| Shu Han Qiang |
Cao Wei | ||||||
| Commanders | |||||||
| Zhuge Liang† | Cao Zhen Sima Yi |
||||||
- For Chiang Kai-shek's Northern Expedition in modern China, see Northern Expedition.
| Wars of the Three Kingdoms |
|---|
| Yellow Turban Rebellion – Campaign against Dong Zhuo – Jieqiao – Wancheng – Xiapi – Yijing – Guandu – Changban – Red Cliffs – Tong Pass – Hefei – Mount Dingjun – Fancheng – Xiaoting – Southern Campaign – Northern Expeditions (Jieting) – Shiting – (Wuzhang Plains) |
The Northern Expeditions (北伐) were a series of five military campaigns launched by the state of Shu against the northern state of Wei from A.D. 228 to 234. All five expeditions were led by the famed statesman and commander Zhuge Liang (諸葛亮). Although they proved unsuccessful and indecisive, the expeditions have become some of the most famous conflicts of the Three Kingdoms period. In popular history, they overlap with the "six campaigns from Mount Qi" (六出祁山).
Contents |
[edit] Background
In A.D. 227, China was divided into three competing regimes - Wei, Shu and Wu - each with the purpose of reunifying the empire of the fallen Han Dynasty. In the state of Shu, the strategic thinking behind the Northern Expeditions can be traced back as early as 207, when the twenty-seven-year-old Zhuge Liang outlined his Longzhong Plan (隆中對) to his lord Liu Bei. In it, he explained in very general terms the need to gain a viable geographical base, and then went on to detail a two-pronged strike north for mastery of the north. One advance would be from Yi province in the west (roughly modern Sichuan province), north through the Qinling Mountains, debouching into the Wei River valley and achieving a strategic position at the great metropolis Chang'an from which to dominate the great bend of the Yellow River. The second advance would be from Jing province north toward the political centre of Luoyang.
After Liu Bei established himself in Yi province in 215, the essential prerequisites of the plan had been completed. The geopolitical arrangement envisaged by Zhuge Liang proved, however, to be a military unstable one. The alliance with the state of Wu in the east broke down over the issue of the occupation of Jing province. By 223, the province had been lost and Liu Bei, as well as some of his top generals, were dead. Even after Zhuge Liang re-established friendly relations with Wu, his original plan had been markedly altered since only the left prong could be executed.
In Zhuge Liang's much quoted Chu Shi Biao (出師表) of 227, he explains to Liu Bei's son Liu Shan in highly ideological terms the reasoning for his departure from the capital Chengdu: "We should lead the three armies to secure the Central Plain in the north. Contributing my utmost, we shall exterminate the wicked, restore the house of Han and return to the old capital. Such is this subject's duty in repaying the Former Emperor and affirming allegiance to Your Majesty."
[edit] Geography
Zhuge Liang's plan called for a march north from Hanzhong, the main population centre in northern Yi province. In the third century, the region of Hanzhong was a sparsely populated area surrounded by wild virgin forest. Its importance lay in its strategic placement in a long and fertile plain along the Han River, between two massive mountain ranges, the Qinling in the north and the Micang in the south. It was the major administrative centre of the mountainous frontier district between the rich Red Basin (Sichuan Plain) in the south and the Wei River valley in the north. The area also afforded access to the dry northwest, and the Gansu panhandle.
Geographically, the rugged barrier of the Qinling Mountains provided the greatest obstacle to Chang'an. The mountain range consists of a series of parallel ridges, all running slightly south of east, separated by a maze of ramifying valleys whose canyon walls often rise sheer above the valley streams. As a result of local dislocations from earthquakes, the topographical features are extremely complicated. Access from the south was limited to a few mountain routes called the gallery roads. These crossed major passes and were remarkable for their engineering skill and ingenuity. The oldest of these was to the northwest of Hanzhong, and which crossed the San Pass. The Lianyun "Linked Cloud" Road was constructed there to take carriage traffic under the Qin in the third century BCE. Following the Jialing Valley, the route emerges in the north where the Wei River widens considerably, near the city of Chencang. Another important route was the Baoye route, which transverses the Yegu Pass and ends south of Mei. A few more minor and difficult routes lay to the east, notably the Ziwu, which leads directly to the south of Chang'an.
[edit] First expedition
At Hanzhong, Zhuge Liang held war council on the method of realisation of the tactical objective of capturing Chang'an. He proposed a wide left hook to seize the upper Wei valley as a necessity to the capture of the city itself. The commander Wei Yan, however, objected to the plan and suggested a bold strike through a pass in the Qinling with 10,000 elite troops to take Chang'an by surprise. He was confident that he could hold the city against Wei until the main forces of Zhuge Liang arrived. Wei Yan's plan was rejected by Zhuge as being too ambitious; he preferred a more cautious approach.
In the spring of 228, two small forces were sent through Ji Gorge, one of which was commanded by the veteran Zhao Yun, as decoys to give the appearance of threatening Mei. The real objective, however, was to seize the Longyou area far west of Chang'an: Tianshui, Anding, Nan'an and most of all Qishan, the defensive bastion that screened the upper Wei valley.
Cao Rui, the Emperor of Wei, himself moved to Chang'an to oversee the defense. General-in-chief Cao Zhen secured Mei against Zhao Yun whilst a combined cavalry-infantry force of 50,000 under Zhang He were sent west to oppose Zhuge's main army.
Sima Yi puts down Meng Da's rebellion which was co-ordinated with Zhuge Liang. Meng Da was taken by surprise as he had not expected Sima Yi to attack without seeking court approval.
At Jieting, the strategic outpost crucial to future Shu supplies, Zhang He found the larger part of the advance guard of Shu under Ma Su entrenched on a nearby mountain top. Because he forfeited access to water supplies, Ma was easily defeated. The minor part of the vanguard stationed on the mountain road broke through Wei ranks and the remnants of Ma Su's force escaped south, only escaping total annihilation due to Zhang He's fear of ambush. Meanwhile Zhao Yun's small intrusion against Mei met with stiff resistance and Zhuge Liang ordered a general withdrawal to Hanzhong at the prospect of an outflanking motion by the Wei army. Following his defeat, Zhuge Liang had Ma Su executed for the tactical blunder at Jieting and then published a memorial to Liu Shan, in which he chastised himself for the failure and requested demotion from Prime Minister to General of the Left.
[edit] Second expedition
Not long after the end of the first expedition, Wu inflicted a defeat on Wei at Shiting, in the Hefei battlegrounds. Fearing a breakthrough in the Huai River valley, the Wei court decided to reinforce the east by transferring troops from the west. Sensing an opportunity, Zhuge Liang struck in December 228 through Qinling in the winter of the same year with the aim of capturing Chencang, communication thoroughfare of the Wei River.
The walled city was held by Hao Zhao with am estimated 1000 or so soldiers who was warned by Cao Zhen after Zhuge Liang's first campaign to make defensive preparations.
Although hugely outnumbered by the 20,000 or more Shu troops, Hao refused requests to surrender. Soon Zhuge Liang brought to bear an array of siege equipment, including scaling ladders, battering rams and archery towers. Nevertheless, Chencang could not be broken and the Wei soldiers provided stubborn resistance with various incendiary devices.
After three weeks, Zhang He arrived with relief troops and food supplies. Zhuge, himself short of grain, ordered a retreat to Hanzhong once more. One of Zhang He's subordinates, Wang Shuang decided to pursue through Qinling and was killed by an ambush arranged by Zhuge. This incident, with the victim as one of the champions personally accredited by the Wei emperor, was a shock reminder of the skills of Zhuge Liang as a master of ambuscades.
[edit] Third expedition
The spring of 229 saw Zhuge Liang make his third expedition, the objective being still the Longyou region - with the immediate goal being the capture of the territories of Wudu and Yinping. These areas, on the western foothills of Qinling were swiftly occupied and they would presumably be used as a launch pad for a further strike toward the Wei River. Zhang He, stationed at Tianshui, ordered Guo Huai south to counter the Shu army.
With timely intelligence, Zhuge Liang immediately reinforced his vanguard by sending his general Chen Shi to defeat Guo's forces in open battle northwest of Wudu, at Jianwei, and taking the two commanderies. Although Guo Huai was defeated he retreated and prepared a defensive position and effectively checked any plans Zhuge Liang had of a quick advance to Tianshui, due to his numerical superiority over both Chen Shi and Zhuge Liang. Zhuge Liang, in the mean time, was leading a separate army to prevent any Wei reinforcement to Guo Huai, and thus could not exploit the advantage achieved by Chen Shi's victory. Frustrated that the tactical victory at Jianwei did not reap significant strategic benefits, and fearing that a stalemate against a well-defended enemy would be a drain on manpower and rations, Zhuge Liang retreated back to Hanzhong. The two commanderies were incoporated into Shu. In response to this the Shu Emperor issued an imperial edict and had Zhuge Liang reinstated as Prime Minister.
Beginning in the winter of 229 and into the spring of 230, Hanzhong was the scene of a new military development. On knowledge of a Wei offensive, Zhuge Liang initiated extensive defensive preparations including two defensive barriers on the Hanzhong plain, running 200 kilometres with nearly 100,000 troops. The Wei court had decided to abandon its defensive strategy and launched a three-pronged attack with the objective of Hanzhong led by Sima Yi, Cao Zhen and Zhang He. In the fall of 230, when the Wei offensive began with over 400,000 troops, Wei Yan and Wu Yi were sent north with a mixed cavalry-infantry force behind enemy lines to incite dissension amongst the various non-Han peoples, while at the same time sell the famous Chengdu silk brocades in return for horses and weapons. From the start the Wei attack ran into problems: heavy rain continued for more than 30 days, and ensured that the narrow valleys were impassable, while Zhang He in the west had to deal with the threat from the rear. After a month or a half of little progess, the disastrous campaign was terminated. Zhuge Liang made a daring march northwest to relieve Wei Yan, who was besieged by Guo Huai on his return, but before the reinforcement reached its destination, Wei Yan had already managed to defeat the main force of the enemy led by Guo Huai and the Wei reinforcement led by Cao Zhen, and the Shu Han force behind the enemy line was able to safely make a prudence dictated return to Hanzhong.
In many Chinese historical writings and novels, these campaigns are classified as separate expeditions although the latter two were actually defensive maneuvers and Zhuge Liang never left Shu.
[edit] Fourth expedition
Zhuge Liang's fourth Northern Expedition was launched in early 231. Envoys were sent out to rouse the Xianbei and Qiang, urging them to create a disturbance in the Wei rear. Furthermore, supply was improved with the introduction of the 'wooden ox'. Nevertheless, the goal of seizing Longyou was perhaps overly optimistic since Wei's defensive posture in the region was indeed formidable. Qishan was garrisoned, forming an initial defense for Tianshui, which was itself occupied by the battle-tested forces of Guo Huai and Dai Ling. The Shu offensive began with a minor clash at Qishan which the commander-in-chief Cao Zhen feared was a diversion to mask a major offensive through the Qinling passes against Chang'an itself. In the early summer Cao Zhen took ill and was replaced by Sima Yi, who at once set out with the main army at Chang'an to relieve Qishan. On hearing of Sima's advance, Zhuge left part of his 30,000-man army besieging Qishan and set out with the remainder to seize the various Wei garrisons dispersed around Tianshui.
Without the benefit of coordinated strategic control, his opponents played into his hands. Guo Huai had been ordered to join Sima Yi at Qishan but he took the initiative and together with Fei Yao, garrison commander of Shanggui, tried to catch Zhuge Liang in a front-rear pincer attack. Having left the defensive position, they were routed by the Shu forces, leaving the approaches to Longyou open. Zhuge, however, did not move to take Tianshui, perhaps fearing the breakdown of the supply line should the Shu army overextend itself. Instead he went about harvesting the early spring wheat that was available in the vicinity. Sima Yi, after surveying the situation at Qishan and Gou Huai's defeat, occupied the hills east of Shanggui, blocking any further Shu advance. Upon completing the harvest the Shu forces marched south and halted, preparing for battle; but Sima Yi declined the challenge. Faced with intensive criticism and ridicule, he relented and the ensuing frontal assault by the Wei forces was ruinously defeated. The Wei forces were forced to retreat in disorder and accounts of the battle note that the Shu forces captured 3000 sets of armour, 5000 swords, and 3100 crossbows.
After such a victory, Zhuge Liang, did not capitalise on it with a major offensive due to the lack of food supply. Instead the Wei-Shu armies settled down to a stalemate at Shanggui of which the resource-poor Shu would surely be the loser. At this juncture, Li Yan, who was responsible for maintaining ration supplies to the front, realising rain had caused the breakdown of transport, informed Zhuge that Liu Shan had ordered a withdrawal. There was, however, some consolation in the retreat. Sima Yi, letting go of his usual cautiousness, ordered Zhang He's cavalry to pursue. At Mumen, Zhang was ambushed by massed crossbowmen as his army entered a narrow defile and killed.
[edit] Fifth expedition
- See also: Battle of Wuzhang Plains
In the following two years both sides developed agriculture and prepared for another inevitable campaign in Longyou. Sima Yi, for his part rehabilitated the Zheng Guo canal of 234 BC, increasing the potential to withstand a protracted war in Longyou.
In the spring of 234, 100,000 Shu soldiers advanced through Qinling by way of Baoye toward the broad plain of Wuzhang, in what would become Zhuge Liang's fifth and last Northern Expedition. Sima Yi, well prepared for such a move with a 200,000-strong army, built a fortified position on the southern bank of the Wei River. The veteran of the Zhuge Liang's incursions, Guo Huai suggested that the Shu forces were not planning an immediate attack on Chang'an itself but were planning to consolidate their position on the Wuzhang Plain for a takeover of Longyou, which had always been Zhuge Liang's immediate goal. Already, he pointed out, there were reports of Shu forces crossing the Wei River upstream and constructing lines of communications. Concerned about the threat of being cut off on the south bank, Sima asked for an additional planned reinforcement of several hundred thousand troops for the communication centre of Beiyuan. Such a move was none too soon, for Zhuge was already on the verge of wiping out the Wei garrison after encroaching on the Wei positions in the north. After two months of manoevring north of the Wei River, the additional Wei reinforcement successfully foiled Zhuge Liang's attempt and he settled down to a stalemate on the Wuzhang Plain. The Shu army anticipated a long protracted struggle and used the tuntian system pioneered by Cao Cao, as they awaited an agreed offensive by Wu.
Sun Quan's armies in the Huai region, however, was defeated and his offensive broke down due to the spread of endemic disease. The frustration of this last hope to break the stalemate no doubt increased the rapid deterioration of Zhuge Liang's health and depressed mental condition. By late summer, he started giving instructions to his close subordinate officers on the future of Shu. In the early autumn of 234, Zhuge Liang died at the age of 54.
Sima Yi, convinced that Zhuge Liang had died despite the fact that Zhuge Liang's death was kept a secret by Shu, gave chase to the retreating Shu forces. Zhuge Liang's successor, Yang Yi then turned around, pretending to strike in full scale by devasting the vanguard of Wei. Learning the news of the defeat, Sima Yi feared that Zhuge Liang only pretended he was dead to lure him out for a full scale war that favored Shu force, and immediately ordered a general retreat. Common folklore tells of a double, or a wooden statue, that was dressed as Zhuge Liang, driving Simi Yi away in this incident. In any case, word that Sima Yi fled from the already dead Zhuge Liang spread, spawning a popular saying, "A dead Zhuge scares away a living Zhongda" (死諸葛嚇走活仲達), referring to Sima Yi's courtesy name. Sima Yi's answered such ridicule by claiming that he, like most at the time, could not even predict Zhuge Liang's intention when he was alive, and thus could not do so when Zhuge Liang was dead either.
News of Zhuge Liang's death was withheld until the army had reached the safety of the Baoye valley to return to Hanzhong. Sima Yi, still fearful that the announcement was false and merely another opportunity for Zhuge to demonstrate his talent for ambuscade, hesitated to pursue. Only after his inspection of the empty Shu encampment did he resolve that pursuit was appropriate, but after reaching Baoye and deciding the advance could not be supported with supplies, the Wei army returned to the Wei River. The death of Zhuge Liang ended a huge strategic threat to Wei and the Wei court soon began development of ambitious public works.
[edit] Analysis
It is surprising that though the state of Shu was the weakest in terms of land size and resources, of the three, in its early years it carried out a vigorous offensive military policy. If Zhuge Liang had not have died in 234, he may well have continued this policy. However, the constant expeditions took a heavy toll on Shu's limited resources and this was worsened by Jiang Wei's expeditions after the death of Zhuge Liang. Resources wise, Shu was far inferior to the vast kingdom of Wei, as reflected in the obvious numerical difference: with the exception of the second expedition, Shu force committeed never exceeded 25% of the Wei force it faced during each campaign, and in fact, Shu force could not even achieve numerical superiority locally and it was only Zhuge Liang's ingenuity that forced Wei to be on the defensive all the time.
Sima Yi was unarguably the best tactician that Wei had at that period. Even so, after initial defeats against Zhuge Liang, he was forced to change his tactics in the later expeditions. He was on the defensive for long periods of time with strong fortifications to deter Shu. His aim was to create a dreadlock in which was to wait for Shu's supplies to run out and to force them to retreat without a fight. In the last expedition's dreadlock on the Wuzhang Plains, Sima Yi's reluctance to engage in battle prompted Zhuge Liang to send him a woman's dress in one occasion to mock his tactics. Even so, Sima Yi refused to bite the bait, much to the displeasure of his officers.
The diplomatic success in restoring the alliance with Sun Quan prior to the Northern Expeditions has been dismissed as useless because it brought little strategic dividend: each side had different political agendas which precluded close military coordination. Once the first Northern Expedition was turned back, the Wei state was capable of handling the two-front threat without much difficulty.
Some people believe that Wei Yan's plan for a surprise assault on Chang'an could have succeeded, but it is more likely Zhuge Liang was correct in deciding the plan was far too ambitious. Chang'an, being one of Wei's most prosperous cities, would probably have been well fortified. Furthermore, there is little chance that the people of the city, who enjoyed peace and prosperity under the rule of Wei, would side with the Shu-Han forces.
