Munchhausen-Trilemma
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Munchhausen-Trilemma, also called "Agrippa's Trilemma", is a philosophical term coined to stress the impossibility to prove any certain truth even in the fields of logic and mathematics. It is the name of a logical proof in the theory of knowledge going back to the German philosopher Hans Albert. The term is ironically named after Baron Munchhausen, who allegedly pulled himself out of the quagmire by seizing himself at the shock of his hair. This proof runs as follows: All of the only three ("tri"-lemma) possible attempts to get a certain justification must fail:
- All justifications in pursuit of certain knowledge have also to justify the means of their justification and doing so they have to justify anew the means of their justification. Therefore there can be no end. We are faced with the hopeless situation of 'infinite regression'.
- One can stop at self-evidence or common sense or fundamental principles or speaking 'ex cathedra' or at any other evidence, but in doing so the intention to install certain justification is abandoned.
- The third horn of the trilemma is the application of a circular and therefore invalid argument.
Albert stressed repeatedly that there is no limitation of the Munchhausen-Trilemma to deductive conclusions. The verdict concerns also inductive, causal, transcendental, and all otherwise structured justifications. They all will be in vain. Therefore certain justification is impossible at all. Once having given up the classical idea of certain knowledge one can stop the process of justification where one wants to stop, presupposed one is ready to start critical thinking at this point always anew if necessary. This trilemma rounds off the classical problem of justification in the theory of knowledge, which was expressed most concisely by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in his Monadology § 32.
The failure of proving exactly any truth as expressed by the Munchhausen-Trilemma does possibly not lead to relativism or scepticism. This is demonstrated clearly by the philosophy of Karl Popper and Hans Albert.
In Albert's view the impossibility to prove any certain truth is not in itself a certain truth. After all, you need to assume some basic rules of logical inferrence in order to derive his result, and in doing so must either abandon the pursuit of "certain" justification, as above, or attempt to justiy these rules, etc. He suggests that it has to be taken as true as long as nobody has come forward with a truth which is scrupulously justified as a certain truth. Several philosophers defied Albert's challenge. Until now he refuted them all in his long addendum to his Treatise on Critical Reason (see below) and later articles (see publication list).
[edit] Further information
- Hans Albert, Treatise on Critical Reason, Princeton University Press, 1985, chap. I, sect. 2.
- For Hans Albert's scientific articles see List of Publications in [1]
