Multism

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We may conceive of an approach to metaphysics called multism which carries a monist point of view to the fundamental multiplicity of the universe. A theory can admit a single primal substance, but allow for a mechanism of multiplicity. This multiplicity can be used in the explanation of subjective experience. In other words, multism is a thesis that is neither monist nor dualist. Intuitively, it can be explained as follows: substance dualism seems to us a primitive, religious point of view, on the other hand we have the irrefutable reality of subjective experience. Monism (as witnessed in behaviorism or functionalism) looks excessively plain, and incompatible with the existence of the subjective. If we were to extract a common denominator among these, we obtain the multism approach. Briefly, multism tells us that all theories of mind, and consequently related theories of existence, must be divided into three, rather than two metaphysical categories.

Of this new category, especially one of them stands out in relation to contemporary logic, positivism and empiricism. This theory can be called Digital Multism, as a multist interpretation of digital philosophy which postulates that the universe is identical to a computation.

All that Multism is doing can be seen as promoting a version of Spinoza's metaphysics, although multism is not quite the same thing. In multism, too, there is a single substance, and there are many modes of this basic substance. Naturally, Spinoza and Leibniz's theories are both quite relevant to Multism.