Monroe Doctrine

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The Monroe Doctrine is a U.S. doctrine which, on December 2, 1823, proclaimed that European powers should no longer colonize or interfere with the affairs of the nations of the Americas. The United States planned to stay neutral in wars between European powers and in wars between a European power and its colonies. However, if these latter types of wars were to occur in the Americas, the United States would view such action as hostile.

President James Monroe first stated the doctrine during his seventh annual State of the Union Address to Congress, a defining moment in the foreign policy of the United States.

The doctrine's authors, especially John Quincy Adams, saw it as a proclamation by the United States of moral opposition to colonialism, but it has subsequently been re-interpreted in a wide variety of ways, including by President Theodore Roosevelt as a license for the U.S. to practice its own form of colonialism, the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

The United Kingdom was ripped apart between monarchical principle and a desire for new markets; South America as a whole constituted, at the time, a much larger market for British goods than the United States. When Russia and France proposed that Britain join in helping Spain regain her New World colonies, Britain vetoed the idea.

The United States was also negotiating with Spain to purchase Florida, and once that treaty was ratified, the Monroe administration began to extend recognition to the new Latin American republics — Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Mexico were all recognized in 1822.

In 1823, France invited Spain to restore the Bourbons to power, and there was talk of France and Spain warring upon the new republics with the backing of the Holy Alliance (Russia, Prussia and Austria). This news appalled the British government — all the work of James Wolfe, William Pitt and other eighteenth-century British statesmen to get France out of the New World would be undone, and France would again be a power in the Americas.

British Foreign Minister George Canning proposed that the US and the UK join to warn off France and Spain from intervention. Both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison urged Monroe to accept the offer, but John Quincy Adams was more suspicious. Adams also was quite concerned about Russia and Mexico's efforts to extend their influence over the joint British-American claimed territory of Oregon Country (see New Albion).

At the Cabinet meeting of November 7, 1823, Adams argued against Canning's offer, and declared, "It would be more candid, as well as more dignified, to avow our principles explicitly to Russia and France, than to come in as a cockboat in the wake of the British man-of-war."

He argued and finally won over the Cabinet to an independent policy. In Monroe's Annual Message to Congress on December 2, 1823, he delivered what we have come to call the Monroe Doctrine. Essentially, the United States was informing the powers of the Old World that the Americas were no longer open to European colonization, and that any effort to extend European political influence into the New World would be considered by the United States "as dangerous to our peace and safety." The United States would not interfere in European wars or internal affairs, and expected Europe to stay out of the affairs of the New World.

This explicitly stated intent was contradicted by cooperation with European powers in the repeated re-occupation of various territories of the island of Hispaniola, regions of which were in this period variously known as Santo Domingo and Haiti. Both France and Spain were interested in re-claiming their territories in Hispaniola, or re-exerting their influence, although Spain was more successful in the 19th century. In practice, the U.S used the Monroe Doctrine to side with whatever side of Caribbean conflicts favoured the United States' short-term economic interests, rather than definitively drawing a barrier against European interventionism.

1 Legacy
2 Main points
3 Criticism
4 The Cold War
5 British North America - an exceptional case
6 Further reading
7 Reference
8 External links

[edit] Legacy

Although it would take decades to coalesce into a notably identifiable policy, John Quincy Adams did raise a standard of an independent U.S. foreign policy so strongly that future administrations could not ignore it. One should note, however, that the policy succeeded because it met British interests as well as those of the United States and, for the next 50 years, was secured by the backing of the Royal Navy.

The first use of the yet unnamed doctrine was in 1836 when Americans objected to Britain's alliance with Texas on the principle of the Monroe Doctrine.

On December 2, 1845, U.S. President James Polk announced to Congress that the principle of the Monroe Doctrine should be strictly enforced and that the United States should aggressively expand into the West (see Manifest Destiny).

In 1852, some politicians used the principle of the Monroe Doctrine to argue for forcefully removing the Spanish from Cuba. In 1898, the U.S. obtained Cuba and Puerto Rico from Spain after winning the Spanish-American War.

Between 1864 and 1867, Napoleon III invaded Mexico and set up a French puppet regime headed by Emperor Maximilian; Americans proclaimed this as a violation of "The Doctrine" (see Maximilian Affair), but were unable to intervene due to the American Civil War. This was the first time the Monroe Doctrine was widely referred to as a "Doctrine".

In the 1870s, U.S. President Ulysses S. Grant extended the Monroe Doctrine, saying that the U.S. would not tolerate a colony being transferred from one European country to another.

In 1895, U.S. Secretary of State Richard Olney extended the Monroe Doctrine to give the U.S. authority to mediate border disputes in South America. This is known as the Olney interpretation.

The Drago Doctrine was announced on December 29, 1902 by the Foreign Minister of Argentina. Extending the Monroe Doctrine, it set forth the policy that no European power could use force against an American nation to collect debt.

In 1904, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt added the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which asserted the right of the U.S. to intervene in Latin America. This was the largest extension that has ever been added to the Monroe Doctrine.

In 1930, the Clark Memorandum was released, concluding that the Doctrine did not give the U.S. any right to intervene in Latin American affairs when the region was not threatened by Old World powers, thereby reversing the Roosevelt Corollary.

U.S. President John F. Kennedy at an August 29, 1962 news conference:

The Monroe Doctrine means what it has meant since President Monroe and John Quincy Adams enunciated it, and that is that we would oppose a foreign power extending its power to the Western Hemisphere, and that is why we oppose what is happening in Cuba today. That is why we have cut off our trade. That is why we worked in the OAS and in other ways to isolate the Communist menace in Cuba. That is why we will continue to give a good deal of our effort and attention to it.

[edit] Main points

The Monroe Doctrine states three major ideas, with one more added by President Theodore Roosevelt. First, it conveys that European countries cannot colonize in any of the Americas: North, Central, or South. Second, it enforces Washington's rule of foreign policy, in which the U.S. will only be involved in European affairs if America's rights are disturbed. Third, the U.S. will consider any attempt at colonization a threat to its national security. Roosevelt added to the doctrine, and summed up his additions with the statement, "Speak softly and carry a big stick."

[edit] Criticism

Some allege that, in practice, the Monroe Doctrine has functioned as a declaration of hegemony and a right of unilateral intervention over the nations of the Western Hemisphere - limited only by prudence, as in the case of British possessions. They point to 79 U.S. military interventions in Latin America and Haiti since 1846[1]. Some critics also point to the work of mercenaries such as William Walker, who briefly installed himself as president of Nicaragua, as inspired by the Monroe Doctrine.

Some Latin Americans have come to resent this "Monroe Doctrine", which has been summarized there in the phrase: "America for the Americans", translated into Spanish ironically as América para los americanos. The irony lies in the fact that the Spanish term americano is used to name the inhabitants of the whole continent. However, in English, the term American is related almost exclusively to the nationals of the United States. Thus, while "America for the Americans" sounds very much like a call to share a common destiny, it becomes apparent that it could really imply: America (the continent) for the United States.

Other critics have interpreted the Monroe Doctrine as isolationist in intent. See also: United States non-interventionism

[edit] The Cold War

During the Cold War, the Monroe doctrine was applied to Latin America by the framers of U.S. foreign policy. When the Cuban Revolution established a socialist regime with ties to the Soviet Union, after trying to establish fruitful relations with the US, it was argued that the spirit of the Monroe doctrine should be again invoked, this time to prevent the further spreading of Soviet-backed Communism in Latin America. During the Cold War, the United States thus often provided intelligence and military aid to Latin and South American governments that claimed or appeared to be threatened by Communist subversion. This, in turn, led to some domestic controversy within the United States, especially among some members of the left who argued that the Communist threat and Soviet influence in Latin America was greatly exaggerated. (See Operation PBSUCCESS.)

The debate over this new spirit of the Monroe Doctrine came to a head in the 1980s, as part of the Iran-Contra Affair. Among other things, it was revealed that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had been covertly training "Contra" guerrilla soldiers in Nicaragua in an attempt to overthrow the Sandinista revolutionary government and its President, Daniel Ortega. During the period of the civil war, the Contras killed an estimated 14,000 people and 150,000 were displaced. CIA director Robert Gates vigorously defended the Contra operation, arguing that avoiding U.S. intervention in Nicaragua would be "totally to abandon the Monroe doctrine".

Critics of the Reagan administration's support for Britain in the Falklands War charge that the U.S. ignored the Monroe Doctrine in that instance (even though an American nation, Argentina, attacked the possession of an existing European power, Britain, that predated the Doctrine).

[edit] British North America - an exceptional case

Of the regions of the Americas which were directly influenced by a European colonial power, it is notable that the colonies and territories of British North America were not included in the implementation of the Monroe Doctrine. The War of 1812 had already been fought between the United States and the United Kingdom for possession of Lower and Upper Canada, and any further attempts at intervening in the northern colonies would almost certainly led to another US-UK war.

It is also notable that the presence of the colonies - and eventually the Dominion of Canada - within the Empire was viewed from within the colonies themselves as being an important counter-weight to possible American hegemony - indeed, the Hudson's Bay Company was obliged to sell its holdings in Rupert's Land to the young Dominion instead of the United States, and subsequent colonisation efforts in Ottawa were stirred on in part to counter the presence of American traders in the region.

[edit] Further reading

Bemis, Samuel Flagg. John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy. 1949.
Dozer, Donald. The Monroe Doctrine: Its Modern Significance. New York: Knopf, 1965.
May, Ernest R. The Making of the Monroe Doctrine. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975.
Merk, Frederick. The Monroe Doctrine and American Expansionism, 1843-1849. New York: Knopf, 1966.
Murphy, Gretchen. Hemispheric Imaginings: The Monroe Doctrine and Narratives of U.S. Empire. Duke University Press, 2005. Examines the cultural context of the doctrine.
Perkins, Dexter. The Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1826. 3 vols. 1927.
Poetker, Joel S. The Monroe Doctrine. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc, 1967.
Smith, Gaddis. The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993. New York: Hill and Wang, 1994. Argues that the Monroe Doctrine became irrelevant after the end of the Cold War.