Mohammad Ahmed Abdullah Saleh Al Hanashi

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Mohammad Ahmed Abdullah Saleh Al Hanashi is a citizen of Yemen, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba.^[1] Al Hanashi's Guantanamo detainee ID number is 078. The Department of Defense reports that Al Hanashi was born on February 1, 1978, in Al Habrub, Yemen.

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a small trailer, the same width, but shorter, than a mobile home. The Tribunal's President sat in the big chair. The detainee sat with their hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor in the white, plastic garden chair. A one way mirror behind the Tribunal President allowed observers to observe clandestinely. In theory the open sessions of the Tribunals were open to the press. Three chairs were reserved for them. In practice the Tribunal only intermittently told the press that Tribunals were being held. And when they did they kept the detainee's identities secret. In practice almost all Tribunals went unobserved.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Al Hanashi chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[2]

[edit] allegations

The allegations against Al Hanashi were:^[2]

a The detainee is a member of the Taliban and/or Al Qaeda.

• Yes, I was with the Taliban.

1. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan in 2001.
   • I entered Afghanistan about eight to nine months before 11 September. I didn’t hear about al Qaida until from the media in the front lines.
2. The detainee joined the Taliban while in Afghanistan.
   • Yes, but that doesn’t mean I support Usama Bin Laden.
3. The detainee stayed at four different Taliban guesthouses during his travels between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
   • The first house was in Pakistan on the boarder [sic], a place called Qatar. The second house was in Bulldock (Spin Boldak), Afghanistan across the boarder [sic]. The third house was in Kandahar and the fourth house was in Kabul.
4. Usama Bin Laden spoke to the detainee’s group while they were in Tora Bora.
   • Not true. I have never been in Tora Bora. When I entered Kabul twenty days later, I went up North.

bThe detainee participated in military operations against the United States or its coalition partners.

• The first time, I fought against Massoud’s group. The first time I swa Americans was in Kandahar.

1. The detainee fought on the front lines against the Northern Alliance.
   • True
2. The detainee stated that he fired at the enemy, but did not kill anyone.
   • True.
3. The detainee was captured at Mazar-e-Sharif [sic].
   • True.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

The factors for and against continuing to detain Al Hanashi were among the 121 that the Department of Defense released on March 3, 2006.^[3]

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan in March or April 2001. He traveled to Afghanistan (AF) from Yemen via air to Dubai, United Arab Emirates (TC) and Karachi, Pakistan (PK); bus to Quetta, PK and Kandahar, AF, then taxi to Kabul, AF.
2. The detainee did not have money to obtain a passport. Sa'ed paid for the detainee's passport, airline tickets and obtained the visas.
3. Sa'ed facilitated travel from Yemen to Afghanistan and subsequently served as a front line commander in the front lines north of Kabul. Sa'ed held a position subordinate to Abdel Hadi Al-Iraqi [sic].
4. The detainee stayed at both Taliban and Jama Tablique guesthouses while en route to Kabul, Afghanistan.
5. Jama'at Al Tablighi is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.
6. The detainee joined the Taliban while in Afghanistan.
7. The detainee fought on the front lines against the Northern Alliance.

b. Training

1. Ghailani identified the detainee as being present at the al-Faruq Training Camp in Afghanistan where he underwent basic training in 1998 to 1999 before moving on to the front lines in Kabul, Afghanistan.
2. Ghailani is a Tanzanian al-Qaida operative who has been indicted in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

c. Connection/Associations

1. The detainee was associated with a high level al Qaida commander, Abdul Hadi Al-Iraqi [sic].
2. Abd Al-Hadi Al-Iraqi [sic]was a veteran Afghan fighter who was the head of the Kabul, Afghanistan guesthouse named Khan Ghulam Bashah and who later took charge of the Northern front in Kabul in 2000.
3. The detainee fought under the leadership of Abdul Salam.
4. Abdul Salaam was one of the leaders at the Kabul front during the fighting with the Northern Alliance. He was also in charge of mine clearing operations.
5. Detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from a safe house associated with suspected al-Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.
6. Usama Bin Laden spoke to the detainee's group while they were in Tora Bora.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was captured at Mazar-e-Sharif [sic].
2. The detainee was captured with 400 U.S. dollars. Mu'Amar Sa'ed Dayan, aka Jabir, gave the detainee his wallet before he died. Inside the wallet was Dayan's last will and 400 U.S. dollars.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee readily admits to having fought for the Taliban, but noted that it was never his intention or desire to fight against the U.S.

b. The detainee affirmed he had never seen Usama Bin Laden and that he had never been to Tora Bora as previously stated.

c. The detainee advised he was not trained on weapons in Afghanistan as he already knew how to operate a Kalishnakov (AK-47) and how to handle hand grenades when he lived in Yemen.

d. The detainee considers himself devout, but added that he is not a religious fanatic.

e. The detainee denies any involvement with al Qaida.

[edit] Transcript

Al Hanashi chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.^[4]

[edit] Testimony

[edit] References

1. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
2. ^ ^{a b} Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Mohammad Ahmed Abdullah Saleh Al Hanashi'sCombatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 55-56
3. ^ Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Mohammad Ahmed Abdullah Saleh Al Hanashi Administrative Review Board - pages 81-82 18 April 2005
4. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Mohammad Ahmed Abdullah Saleh Al Hanashi's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 201