Maginot Line
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
| Maginot Line | |
|---|---|
| Eastern France | |
 The entrance to Ouvrage Schoenenbourg along the Maginot Line in Alsace. |
|
| Type | Defensive line |
| Built | 1930–40 |
| Construction materials |
Concrete, steel |
| In use | 1935–69 |
| Controlled by | France |
| Battles/wars | Battle of France |
The Maginot Line (IPA: [maʒi'no], named after French minister of defence André Maginot) was a line of concrete fortifications, tank obstacles, machine gun posts and other defenses which France constructed along its borders with Germany and with Italy, in the light of experience from World War I, and in the run-up to World War II. Generally the term describes either the entire system or just the defences facing Germany while the Alpine Line is used for the Franco-Italian defences. The French believed the fortification would provide time for their army to mobilize in the event of attack and also compensate for numerical weakness. The success of static, defensive combat in World War I was a key influence on French thinking. The fortification system utterly failed to contain the Germans in World War II, and the term is sometimes used today to describe any ineffective protection.
Contents |
[edit] Planning and construction
The defenses were first proposed by Marshal Joffre. He was opposed by modernists such as Paul Reynaud and Charles de Gaulle who favoured investment in armour and aircraft. Joffre had support from Pétain and there were a number of reports and commissions organised by the government. It was Andre Maginot who finally convinced the government to invest in the scheme. Maginot was another veteran of WW I who became France's Minister of Veteran Affairs and then Minister of War (1928–1931).
The line was built in a number of phases from 1930 by the STG (Section Technique du Génie) overseen by CORF (Commission d'Organisation des Régions Fortifiées). The main construction was largely completed by 1939 at a cost of around 3 billion French francs.
[edit] Features
The specification of the defences was very high, with extensive and interconnected bunker complexes for thousands of men; there were 108 main forts (grands ouvrages) at 15 kilometres intervals, smaller forts (petits ouvrages) and casements between, with over 100 kilometres of tunnels. The fortifications did not extend through the Ardennes Forest (which was believed to be "impénétrable" and "impassable") or along the border with Belgium because the countries had signed an alliance in 1920, by which the French army would operate in Belgium if the German forces invaded. When Belgium abrogated the treaty in 1936 and declared neutrality, the Maginot Line was quickly extended along the Franco-Belgian border, but not to the standard of the rest of the Line. And as the water table in this region was high, there was the danger of underground passages getting flooded, which the designers of the line knew would be difficult and expensive to overcome.
There was a final flurry of construction in 1939–1940 with general improvements all along the Line. The final Line was strongest around the industrial regions of Metz, Lauter and Alsace, while other areas were in comparison only weakly guarded. In contrast, the propaganda about the line made it appear far greater a construction than it was; illustrations showed multiple stories of interwoven passages, and even underground railyards and cinemas. This reassured allied civilians.
[edit] German invasion
The World War II German invasion plan of 1940 (Sichelschnitt) was designed to deal with the Line. A decoy force sat opposite the Line while a second Army Group cut through the Low Countries of Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as through the Ardennes Forest which lay north of the main French defences. Thus the Germans were able to avoid assaulting the Maginot Line directly. Attacking from May 10, German forces were well into France within five days and they continued to advance until May 24, when they stopped near Dunkirk. By early June the German forces had cut off the Line from the rest of France and the French government was making overtures for an armistice, which was signed on June 22 in Compiègne. But the Line was still intact and manned with a number of commanders wanting to hold out; and the Italian advance had been successfully contained. Still, Maxime Weygand signed the surrender and the army was ordered into captivity.
[edit] End of the war
When the Allied forces invaded in June 1944 the Line, now held by German defenders, was again largely bypassed, with fighting only touching a part of the fortifications near Metz and in northern Alsace towards the end of 1944.
[edit] The Line after WWII
After the war the Line was re-manned by the French and underwent some modifications. However when France withdrew from NATO's military component (in 1966) much of the Line was abandoned. With the rise of the French independent nuclear deterrent by 1969 the Line was largely given up by the government, with sections auctioned off to the public and the rest of it left to decay.
[edit] The Legacy of the Line
Generally considered one of the great failures of military history, the term "Maginot Line" is now sometimes used as a metaphor for something that is confidently relied upon though ending up being ineffective. It could be argued that this association is inaccurate, as the Line achieved the specific task it was intended to do, rendering a direct assault against France's Eastern border impossible (the few Maginot forts which were directly attacked by German armored troops held very well). It would be more truthful to state that the Line was sound, but France's strategic use of it was poor. As originally envisioned, the Maginot Line was only part of a larger defense plan, in which the Line was to provide coordinated backup to resistance from the French Army. But execution of the plan was lax and this, combined with a failure to appreciate that the frustration of one particular approach would not necessarily render an aggressor impotent, cost both the Line and the French Army their effectiveness. In some sense, French authorities came to believe their own propaganda: that the mere existence of the Line rendered them impervious to invasion.[citation needed]
[edit] See also
[edit] External links
 |
Wikimedia Commons has media related to: |
