Lobbying

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Lobbying refers to efforts to influence government public policy decision-making towards favored policy outcomes on subjects deemed relevant to those directing or funding the lobbying effort. Those who engage in lobbying as a profession are known as "lobbyists" or as "public affairs professionals."

Lobbying exists because of disparities in the attention paid to government policies by various groups. Cohesive groups (such as a corporation like ExxonMobil or a single-interest ideological group like the Sierra Club) have more cohesive policy views than the general public, and are better able to coordinate their actions to achieve a desired outcome. Thus, they attempt to influence policy, confident that public opinion will be a relatively insignificant factor. For more on the theoretical bases of lobbying, see Mancur Olson's work on the collective action problem.

Contents

[edit] Motivations

The goal of lobbying is to convince the government, usually specific segments of a government, such as a particular branch of bureaucracy or legislative committee, to follow policies desired by the lobbyist.

[edit] Corporate profits

It is common practice for large corporations to employ lobbyists if they have significant vulnerability to unfavorable public policy decisions. If the corporation directly employs lobbyists, as opposed to engaging the services of an outside professional independent or firm, they are often centralized in a department for public affairs. Large corporations lobby the government on regulations which affect their business, such as those which impact their access to markets or resources, their method of business, their tax responsibilities, employment standards, government contracts, and environment/safety standards.

[edit] Ideological

Significant lobbying is also done by organizations established for the expressed purpose of promoting a specific policy agenda. These organizations, whom predominantly engage in lobbying for their own purposes, are described as interest groups, advocacy groups, or lobby groups. Such organizations often describe themselves as public affairs committees. Interest groups can be created by corporations to advance their interests at arm's length. Interest groups can also be created by groups of motivated individuals who, because of a shared ideological belief, share a strong desire to influence the formulation of public policies deemed relevant to their shared ideological concern.

[edit] Methods

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Lobbying can consist of the private cajoling of legislative members, public actions (e.g. mass demonstrations), or combinations of both public and private actions (e.g. encouraging constituents to contact their legislative representatives). There exist large differences in the effectiveness of lobbyist groups.

[edit] Targeting legislators

Legislators can be sorted into five classes, according to the Democracy Center[1], each class being associated with a specific lobbying strategy which will maximize effectiveness:

  1. "Champions." "All issues need a group of lawmakers dedicated to being tireless, committed advocates for your cause. What they can do for you is make the case to their colleagues, help develop a strong 'inside' strategy, and be visible public spokespeople. What they need is good information, and visible support outside the Capitol."[1]
  2. "Allies." "Another group of legislators will be on your side but can be pushed to do more -- to speak up in party caucuses or on the floor."[1]
  3. "Fence Sitters." "Some legislators will be uncommitted on the issues, potentially able to vote either way. These are your key targets and lobbying strategy is about putting together the right mix on "inside" persuasion and "outside" pressure to sway them your way."[1]
  4. "Mellow Opponents." "Another group of legislators will be clear votes against you, but who are not inclined to be active on the issue. With this group what's key is to keep them from becoming more active, lobbying them enough to give them pause but not to make them angry."[1]
  5. "Hard Core Opponents." "Finally, there are those lawmakers who are leading your opposition. What is important here is to isolate them, to highlight the extremes of their positions, rhetoric and alliances and to give other lawmakers pause about joining with them."[1]

[edit] Guiding policy creation

With regards to policy formulation, interest groups, according to John Dietrich[2] , are able to have "an impact on the earlier stages of the decision making process"[2] via the following techniques:

[edit] Framing the issues

Framing, Ambrosio describes, is "the attempt by interest groups to place an issue on the government's agenda, shape perspectives of that issue, and influence the terms of debate."[3]

[edit] Offering information and analysis

Framing is closely connected to with supplying information and analysis, according to Ambrosio, because of "the large number and diversity of issues confronting [the staff of an elected representative], it is impossible for staffers to invest sufficient time to research issues themselves. Consequently, they are forced to rely on outside sources of information; interest groups provide this information, most likely with analysis (or "spin") beneficial to their agenda." [3]

[edit] Monitoring the policy process and reacting as necessary

In addition to framing, supplying information and analysis, Ambrosio states that "interest groups closely monitor government policies pertaining to their agenda and react to those policies through" such actions as:

  • "the dissemination of supplementary information,"
  • "letter-writing campaigns,"
  • "calls for hearings or additional legislation, [and]"
  • "support or opposition of candidates during elections"[3]

[edit] Corruption concerns

Lobbying is frequently performed on behalf of organizations which also make campaign contributions. This has led to allegations of corruption by opponents of some lobbying organizations.

Some politicians have been known to make bad decisions and some have been found in apparently compromising positions because of their need to solicit financial contributions for their campaigns. Critics complain that they then appear to be acting in the interests of those who fund them, giving rise to the public perception of political corruption.

Supporters of the system respond that many politicians act in the interests of those who fund them due to common ideologies or shared local interests, and that lobbyists merely support those who agree with their positions.

[edit] Anti-corruption measures

Many jurisdictions, in response to concerns of corruption, require the formal registration of lobbyists who come in contact with government representatives.

Several states and cities in the United States have passed Clean Elections laws to be sure that lobbyists gain influence by the persuasiveness of their arguments rather than the size of their campaign contributions.

[edit] Government-specific issues

This article, up until this section, focuses on the common aspects of lobbying methods, underlying motivations and concerns independent of any specific target-government. The remainder of this article summarizes lobbying issues relevant to specific governments and regions.

[edit] European Union

Lobbying in Brussels was only born in the late 1970s. Up to that time, “diplomatic lobbying” at the highest levels remained the rule. There were few lobbyists involved in the system and except for some business associations, representative offices were rarely used. The event that sparked the explosion of lobbying was the first direct election of the European Parliament in 1979. Up until then the Parliament consisted complex, and companies increasingly felt the need of an expert local presence to find out what was going on in Brussels. The foundation of lobbying was therefore the need to provide information. From that developed the need to influence the process actively and effectively . The next important step in lobbying development was the Single European Act of 1986 which both created the qualified majority vote for taking decisions in the Council and enhanced the role of the Parliament, again making EU legislation more complex and lobbying more important and attractive for stakeholders. In short, the stronger the EU developed from a Member States organization to an own political player in the world, the more policy areas it covered, the more important it became as a lobbying target. With the EU enlargement in 2004 this development has taken a further step, bringing in not only a lot more players and stakeholders but also a wide range of different political cultures and traditions.

There are currently around 15,001 lobbyists in Brussels (consultants, lawyers, associations, corporations, NGOs etc.) seeking to influence the EU’s legislative process. Some 2,600 special interest groups have a permanent office in Brussels. Their distribution is roughly as follows: European trade federations (32%), consultants (20%), companies (13%), NGOs (11%), national associations (10%), regional representations (6%), international organizations (5%) and think tanks (1%).

In the wake of the Abramoff scandal in Washington and the massive impact on the lobbying scene in the U.S., the rules for lobbying in the EU — which until now only consist of a non-binding code of conduct — will probably also be tightened and made more specific, as indicated by the Commission through its latest transparency initiative (Green Paper on European Transparency Initiative): http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kallas/doc/com2006_0194_4_en.pdf. The full Transparency Initiative website is at : http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kallas/transparency_en.htm.

The fragmented nature of EU institutional structure provides multiple channels through which organized interests may seek to influence policy-making. Lobbying takes place at the European level itself and within the existing national states. The most important institutional targets are the Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament.[4]

The Commission has a monopoly on the initiative in Community decision-making. Since it has the power to draft initiatives, it makes it ideally suited as an arena for interest representation. There are three main channels of indirect lobbying of the Council. First, interest groups routinely lobby the national delegations in Brussels,; the second indirect means of lobbying the Council is for interest groups to lobby members of the many Council-working groups. The third means of influencing the Council is directly via national governments. As a consequence of the co-decision procedures, the European Parliament attracts attention from lobbyists who target the rapporteur and the chairman of the committee. The rapporteurs are MEPs appointed by Committees to prepare the parliament’s response to the Commission’s proposal and to those measures taken by the Parliament itself.

[edit] United Kingdom

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In the United Kingdom, political parties have been known to raise funds by the 'sale' of peerages and other honors. Since peers sit in the House of Lords, part of the UK legislature, they are in a position to initiate or amend Bills on their way to becoming Acts of Parliament. The rules of Parliament require participants in debates to 'declare their interest'. The 'sale' of peerages is a criminal offence. To circumvent this law, it is alleged that some contributions thus solicited, are given, not as outright gifts but as loans.

[edit] United States

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Main article: Lobbying in the United States

Lobbyists in the United States target the United States Senate, the United States House of Representatives, and state legislatures. They may also represent their clients' or organizations' interests in dealings with federal, state, or local executive branch agencies or the courts. Lobbyists sometimes also write legislation and whip bills. The ability of individuals, groups, and corporations to lobby the government is protected by the right to petition[5] in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Folklore stated by publicists for the Willard Hotel holds that "lobbying" originated at that accommodation as Ulysses S. Grant used its lobby repeatedly to drink brandy and smoke a cigar during his term as president of the United States from 1869 to 1877. Grant was often approached there by those seeking favors. However the verb "to lobby" is found decades earlier and did not originally refer to Washington politics. The word "lobby", used in the political sense of "those who seek to influence legislation" has been used since 1808 or earlier in American English, in reference to the custom of influence-seekers gathering in large entrance-halls outside legislative chambers. The verb in this sense is first attested 1850. "Lobbyist" is first attested in 1863.

In July 2005, Public Citizen published a report entitled "The Journey from Congress to K Street". The report analyzed hundreds of lobbyist registration documents filed in compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act and the Foreign Agents Registration Act, among other sources. It found that since 1998, 43 percent of the 198 members of Congress who left government to join private life have registered to lobby. The Washington Post described these results as reflecting the "sea change that has occurred in lawmakers' attitudes toward lobbying in recent years." The paper noted that

Congressional historians say that lawmakers rarely became lobbyists as recently as two decades ago. They considered the profession to be tainted and unworthy of once-elected officials such as themselves. And lobbying firms and trade groups were leery of hiring former members of Congress because they were reputed to be lazy as lobbyists, unwilling to ask former colleagues for favors. [1]

But starting in the late 1980s, high salaries for lobbyists, an increasing demand for lobbyists, greater turnover in Congress, and a change in the control of the House all contributed to a change in attitude about the appropriateness of former elected officials becoming lobbyists[citation needed].

Former lawmakers are hired on their attractiveness to the opposite sex, their relationships with their former colleagues, as well as other contacts[citation needed]. The Public Citizen report included a case study of one particularly successful lobbyist, Bob Livingston, who stepped down as Speaker-elect and resigned his seat in 1999 after a sex scandal. In the six years since his resignation, his lobbying group grew into the 12th largest non-law lobbying firm, earning nearly $40 million by the end of 2004. During roughly the same time period, Livingston, his wife, and his two political action committees (PACs) contributed over $500,000 to the PACs or campaign funds of various candidates.

The increasing number of former lawmakers becoming lobbyists has led Senator Russ Feingold (D, WI) to propose paring back the many Capitol Hill privileges enjoyed by former senators and representatives. His plan would deprive lawmakers-turned-lobbyists of privileges such as unfettered access to otherwise "members only" areas such as the House and Senate floors and the House gym.

Most recently the scandal involving former lobbyist Jack Abramoff has inspired the Legislative Transparency and Accountability Act of 2006, a bill debated on the Senate floor in March 2006. According to a Time Magazine article in its April 10th issue, the Senate passed legislation the first week of April 2006 to reform U.S. lobbying practices. The Senate bill: 1) bars lobbyists themselves from buying gifts and meals for legislators, but it leaves a big loophole: firms and organizations represented by those lobbyists may still do so; 2) Privately funded trips would still be allowed if lawmakers get prior approval from a commissioned ethics committee; 3) It would also require lobbyists to file more frequent, more detailed reports on their activities, which would be posted in public domains.

Critics of the bills proposed from both the House and Senate like Fred Wertheimer, head of the nonpartisan Democracy 21 watchdog group, say the bills "leave lobbyists free to function in Congress exactly the way they have been functioning."

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  • Geiger, Andreas: EU Lobbying handbook, A guide to modern participation in Brussels, 244 pages, ISBN 3-9811316-06, Helios Media GmbH, 2006 (http://www.helios-media.com/de/information/buecher/lobbying_handbuch.php)
  • Geiger, Andreas: From a lobbyist's point of view, European Agenda 1/2006)
  • The Bulletin, 16 March 2006, p. 14, Lobbying Europe: facts and fiction
  • The European Lawyer, December 2005/January 2006, p. 9, The lobbyists have landed
  • Financial Times, 3 October 2005, p. 8, Brussels braces for a U.S. lobbying invasion
  • Public Affairs News, November 2004, p. 34, Judgement Call
  • The European Lawyer, December 2004/January 2005, p. 26, Lifting the lid on lobbying
  • Geiger, Andreas: Lobbyists — the Devil’s Advocates?, European Competition Law Review, Volume 24, issue 11/2003, p. 559

[edit] External links

General
Lobbying in the United States
Lobbying in Europe
Lobbying in Canada
Lobbying in the UK
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