Lion of Babylon tank

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The Lion of Babylon tank (Asad Babil) was an Iraqi-built version of the Soviet T-72 MBT (main battle tank), assembled in a factory established in the 1980s near Taji, north of Baghdad.

[edit] Production History

This project represented the most ambitious attempt by Saddam Hussein's Regime to develop an indigenous tank production, triggered in part when some western governments imposed an embargo in order to force a negotiated end to the Iran-Iraq war.

A steel plant was in place in Taji since 1986, built by a West German Company, manufacturing steel for several military uses and meeting the standards to retrofit and rebuild tanks already on duty in the Iraqi Army, such as the T-55 family and the T-62. But the first locally-built T-72 came off the production line in early 1989, after a license agreement was achieved with a Polish contractor to provide essential parts for assembly^[1]. The new imposed UN arms embargo following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (August 1990) soon limited the complex activity to the production of spare parts for the Lions and other tanks in the Iraqi stock[1].

In most aspects, the Lion of Babylon is (at least physically) identical to the first model T-72. Nevertheless, the two differ considerably, both in the quality of construction and durability of materials used. The tank was equipped with additional armour at the front and rear as protection against missile attacks (see Russian link in the Armor section), this according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)[2]. A few examples featured a laser range-finder for its 125 mm smoothbore main gun. American military intelligence believed some of them also featured Belgium-made thermal sights (see Crusade, p.443). These same sources claim the tank was also provided with a better track protection against sand and mud than the Soviet T-72 [3]. It's widely believed that the tank had some kind of electro-optical interference pods, probably of Chinese origin. Another link [4] shows and describes a crude detachable device made by the Iraqis in order to use the exhausts to blow up sand or dust to digging-in the tank. As secondary armament, the tank mounted either the NSV or the DShK 12.7 mm machinegun and the coaxial 7.62 mm PKT common to all models of T-72.

[edit] Combat Performance

The Asad Babil was generally credited as being the most common tank in Iraqi service during the Gulf War (1990-91), but that honor goes, in fact, to the Type 69, produced in China but widely refitted by the Iraqis. Only Republican Guard divisions were equipped with Iraqi-built T-72s. Much to the distress of Russian armaments designers, many of the failings of the Iraqi armies were blamed upon the original T-72, with little note that the vehicle itself was an Iraqi copy of an older export model, and nowhere near its up-to-date Soviet counterpart in capability.

Even in the hands of competent crewmen, the Lion of Babylon is utterly outclassed by the M1 Abrams and by any other contemporary Western main battle tank, as was demonstrated in both Gulf Wars. For example, a 120 mm depleted uranium (DU) APFSDS round from an M1 could kill an Asad Babil tank well beyond 3,000 m, while the effective range of a tungsten-core 125 mm shell is scarcely 1,800 m. The only chance for the Asad Babil against American tanks was to lure them to close range combat, or trying to ambush them from dug-in positions. But even in those conditions, the M1s usually prevailed, as proven in circumstances like the Battle of 73 Easting, during Desert Storm, where dozens of Iraqi MBTs were obliterated, or near Mahmoudiyah, south of Baghdad, April 3, 2003, (Iraqi Freedom) when US tanks engaged their counterparts from just 50 yards, shattering 7 enemy T-72s without losses (see Heavy Metal: A Tank Company's Battle To Baghdad., p. 158). These encounters also exposed the very poor marksmanship of the Iraqi gunners, in part due to the shortage of modern night-vision and range-finder assets, as reported in the Production History section. Indeed, barely a dozen US vehicles were knocked out or destroyed by Iraqi tanks of any kind in the course of both 1991 war and 2003's invasion. Four of those vehicles were wheeled trucks. One was rammed by an iraqi upgraded Type-69 in Nasiriyah.

[edit] Desert Storm (1991)

The Ground War begun Feb 24, 1991, and lasted until Feb 27, when President George Bush Sr declared an unilateral cease-fire, after the last Iraqi Army Units were forced out from Kuwait. The Asad Babil saw action mostly with the Republican Guard Armored Division Tawakalna (God with us), on the third day of operations^[2] . The Division was decimated by the simultaneous assault of several American armored Task Forces.

[edit] vs the M1 Abrams

At first, combat assessment researchers thought that about a dozen M1s were hit and damaged in some degree in the course of tank battles with Iraqi T-72s in 1991, but further ballistics information and radiological readings showed that 6 Abrams were beyond any doubt hit by friendly fire. Helicopter-launched missiles are suspected of inflicting friendly damage in another 4 cases.

A Lion lays wrecked in Southern Iraq, March 1991

As already mentioned, the T-72s built in Taji were technologically fifteen or more years out of date, so they could not face the latest generation of US MBTs without sustaining heavy losses. However, some sources dispute the claim that no M1A1 Abrams took damage from this Iraqi tank. Brig. Gen. Robert Scales, in Certain Victory (pp. 269-270) describes an engagement at close range between advancing M1s and dug-in Lions where at least two American tanks were knocked out, apparently by 125 mm sabot rounds. The battle took place before midnight, February 26, 1991, against a brigade of Tawakalna Division. The Abrams tanks belonged to TF 1-37th Armour, U.S. 1st Armored Division, were both struck from behind. Two more became the targets of anti-tank missiles, depicted in the ballistics report as small shaped charge munition (scan).

M1A1 destroyed in the course of the battle against Tawakalna division. The kind of damage sustained matches in some way that inflicted upon Abrams B-23.

There was speculation about incoming friendly-fire from Apache helicopters of the U.S. 3rd Armored Division deployed to the south, but one of the four M1s (B-23) was definitely hit by a non-depleted uranium discarding sabot shell, since no radiological trace was found (see item B in the following link). An official document (scan), shows a drawing describing the projectile path right through the tank hull, defeating the armour on both sides, a kind of harm that only a large kinetic energy penetrator could make (the Hellfire missile fired from the Apaches has a high explosive anti-tank warhead). Had a Hellfire hit the tank, the path depicted would have shown a sharp downward angle.

This is the summary (scan) detailing Abrams B-23's damage. Note that this text mentions two rounds hitting the Abrams, the first of them (a shaped charge weapon) being probably an AGM-114 Hellfire missile blast through the rear grill doors, while the second unknown round is almost certainly that depicted in the ballistic's sketch, likely from an Asad Babil gun. The damage taken from this second hit, as is described in this unclassified article, was catastrophic.

Another US Army official damage assessment (scan), asserts that an unidentified Abrams suffered three non-DU impacts. Witnesses in the field claimed a T-72 was responsible.

The damage may have been sustained during the last engagement of the Gulf War, March 2 1991, near the Rumeilah oil fields, southwest of Basra, when the 1st Brigade of the US 24th Infantry Division attacked by surprise a large retreating column of the Hammurabi elite Division, comprising some Asad Babil and APCs, which apparently broke the cease-fire. Most of the Brigade-size formation was demolished by the combined force of helicopters, A-10 attack aircraft and armoured vehicle weapons, but Rick Atkinson's book Crusade, cites one M1A1 destroyed and another taken out of action by "exploding" T-72s (p. 484).

More specific reports exist about an Abrams storage boxes catching fire from a T-72 as a result of this engagement in this link to the official Chronology of the XVIII Airborne Corps in Gulf War [5].

This additional photo apparently shows the damaged M1A1, with what seems to be two large darts embedded in the rear-right side of its turret, somewhat matching the description of the US Army assessment^[3]. The tank's markings also match those identifying the 2nd Platoon of A Company , TF 4-64 Armour, 24th Infantry Division[6]. As can be seen, the impacts seem to be well aimed shots rather than random falling shells or splinters from the explosion of an enemy vehicle. The storage area around the turret seems devastated by the subsequent fire, as reported in the Chronology link. This kind of mishaps proved that the external storage of the M1As Abrams are highly vulnerable to enemy fire, capable of igniting packaged items dripping down to the engine compartment, as also happened in at least one case during the 2003 invasion when the turret was hit by heavy machine gun rounds [7] (See 1-64 AR, B-24 tank).

[edit] vs the M2 Bradley

M2 Bradley K12 burning after being hit by 125 mm rounds

According to Atkinson and Scales, the Lions also accounted for at least three M2 Bradley IFVs during Desert Storm and left several damaged, all of them on February 26, 1991.

The Bradleys were often deployed as advanced scouts for the main armored forces. They explored the enemy lines, having been greeted by the iraqi tank's main guns in many occasions. In return, if located within striking distance, they retaliated by firing their BGM-71 TOWs antitank missiles with deadly effects, taking out even some MBTs. Almost all the M2 losses were the result of this kind of mission.

Brigadier General Scales states that on the mentioned date, an M2 Bradley (ID number unknown), leading the TF 3-5th Cavalry scout platoon and commanded by a First Lieutenant Donald Murray, took a T-72 sabot round through the road wheels. This action led to the first officially reported killing of a Lion in the campaign, by First Lieutenant Marty Lener's tank (p. 273).

Atkinson cites a mostly fratricidal battle near Phase Line Bullet, a preestablished objective in the 3rd Armored Division way towards northern Kuwait, west of Al-Busayyah (pp. 428 to 433). The close-range skirmish involved Bradleys from the 4th Squadron of the 7th Cavalry Regiment against Iraqi dismounted infantry, APCs, and T-72s of Tawakalna Division. Visibility conditions were extremely poor (less than 400 yards), due to a sandstorm combined with the fumes of burning oil wells. The Iraqis employed small arms, RPG-7s, AT-3 Sagger missiles (completely aimless in such bad weather), and direct and indirect tank and 73mm cannon fire from their entrenched positions. One of the American IFVs (A-36) was hit and crippled by what ballistics suggest was a 12.7 mm bullet from an Iraqi tank^[4] (though it may have been a sabot round splinter) and then shattered by a HEAT 125mm shell after the crew evacuated the vehicle (see this description of the incident). Bradley A-35 also took some damage from a mix of ricocheting 12.7mm bursts and 125mm HEAT near-misses, but was able to be driven out(see citation here). Another three vehicles were put out of action by M1A sabot friendly fire. The rest of the 14 IFVs platoon, all of them damaged by shrapnel and machine gun fire, was forced to withdraw. This is the only known action in which an Iraqi armored force led by T-72s Lions beat off a US ground assault in both Iraqi wars.

There is also another reference to a third Bradley (K12), belonging to 3rd squadron, 2nd ACR (US 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment), hit by both kinetic energy and HEAT rounds and totally destroyed, present in the following document.This incident apparently happened in the course of the scattered skirmishes that preceded the battle of 73 Easting.

[edit] Invasion of Iraq (2003)

During the invasion of Iraq, the Republican Guard's Lions, most of them from the Medina Division, showed up around Baghdad, attempting a last ditch defense of the Baath Regime.

An Asad Babil from the Medina Division makes its last stand, Baghdad, April 2003

Since the beginning of the war, the bulk of the resistance had been conducted by regular army units, fitted with Type 69s and T-62. In the process of the final run to the Iraqi capital, another M2 was struck by a 125 mm shell near Baghdad Airport in early April 2003, caught in the open while on a reconnaissance mission[8]. Other sources claim the Bradley was destroyed by an iraqi modified Type 69 fitted with a single 57 mm gun[9], but the high rate of fire of this antiaircraft weapon (70 RPM) makes this hypothesis unlikely, since there were just two rounds fired, one against the Bradley and a previous near-miss aimed at an NBC Fox vehicle [10].

This action took place during a counter-attack led by Republican Guard armored forces against the Task Force 2-7 Infantry (Mechanized) Tactical Operation Center (TOC). Other light vehicles (Humvees and heavy trucks), possibly fell to tank main guns shelling the compound area at this instance.

In preparation for the final assault, the Iraqi T-72s were the preferred target for Apache helicopters and A-10s, in an attempt to diminish the combat power of Medina. However, one of these US air operations, executed by Apaches from the 11th Aviation Regiment became a fiasco near Karbala, on March 25. The Republican Guard T-72s, APCs, ZSU-23-4 antiarcraft systems, along with infantrymen armed with AK-47s, aware of the American Army plans, surprised the 34 helicopters with a barrage of PKM, NSV, 23 mm, and perhaps 125 mm tank fire^[5]. The route of the raiders was uncovered by the Republican Guard long before they could reach their intended objective.

The large aerial strike was repulsed with one Apache brought down (according to Iraqi propaganda, shot at by a peasant firing an AK-47, although it was likely hit by 23 mm rounds), and all the remainder damaged, some of them taken temporary out of service and at least two being written off. Only 7 were still operational after the failed raid. The two crew members of the downed aircraft were captured by the Iraqis. This left the US Regiment grounded for the rest of the invasion and, in some sense, it was the last successful battle of the T-72 Lion of Babylon^[6].

A kinetic energy tank round seconds before being employed by Iraqi insurgents as an improvised projectile against a US Humvee

The last operational Asad Babils were destroyed by the successive waves of American armored incursions on the Iraqi capital [11] or abandoned by their crews after the fall of Baghdad, several of them without firing a single shot. Contrary to what occurred in the Gulf War, when US forces crushed dozens of armored brigades and forced the rest to withdraw from Kuwait, the Iraqi Army of 2003 collapsed by itself after it became clear that the central power was no more. The derelict tanks were later scrapped by US Army disposal teams or shipped to the USA for targeting practice. Apparently, a handful of them that were still on production in the Taji complex or hidden elsewhere were later incorporated to the new Iraqi Army for training (see Aftermath section).

But the Lions and their now dismantled factory would continue to haunt American forces in Iraq under the guise of IEDs, many of them made from 125 mm HEAT shells [12] or even sabot rounds and other ammunitions once produced in the Taji plant, and now used, often with deadly effects, by the Iraqi Insurgency.

[edit] Conclusions

From a wide point of view, the Iraqi T-72 was affected by the same lack of maneuvering skills which pervaded the Iraqi Army commander's minds since the war with Iran, as expressed in the following link[13]. The Asad Babils, like any other tank in the Iraqi inventory, were mainly employed as artillery pillboxes, rather than high-mobility combat vehicles. The Iraqi Generals wasted tons and tons of HEAT and even sabot tank shells in indirect fire missions from reveted positions, achieving absolutely nothing against coalition troops before being located and wiped out by helicopter or A-10 air strikes. As we have seen above, the ambushes were also mostly ineffective, and those tanks met their fate at the hands of Allied MBTs or IFVs. In any case, the overwhelming air supremacy of the Coalition would had forced to bury in foxholes even the fastest armored division in the world. However, the destruction of the Tawakalna Division (the bulk of it comprised of Lion of Babylon tanks) by the US 1st and 3rd Infantry Divisions cost the Allied forces too much time, and consequently they were unable to destroy other Republican Guard divisions before ordered to cease-fire. Many authors maintain that the very existence of Saddam's Regime for the next 12 years can be attribute to this fact, since the surviving Republican Guard units crushed the Shiite and Kurd risings right after the Iraqi defeat in Desert Storm^[7].

[edit] Armor

The Lion's armour was the same as the basic Soviet T-72, without any composite armour improvement, which made this tank an easy prey for any Western counterpart of latest generation. Their sides had just 60 mm protection, the turret side 300 mm standard and flat 45 mm at rear (later reinforced by the Iraqis).

Nevertheless, the 350 mm frontal armor present both at the turret and the front glacis plate worked relatively well against some shaped-charge ordinance, like the TOWs and Hellfire missiles^[8]. There are reports of Iraqi T-72s surviving direct hits from these weapons, although becoming a mobility kill in almost all of these cases. This link shows one example:[14]. Even if the Iraqi tank was ultimately destroyed, its armour forced the Bradleys to fire three TOWs before they finished it. Atkinson (op. cit., p. 444), cites another account of a TOW bouncing off a T-72 glacis plate and hitting the turret of another tank. There is even a citation in the report about the Battle for the Airport of a T-72 Lion defeating a Javelin missile and then limping away with only slight damage. The missiles could also have been deflected by the electro-optical jammers.

An infantryman firing a FGM-148 Javelin

Another of these few cases took place in the already mentioned combat of Mahmoudiyah, also in 2003, when a 120 mm HEAT round from an Abrams impacted on the front of an Asad Babil turret at point blank without any significant consequences (see Conroy & Martz, Op. Cit., p. 9).

It may be that some of these tanks featured ERA reactive armour, obtained from spare parts of the Polish T-72M1. A US Commander in the field suggested that during their last stand for Baghdad, five Iraqi T-72s seemed to be equipped with reactives [15].

An improvised innovation that may have also work in these circumstances was introduced at the Taji complex, according to this Russian web site. An additional armor plate with a thickness of 30 mm was welded on the front areas of the hull and turret, leaving an air layer gap matching the size of the armour, so that the power of a HEAT jet could be dissipated in the hollow space. This technique follows the principle of spaced armour. The Iraqi engineers tested this reinforcement against smoothbore 120 mm Chieftain tank guns in 1989, apparently with some success. This FAS document claims that Russian designers took note of this Iraqi employment of layer armor for their T-90 MBT^[9].

The same plating armor reinforcement seems to be welded on the Type 69-QM front glacis.

There are also at least two examples of 25 mm armour-piercing cannon fire from Bradleys IFVs ricocheting harmlessly when fired at the Iraqi tank in Desert Storm. But in the end it was no match for the so called silver bullet: the 120 mm DU tank ammunition.

[edit] Aftermath

Two years after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the new Iraqi Government acquired dozens of refitted T-72-M from Hungary [16],in order to equip an armored brigade. Interestedly, the headquarters of this new Iraqi Army unit is located in Taji, so there may still remain some maintenance facilities for MBTs. The website cited in the link also says that some surviving Lions are used to instruct the new recruits. The training and experience of the old Iraqi Army officers and crews with the Asad Babil was also one of the reasons behind the choice of the Soviet-designed tank by the authorities.

[edit] Notes

1. ^ According to Russian sources, an informal agreement was already in place between the Iraqi Government and the Polish Company as early as 1982. The deal comprised the assembling of 250 T-72M1As from imported hulls, in order to waive the embargo. However, the process actually consisted in a kit-to-build model rather than a true production line. The first assembling site seems to have been located at Samawa. By September 1982, the Soviet Union started to provide under the Polish covert other T-72 components to upgrade the Iraqi MBTs. The Baath Regime also had bought a handful of very basic T-72 models to the USSR during the last year of president Bakr in power (1979), the only tanks of this type imported outright by the Iraqis. About 60 T-72s were lost in the war with Iran. By the time of the beginning of the production in Taji’s factory, several hundreds of T-72s were in active service in the Iraqi Army. Neverthless, we use the generic name of Asad Babil for all the Iraqi T-72s, since all of them were upgraded to T-72M1A standards (in the case of the few of basic model ) or ( in the case of the assembled from Polish hulls) refurbished and modified in the Taji complex.
2. ^ The existence of Type-69 tanks featuring 125 mm smoothbore guns (yet another Iraqi innovation) led to conflicting reports about clashes with T-72s on February 25. The source of these reports came from the USMC’s battle assessments.
3. ^ For a wide view of the disabled tank, click here
4. ^ From the upward angle of impact (+9º), we also must infer a ricocheting round.
5. ^ The latter is a not improbable scenario, since one air loss in the Gulf War (actually an OH-58 Kiowa, although the cited source indicates an Apache) was allegedly scored by tank fire on February 25:
   • http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/declassimages/army/19960919/091896_apr96_decls1_0113.html
6. ^ Apache Operation a lesson in defeat, By Rowan Scarborough, The Washington Times, April 22, 2003.
7. ^ See the following USAF article:
   • http://www.afa.org/magazine/march2003/0303escape.asp
8. ^ Brig. Gen. Scales hints that some Iraqi T-72s survived Hellfire’s strikes before the 1-37TF assault (Op. Cit., p.268).
9. ^ Literal transcription: So far, no specific additional information about the T-90’s front-slope or glacis armor configuration is available.The most likely design would be a much improved version of the 5-layer armor that protected the hulls of Iraqi T-72s in Desert Storm.

[edit] Sources

• Scales, Brigadier General Robert H. Jr: Certain Victory. Brassey's, 1994.

• Atkinson, Rick: Crusade, The untold story of the Persian Gulf War. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993.

• Rostker, Bernard: Enviromental Exposure Report:Depleted Uranium in the Gulf. DoD Publication, 1998.

• Conroy, Jason & Martz, Ron: Heavy Metal: A Tank Company's Battle To Baghdad. Potomac Books, 2005.

• Isby, David: Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army. Salamander Books, London, 1988.

• "Dragon's Roar: 1-37 Armor in the Battle of 73 Easting." Armor, May-June 1992, VOL CI, #3.

• Jane's Armor & Artillery, Jane's Information Group, Surrey, 1988-89 Ed.

[edit] External References

• The Death Lobby: How the West armed Iraq.

• Inspecting Iraq-Iraq military Jane's