Line of battle
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In naval warfare, line astern or line of battle is a tactic in which the ships of the fleet form a line, end-to-end. Its origins are traditionally ascribed to the navy of the Commonwealth of England, especially to General at Sea Robert Blake who wrote the Sailing and Fighting Instructions of 1653. Modern research has shown that the first documented deliberate use seems to be in the Action of 18 September 1639 by Dutch Lieutenant-Admiral Maarten Tromp who employed it to damage a Spanish fleet, far superior in numbers and firepower, so severely it took refuge in the Downs where he would destroy it five weeks later in the Battle of the Downs. The United Provinces, however, did not formalise it into an official doctrine.
In the 1652 battles of the First Anglo-Dutch War the Dutch again used the line-of-battle when trying to defend themselves against the heavier English vessels. Blake's innovation was that he understood it could be used as a decisive offensive method too, as he showed in the Battle of Portland and the Battle of the Gabbard, causing severe losses to the Dutch fleet.
After this war the English perfected the method; but the Dutch were slower to adopt the modern tactic, still having no written instructions when the Second Anglo-Dutch War broke out. An attempt to employ the line-of-battle against the English by Dutch Lieutenant-Admiral Jacob van Wassenaer Obdam failed catastrophically in the Battle of Lowestoft due to insufficient training and confusion among the lower ranks whether the line should be used or the direct attack. In the summer of 1665 the Dutch too wrote formal instructions. Michiel de Ruyter used the line-of-battle with great ability in the Four Days Battle. That the English were still more competent in it was shown in the St. James's Day Battle when they recovered much earlier from exceptional weather conditions causing large manpower losses to the Dutch.
In the Third Anglo-Dutch War the Dutch had full mastery of the tactic as is evident by the events during the Battle of Schooneveld. At the same time the British became rather dogmatic about the line-of-battle, trying to employ it even in unfavourable conditions, as shown in the Battle of Beachy Head and the Battles of Barfleur and La Hougue, where the French gained an advantage because of British inflexibility. This worsened during the 18th century when the line-of-battle became a dogmatic doctrine. This was gradually abandoned in the late 18th century: the Battle of the Saints (1781) saw a greater emphasis on breaking the enemy line instead of keeping the own line intact at all costs; the Battle of the First of June (1794) a return to the mêlée.
The line of battle has the advantage over previous naval tactics — in which ships closed on each other for individual combat — that each ship in the line can fire its broadside without fear of hitting a friendly ship. Therefore in any given amount of time more shots can be fired by the entire fleet. Another advantage is that a relative movement of the line in relation to some part of the enemy fleet allows for a systematic concentration of fire on that part. To fend off this possibility the other fleet too can move in a line, with the result so typical for sea battle since 1675: two fleets sailing along each other or in opposite tack. A ship powerful enough to stand in the line of battle came to be known as a "ship of the line" (of battle) or a "line of battle" ship which shortened to become "battleship". The line is at its most effective when moving perpendicular to the axis of movement of the enemy fleet, e.g. by "crossing the T" or by breaking the enemy line and moving through it (eg Battle of Trafalgar). This way the enemy ships block each other's line of fire.
Line of battle tactics continued to be used (for example in the Battle of Jutland in 1916 and the Battle of Surigao Strait in 1944) until the end of World War II.
World War II saw the decline of line of battle tactics, as admirals quickly realized that with the long (and lengthening) arm of aircraft carriers changing the strategic calculus, lining battleships up to pound away at each other had become more of a liability than a strength, as carrier-borne aircraft could swoop down and pounce on battleship formations easily. Battle group tactics became the norm as World War II progressed, with a single capital ship (carrier or battleship) and its escorts becoming a fleet unto itself. Note that battleships only sailed in line formation just before and during battles (i.e. during tactical movement); normally (during strategic movement) they sailed in group formation, surrounded by scouting frigates or cruisers.
After World War II, the carrier battle group became the accepted paradigm of strategic naval formations.
Some military science fiction works revive the term "battle-line", or its 3D analogon, "wall of battle", to refer to the heavy warships of a space fleet.
