Libertarianism (metaphysics)

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For the use of the term libertarianism in politics, see libertarianism.

Contents 1 Summary 2 Appeal to experience 3 Appeal to the experience of decision making 4 Further challenges to libertarianism 5 Further reading

[edit] Summary

In philosophical debates about free will and determinism, libertarianism is generally held to be the combination of the following beliefs:

1. that free will is incompatible with determinism
2. that human beings do possess free will, and
3. that determinism is false

All libertarians subscribe to the philosophy of incompatibilism which states that an action cannot be both free and physically predetermined in the commonly understood sense. Free actions are ones which could have been different. Traditionally, this has meant that there is no causal chain that necessitated the action prior to the agent freely choosing it; the agent is an originator of causal chains. Libertarianism is the opposite of Determinism which states all human actions are predetermined, and soft-determinism or 'Compatibilism' which argues determinism is compatible with free will.

For the Libertarian although causality applies to the inanimate and animal worlds, it cannot extend to human actions and decisions. Although, personality and physical appearance are effected by causality, the moral self is capable of free choice; and overcomes the predispositions of my personality.

For example, a kleptomaniac in a shop would have a natural predisposition, due to his illness to steal from said shop, but his moral self may overcome this desire, and a psychologist cannot say 100% whether he will. A determinist would argue that the psychologist is not aware of all the causes; an awareness of being watched, fear of arrest by the police, that the psychologist is not aware of, could have prevented the action. To overcome determinist arguments, the libertarian makes 3 additional arguments:

[edit] Appeal to experience

All human beings, claims the libertarian, have experience of being a self-determining being, we are all aware of the free choices we have made. But for the determinist, this claim lends no support at all; he would argue that everyday we labour under the illusion of free will, as we are often unaware of the causes of our actions.

[edit] Appeal to the experience of decision making

We all have experience of deliberating, of weighing factors which could influence our decisions and this often takes a long time. For this appeal, there is also a simple determinist response. Benedict Spinoza claimed that this is merely evidence to support the argument that people believe in free will. For Spinoza, “Man believes himself to be free, simply because he is conscious of his actions “. Regardless of whether someone feels aware of their decisions, they are nevertheless influenced by causal factors.

[edit] Further challenges to libertarianism

A further objection to libertarianism is that it remains a mystery why an agent makes the choice she does — any explanation of the choice (beyond a probabilistic one) would seem to make it determined. However, according to David Hume, if a choice is not determined then it is simply a random event, which is problematic since such a choice would lack purpose. Attempts to deal with this tend towards dualism, in which mental events, such as choices, are independent of physical causes.

Although quantum mechanics provides some reason for thinking that determinism may indeed be false, Roy C. Weatherford (in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy) echoes Hume on randomness:

The random behaviour of atoms certainly does not by itself make for the freedom and moral responsibility asserted by libertarians.

Although not held by the majority of contemporary philosophers, libertarianism is still widely discussed and avidly defended by several leading philosophers on the field, such as Peter van Inwagen, Robert Kane, Timothy O'Connor and Laura Ekstrom. It is still popular among non-academics and is endorsed by some religions as a tenet.

[edit] Further reading

• Randolph Clarke Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. Oxford University Press: New York, 2003. ISBN 0-19-515987-X
• Robert Kane The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press: New York, 1998. ISBN 0-19-512656-4