Talk:La Grande Armée

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Ansbachdragoner (talk • contribs • email)

I was very happy to find this webpage. It gave a nice new light to the subject of my study, which concerned the recruitment of these soldiers. My case was the organisation of the conscription in a territorial unity (canton) of 19 East-flemish (ie Belgian) communes near Ghent.

Contents

[edit] Sentence removed

I removed this because it is not a neutral point of view statement. *Kat* 07:12, May 2, 2005 (UTC)

  • Of course, the morale of line troops soared when the Grumblers moved forward into the fray.


[edit] I removed the following:

The Grande Armée is consisted of seven corps:

  • 1st Corps: Commanded by Marshal Bernadotte, 2 divisions, each of 3 regiments(9 battalions), 1 light calvary division of 4 regiments;
  • 2nd Corps: Commanded by General Marmont, 3 infantry division and 1 light calvary division;
  • 3rd Corps: Commanded by Marshal Devout, 3 infantry divisions and 1 light calvary division;
  • 4th Corps: Commanded by Marshal Soult, 3 infantry divisions and 1 light calvary division;
  • 5th Corps: Commanded by Marshal Lannes, 3 infantry division and 1 light calvary division;
  • 6th Corps: Commanded by Marshal Ney, 3 infantry division and 1 light calvary division;
  • 7th Corps: Commanded by Marshal Augereau, 2 divisions of nine battalions each (This Corp is the reserve).

Twejoel, I assume this is the OoB for the 1805 campaign. Which would be fine if that section were only about that, but it deals with organization in general. Maybe if you add a section on that campaign at the bottom of the article, this information can be readded there. I'm trying to get this article up to FEATURED status and your edits, while well meaning, are not really helping.--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) 10:09, 16 November 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Can I help ??

It seems that is almost done here , great job man, but let me know if ya need something about --Philx 06:09, 18 January 2006 (UTC)it.

Hey Bro! Why sure you can help if you want. If you know half as much about Napoleonic warfare as you do about Roman history you are more than welcome...even if you don't, you are still welcome.--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) 23:53, 23 January 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Work on Infanterie de Ligne and Légère

Hi There,

I've just fleshed out the section on Line infantry, and will be doing the same with the Light Infantry. Adding some more detailed information, as well as fixing some inaccuracies (e.g. Tirailleurs were not a part of the Infanterie Légère(which was Carabiniers, Chasseurs and Voltigeurs), but rather seperate foreign formations [Tirailleurs Corses and Tirailleurs du Pô] or part of the Jeune Garde [the Tirailleurs-Grenadiers and Tirailleurs-Chasseurs]) Hope this helps --ansbachdragoner 01:10, 20 January 2006 (UTC)

Bienvenue! I was intending to flesh out some of the complex differences between different Légère types, but you, Sir, not only humbuged me to the march but did a FAR more elaborate and eloquent job of it than I. You are correct too, Grenadiers, were technically, Ligne units. Even though they were often separated into their own regiments and (until 1809) divisions. Tirailleurs, were separate too, and it seems were generally used as ball fodder. Thanks for your great contributions to both the article and the images! Again, VERY well done! --R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) 21:37, 22 January 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Featured

Why isn't this article featured so far? Halibutt 03:32, 7 February 2006 (UTC)

I don't feel it is quite done yet. I need to add one more section to sum up the G.A.'s history and legacy. Ansbach has also expressed the desire to expand upon other already completed sections. And after the brilliant job he did with the infantry, how could I refuse him. Then we will turn it over for not peer review but project review at Wikipedia:WikiProject Military history. I figure we will get a much larger and more knowledgable response there than at regular peer review. Once the project deems it worthy, THEN we will cast it out into the FAC storm:>--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) 09:19, 7 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Dont Panic

Hi There,

I'm in the middle of expanding on the Guard. The Cav Needed a mention, and a little expansion of the Young / Middle Old Guard.--ansbachdragoner 05:48, 14 February 2006 (UTC)

Up with your heads gentlemen, those are only bullets, not turds. Priceless;>--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) 00:26, 15 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Glory Years (to 1806 or 1807?)

People STOP messing with this section; it is generally agreed that the glory years of the Grande Armee were from 1805 to 1807, when their victories permitted an end to bloodshed on the continent at Tilsit. Friedland was Napoleon's second most decisive victory, so calling it a "hard-won triumph" makes no sense; the Russians were thoroughly destroyed.

Eylau was a bloody draw, but presumably when we're talking about crowning glories we're covering the period, not just individual battles. For the Grande Armee, Eylau was a catharctic moment, since it was the first time they did not have a decisive victory. Nevertheless, the epic charge by French cavalry and the horrible snowstorm do elevate the battle to some sort of 'crowning glory,' semantics aside. Friedland was not a costly victory; you'd have to be joking to say that. The Russians lost 20,000, about 1/3 of their army, while the French only 8,000, a very very low fraction of their entire force in Poland (1/8 of the men that were at the battlefield). At Austerlitz, the French lost nearly 9,000 and the Allies about 25,000, yet you're not saying that was a costly victory now are you? Logically, you'd have to! But of course it makes no sense, just like calling Friedland a 'costly victory' makes no sense either.

Just as a matter of history, however, the great years of the Empire's armies do include 1807. And by "history" I mean the vast collection of literature; books by historians, military enthusiasts like you and I, and others are all most likely to include 1807 as part of the glory years. Furthermore, the army did not fight in 1804, so I don't know why you're including that year. It was formed then, but had no actual glory in that year. Please do not make any further changes here; history should not be sacrificed for your personal views. User:UberCryxic

UberCryxic, your claim that the treaty of Tilsit is completely accepted as the end of the 'Glory Years' is incorrect. In fact, I was of the opinion that in the majority of histories (Etling, Chandler etc) were of the opinion that the Glory years ended in December 1806. Just going from Chandler's authoritative work 'Campaigns of Napoleon', Chandler claims that Iena-Auerstadt was the height, and that December 1806 was the beginning of Napoleon's (and therefore La Grande Armée's) decline. He gives the following reasons for this.
  • While the twin victories of Iena-Auerstadt were unargueably complete (with 70% of the Prussian army becoming either casualties or prisoners), Napoleon had failed in his efforts to bring a swift conclusion to the war. Königin Louise of Prussia had managed to persuade her husband not to sue for peace. This meant that the Tsar's army was now also drawn into the war, an eventuality which Napoleon did not desire. Instead of a 'blitzkreig' style campaign (as at Austerlitz), he was now forced into an unwanted winter campaign in Poland, and while his victory at Friedland was spectacular, It was merely the conclusion to an unwanted and costly campaign.
  • The introduction of the Continental System with the Berlin Decree of November 1806 was to lead to the Invasion of Portugal in 1807 and of Spain in 1808, so therefore to the Peninsular War (The Spanish ulcer ruined me). This was also the reason for the disastrous Russian Campaign of 1812.
  • Finally, from this point Napoleon was no longer seen as invicible. Although Imperial publicity painted Eylau as a great victory, the true nature of the battle was leaked out, and this dent in Napoleon's invincibility hardened the resolve of those fighting Napoleon, particularly Britain, to 'stay the course'. Also, for the first time La Grande Armée was discontent and suffering from poor morale (It was during the 1806-7 winter campaign that the Grenadiers a Pied received the nickname 'les grognards' for openly voicing their concerns to the Emperor).
In conclusion, to state that Friedland is the end of the Glory Years ignores the equally popular school of thought that December 1806 saw the end of this period.--ansbachdragoner 23:30, 2 March 2006 (UTC)

I reverted the changes after taking a look at your propositions. I have read Chandler's authoritative work, at least twice from front to back. I think what he implies more than anything else is that Napoleon, not the army, suffered some sort of deterioration in 1807.

The actualy quality of the French army during 1807 was spectacular; they basically had the same mettle as the 1805 and 1806 armies. Eylau is an unfortunate battle from which to judge their effectiveness or greatness, and besides memorable courage, it doesn't indicate much. In fact, Chandler's account of that battle is pathetic and appalling; there's barely any real historical work done, and he just repeats the same sort of historical trash about how Murat's cavalry 'gloriously' rode against the Russian lines in fancy clothes, when undoubtedly all they could have done is a trot in three freaking feet deep snow, and they were wearing greatcoats up to the wazzooo. They would've looked more like zombies than cavalrymen. The French had a ferocious snowstorm driving into their faces, making any serious coordination and attacks virtually impossible. Like I said, this battle shouldn't be used to determine the greatness of the army at the period.

Friedland is far more indicative of their stature. Why? Because, perhaps more than any other engagement during the Napoleonic Wars, it displayed some of the most importance concepts underlying French strategy. Lannes was able to hold out and pin the Russians while French reinforcements swung the balance in the Emperor's favor; this was a classic demonstration of the power an isolated corps had to fend off larger opponents until additional troops could come and rescue the situation. And the result was brutal: 20,000 Russian casulaties at the cost of just 8,000. This battle was on the scale of Austerlitz, both militarily and politically. When wondering about whether to continue the struggle against Napoleon, Alexander's brother, Grand Duke Constantine, told him, "Sire, if you are considering fighting the French, you might as well give each man a bullet and let them shoot themselves." Friedland single-handedly lead to Tilsit, which many (and maybe most) historians at least regard as the height of Napoleon's empire, if not his army. However, as a general rule, France's fortunes during this time were strongly tied to the performance of the military, so that Napoleon was able to bring off such a successful treaty and give peace on the continent also speaks volumes on the actual strength of the army.

The only reasonable recourse one could have to saying this period was not glorious for La Grande Armee was to show its slackening performance or quality. However, Eylau having been explained, neither of these can be claimed because they fought magnificently. And the peace they acquired shows that. If they had not been so successful (or just successful in general), Napoleon would not have gotten to Tilsit. The issue here shouldn't be a swift conclusion to the war; how can that possibly be our standard for deciding the Grande Armee's greatness when the elements did not cooperate? If it was something under the army's control that lead to their "poorer" performance, then I'd be fine, but the weather shouldn't lead us to conclude that they were worse than they were in 1806. Besides weather problems, Poland had horrible roads; in fact, Poland virtually had no roads. Even shortly after the Napoleonic Era, France and Britain had something like 20,000 miles of roads each, Prussia just over 3,000, and Poland and Russia practically none (or whatever they had were in a horrible state). People are unfairly taking it out on the Grande Armee just because uncontrollable circumstances didn't go their way. Questions of invincibility and morale are ancillary questions; we can discuss them, but they don't address the meat of the topic: how good was the French army at this point. The truth is it was just as good as in 1805 and in 1806, but it didn't have the fortune of fighting in the same well-stocked, well-linked regions of Central Europe.

I'm not sure where you got your numbers on Jena-Auerstadt. First of all the entire Prussian army was about 200,000, but the numbers involved at the twin-battles were the 63,000 under the King and Brunswick, and the flank covering force under Hohnelohe, comprising 38,000. Total casualties for the Prussians were 38,000 (25,000 at Jena, 13,000 at Auerstadt), which is 38% of the force, not 70%. If you meant over the whole campaign, then you're probably still wrong, since the Prussians (going by Chandler) lost 165,000 out of 200,000, or about 83% of their forces.UberCryxic 04:42, 6 March 2006 (UTC)

Points, taken. But most historians, along with Ansbach and myself, judge an army's quality by its performance. In evaluating this, also, one must distinguish between brave and brilliant. The fact is that due to many factors, the Armee's performance is 1807, while brave and, ultimately triumphant, was not as brillant as that of the previous two years' campaigns. Another factor that needs mention-Their opponents were better as well. The Russian army of 1807 proved far more formidable than its predecessors, and it was a taste of things to come. Even Davout and Ney were surprised and somewhat disheartened by their aggressiveness and tenacity. So the question here is not the Armee's quality, which I conceed was as good as 05-06 (Afterall it was the same Armee) but how well that quality matched up against changing circumstances. To do otherwise, is to risk going not only against historical consensus, but leads to favoring opinion over facts and entering the realm of PoV. However much we admire the Armee, we must try and be objective in our evaluations and presentations. You may "spin" it any way you wish, but the fact is, while the Armee was the same, the 1807 campaign was very different.

On another note, it should be pointed out that the time, energy and intellect we are expending in this arguement, could be better spent improving and expanding the actual article itself. I regret I started those headers before I wrote the actual sections which would go under them and explain the rationale for the dates.--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) 18:46, 6 March 2006 (UTC)

Let me just begin by saying that there is no 'spinning' going on here; I am actually quite dumbfounded that we are even having this discussion (that's how fait accompli I thought it was going to be). I don't think you are spinning either; we have divergent opinions on the same campaign.

I actually think we're all saying the same thing in differing terms, but we're reaching varied conclusions. First of all, are we all in agreement that in 1807 the army did not perform as well as in the two preceding campaigns? I think we are. So the crux of your arguments appear to be that because they performed worse, perhaps in lowered standards, then this time period should not count as 'glorious.' Before we can continue, I'd like a definition of just what you are willing to consider as a 'glorious' victory, battle, or campaign, because unless this is defined, there is no point in arguing. We all know Napoleon won in 1807; the question is whether that victory counts as impressive enough to earn the title 'Crowning Glory.'

Historical consensus actually states that Napoleon's army performed marvels in 1807, considering what they were up against. This is my fundamental point too: circumstances beyond their control are being used to derogate their feats. When conditions were normal, as at Friedland, they proved they were the same army of Austerlitz. Like I've mentioned before, Friedland and Austerlitz are regarded as Napoleon's two most decisive battlefield victories, and the former showed its worth by leading to Tilsit.UberCryxic 22:54, 6 March 2006 (UTC)

So basically you are saying "Dude! They won! Glory years Dude!". Most of the empirical evidence for your case is made by various casualty figure ratios. This can be a misleading metric. You also seem incapable of distinguishing between a brillant victory (IE Austerlitz) and a decisive but unbrilliant one (Friedland). Cannae is argueably the most brilliant victory in military history...but it was not decisive. Gettysburg was decisive, but it was hardly a brillant victory. Austerlitz was BOTH. Now look at...Friedland again...go on...LOOK at it. See? Not the same. A triumph?, oui, decisive? oui encore, but brilliant?...mais non! It is the difference between an enemy making a costly blunder by their own accord which may or may not be fully exploited but still costs them the battle, OR...MAKING them make a costly blunder then fully exploting it, whether strategically/politically decisive or not. Est-ce-que vous comprennez maintenant, monsieur? A blunder can cost lots of lives and ramp up the casualty ratios, but it hardly means the other side won a great victory merely because they made fewer mistakes and thus suffered fewer losses.--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) 23:30, 6 March 2006 (UTC)

First of all, no one gave you the authority to remove the material in the history section, and I am wholeheartedly furious right now. Our quarrels lay mainly with one year, and there is no need to delete practically the entire section. Some other contributors may also want those years and battles as reference points for visitors, so in that light your actions become all the more baffling. I feel like Napoleon at Wagram after Bernadotte's withdrawal from Aderklaa; incompetence is ruining us. I will eventually restore the section if someone else does not do it before me; please keep your tampering at a localized level.

Your derogatory characterizations of my position aside, Friedland was a brilliant victory, and if we can't even agree on this point, then our differences are beyond rescue. Friedland was a brilliant victory because it almost perfectly highlighted the strategic potential of Napoleon's system. At Friedland, the entire mechanism came together like a Romantic painting. I cannot understand what fiber in your body incites you to say Friedland was not a brilliant victory. I really want an explanation; on what account was Friedland not brilliant? I happen to think casualty ratios are very important, and time after time in military history we see the victor causing far more casualties to the defeated. This is not a rule written in stone, but it is a good indicator of the scope of victory. Furthermore, you are confusing your own standards with Cannae. Cannae was both brilliant and decisive militarily, but not politically (at least not too much; however, half of the Roman Senate did resign after the defeat). Austerlitz and Friedland are different from Cannae because they were both militarily and politically decisive, but all three battles were brilliant victories. In brilliance presumably we are looking for some sort of strategic and/or tactical superiority, and the French displayed both with skill. Ney crushed the Russian left, the artillery did the rest, and for some still-unknown reason the cavalry was not ordered forward at the end to complete the victory in a fashion that would've humbled Austerlitz.

What's weird about your refusal to recognize the greatness of Friedland is that developments there were situational; the French were caught by surprise and had to react. Contrast this with Austerlitz, where Napoleon had good intelligence all along that the Allies were falling for his trap. One would typically think that a predicament falling when unprepared is worse than one falling when prepared, so from this angle the French reaction and victory becomes all the more impressive. Why you still balk at what is nothing short of an amazing achievement truly reminds me that nothing in history is settled fact, even fact.UberCryxic 05:18, 7 March 2006 (UTC)

If I may interject, there seems to be a problem here caused by the adjectives. Can't we just leave them out, and say, for example, "Victories, 1805-1807"? Unless we can find references for the adjuectives, we will in any event be as risk of infringing WP:NPOV or WP:NOR. Alternatively, perhaps a simple timeline would be the best idea? -- ALoan (Talk) 11:57, 7 March 2006 (UTC)

Yeah I like your idea. What I'm going to do is bring up the conflicts in terms of coalitions, in the following format:

UberCryxic 15:35, 7 March 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Featured Article?

There's no need to deny it, this page rocks. It's well-researched, informative, and has plenty of pictures. It's gotta become a featured article!UberCryxic 22:40, 7 March 2006 (UTC)

Gosh - that new history section is excellent. Unfortunately, I think it is now a bit too long for this article: it could usefully be copied to somewhere like Napoleonic Wars or History of the Grande Armée and summarised (even more) ruthlessly here. -- ALoan (Talk) 21:16, 9 March 2006 (UTC)
In terms of WP:FAC, the article could do with more citations for specific facts (numbers etc), but otherwise is looking great. It may be worth trying WP:PR for a week or two first, though. -- ALoan (Talk) 21:18, 9 March 2006 (UTC)
I was the one who added 1812: Napoleon's Fatal March on Moscow, Adam Zamoyski, ISBN 0007123752 to the references list (for a very very early version of this article), so if you want numbers/page refs for anything specific from that book let me know on my talk. Pcb21 Pete 11:06, 10 March 2006 (UTC)
I agree with ALoan, perhaps a week or two on WP:PR would be an idea. Otherwise it's fantastic. Bravo UberCryxic for adding a concise, neutral and informative history of LGA.--ansbachdragoner 01:24, 10 March 2006 (UTC)

Yeah, our problem with the sources are the footnotes; we only have one, and that won't do. If we can correct that, we won't even need peer review; this article is spectacular, and I'm not just saying that cuz I'm a nerd. I'm going to scour Chandler's Campaigns and Elting's Swords to see what I can back up (I've wanted to do this for a while, but I've been working on something else), but I still have to remind myself that those two books are so convenient that I shouldn't use them exclusively haha....UberCryxic 20:47, 10 March 2006 (UTC)

We have no problems with our sources. They are numerous, clearly listed, in depth and varied. In-line citations are NOT a requirement yet for featured articles and I'd rather we avoid having too many in this one. I believe it works much better as a cohesive, well-ordered narrative, than a Franken-Article of citations strung together or a virtual Ibid. As for peer review, might I suggest giving our new Wikipedia:WikiProject Military history/Peer review a test run by submitting it there instead? Regular PR, does not seem to be working properly.--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) 21:31, 12 March 2006 (UTC)
Starting to add in some footnotes and extra refs for my edits.--ansbachdragoner 02:35, 16 March 2006 (UTC)
Are we ready for FAC yet? -- ALoan (Talk) 11:01, 3 April 2006 (UTC)
Mais Non, mon soldat! We still have some work to do-Regardez Voici! Especially on the intro and the final section. I'll get the intro, see if you and Uber can get the latter. We also need some more strategically placed inline cites. On this you can be a GRANDE help to our Armee, Monsieur.--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) 13:49, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Marshals

We have images of only 12 of the 26 Marshals of France under Napoleon:

Included Omitted
  1. Louis Alexandre Berthier (1804)
  2. Joachim Murat (1804)
  3. André Masséna (1804)
  4. Jean Baptiste Jules Bernadotte (1804)
  5. Nicolas Jean de Dieu Soult (1804)
  6. Jean Lannes (1804)
  7. Michel Ney (1804)
  8. Louis Nicolas Davout (1804)
  9. Claude Perrin Victor (1807)
  10. Étienne-Jacques-Joseph-Alexandre MacDonald (1809)
  11. Nicolas Oudinot (1809)
  12. Auguste Marmont (1809)
  1. Pierre Augereau (1804)
  2. Bon Adrien Jeannot de Moncey (1804)
  3. Jean-Baptiste Jourdan (1804)
  4. Guillaume Marie-Anne Brune (1804)
  5. Édouard Adolphe Casimir Joseph Mortier (1804)
  6. Jean-Baptiste Bessières (1804)
  7. François Christophe Kellermann (1804)
  8. François Joseph Lefebvre (1804)
  9. Dominique-Catherine de Pérignon (1804)
  10. Jean-Mathieu-Philibert, Comte Sérurier (1804)
  11. Louis Gabriel Suchet (1811)
  12. Laurent, Marquis de Gouvion Saint-Cyr (1812)
  13. Józef Antoni Poniatowski (1813)
  14. Emmanuel, marquis de Grouchy (1815)

I can understand leaving Kellermann (old), de Moncey and Jourdan (in Spain), Brune, Pérignon and Sérurier (more administrators) or Grouchy (1815 is late) off the list, but what is the rational for leaving Augereau, Mortier, Bessières, Lefebvre, Suchet, Saint-Cyr, Poniatowski off the list? Almost all have images... -- ALoan (Talk) 09:43, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

I deliberately chose the better known and more important (from an operational standpoint) Marshals who had decent portraits avalable. Obviously, not everyone could be selected. Objections were raised in peer review that this section was too heavy on pictures and too light on text. Augereau's picture was unfortunately deleted. Lefebvre, quite honestly, was more of a political appointee than an impressive commander in the field. Suchet is more obscure and a somewhat late appointee, but a fine commander nevertheless. The gallant Poniatowski was promoted posthumously. Saint-Cyr is not obscure, but he was a later Marshal and really was not so important in the grande scheme of things, his reputation being largely created by his own post war writings and activities. But I tell you what, let's open up four more slots in the Marshal's gallery. I recommend they be filled by Bessières, Mortier, Poniatowski and either Saint-Cyr or Suchet (depending on whether you prefer a show horse or a warhorse:)--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) 00:17, 29 April 2006 (UTC)
I agree with your first 3; I would go for Suchet. As far as I remember, Poniatowski was made a marshal a few days before he died, not posthunously. -- ALoan (Talk) 08:54, 30 April 2006 (UTC)
There is some confusion over Poniatowski's status. But no confusion over his gallantry, flamboyance or wothiness as a Marshal. Besides, his inclusion would further help to illustrate the Armee's international composition, especially post 1809. He and his comrades have been added--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) 17:00, 2 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Correction of factual errors

The highest "rank" in Napoleon's army was Général de division. Maréchal de l'Empire or Marshal "was not a superior military grade but a personal title of honor to be granted distinguished generals of division, along with higher pay and privileges." Elting, John R.:"Swords Around A Throne.", page 124. Da Capo Press, 1997. There was no such rank as Général de Armee or Général de Corps. Idem. G.de Dv. could be appointed to command a corps, or even an army, but this was an operational designation, not a rank.

The original entry for Train d’artillerie was completely wrong. That organization militarized the teamsters responsible for hauling the artillery, ending the previous reliance on civilian contractors. Elting, John R.:"Swords Around A Throne.", p. 250, 254. Da Capo Press, 1997. --Paco Palomo 23:36, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

The image originally captioned "cornet of the voltigeurs of the line" actually depicts a cornet of the French light infantry rgts. First, and foremost, the cornet wears the distinctive blue trousers of the légère infantry. Aditionally, the soldier depicted has the "hussar" boots and distinctive pointed cuffs of the light infantry. --Paco Palomo 05:12, 15 July 2006 (UTC)

I removed the section on tiralleurs because it was completely wrong. The term tiralleurs did mean "skirmishers," but it was used in a generic sense, e.g., the 3rd Bn/57th Ligne was deployed en tiralleur meaning that an entire batallion was deployed as skirmishers. The term was not used to designate a unique type of unit. There WERE units that incorporated the term tiralleurs in their name, such as the Tiralleurs Corses mentioned in the section deleted, but they were actually considered to be elite units, not the misfits the deleted section implied. See Elting, John R., "Swords Around A Throne", p. 220-21. --Paco Palomo 05:47, 15 July 2006 (UTC)

The name Grande Armée was only given to the main operational armies of the 1805, 1806-7, 1812, 1813 and 1814 Campaigns. The forces committed to the Peninsular War were assigned to various armies, e.g., Massena's Army of Portugal in 1810. Similarly, the war against Austrian in 1809 was fought by l'Armée d'Allemagne and the Waterloo Campaign was fought by l'Armée du Nord. Chandler, David G., "Campaigns of Napoleon" (Macmillan 1966). --Paco Palomo 06:52, 15 July 2006 (UTC)

The name of the Marins de la Garde is commonly mis-translated as "Marines" when in fact they were "Sailors." Elting, John R., "Swords Around A Throne", p. 190. --Paco Palomo 17:35, 15 July 2006 (UTC)

[edit] GAC

This article has been rated on 7 criteria:

  1. Well-written: Pass
  2. Factually accurate: Pass
  3. Broad: Pass
  4. Neutrally written: Pass
  5. Stable: Pass
  6. Well-referenced: Neutral
  7. Images: Fail

This article is long. Really long. Which is good, but: there are only 20 referrences. While that might be enough for most GAC's, in this one that means that there screen-pages pass without a single reference, sometimes several at a time. What's more, the last 4 of the references aren't references, but footnotes- bringing the total to 16. I do not think that that is enough on it's own to fail the article. However: Images. There are 46 images. I understand that they are all fair use or not held under any copyright. That is beside the point. 46 is far too many for any article. Images should be used to add to the information presented, not as decoration. If these problems are taken care of, please resubmit to GAC and message me on my talk page- as this article has sat at GAc for 2 months without review, and would likely sit there that long again, I am willing to look at it again immediately, rather than waiting for ti to reach the top of the list. --PresN 16:48, 25 August 2006 (UTC)

Passed the article for GA. The remaining criteria were met, and the article looks good. The image issue has been fixed. --MPD01605 (T / C) 23:57, 17 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Tips

This article should include the following informations about the allies of Napoleon:

  • what they fought for (e.g the Poles hoped for a creation of independent state see the Duchy of Warsaw)
  • what was their morale
  • how loyal were they to Napoleon Mieciu K 22:48, 14 September 2006 (UTC)
  • I have written a section on Foreign troops in La Grande Armée.--Bryson 20:20, 25 November 2006 (UTC)
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