Koevoet
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 |
Please see the discussion on the talk page. |
Koevoet (Afrikaans for crowbar) was a police counter insurgency unit in South-West Africa (now Namibia) during the 1970s and 1980s. They were the most effective unit (in terms of personnel lost versus enemies killed) deployed against SWAPO fighters (seeking Namibian independence from Apartheid South Africa), and were accused by them of brutal and indiscriminate use of force.
Contents |
[edit] History
[edit] Background
- See also: History of Namibia
- See also: Decolonization of Africa
South-West Africa (now Namibia) was a South African protectorate since the end of World War II, but since the 1960s there was a growing struggle for independence from former colonial powers across the entire African continent. In the Southern African region this usually took the form of armed guerrillas (or insurgents as they are called today) support with weapons and training from communist states such as the Soviet Union and China, both seeking to expand their influence in strategically important and mineral rich region.
The apartheid government had watched with great concern as these low intensity wars ousted former colonial powers in neighbouring states replacing them with communist backed regimes, first it was Mozambique and Angola in 1975 followed by Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) in 1980. Fearing a similar fate for South-West Africa (Namibia) and eventually South Africa, the South African government did not relinquish control over South-West Africa (Namibia) in contravention of a UN Security Council resolution 435 of 1978.
[edit] South African Border War
Even though South Africa and therefore South-West Africa were no longer controlled by colonial powers, they were the last White minority regimes in the strategically important (shipping routes, mineral wealth) southern tip of the continent. As such, South-West Africa and its northern border with Angola (Caprivi Strip) became a battle ground where South Africa attempted to keep control of the southern parts of Angola in order to weaken SWAPO.
[edit] Rising insurgency
As with most countries there was a separation of duties between law enforcement and military such that only the former deals with internal issues while the latter should typically only be deployed in defence of a nation and this was also the case in South-West Africa and South Africa. Terrorist acts committed inside South-West Africa were seen as an internal matter to be handled by police and insurgents – rather naively – seen as common criminals to be arrested and processed as such. It soon became apparent that these insurgents were armed with military equipment which normal police officers were not equipped or trained to deal with. It was therefore decided to establish a better armed and better trained unit capable of facing such challenges, but it is important to note that it would remain a police unit attached to the South-West African Police (SWAPOL) force.
[edit] Disbanded
In 1989 Koevoet was incorporated into the South West Africa Police and its members were dispersed nationwide. It conducted many operations in support of or with the SWATF. They were accused of human rights abuses including rape and torture.
The Koevoet issue was one of the most difficult the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) had to face. Because the unit was formed after the adoption of Security Council resolution 435 (calling for South Africa's immediate withdrawal from Namibia), it was not mentioned in the eventual Settlement Proposal or related documents. Once Koevoet's role became clear, the UN Secretary-General took the position that it was a paramilitary unit and, as such, should be disbanded as soon as the Settlement Proposal took effect. About 2,000 of its members had been absorbed into the South-West Africa Police (SWAPOL) before the implementation date of April 1, 1989 but they reverted to their former role against SWAPO in the "events" of early April 1989. Although ostensibly re-incorporated into SWAPOL in mid-May, the ex-Koevoet personnel continued to operate as a counter-insurgency unit travelling around the north in armored and heavily armed convoys. In June 1989, the UN Special Representative in Namibia (Martti Ahtisaari) told the Administrator-General (South African appointee Louis Pienaar) that this behavior was inconsistent with the Settlement Proposal, which required the police to be lightly armed. Moreover, the vast majority of the ex-Koevoet personnel were quite unsuited for continued employment in the police force and, if the issue was not dealt with, Ahtisaari threatened to halt the transition process.
There ensued a difficult process of negotiation with the South African government which continued for several months. The UN Secretary-General pressed for the removal of all ex-Koevoet elements from SWAPOL, with Ahtisaari bringing to Pienaar's attention many allegations of misconduct by them. Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar visited Namibia in July 1989, following which the UN Security Council demanded the disbandment of Koevoet and the dismantlement of its command structures in its resolution 640 (1989) of August 29. Under pressure, the South African foreign minister, Pik Botha, announced on September 28, 1989 that some 1,200 ex-Koevoet members of SWAPOL would be demobilized the next day. A further 400 such personnel were demobilized on October 30 - both demobilizations supervised by UNTAG military monitors.
[edit] Structure
Koevoet was a 3000-man force consisting of Ovambo tribesmen and about 300 white officers and white SADF non-commissioned officers (NCOs). It was organized into 40-man platoons equipped with mine resistant Casspir wheeled armored personnel carriers (including one informally armed with a 20mm cannon) and a supply truck. They rotated one week in the bush for one week at camp. It was the 1978 brainchild of then Colonel Hans Dreyer (later a Major-General in the SADF) to develop and exploit intelligence and was based on the Portuguese Flechas and the Rhodesian Selous Scouts. Koevoet was based in Oshakati and suffered 153 killed in action and several hundred more wounded. They killed more than 3,681 alleged SWAPO insurgents which resulted in a 1:25 or one to 25 kill ratio.
[edit] Training
The white officers were either South-West African or South-African police officers and, as often as not, not trained for what were effectively military operations. Accordingly, these officers were usually sent for additional training with South African Special Forces Brigade in bushcraft, tracking and small arms handling and tactics.
The Ovambo and Bushman trackers essentially underwent intensive basic infantry training although many were captured and "turned" SWAPO fighters that had already received training elsewhere.
[edit] Tactics
Koevoet operations were devoted to tracking groups of SWAPO fighters who were on foot. Their tracks were picked up in various ways, but most often from:
- Patrols of areas favoured for crossing by SWAPO fighters.
- Information from local inhabitants.
- From areas surrounding a recent attack.
Once a suspicious track was found, a vehicle would leap-frog ahead a few kilometres to check for the same tracks and once found the other vehicles would race up to join them. Using this technique they could make quickly catch up with the guerillas who were travelling on foot.
The trackers were so skilled at their art that they could provide very accurate estimates on the distance to the enemy, the speed at which they were travelling and their states of mind by looking at factors such as abandoned equipment, turning from walking to running or reduced attempts at anti-tracking, splintering into smaller groups taking different directions ("bomb shelling").
Once the trackers sensed that the SWAPO fighters were close they would often retreat to the safety of the Casspir armoured personnel carriers to face an enemy typically armed with RPG-7 rocket launchers, rifle grenades, AK-47s, SKS carbines and RPK and PKM machine guns.
[edit] See also
- Counter insurgency
- SWAPO
- Executive Outcomes
- History of Namibia
- South African Border War
- Angolan Civil War
[edit] Notes and references
- Stiff, P. The Covert War: Koevoet Operations in Namibia 1979-1989, Galago Publishing Pty Ltd, 2000. ISBN 1-919854-03-7
- ↑ (1994) Al J. Venter: The Chopper Boys. Helicopter Warfare in Africa. Gibraltar: Ashanti, 127-168. ISBN 1853671770.
- ↑ John W. Turner (1998). Continent Ablaze. The Insurgency Wars in Africa 1960 to the Present. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 127-168. ISBN 185409128X.
- ↑ Lise Morjé Howard: UN Peace Implementation in Namibia: The Causes of Success in International Peacekeeping, Vol.9, No.1, Spring 2002, pp.99-132; also The New York Times of 15 January 1989 states that Koevoet were responsible for approximately 80% of Namibian deaths.
