John Lucas (philosopher)
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John Randolph Lucas FBA (born 18 June 1929) is a British philosopher.
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[edit] Overview
As an undergraduate at Balliol College, Oxford, 1947-1950, Lucas studied first maths, then Greats (Philosophy and Ancient History), obtaining the MA in Philosophy in 1954. He spent the 1957-58 academic year at Princeton University, deepening his understanding of mathematics and logic. For 36 years, until his 1996 retirement, he was a Fellow and Tutor of Merton College, Oxford, and remains an emeritus member of the University Faculty of Philosophy. He is a Fellow of the British Academy.
Lucas is perhaps best known for his paper "Minds, Machines and Gödel," arguing that an automaton cannot represent a human mathematician. Douglas Hofstadter's Gödel, Escher, Bach includes an extensive critical discussion of Lucas's argument and the ensuing vigorous debate in the academic literature.
A prolific author with unusually diverse teaching and research interests, Lucas has written on the philosophy of mathematics, especially the implications of Gödel's incompleteness theorem, the philosophy of mind, free will and determinism, the philosophy of science with special reference to special relativity, causality, political philosophy, ethics and business ethics, and the philosophy of religion.
The son of a Church of England clergyman, Lucas describes himself as "a dyed-in-the-wool traditional Englishman." He and Morar Portal have four children, among them Edward Lucas, Eastern European editor for The Economist. Sartorially independent, he may be remembered for a cool-weather habit of wearing a tie over his sweater under a jacket.
In addition to his philosophical career, Lucas has taken a practical interest in business ethics. He helped found the Oxford Consumers' Group [1], and was its first Chairman in 1961-3, serving again in 1965.
[edit] Main Philosophical Contributions
[edit] Freewill
Lucas's argument in Minds, Machines and Gödel is one of the most interesting 20th Century ideas in philosophy. He argues that [1]:
- (Freewill) Determinism <=> for any human h there exists at least one (deterministic) logical system L(h) which can completely reliably predict H's actions in all circumstances.
- For any logical system L a sufficiently skilled mathematical logician (equipped with a sufficently powerful computer if necssary) can constuct some statements T(L) which are true by unprovable in L.(this follows from the proof of Gödel's theorem)
- If a human m is a sufficiently skillful mathematical logician (equipped with a sufficiently powerful computer if necessary)then if m is given L(m)(s)he can construct T(L(m)) and
- Determine that they are true which L(m) could not do.
- Hence L(m) does not reliably predict m's actions in all circumstances.
- Hence m has freewill.
- But there is insufficient qualitative difference between mathematical logicians and the rest of the population for it to be plausible to believe that the former have freewill and the latter do not.
Although (as with any argument) it is possible to dispute any of these points they constitute a new contribution to a major philosophical debate that has been going on for centuries.
[edit] Space, Time and Causality
Lucas wrote several books on the philosophy of science and space-time (see below). In A treatise on time and space he introduced a transcendental derivation of the Lorenz Transformations based on Red and Blue exchanging messages (in Russian and Greek respectively) from their respective frames of reference which demonstrates how these can be derived from a minimal set of philosophical assumptions.
[edit] Career highlights
- 1942-7. Schooled at St Mary's College, Winchester (commonly known as Winchester College)
- 1947-51. Attended Balliol College, Oxford on a scholarship.
- 1951. BA with 1st Class Honours, Greats.
- 1951-3. Harmsworth Senior Scholar, Merton College, Oxford.
- 1952. John Locke Scholarship, Balliol College, Oxford.
- 1953-6. Junior Research Fellow, Merton College, Oxford.
- 1956-9. Fellow and Assistant Tutor, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge.
- 1957-8. Jane Eliza Procter Visiting Fellow, Princeton University.
- 1959-60. Leverhulme Research Fellow, Leeds University.
- 1960-96. Fellow and Tutor of Merton College, Oxford.
- 1988. Elected a Fellow of the British Academy.
- 1990-6. Reader in Philosophy, Oxford University.
- 1991-3. President, British Society for the Philosophy of Science.
[edit] Books
- 1966. Principles of Politics (edited). ISBN 0-19-824774-5
- 1970. The Concept of Probability. ISBN 0-19-824340-5
- 1970. The Freedom of the Will. ISBN 0-19-824343-X
- 1972. The Nature of Mind. (with A. J. P. Kenny, H. C. Longuet-Higgins, and C. H. Waddington)
- 1973. The Development of Mind. (with A.J.P.Kenny, H.C.Longet-Higgins, and C.H.Waddington)
- 1973. A Treatise on Time and Space. ISBN 0-416-75070-2
- 1976. Essays on Freedom and Grace. ISBN 0-281-02932-6
- 1976. Democracy and Participation. ISBN 0-14-021882-3
- 1978. Butler's Philosophy of Religion Vindicated. ISBN 0-907078-06-0
- 1980. On Justice. ISBN 0-19-824598-X
- 1985. Space, Time and Causality (with P. E. Hodgson). ISBN 0-19-875057-9
- 1989. The Future. ISBN 0-631-16659-9
- 1990. Spacetime and Electromagnetism (with P. E. Hodgson). ISBN 0-19-852038-7
- 1993. Responsibility. ISBN 0-19-823578-X
- 1997. Ethical Economics (with M. R. Griffiths). ISBN 0-312-16398-3
- 1999. Conceptual Roots of Mathematics. ISBN 0-415-20738-X
- 2003. An Engagement with Plato's Republic (with B.G. Mitchell). ISBN 0-7546-3366-7
Bibliography of Lucas's writings, with many available online.
[edit] External links
- Lucas, John R., 2002, "The Godelian Argument," The Truth Journal.
- Home page of J. R. Lucas, with much online material.
- Short bio of Lucas,, including his Who's Who entry.
- Oxford University Faculty of Philosophy Home Page.
- Oxford Consumers' Group.
