Jaffna University Helidrop

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The Jaffna University Helidrop was the first of the operations launched by the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) aimed at disarming the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) by force and securing the town of Jaffna, Sri Lanka, in the opening stages of Operation Pawan during the active Indian mediation in the Sri Lankan Civil War. The aim of the operation was to capture the LTTE leadership at Jaffna University building which served as the Tactical Headquarters of the LTTE, which was expected to shorten Operation Pawan, the battle for Jaffna. Mounted on the midnight of 12 October 1988, the operation was planned as a fast heliborne assault involving Mi-8's of the No.109 HU, the 10th Para Commandos and a contingent of the 13th Sikh LI.

Contents 1 Background 1.1 An uneasy Truce 1.2 Peace by any means 2 Planning for the Attack 3 Operation 3.1 The first insertion 3.2 Delayed insertion of the Sikh LI 3.3 Aborting further insertions 4 Combatants 4.1 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 4.2 Indian Peace Keeping Forces 5 IPKF casualties 6 References

[edit] Background

Main article: IPKF

See also: Sri Lankan Civil War, Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, LTTE, and Operation Poomalai

[edit] An uneasy Truce

The signing of the Indo-Sri-Lankan accord on 29 July 1987 ^[1] brought a temporary truce to the Sri Lankan Civil War. Under the terms of the agreement,^[2][3] Colombo agreed to a devolution of power to the provinces the Sri Lankan troops were withdraw to their barracks in the north, the Tamil rebels were to disarm ^[4]. Also, on the request of President J. R. Jayewardene, India was to send a contingent, the IPKF, to Northern Sri Lanka as a peace keeping force.^[5]

The LTTE, who had enjoyed support from India till then^[6] however, agreed to the truce only reluctantly. The Tigers had rejected the Provincial Council framework as inadequate and Prabhakaran had protested against the Indian military intervention.^[7] The Tigers resisted the spread what was deemed India's self-serving aim of binding Sri Lanka into India's geo political sphere of Influence ^[7], as well as a symapthy for Sri Lanka's ruling Sinhala community in India outside the support-base in Tamil Nadu.^[7] With the induction of the Indian troops, the Tigers intially complied by surrendering arms along the terms of the truce. However, the LTTE boycotted the elections that were held in October and November 1988 along the lines outlined in the accord.^[8] the opposition to the induction of Indian troops soon flared into active confrontation. The Indian administration had not expected opposition from the Tigers ^[5] and was intially taken unaware. The support for Tamil Nationalism in India also raised the spectre to the Indian Govt. of a possible situation of Tamil secessionist movement in Tamil Nadu^[9][7] However, faced with growing dilligence from her erst-while partner, India adopted a stragy of aiding alternative Tamil power bases, including the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front^[10], which had emerged strongly in the November 1988 elections, and at the same time continue negotiations with the LTTE.^[10]

[edit] Peace by any means

The incident that marked the turning point of Indo-LTTE relationship occurred in early October. On 4 October 1988, the Sri Lankan Navy captured an LTTE boat off Point Pedro with seventeen Tigers, including some high-profile leaders of the movement, onboard.^[11] The Colombo govt alleged the boat was involved in smuggling arms across the Palk Straits and on the grounds denied immunity to these captured Tiger rebels.^[11] The LTTE denied this claiming the rebels movement were in accordance with the truce, being in the process of transferring documents for shifting the Tigers Headquarters from Madras to Jaffna. The Sinhalese govt. intended to bring a number of the rebels captured, including Pulendran, Kumarappa and others, to trial in Colombo for allegedly masterminding the massacre of a hundred and fifty civilians.^[11] The Tigers, who were at the time still in negotiation with the Indian authorities, appealed for enforcement of protection by the IPKF. The rebels were at this time in IPKF custody at Palay Airbase pending transfer to Sinhalese authorities. Although the Indian authorities insist that they had explained the possible repercussions^[10] of such an action on the fragile truce and exerted considerable pressure on the Sinhalese authorities to desist from proceeding^[11], ultimately the IPKF withdrew allowing the Sri Lankan forces to proceed with transferring the captured rebels to Colombo. The detainees however, attempted mass suicide by swallowing cyanide- a common LTTE practice when faced imminent capture. This singular event marked a total break-down of the truce. The night of 5 October saw large scale slaughter of Sinhalese people who had returned to Jaffna^[11], including eight troops of the Sri Lankan Army who were at the time being held hostages by the LTTE. These coincided by armed confrontations between the Tiger Cadres and the Indian Troops in and around Jaffna.^[11]On 8 October, the LTTE carried out a number of Mortar attacks and ambushes on the IPKF.^[12] The deterioration of the situation put the Indian government into a position of having to enforce peace in Jaffna by Force. The Indian Govt. had already been accused of inaction in the face of a failing accord.^[11] It was declared on 9 October The that the IPKF was to launch a terminal campaign against the LTTE. This was the point of no return.

[edit] Planning for the Attack

The Indian intelligence reports received on 10 October indicated that the a Tigers' meeting was to be held at Kokuvil in the Jaffna University campus on the night of the 11 October. Intelligence further indicated the meeting was to be attended by a number of high profile Tiger leaders including Velupillai Prabhakaran, Gopalaswamy Mahendraraja (alias Mahattaya), as well as the LTTE local commanders.^[13] The Indian Army was aware even before this that the LTTE had been using the University as their operational headquarters. The Indian Forces had already prepared for a Special Helicopter Borne Operation against Jaffna University. With these reports, Gen Harikat Singh- GOC 54 Division, took the decision to utillise the window offered by this meeting to capture the LTTE leadership^[14]- a move that was expected to leave the rebel movement directionless in the face of the impending assault on the LTTE strongholds by the IPKF.^[13]

The final plan tasked a hundred and twenty commandos from the 10th Paracommado group and three hundred and sixty troops from the 13th Sikh LI for the mission. The Para Commandos and a detachment of the Sikh LI were to be dropped into the University Football ground in three waves of four helicopters. The rest of the Sikh LI contingent was to advance on the ground to link up with the heliborne troops. To minimise exposure to ground-fire, fast-roping was ruled out and the decision was made to assign the first wave of the Paras with the additional responsibility as pathfinders to mark the drop-zone.^[13] The operation was to utilise four Mi-8s flying from Palay airfield, two from the No.109 HU, and one each from the No.107 HU and the No.112 HU. The Mi-8s had provisions for fitting rocket pods, this was deemed not necessary since the IPKF did not anticipate any significant resistance from the ground. A Sri Lankan Air Force Bell gunship was detailed to carry out a diversionary strike west of the drop-zone across the railway tracks, which the Indian troops were under strict orders not to exceed.^[13]

On the morning of 11 October, a reconnaissance flight over the University however revealed that the football field- the designated drop-zone- may be unable to accommodate four helicopters in a single wave. Holding off outside the dropzone in the face of expected hostile fire was ruled out and a change in the plans saw the decision made to divide each wave into two flights of a pair of Mi-8s. The second flight was to leave Palay Airfield- about four minutes flying time from the drop zone- only after the first flights had started on their return leg after disembarkation of their contingent. The whole operation was expected to last for ninety minutes.

[edit] Operation

Unbeknown to the Indian intelligence, the Tigers had intercepted Indian radio communications,had advanced knowledge of the Operation, and had correctly identified the landing ground. Jaffna University had been turned into a fortress. Several 0.50 calibre machineguns had been moved to the north of the football field, and Tiger cadres armed with light armaments had laid an ambush for the Indian troops.^[15][13]

[edit] The first insertion

The operation H-Hour was set at midnight of the 11th. Led by Maj Sheonan Singh, the first stick of forty Paras were inserted in the first flight of two Mi-8s. The formation, led by Wg Cdr Sapre and Sqn Ldr Vinayraj as number two, approached the drop zone in low visibillity observing complete black-out. The flights had only their formation lights- situated on top of the tail boom- switched on. These were turned off as the flight entered it's short finals. Because of this complete black-out, the direction of approach of the first flights were missed by the Tigers. The two helicopters therefore entered the landing ground unopposed. However, as the commandos disgorged and moved to take defensive positions, they were pinned down by sustained fire from the Tiger positions. Both Sapre and Vinayraj's flight came under fire as they took off on full power, but did not suffer any hits.^[13] Under heavy fire, the paras were unable to mark the drop-zone in time for the next stick. As the second flight approached the dropzone, the pilots Flt Lt V Prakash and Sqn Ldr Duraiswami could identify the flashes of small arms fire and grenades. However, added to this, the tracers from the SLAF gunship detailed for the diversionary attack were also identified as groundfire. The pilots, unable to identify the dropzone after considerable efforts, aborted the mission. The paras on the ground were by this time nearly completely encircled by the Tigers.

By the time as the first flight of the second wave- flown again by Sapre and Vinayraj- took off from Palay airbase however, the Tigers had been able to identify the approach route and moved troops and heavy machine guns to the roof top of a building north of the field. As Sapre and Vinayraj approached their target zone, the Tigers directed heavy and sustained machine gunfire to the choppers, aiming at the cargo-hold. As the heavy machine gun fire pierced the metal skin of the helicopters, at least one commando on Vinayraj's flight was hit and wounded badly. The pilots however, were able to land and drop their load. Under increasingly intense ground fire, they took off to head back to Palay.

As the paras tried to hold their ground, waiting for the rest of the detail to reinforce, however, they came under sniper fire. The LTTE have already moved in snipers armed with telescopic sights, and as the battle raged, they were able to inflict some casualties on the paras trying to hold their ground. However, Duraiswamy and Prakash, unable to identify the LG, had not commenced on their second flight. By the time the first flight of the second wave landed back at Palay, the Paras numbered eighty instead of the preplanned hundred and twenty. The decision was made for the two flights to exchange pilots, with Sapre and Vinayraj as the flight leaders of both the flights.

[edit] Delayed insertion of the Sikh LI

As the pilots prepared to insert the first troops of the 13th Sikh Light Infantry, the operation was delayed by twenty minutes. Later analysis would show this may have been due to the Sikh LI troops, who were infantrymen, not being aware of the embarkation routeine of heliborne accomodtion.^[13] Furthermore, the troop load of twenty had to be reduced to fifteen to accommodate the ammunition boxes for the troops.

The third shuttle departed with Wg Cdr Sapre leading and Sqn Ldr Duraiswami as No.2. Under intense fire from LTTE positions, the load of 40 paras and 15 Sikh LI along with the ammunition boxes unloaded. Sapre’s Mi-8 was heavily damaged.

As the second shuttle came in for their insertion, however, they faced a new threat as the Tigers brought RPG fire towards the helicopters. Heavy machine gun fire also hit the helicopters. Vinayraj's load of forty paratroops were soon out, however although the Sikh LI troops from Prakash's flight disembarked without any problems, it seems there was some delay in dislodging the ammunition boxes, which further delayed the return flight^[13] Under the heavy ground fire, the Mi-8s limped home to Palay.

[edit] Aborting further insertions

As the heavily damaged choppers returned to Palay airbase, it became clear that further missions may be impossible. Vinayraj's helicopter had whole of it's port mainwheel as well as it's nosewheel tyre shot off. The portside Battery compartment cover was missing and the whole fuselage was peppered with bullet holes. Wg Cdr Sapre’s Mi-8 had a its hydraulic system damaged. It was also evident that the Tigers had improved the organisation and accuracy of ground fire during the third run. They also faced a possbile situation of RPG fire. Although Duraiswami’s and Prakash’s Mi-8s were still serviceable,it would have been a very high risk to fly them on top of LTTE battlements to drop another 30 more troops.

After great deliberation the decision was made by the Detachment Commander to abort further drops by the Choppers. By this time although the hundred and twenty para commandos were in position, only thirty of the intended three hundred and sixty Sikh LI troops had been inserted.^[13]

[edit] Combatants

[edit] Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

Main article: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers, is a politico-military organisation that has been waging a secessionist campaign against the Sri Lankan government since the 1970s in order to secure a separate state for the Tamil majority regions in the North and East of Sri Lanka. Supporters of the LTTE refer to them as freedom fighters; however, 29 countries (see list) have listed them as a terrorist organisation (another 161 countries, as well as the UN - which only has a terrorist list devoted solely to individuals and organisations believed to be connected to al-Qaeda and the Taliban^[16], and therefore does not have the mandate to ban any other group - have not). The Sri Lankan government itself lifted its ban on the LTTE before signing a ceasefire agreement in 2002.

[edit] Indian Peace Keeping Forces

Main article: Indian Peace Keeping Force

Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), was the Indian military contingent performing a peacekeeping operation that was formed to oversee the peace accord signed between India and Sri Lanka in 1987, trying to solve the ethnic conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka.

The mandate of the IPKF was to keep the peace between the main Tamil rebel group LTTE and the Sri Lankan armed forces. From the start, the LTTE did not trust the IPKF fully and the Sri Lankan forces and the JVP loathed the foreign presence on their soil.

The IPKF was drawn into conflict with the LTTE in late 1987. In brutal fighting that took about three weeks, the IPKF took control of the Jaffna Peninsula from the LTTE rule, something that the Sri Lankan army had tried and failed to achieve for several years. Supported by Indian Army tanks, helicopter gunships and heavy artillery, the IPKF routed the LTTE. But this victory came at a price, as the IPKF lost around 1200 soldiers.

[edit] IPKF casualties

13th Battalion, The Sikh Light Infantry Regiment

• Major Birendra Singh
• Subedar Sampuran Singh
• Havildar Ajit Singh
• Havildar Swaran Singh, SM
• Havildar Kashmir Singh, SM
• Lance Havildar Sher Singh, SM
• Naik Surjit Singh
• Naik Gurmail Singh
• Naik Mukhtiar Singh
• Naik Satwinder Singh
• Lance Naik Hira Singh
• Lance Naik Manjit Singh
• Lance Naik Darshan Singh, SM
• Sepoy Lal Singh
• Sepoy Ranjit Singh
• Sepoy Kuldip Singh, VrC
• Sepoy Jarnail Singh
• Sepoy Sohan Singh
• Sepoy Gurdial Singh
• Sepoy Gurbax Singh
• Sepoy Gurnam Singh
• Sepoy Satnam Singh
• Sepoy Joginder Singh
• Sepoy Sakinder Singh
• Sepoy Bakshish Singh
• Sepoy Somnath Singh
• Sepoy Harjinder Singh
• Sepoy Sukhwant Singh, VrC
• Sepoy Sukhwinder Singh

10th Battalion, The Parachute Regiment

• Naik Babu Lal
• Naik Ganga Ram, VrC
• Naik Lakhmi Singh
• Naik Umesh Pandey
• Naik Manohar Singh Rathore
• Paratrooper Manuwa Kujur

[edit] References