Implied cause of action
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Implied cause of action is a term used in United States statutory and constitutional law for circumstances when a court will determine that a statute or provision that creates rights also supports a remedy that can be achieved through a lawsuit, even though no remedy is explicitly provided for in the statute. Implied causes of action arising under the Constitution of the United States are treated differently than those based on statutes.
[edit] Constitutional causes of action
Perhaps the best known case creating an implied cause of action for constitutional rights is Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In that case, the United States Supreme Court ruled that an individual whose Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable search and seizures had been violated by federal agents could sue for the violation of the Amendment itself, despite the lack of any federal statute authorizing such a suit. The existence of a remedy for the violation was implied from the importance of the right violated.
In a later case, Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988), the Supreme Court determined that a cause of action would not be implied for the violation of rights where the U.S. Congress had already provided a remedy for the violation of rights at issue, even if the remedy was inadequate.
[edit] Statutory causes of action
The best known statutory implied cause of action case is Cort v. Ash 422 US 66 (1975), where the Supreme Court applied a four factor approach to determine whether Congress intended the statute to have an implied cause of action. Those factors include:
- Whether the plaintiff is part of an especial class of people that the statute was intended to protect,
- Whether the legislative history suggests that Congress intended to create a cause of action,
- Whether granting an implied cause of action would support the underlying remedial scheme set down in the statute, and
- Whether the issue would be one that is traditionally left to state law.
The Supreme Court has waivered in its approach in statutory implied rights of action in recent years, adopting a looser interpretation of what constitutes legislative intent in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), and Thompson v. Thompson and at times only insisting on the first two factors in California v. Sierra Club (1981). It is unclear whether the Supreme Court has officially rejected Cort v. Ash or merely reinterpreted it.
