Imperial Way Faction
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 |
This article or section may require cleanup to meet Wikipedia's quality standards. Please help improve this article or replace this tag with a more specific message. This article has been tagged since September 2005. (help, talk) |
The Imperial Way Faction (皇道派 kōdōha) was a Japanese right-wing nationalist political grouping, active in the 1930s. It was the political wing for the Japanese military, aiming to establish the military government. It was largely supported by junior officers of the Imperial Japanese Army, and promoted totalitarianism, militarism and expansionism in its doctrine.
One of the founders was Sadao Araki, leader in the movement. Hideki Tojo, the opponent military faction leader, became the effective dictator of Japan in 1941, with command of Imperial forces during the first periods of the Pacific War, until the Saipan disaster in 1944.
Contents |
[edit] Origins of the movement
[edit] Political environment
The origins of this party in the 1920s saw the last of the old-style samurai officers going and a new radical breed taking their place in the Japanese military. Officer groups, such as the Double Leaf Society, which were secret societies themselves and with ties to the other secret groups, were formed with the fanatical beliefs of ultranationalism and the need for a purge of the Chōshū elements of the army. The Army became divided between the Kodaha (Imperial Benevolent Rule or Action Group) led by Colonel (later General) Sadao Araki and the Toseiha (Control Group) led by General Kazushige Ugaki. The groups later merged and incorporated ideas from right-wing, fascist and right socialist ideologies and political philosophies. Influences were Kita Ikki and Nakano Seigo, amongst others. It drew on the secret political societies of the 1920s. Together, both groups formed a political movement to gain power by democratic elections, or if necessary, by force.
After friction with the civilian government, the Army became more isolated and more of a power unto itself. The government had a better control over the Imperial Japanese Navy, but the grip was weakening, too. Faced with the limits imposed by the Washington Armaments Conference of 1921, the Navy was split into two factions, the Fleet Faction and the Treaty Faction. The latter group prevailed in the beginning, and in the process won a public relations victory. During the 1920s, the civilian government largely managed to keep the radicals in the military in check.
Osachi Hamaguchi replaced Tanaka Giichi as Prime Minister in 1928 and formed a new cabinet. Initial public confidence bolstered Hamaguchi's government and allowed him to successfully challenge the military radicals and get the London Naval Conference of 1930 treaty ratified. That was the last pre-war instance of true civilian government, and real challenge to the military radicals. Hamaguchi was the target of an assassination attempt on November 14, 1930. The assassin was Tomeo Sagoya, a member of the Aikoku-sha (Love of Country Association), yet another ultranationalist secret sect. Hamaguchi survived but was hospitalized for several months. He returned to his post in March 1931 but resigned a month later.
Following the war, a peace movement developed in Japan; the militarists might have begun to lose their power. Several events conspired, however, to destroy any hopes of ousting them. A major influence was the way in which the United States acted, and came to be perceived in Japan: America grew to become Japan's clear rival during this period. The USA opposed Japan's territorial acquisitions, and any geo-political moves Japan would make, as Japan pursued her emerging colonial aspirations. Relations, already soured, continued a gradual but steady decline with each year.
Factional strife continued until December 25, 1926 when the weak Emperor Taisho died. Crown Prince Hirohito took over the throne. The Great Depression saw unchecked military plots. The target was the overt colonization of Manchuria and other key parts of China. Shortly the Kwantung Army took matters into its own hands, and moved through Manchuria.
[edit] Japanese military politics
The Kodoha faction, later a real party, was a political wing of the Imperial Armed forces. The real idea of the Army militarists, in the Right-socialist and right-wing line, was a return to the old Shogunate system, but in the form of a modern Military Shogunate. In such a government the Emperor would once more be a figurehead (as in the Edo period). Real power would fall to a leader, in fact very similar to a Führer or Duce, though with the power less nakedly held. On the other hand, the Navy militarists defended the Emperor and a monarchical constitution. For them the religious aspect was significant.
From 1905 and victory in the Russo-Japanese War, the Army and Navy had high confidence in their ability to roll back the Western great powers, given only time and resources. From that point of view, democratic institutions existed on tolerance.
The actual position of the Showa Emperor has been much discussed. He was most important as nationalist symbol, taking its place in the constructed State Shintoism. Subjects believed him to be the supreme leader, with power to promote or dismiss in central government. While the popular image was that he was well and effectively advised, as well as holding power, a group of fictional advisers and non-military aristocrats, without real function, constituted those nearest the Throne. The military men operated at a little distance.
[edit] Industrialists and militarism
At same time, the capitalist groups or zaibatsu (principally Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Yasuda) could see themselves as the Krupps of the future. Raw materials were a major concern. Fumimaro Konoye synthesised pressing social concerns, and the needs of capital, as a planned expansionist mission.
The seeds of World War II which were long in germinating were planted in the mid 19th century. In hindsight, the reasons for the war were largely economic. The seizure or protection of spheres of influence, the maintenance of territorial integrity, the acquisition of raw materials as well as Asian markets for the commercial opportunities they presented were all reasons which would eventually account for so much loss of life and national treasure.
Western nations, notably Great Britain, France, and the United States, had for more than one hundred years prior to the outbreak of hostilities exhibited great interest in the commercial opportunities in China and other parts of Asia. These opportunities had attracted Western investment for the exploitation of raw materials for the manufacture of products not only for domestic consumption but for export of finished goods back to the Orient
These opportunities were eyed covetously by Japan through what was to become known as the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.
Once outright war was joined, the Domei Tsushin Press Agency would celebrate the quality of Japan's armaments. Mitsubishi and the others had taken the measure of the "white barbarians".
[edit] Circumstances that allowed the Japanese military to gain political power
In a close to chaotic political (and economic and social) situation, the military were considered politically "clean" in terms of political corruption, and assumed responsibility for 'restoring' the security of the nation. The armed forces took up criticism of the traditional democratic parties and regular government for many reasons (low funds for the armed forces, compromised national security, weakness of the leaders). They were also, by their composition, closely aware of the effects of economic depression on the middle and lower classes, and the communist threat. This explains the victory in elections for General Tojo, becoming Prime Minister, and the lack of effective obstacles to complete political power.
The massive economic growth the zaibatsu groups had enjoyed during WWI came to a grinding halt in the early 1920s, as the wartime levels of production glutted the markets and drove down prices. Radical leftists in the labor unions (syndicalists, and Communists with Soviet outside support), came in the wake of Japan's industrial birth, attracting violence and social unrest to their causes. The military saw danger and decided to take direct action.
Under the Peace Preservations Acts (mid-1920s), the Kempeitai and other police and government security groups started to crack down on the unrest, that would last until World War II began. During this time the Army became mutinous, and brought much more power into its grasp. Young recruits came from the harsh life of the peasantry.
Militarists and secret society members waged a war against every moderating voice heard in Japanese politics. Assassinations and coups were the rule of the day. Even when they failed, they wrung concessions. Secret societies flourished, and the Kwantung Army and the Kempeitai became largely autonomous. The Second Sino-Japanese war in China brought matters to a head.
[edit] Political development
[edit] Sadao Araki has his day
Araki Sadao was an important figurehead and "political and thinking father" of the party; his first ideological works date from his leadership of the Kodaha (Imperial Benevolent Rule or Action Group), opposed by the Toseiha (Control Group) led by General Kazushige Ugaki. He linked the ancient (bushido code) and contemporary local and European fascist ideals (Japanese fascism), to form the ideological basis of the movement (Showa nationalism).
From September 1932, the Japanese were becoming more locked into the course that would lead them into the Second World War and Araki was leading the way. Totalitarianism, militarism and expansionism were to become the rule and fewer voices would be able even to speak against it. In a September 23 news conference Araki first mentioned the philosophy of "Kodoha" (The Imperial Way). The concept of Kodo linked the Emperor, the people, land and morality as one and indivisible. This led to the creation of a "new" Shinto and increased Emperor worship.
Araki also devised Seishin Kyoiku (spiritual training) for the army and the Kikosaku security doctrine of the Kempeitai. The state was being transformed into a creation that served the Army and the Emperor, while the Army transformed into a fanatical force. Symbolically katana sword came back into fashion as the martial embodiment of these beliefs, and the Nambu pistol became its contemporary equivalent, with the implicit message that the Army doctrine of close combat would prevail.
[edit] Hideki Tojo succeeds as party leader
Hideki Tojo, the Minister of War, tried to maintain control over the Army. In this respect, he has the reputation for having been the most able War Minister, and with the best results, since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in 1931.
After the "2-26" Incident of 1936, Tojo did his best to eliminate the Emperor's distrust of the Army. After having been Vice-Minister of war (May-December 1938), Tojo became War Minister in July 1940. He reported various problems-whether large or small-to the Sovereign, and always went through three stages of presentation: initial precis, interim report, and definitive project.
The views of Prime Minister Konoye and of Tojo clashed head-on. Konoye was planning to bring the parleys with the United States to a successful close, by agreeing to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China. Tojo, on the other hand, regarded this course of action as leading to the utter nullification of Japan's continental policy, and he strongly opposed it
The difference in opinion gathered intensity after October 1941. Tojo spoke of the need to resolve upon war and urged such a policy to the Prime Minister. He told Konoye that it was sometimes necessary for a man to leap from the stage of Kiyomizu. The differences between Tojo and Konoye finally led to the fall of the Prince's third cabinet. Tojo, representing the "toughs" militarists and right-wing elements, was then recommended to head the succeeding government.
The signal for war in the Pacific was given on August 26, 1941, at a session of the Black Dragon Society in Tokyo. At this meeting, War Minister Hideki Tojo ordered that preparation be made to wage a total war against the armed forces of the United States, and that Japanese guns be mounted and supplies and munitions concentrated in the Marshalls and Caroline groups of the mandated islands by November, 1941. Approving Tojo's war orders, former Foreign Minister Koki Hirota, head of the Black Dragons secret services, discussed the advantages and consequences of a conflict with the United States. Many of those at the meeting considered December, 1941, or February, 1942, the most suitable time for Japan to attack.
This well-known Japanese legend underlay Tojo's exhortation that Japan undertake her bold leap ("a la Kiyomizu") in 1941.
During September 1941 the situation worsened with continued sanctions imposed against Japanese trade and became irreversibly worse in October 1941, when Lieutenant-General Hideki Tojo became the party leader. At the same time he also became Japanese Prime Minister, with the support of the Nippon nation's powerful military establishment, the Gunbatsu, was represented in the Kodoha movement.
He stated that he would "start the war with America, and after sixty days reshuffle the cabinet and become a great dictator". Both predictions came true, confirming the long standing deadly antagonism of upper-crust Japanese in the Black Dragon Society toward the United States. In truth his powers were initially close to dictatorial. Continuity with Araki's thinking was maintained, and the government's grasp of power all over the occupied lands overseas (where Army and Navy independence had been quite marked) was increased.
After the formation of his new government, Tojo ordered the Cabinet Planning Board to re-examine the question of the possible effects upon national power if the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands were to cut off their trade with Japan. Tojo asked the Board to start from scratch and especially to ascertain the possibilities of Japan's avoidance of a crisis by stepping up the development of the synthetic petroleum industry. Teiichi Suzuki, the Chief of the Cabinet Planning Board, reported that the whole problem of synthetic fuel had been examined, and that it was assumed that 5,200,000 tons of petroleum would be required annually. Tojo was told that rapid achievement of self-sufficiency could not be expected. Even if intensive efforts were made, it would still take at least seven years before the desired results could be obtained;such problem was partially solved by Industrial technology for Coal Tar process,Shale Oil,Gasification installations provided by Germans debt at previous German-Japanese accords for interchange such technology.
At same time the Prime Minister Tojo, assumed heavy control of more aspects in inner policies and other aspects in nation(education, culture, religion and moral, etc) for media of your respective ministries in central government, amongst the political organizations linked with political movement "Kodoha" and proper own political sections of Armed forces in country.
On 5 November Prime Minister Tojo revealed to his inner circle the offensive plans for a defensive war that he felt was increasingly certain to happen. The eventual plan drawn up by Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff envisaged such a mauling of the western powers that a defence perimeter line established based on the abilities of Japanese tenaciousness, operating on interior lines for communications and western casualty counts, could not be breached.
Japan had come to believe that the wars in Europe had weakened the imperialists that the Mikado could pick up an extended East Asian empire at will. The Japanese military hierarchy planned a line of defence based on islands stretching from Rabaul in the Bismarck Archipelago to the Kuriles north of Japan, intending to swallow and digest the insular possessions of France, Britain, Holland, Australia, the Portuguese, and of the United States too, while finishing off the Chinese meal began decades before with the notorious Twenty-One Demands. The "Indies" was the Crown Jewel to the Japanese conquest planners. Without it, the embargoes placed against Japan would bankrupt her. Japan had 2 years supply of oil reserve for non-military use, one year if she went to war, the growth of Japanese military dominance of East Asia.
In her conversations with the United States, Japan was prepared for either war or peace. While pursuing a policy of negotiation, Japan simultaneously proceeded with operational preparations.
On November 26, 1941, the United States submitted three proposals:
- repudiate the Nanking Reformed Government;
- evacuate China and Indo-China;
- repudiate the Tripartite Alliance.
The Japanese Government decided that these terms were inadmissible. At the Imperial Conference of December 1, it was determined to open war against the [[United States]], Great Britain, and the Netherlands.
Aggressive Japan's major problem lay in that with great modern industrial expansion she had turned into a major manufacturing nation and required sufficient raw materials that could be obtained over eastern Asia. Hence Japan's swift advance in securing these areas which brought on an immediate conflict with the western powers, who also had considerable political and economic interests in the Far East region. The Japanese move into French Indo-China and diplomatic discourse with Siam (Thailand) constituted a threat to the security of British Malaya, the American Philippines, Dutch East Indies and the southern lands of Australia and New Zealand.
Although the Government thus decided upon hostilities, it possessed no feasible plans for bringing the war to an end. Of course, there was a so-called "Plan for Accelerating the Termination of War against the United States, England, and the Netherlands" (decided upon at the Liaison Conference of November 15, 1941):But this document merely summed up Japan's one-sided wishful thinking.
On Sunday 7 December the Imperial Japanese Navy hit the American military base at Pearl Harbor with an aerial onslaught. The elements of total war were clearly revealed by the undeclared surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Itself in line with the practices of total warfare, was also in the Japanese military tradition, for they had begun other wars previously the same way.
In February 1942, while World War II was raging, the British government attempted to propose a peace agreement with Japan, due to their increasing fear of losing the most important of their overseas colonies: Australia, after their recent failure in defending Malaya and Singapore.
The Fall of Singapore and Dutch Indies had grave consequences in the British Empire in the Far East, along with the loss of the two navy ships HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse. Furthermore, with the abandonment of Malaya and Singapore, a Crown Colony, Great Britain was receiving an extremely heavy blow on the Empire, and was placing Australia at great risk.
Elated by these early successes Admiral Yamamoto, the Chief of the Combined Fleet, convinced his superiors to expand further including the objectives of Midway, the Aleutians, and the Solomons, expanding the thin line of sea communications dangerously thinner. Individual Japanese commanders of the new "Rising Sun Empire of Asia" would go off on wild hunts to enhance their name after easy conquests unrelated to any overall strategic plan and was categorised as "victory disease" by the Japanese themselves.
The Sons of Nippon had triumphed beyond all expectations against united adversaries whose potential war machine capacity was some sixteen times greater. Fast moving flanking attacks were essential if considerable oil, rubber, tin, and bauxite ore of South East Asia and the South West Pacific were to be seized relatively undamaged during the early stages of hostilities and to avoid the north-east monsoon of the China Sea and violent gales of the north Pacific. But these land and air victories were hollow for miles away aircraft carrier versus aircraft carrier battles reversed the overwhelming Japanese victories enabling the Americans accompanied by their allies to open a counter attack offensive against unsinkable Pacific bastions of Bushido stubbornness.
On 16 February 1942, the British diplomats secretly proposed a peace deal with Japan. A possible agreement was that if Great Britain formally recognised the authority of imperial Japan over Northern China and Manchuria, the Japanese would give Britain sovereignty over the Malay Peninsula and Singapore.
At the same time as this diplomatic movement, a political confrontation was in progress between the Toho kai party and the Kodoha party. This was possibly the last internal political power struggle in the government before the Midway and Coral Sea defeats in 1943, which sent the Japanese military reeling.
The ultranationalist Toho kai party was led by Nakano Seigo who appeared to have some political influence at the time and expressed his outright support and confidence for Japanese Navy. He anxiously awaited the approval of the peace talks, so as to stabilize the recent conquests in Southeast Asia. Seigo also wanted to prevented any further sacrifices by the Japanese people towards the war effort, and pressured the government to halt the ambitious conquest of Asia.
On the other side was the largely pro-Imperialist faction, which represented the military interests of Japan, was led by Tojo. He displayed a completely different perspective over the issue. He reasoned that the successes in recent campaigns in Southeast Asia were extremely rapid, and continuation of the conquests could lead to gaining most of Asia and Australia before the United States and the Allies could react to further develop the so-called Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.
General Tojo rejected any form of peace processes in the conquered lands and gave authorization for more conquests. This angered and frustrated the Toho Kai until Seigo finally committed suicide on October 27, 1943. When Japan rejected such peace agreements, the imperial empire lost the opportunity to mantain their new territories in Southeast Asia in the long term. Japan was unable to reinforce the defensive infantries, which allowed the United States to launch counter-offensives by 1943.
The Japanese imperialist and militarist state was too busy celebrating their rapid victories to defend their land, and the decision by Tojo ultimately led to the downfall of Japan in World War II.
Hirohito appointed General Hideki Tojo to be Chief of the General Staff on February 21, 1944. Concerning this assumption of "two hats," the War Ministry authorities explained that the Minister of War Tojo was not merely taking on an additional post as Chief of Staff, but that he had been appointed because of his personal qualifications as an Army General.
Simultaneously, a system of selecting two deputy chiefs of staff was adopted, with General Jun Ushiroku the Senior Deputy Chief. Despite the military authorities' justification, for a War Minister simultaneously to assume the position of Chief of Staff was unprecedented since the very inception of the independent General Staff in March 1889.
Behind Premier Tojo's reports to the Throne, submitted to the Emperor for his sanction, lay the fact that the High Command's operational demands had begun to overpower the management of affairs of state, and were influencing national policy. The direct motive was the necessity of reinforcing air power, a need which had been acutely felt since the American task force strike against Truk. By his personnel measures, Tojo aimed to link relations between the Supreme Command and the State closely together.
The previously described personnel measures drew various criticisms among military circles, of which the following are typical:
The prerogative of the Supreme Command would be thrown into confusion.Prime Minister Tojo has become a feudal figure like the "Shogun" of old.Now that such a busy man as Tojo-already Premier and War Minister-has taken the additional post of Chief of Staff, the High Command would turn into a "commercial firm."
There were not a few, however, who favored the new setup, on the grounds that it expedited IGHQ affairs. In addition there was another pronounced opinion that the synchronization of state policy and High Command matters urgently demanded utmost efforts to diminish the rivalry between the Army and the Navy from the very first.
The objective in establishing a dual system of Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff was the strengthening of the High Command's authority, by stressing the duty of assisting the Chief. There were difficulties, however, in finding the right man for the job, In fact, there was overwhelming criticism, within military circles, of the Imperial appointment of General Ushiroku as Deputy Chief. Criticism of the system was further increased by the fact that the appointment of Jun Ushiroku was said to have been influenced by the personal relationship existing between Tojo and him, as old classmates at the Military Academy.
As Minister of War, Tojo's attitude toward Army circles was severity personified; but toward the Navy he appeared markedly deferent. This was due to his opinion that Army-Navy co-operation was absolutely essential to the prosecution of the War. He showed respect for Navy intentions and was cautious even where trivial matters might be concerned, in order that cooperation between the two services might be improved even slightly.
Because of the American task force assault upon Truk,Tojo (as Minister of War) learned that Pacific ground defenses in Navy areas of responsibility were extremely tenuous. He believed that the primary cause which had led to such a state of affairs could be traced to the lack of rapport between the Army and the Navy. When he was appointed Chief of the General Staff and Admiral Shigetaro Shimada was named Chief of the Naval General Staff, Tojo took advantage of the opportunity to institute measures for the promotion of Army-Navy operational collaboration.
The room at the Imperial Household Department was really inconvenient for handling operational matters, but it had been especially assigned for conferences ostensibly because the Army intended to demonstrate the literal command of the Emperor. In reality, however, the object was to attenuate, even a little, the rivalry between the armed services.
Although the Army represent by Hideki Tojo, had many suitable conference rooms to spare, they felt that if they asked the Navy to meet at their place,the latter might disagree for subjective reasons.
With the institution of regular conferences, working relationships between the High Commands of both services were greatly facilitated. The meetings also proved so useful in obtaining mutual understanding that joint matters of operations and tactics were generally resolved faster than ever before. Thereafter the conferences were held regularly until the end of the War, regardless of changes in the Government.
[edit] Downfall of Tojo Cabinet(1944)
On July 18, 1944, after grave failures in the Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal and last, and more notorious, The Saipan disaster the Tojo Cabinet fell. The ostensible cause was Cabinet disunity, but the inside reason (prevalent within Army circles) was to the effect that, after the failure of the Marianas campaign, "anti-Tojo fever" had intensified among the elder statesmen, the senior Navy officers, and the Emperor's intimates.
In accord with Toshikazu Kaze, a high ranking Foreign Affairs officer: "Tojo did not relinquish power without a struggle. He clung to office tenaciously and tried every means to retain it....He refused to resign from the premiership until the last moment and even disputed his removal with the Emperor."
Two days after the resignation of the Tojo Government, General Koiso Kuniaki and Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai received an Imperial mandate to form a new Cabinet. The Imperial ceremony of investiture was held on the 22d. Marshal Gen Sugiyama took office as War Minister.
In same period General Kuniaki,receiving the leadership in Kodoha party,for command all political and ideological works in such party, alongside of Kantaro Suzuki,why later assumed the last command in movement.
It was widely known that Sugiyama had been graduated from the Army War College together with Premier Koiso and that there had been a clamor for him to assume the portfolio of War Minister. On July 22, Koiso made a representation to the War Ministry authorities concerning a possible return to active duty, but the proposal was rejected.
With the resignation of the Tojo Cabinet, the Chief of the Army General Staff was reshuffled. General Yoshijiro Umezu (as Tojo s partner), till then the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, became Chief of Staff on July 18. It was expected that General Umezu would exercise sound command, although there was some feeling that the present stage of the war required rather more resolute authority. In general, however, there was a strong atmosphere of confidence in the ability of the new Chief of Staff.
The system of two Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff was abolished on August 4. General Ushiroku was transferred to command the Third Area Army in Manchuria. Lieutenant General Hikosaburo Hata, the second Deputy Chief of Staff, remained in office. At the end of the Pacific War, the Deputy Chief was Lieutenant General Torashiro Kawabe.
At almost the same time that the Tojo Cabinet resigned, the assassination of Hitler (July 20 Plot) was being attempted in Germany (July 20). From about that time the Army High Command gave up on the future of Germany.
The July 20 Plot gave the Japanese Army the impression that Party problems were a cancer in the German conduct of the war. In Japan, on the other hand, Army circles had the growing feeling that the structural problem involving antagonism between the Japanese Army and the Japanese Navy constituted the greatest obstacle to the prosecution of hostilities. There were growing indications of a desire on the part of War Minister Sugiyama and Chief of Staff Umezu to devote serious effort toward solving the problem of Army-Navy rivalry.
[edit] Political structure in the movement
The Kodoha party, like any political movement, had a structure. The highest placed were the secretary general and supreme party leader (first Sadao Araki, later Hideki Tojo and Koiso Kuniaki) and their leading group or "directorate" (political cabinet). The most important founders and party associates included also Jinsaburo Mazaki, Heisuke Yanagawa, Hideyoshi Obata, Kazushige Ugaki, Gen Sugiyama, Yoshijiro Umezu, and Tetsuzan Nagata. Doctrines came also from the middle and lower party members (see Japanese doctrines in the Showa Period). Influence and contact with real power and central government institutions (and overseas also) was a constant concern.
Important institutional links were with the Imperial Young Federation, under Kingoro Hashimoto and the "Political Department" of the Kempeitai. Amongst the himitsu kessha (secret societies), the Kokuryu-kai (Black Dragon Society), and Kokka Shakai Shugi Gakumei (the National Socialist League) were close, and a source of less scrupulous supporters. The Tonarigumi (residents committee) groups, the Nation Service Society (national government trade union) and Imperial Farmers Association were all allied. The state religious and educational systems were also targets. Direct links with Army and Navy political sections supported the formation of similar right-wing movements in all the occupied lands of the early Pacific War.
[edit] The last party chiefs and Prime Ministers
The final party chiefs and Prime Ministers were Koiso Kuniaki and Kantaro Suzuki, in 1944-45. The former was from the fall of Saipan in summer 1944, and the latter from the Japanese defeat in the Battle of Okinawa.
[edit] Summary
The "Imperial Way Faction" represented the principal right-wing political movement in the Empire of Japan from some point in the 1930s, emerging from a welter of similar groups and secret societies. In 1941, as a political party, it achieved the goal of real power. Its members led all political and military national efforts during the Pacific War.
It was abolished, with the other nationalist organizations, by the Allied occupation authorities in 1945.
