Imperial Japanese Army politics and background

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Contents 1 Backgrounds of Japanese Army political actions 2 Difficulty of adjusting state affairs and supreme command between Japanese Navy and Army 3 Interservice rivalry in arms research and procurement 4 Collaboration

[edit] Backgrounds of Japanese Army political actions

A basic cause of the Army's developing political activity was the internal situation in Japan or, more specifically, the case of the impoverished rural communities.

The latter were extremely important to the Army as its primary source of military manpower. Most of the officer corps derived from small or middle-class landowner antecedents or from landed farm families; the majority of the noncommissioned officers and enlisted men came from rural communities. Poverty in agricultural districts served as an effective incitement for the Army (especially the younger officers) to turn to radical political movements of "reform."

Still another political influence arose from abroad- from Germany. Since the early days of the modern Japanese armed forces, Germany had served as a model for Japanese army officers, and had been intensely respected by them. In the 1930's, the brilliant ascendancy of Nazi Germany and its advanced armaments made an even deeper impression upon the admiring Japanese Army. The dominant opinion in Army circles therefore stressed that Japan ought to follow Germany's lead, in order to effect a state of readiness swiftly. The German influence cannot be underrated as a cause of the Japanese Army's intervention in domestic politics. Factionalism among Japanese Army cliques also entered into the picture. One faction was called the Kodo Ha (Imperial Benevolent Rule Group) under generals like Araki, Mazaki, Yanagawa, and Obata. The second group, the Tosei-ha (Control Group), was led by Generals Sugiyama, Koiso, Umezu, Nagata, and Tojo. After the Manchurian Incident, these two cliques struggled mightily against each other. The Kodo group believed that the so-called "Shōwa Restoration" (cp. Meiji Restoration) could only be effected by means of riots and the call-out of troops. The fundamental principle which they respected was the role of the Emperor as an Absolute Being. In the Kodo view, the Japanese political scene could be cleaned up if only the villainous court retainers were eliminated. Figuratively speaking, after the clouds were gone, the sun could once again shine down.

The Tosei group, on the other hand, opposed radical political movements like those of the Kodo clique, and insisted upon controlled military action. Fundamental to both factions, however, was the common belief that national defense must be strengthened through the reform of national politics. The previously mentioned "2-26" Incident of 1936 was caused by young officers influenced by the Kodo Ha. Taking advantage of the insurrection to crack down upon the Kodo faction, the Tosei-ha proceeded to purge the Army. They prohibited Army intervention in domestic politics, except through the agency of the Minister of War. Thereafter, cliquish factionalism began to abate; but the Tosei's purge failed completely in its basic purpose-to avert Army interference in the political scene. After the purge, in fact, the Army entered legitimately into political organizations and thereby finally established a terrific voice in domestic politics. On one hand, the Army was allied with officialdom and the elder statesmen; on the other, it could deal with the worlds of industry and of politics.

Military intervention in politics, and the resultant factional clashes of ideology, led to a second great transformation within the Army: the growing vogue of insubordination by lower-ranking officers especially lieutenants, captains, and majors against their superiors. The so-called young officers, cocky and conceited because of their very youth and alleged powers of execution, sometimes reproached the prudence of Oldest officers. Not a few of the radicals committed outrages or upset military discipline. The military authorities, nevertheless, remained absorbed only with the doling out of appropriate rewards, while neglecting to mete out commensurate punishments. Certain key officers who most deserved severe punishment were mildly reproved or transferred to other posts, after which they were able to regain important assignments.

Imperial General Headquarters (the General Staff), with its background of insistence upon the independence of the prerogative of supreme command, possessed a strong basis for pre-eminence. Within IGHQ itself, General Sugiyama, the Army Chief of Staff, was practically a "robot;" real power lay with the First Bureau (Operations). This Bureau, with its own dictum concerning the "secrecy of supreme command," adopted ultra-secret policies and acted like a law unto itself, with utter self-satisfaction. It is the common opinion of those who served on the IGHQ staffs when the Pacific War broke out that the driving force to commence hostilities stemmed from the First Bureau advocates.

At the War Ministry, on the other hand, it was the Bureau of Military Affairs which played the most active role. The Ministry was engaged in matters related to actualities, and hence was more concrete and practical in its ways of working and thinking than was IGHQ. In the War Ministry bureaus concerned with materiel and armament there prevailed an atmosphere of special anxiety concerning the initiation of hostilities.

Tojo, the Minister of War, tried to maintain control over the Army. In this respect, he has the reputation for having been the most able War Minister, and with the best results, since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in 1931.

Prior to the Pacific War, the quarrels between cliques (the Kodo-ha and the Tosei-he, discussed earlier) were replaced by a new tendency which attracted remarkable attention: friendships among classmates of the Military Academy, which exerted terrific influence upon official business. Within the Army, especial notice was drawn to the proposals and movements of 25th Class graduates, such as Shinichi Tanaka, Chief of the Operations Bureau; Akira Muto, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau: and Kyoji Tominaga, Chief of the Personnel Administration Bureau. The whereabouts of 29th, 34th, and 35th graduation class officers, in particular, also became special topics of Army conversation.

After the "2-26" Incident of 1936, Tojo did his best to eliminate the Emperor's distrust of the Army. He reported various problems-whether large or small-to the Sovereign, and always went through three stages of presentation: initial precis, interim report, and definitive project.

The views of Prime Minister Konoye and of Tojo clashed head-on. Konoye was planning to bring the parleys with the United States to a successful close, by agreeing to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China. Tojo, on the other hand, regarded this course of action as leading to the utter nullification of Japan's continental policy, and he strongly opposed it.

The divergence in opinion gathered intensity after October 1941. Tojo spoke of the need to resolve upon war and urged such a policy to the Prime Minister. He told Konoye that it was sometimes necessary for a man to leap from the stage of Kiyomizu. The differences between Tojo and Konoye finally led to the fall of the Prince's third cabinet. Tojo, representing the "toughs" elements, was then recommended to head the succeeding government.

This well-known Japanese legend underlay Tojo's exhortation that Japan undertake her bold leap ("a la Kiyomizu") in 1941.

As we have already observed, Japan's defense policy underwent certain changes in keeping with the priorities assigned to potential enemies. Especially after the Manchurian incident, it became imperative to establish a clearly fixed basis for deciding. upon the relative emphasis to be allocated the Army and the Navy within the defense budget. We cannot ascertain, however, whether a definitive policy decision was ever really made concerning the priorities to be assigned to the armed services. We do know, though, that after the Manchurian Incident the Army and the Navy fought tooth and nail in order to secure as much of the fluctuating military budget as possible. The struggle was no less fierce where the allocation of natural resources was concerned.

The Army concentrated upon strengthening the defenses of Manchukuo, with a view toward the Soviet Union as the hypothetical primary enemy of Japan. The Navy, on the other hand, designed its program of construction against what it considered to be the potential foe-the U. S. Navy. As the international situation grew more critical, inter-service rivalries intensified. Eventually, reconciliation of interests proved impossible, and each of the armed services went its own way.

[edit] Difficulty of adjusting state affairs and supreme command between Japanese Navy and Army

The Tenno appointed General Hideki Tojo to be Chief of the General Staff on February 21, 1944. Concerning this assumption of "two hats," the War Ministry authorities explained that the Minister of War Tojo was not merely taking on an additional post as Chief of Staff, but that he had been appointed because of his personal qualifications as an Army General.

Simultaneously, a system of selecting two deputy chiefs of staff was adopted, with General Jun Ushiroku the Senior Deputy Chief. Despite the military authorities' justification, for a War Minister simultaneously to assume the position of Chief of Staff was unprecedented since the very inception of the independent General Staff in March 1889.

Behind Premier Tojo's daring report to the Throne, submitted to the Emperor for his sanction, lay the fact that the High Command's operational demands had begun to overpower the management of affairs of state, and were influencing national policy. The direct motive was the necessity of reinforcing air power, a need which had been acutely felt since the American task force strike against Truk. By his personnel measures, Tojo aimed to link relations between the Supreme Command and the State closely together. In addition (although this was somewhat far afield), a remarkable increase in aircraft production was sought.

The previously described personnel measures drew variouscriticisms among military circles, of which the following are typical:

The prerogative of the Supreme Command would be thrown into confusion. Prime Minister Tojo has become a feudal figure (like the "Shogun" of old). Now that such a busy man as Tojo - already Premier and War Minister - has taken the additional post of Chief of Staff, the High Command would turn into a "commercial firm."

There were not a few, however, who favored the new setup, on the grounds that it expedited IGHQ affairs. In addition there was another pronounced opinion that the synchronization of state policy and High Command matters urgently demanded utmost efforts to diminish the rivalry between the Army and the Navy from the very first.

The objective in establishing a dual system of Deputy Chief of the General Staff was the strengthening of the High Command's authority, by stressing the duty of assisting the Chief. There were difficulties, however, in finding the right man for the job. In fact, there was overwhelming criticism, within military circles, of the Imperial appointment of General Jun Ushiroku as Deputy Chief. Criticism of the system was further increased by the fact that the appointment of Ushiroku was said to havebeen influenced by the personal relationship existing between Tojo and him, as old classmates at the Military Academy.

General Jun Ushiroku, the Deputy Chief, was more interested in the problem of knocking out American armor than in questions of directing Japanese Army operations designed to achieve strategic victories in island fighting. He strongly insisted upon adopting such antitank tactics as dashes against enemy armor, with satchel charges, since Japan had neither the time nor the resources to fabricate sophisticated weapons fromnow on. As a result of the General's insistence, "human bullet"("Banzai") tactics were largely adopted for antitank combat.

During the latter half of 1943, the Army authorities drafted plans to outfit 500 complete air squadrons by the end of 1945. At about the same time, the |Army Air Force began to demand an increase in the production of fighters, upon which they were laying great stress. The new requirements evolved from the desire to secure complete control of the skies, and involved a change in concepts. Formerly the air force had consisted of both fighters and bombers; now it was to be made up primarily of fighters.

Subsequently, on March 28, 1944, General Ushiroku assumed the post of Inspector General of Military Aviation, in addition to being Deputy Chief of Staff. Together with the Chief of Staff, Jun Ushiroku then displayed great interest in the production of the Nakajima G10N1 Fugaku ("Mount Fuji"), a Navy long-range bomber designed by the Nakajima Aircraft Works, and intended to strike the American Mainland. Despite the Generals earnest desires, however, his project met with the austere opposition of the Munitions Ministry and eventually had to be given up. The Ministry opposed the scheme because it would take at least five or six years to complete the Fugaku bomber; and the huge airframe would require immense amounts of materials, which would have rendered if impossible to accomplish the priority production of fighter aircraft.

In order to step up the production of planes, the Government had created a Munitions Ministry on November 1, 1943. The new Ministry, however, had responsibility only for the production side-not for researchin aeronautical technology. In many instances the Army and the Navy blocked mass production, because different parts were used by each service. If they had both employed standardized engines, production could have been increased. Unless Army and Navy technological research on aircraft were brought under the Munitions Ministry, intensive mass production could not be anticipated; but the armed services evindent no enthusiasm toward taking this step. It therefore appeared as if the Munitions Ministry had proved to be nothing more than a new stage for Army-Navy rivalries.

The lack of skilled workers and of aluminum contributed to the prevention of mass production of aircraft. The Government did its best to overcome these weaknesses, but could devise no effective countermeasures. From April 1 until the end of July 1944, the military aides-de-camp of the Emperor were dispatched to the main factories which were producing aircraft. On April 10 the Emperor himself visited the Army Aeronautical Research Institute. Then, on August 14, His Majesty conveyed an Imperial Message to Mr.Fujiwara (in equal situation of Albert Speer, German Minister of Armaments), the Minister of Munitions, concerning an increase in the production of air force materiel. These were all merely trivial attempts to step up production, however.

The monthly production of Army and Navy aircraft in 1944 was as follows:

• January 1 - 815
• February 2 - 610
• March 2 - 711
• April 2 - 296
• May 2 - 314
• June 2 - 857

From the preceding data it can be seen that production was on the increase. Indeed, the output of aircraft during June set a record for the entire Pacific War.

The actual production figures during the first half of 1944 were nevertheless a long way from the demands of the Army and Navy. The former service sought 32,000 planes; the latter, 26,000, as the total for the year. But the Munitions Ministry authorities had set a production target of 50,000 aircraft for 1944, to start out with, since the combined figure of 58,000 was a hopeless goal.

Now the distribution of the projected 50,000 planes became the subject of serious competition between the Army and the Navy; neither service would make concessions. They both clung to their original demands and struggled violently against each other. The authorities directly concerned could reach no accord. The Emperor himself was therefore obliged to dispatch a Message requesting the two parties to solve the matter in a spirit of give-and-take.

The Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff of both the Army and the Navy sought to make mutual concessions in the course of a conference which began on the morning of February 10. By late afternoon the session finally arrived at an understanding. The Army was to get 27,120 aircraft; the Navy, 25,180. Based upon these combined service demands, the Munitions Ministry set about pushing through a program for the production of 52,250 planes as the goal for 1944.

Actually, shipping and aircraft were parts of a vicious circle. In order to realize increased production of aircraft, raw materials had to be conveyed by ship from overseas. Since vessels were lost in the process, however, a shortage of materials resulted, and this precluded the output of planes. But if aircraft were not turned out in increased numbers, surface shipping could not be covered from the air. Thus, the more ships were sunk, the less airplanes could be manufactured. Herein lay the cause for increasingly bitter antagonism between the Army and the Navy.

The loss of ships increased sharply as the war went on. In round figures, the total tonnage of Army, Navy, and commercial shipping sunk mounted from year to year; that is, from about 880,000 tons in 1942 to 1,600,000 tons by the next year. The approximate net difference between new construction and losses amounted to minus 460,000 tons in 1942, and to minus 490,000 tons in 1943. (Prior to the opening of the War, shipping losses had been expected to total some 800,000 tons during the first year of hostilities, and only 600,000 tons during the second.)

In 1944 shipping losses soared: 290,000 tons in January; 380,000 tons in February; and 340,000 tons in March. Because of this critical situation, convoy measures became a pressing problem of the Army and the Navy.

An agreement had been reached between the two armed services, whereby the Navy was to assume responsibility for convoying ships. But the Navy was preoccupied with combat operations and could not take care of shipping protection. The personnel encharged with Army shipping operations felt that the pre-requisite for victory in the Pacific War was the safeguarding of surface transportation. They argued strongly that the Combined Fleet should devote its main strength to convoy work, like the British Navy had done during World War I. In order to gain naval victory, Japan should use both aircraft carriers and island bases (the so-called "unsinkable carriers") to knock out enemy warships from the air. Efforts should meanwhile be made to reinforce air power by making surface transportation secure-thus accelerating aircraft production, in turn.

Although the Navy set up a Shipping Convoy Headquarters toward the end of 1943, the tonnage of losses did not decrease. The Army therefore adopted its own measures for coping with the problem:

• 1.Hurriedly build wartime-type vessels.
• 2.Construct transport submarines and special convoy vessels (a kind of special aircraft carrier).
• 3.Produce anti-submarine radar weapons.
• 4.Arm merchantmen with anti-submarine guns.

By 1944, measures to counter the mounting losses of ships had become imperative, and both of the armed services were conducting joint investigations. On March 17, 1944, a Joint Army-Navy Conference was held in the presence of the Emperor, to study methods of meeting the shipping-loss problem. The Army sent its Chief of Staff, the two Deputy Chiefs, the heads of the First (Operations) and Third (Transportation and Communications) bureaus, the heads of the 2d (Operations) and 10th (Shipping and Railways) sections, the Vice-Minister of the Army, the Chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs, and the head of the Military Affairs Section. The Navy was represented by its counterparts.

There was no precedent for such a session-which indicates the gravity of the shipping menace. The conference took 2 hours, and the Army finally decided to adopt certain major measures.

An increase in Army Shipping Units (ship engineers-soldiers who could handle large motor vessels). Efficient utilization of shipping, by decreasing the amount of munition loads, accelerating both loading and unloading operations, and assigning cargo foremen. Anti-submarine protective measures (primarily aircraft). Reinforcement of the aerial defenses of maritime bases.

War Minister Tojo had good reasons for adhering to his opinion during the arguments with the Army High Command about the problem of requisitioning operational shipping space. He mulled over the Army High Command's contention that "the Supreme Command was independent," and concluded that it was being interpreted in too sweeping a sense. On the other hand, he considered that the High Command's requests laid excessive stress upon operations, in terms of reconciliation with the requirements of national policy. The Minister therefore sought to effect a much closer working relationship between operations and affairs of state. This viewpoint led to his personal assumption of the key post of Chief of, the General Staff, for he was convinced that "the feeling of General Tojo are one thing, but those of Minister Tojo are another."

A stage had thus been reached in the synchronization of operations and policy, where the Army High Command's old trump card-"the requirements of the High Command"-had lost its power. Thereafter the right of the War Minister to dictate the direction of the war became so greatly enhanced that it exceeded that of that Army High Command.

[edit] Interservice rivalry in arms research and procurement

Previously, in June 1943, the Army had established the Tama Army Technical Research Institute, with the objective of speeding up the practical application of radar devices. Ground and aerial investigations which, until then, had been pursued separately, were to be integrated and developed along military lines. In order to devise efficient radar weapons for practical use as soon as possible, both the Army and the Navy should have pooled their research facilities; but here again the serious interservice rivalry between the armed services stood in the way. The army and navy had research goals that substantially overlapped, yet researchers barely knew what the other service was doing, let alone shared plans and findings.

The Army itself studied and manufactured anti-submarine radar equipment to be installed on its own transports.

Among those concerned with Army operations, incidentally, not a few were of the opinion that the inferiority of anti-submarine radar devices was a cause for Japan's defeat. In other words, the country lost out in the logistical sense because of great shipping losses, which were in turn directly attributable to the radar weaknesses.

Accompanying the decline in maritime transportation potential, the Army began to seek an improvement in the movement capacity of the railroads on the Asiatic Continent-to make up for deficiencies at sea. On February 10, 1944, the Army accordingly reinforced and redeployed its railway forces on a large scale. Four organizations were set up:

• Kwantung Army Field Railway Command (Kwantung/Manchukuo-Chosen)
• 1st and 2d Field Railway Commands, China Expeditionary Army (North and Central China, respectively)
• South Field Railway Command, Southern Army(Southeast Asian area)

[edit] Collaboration

As Minister of War, Tojo's attitude toward Army circles was severity personified; but toward the Navy he appeared markedly deferent. This was due to his opinion that Army-Navy co-operation was absolutely essential to the prosecution of the War. He showed respect for Navy intentions and was cautious even where trivial matters might be concerned, in order that cooperation between the two services might be improved even slightly.

Because of the American task force assault upon Truk, Tojo (as Minister of War) learned that Pacific ground defenses in Navy areas of responsibility were extremely tenuous. He believed that the primary cause which had led to such a state of affairs could be traced to the lack of rapport between the Army and the Navy. When he was appointed Chief of the General Staff (and Admiral Shimada was named Chief of the Naval General Staff), Tojo took advantage of the opportunity to institute measures for the promotion of Army-Navy operational collaboration. It was made habitual for a regularly scheduled liaison conference to be held between the two services at a room in the Department of the Imperial Household. Present at the sessions for co-ordination of operations were the Ministers of Navy and War, the Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of both Staffs, the Chiefs of the respective Operations Bureaus, and other officers concerned with operations.

The room at the Imperial Household Department was actually inconvenient for handling operational matters, but it had been especially assigned for conferences ostensibly because the Army intended to demonstrate the literal command of the Emperor. In reality, however, the object was to attenuate, even a little, the rivalry between the armed services.

Although the Army had many suitable conference rooms to spare, they felt that if they asked the Navy to meet at their place, the latter might disagree for subjective reasons.

With the institution of regular conferences, working relationships between the High Commands of both services were greatly facilitated. The meetings also proved so useful in obtaining mutual understanding that joint matters of operations and tactics were generally resolved faster than ever before. Thereafter the conferences were held regularly until the end of the War, regardless of changes in the Government.

With strengthening of defenses in the Japanese main islands, clashes between the Imperial Army and Imperial Navy grew more intense in every way-the rivalry between the so-called "Star" (Army) and "Anchor" (Navy). Herein lay a major cause of wasted national energy and a hindrance to the full manifestation of combat power.