Humanitarian intervention

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Humanitarian intervention is the interference in a sovereign state by another with the objective of ending or reducing suffering within the first state. That suffering may be the result of civil war, starvation or genocide. Humanitarian intervention should not annex the state, nor affect the state's territorial integrity but merely act to minimise the suffering of civilians in that state. The rationale behind such an intervention is the belief in a concomitant duty under certain circumstances to disregard a state's sovereignty to preserve our common humanity.

1 Origins
2 Definitions
3 Limitations
4 See also
5 External links

[edit] Origins

The idea of humanitarian intervention appeared during the Biafran War (1967-1970). The conflict lead to a famine which caused great suffering, widely covered in western press outlets but totally ignored by government leaders in the name of neutrality and non-intervention. This situation lead to the creation of NGOs like Médecins Sans Frontières, which defended the idea that certain public health situations might justify the extraordinary action of calling into question the sovereignty of states. The concept was developed theoretically at the end of the 1980s, notably by law professor Mario Bettati and politician Bernard Kouchner.

[edit] Definitions

Defenders of humanitarian intervention justify it primarily in the name of a moral imperative: "we should not let people die." This idea is grounded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, written in 1948. For these defenders, intervention is only legitimate when it is motivated by a massive violation of human rights and when it is put in motion by a supernational body, typically the United Nations Security Council.

In practice, humanitarian intervention actions are often carried out by coalitions of nations, which can create two somewhat different situations:

The right to interfere, a term coined by the philosopher Jean-François Revel in 1979, is the recognition of the right of one or many nations to violate the national sovereignty of another state, when a mandate has been granted by a supranational authority. In practice, because of humanitarian emergencies, it is common that the mandate is provided retroactively; for instance, France's intervention in Côte d'Ivoire was made initially without a UN mandate.

The duty to interfere is an obligation which falls to all nation-states to provide assistance at the request of the supranational authority. Obviously, this notion is the closest to the original concept of humanitarian intervention. It is also soundly rejected by the member states of the United Nations who see this notion as an unacceptable infringement on their prerogatives.

[edit] Limitations

Despite the generous notions underlying the concept, which place emphasis on values like democracy and respect for human rights, this idea has been questioned and even criticized ever since it was first advanced.

When implemented, an intervention mission is sometimes contrary to the fundamental objectives of the United Nations, such as maintaining peace, and is certainly always contrary to article 2.7 of the Charter of the United Nations: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state".

For many legal scholars, the creation of the concept of humanitarian inteference is a moot point. In fact, the UN Charter already contains numerous specifications implying the notion, particularly in chapters VI and VII. Thus, the creation of a new right is not necessary, but rather the simple application of rights which already exist.

More fundamentally than this legal problem are the contradictions inherent in the concept of humanitarian intervention, which are primarily due to the confusion created by the blurring of the right and the duty to interfere. It is difficult, when such confusion occurs, to separate the humanitarian motives from the political motives and be assured that the powers intervening are entirely disinterested.

Even though it is called universal, the declaration of human rights is strongly influenced by the work of Western philosophers from the Enlightenment and more generally by a Judeo-Christian morality. Intervention has often been an action directed by a Northern state toward a Southern state. It is thus unlikely that a Rwandan contingent might one day be assigned a peacekeeping mission in Northern Ireland, or that the Lebanese might intervene in Basque country.

In reality, the powerful nation-states run little risk of becoming the target of a humanitarian intervention action. For example, the Chechen population is probably in as much danger as of 2005 as the Kosovars were in previous years, but Russia is significantly more powerful in the realm of international relations than Serbia, and so an international action into Chechnya is much less likely.

It is thus logical that invoking the principles of humanitarian intervention in such an asymmetrical way is met with some considerable reticence. Thus, during the G-77 summit, which brought together the poorest nation-states, the "so-called right of humanitarian intervention" claimed by powerful states was condemned.

Even in the West, humanitarian intervention has opposition. Many believe it bears too much resemblance to the colonialism of the 19th century, advancing the values of liberal democracy and dismissing other cultures as having negligible value. Others criticize the event-based nature of the concept; there is a tendency for the concept to be invoked in the heat of action, to give the appearance of propriety for Western television viewers, and to neglect the conflicts that are forgotten by the media or occur based on chronic distresses rather than sudden crises.

As is demonstrated by the criticism surrounding the American intervention in Iraq, the delicate balance between repressing bullies and respecting the equality of sovereign states is still one that must be found.