Hopwood v. Texas

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Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), was the first successful legal challenge to racial preferences in student admissions since Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Hopwood, four white plaintiffs who had been rejected from The University of Texas School of Law challenged the institution's admissions policy on equal protection grounds and prevailed. After seven years as a precedent in the Fifth Circuit, the Hopwood decision was abrogated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2003.^[1]

Contents 1 The case 2 The reaction 3 Later developments 4 Trivia 5 References

[edit] The case

After being denied admission to the University of Texas School of Law in 1992, Cheryl J. Hopwood filed a federal lawsuit against the University on September 29, 1992 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Hopwood, a white female, alleged that she was denied admission to the law school despite being better qualified than many admitted minority candidates. Originally, Hopwood's co-plaintif was Stephanie C. Haynes, but Haynes was dismissed from the suit on February 11, 1993. Ultimately, three white males, Douglas Carvell, Kenneth Elliott, and David Rogers, joined the existing lawsuit as plaintiffs alleging claims similar to Hopwood's. The case was presided over by United States District Judge Sam Sparks (who himself had graduated from the University of Texas School of Law in 1963).

The plaintiffs were represented by a number of attorneys, including Steven Wayne Smith, a conservative Austin lawyer (who would later use his recognition from the case to be elected to the Texas Supreme Court). The University was represented pro bono by the well-renowned law firm, Vinson and Elkins.

Texas Monthly editor Paul Burka later described Cheryl Hopwood as "the perfect plaintiff to question the fairness of reverse discrimination" because of her academic credentials and the personal hardships she had endured (including a young daughter suffering from a muscular disease).^[2]

After an eight day bench trial in May of 1994, Judge Sparks issued his ruling on August 19, 1994. He determined that the University could continue to use the racial preferences which had been at issue in the litigation.^[3]. In his ruling, he noted that while it was "regrettable that affirmative action programs are still needed in our society," they were still "a necessity" until society could overcome its legacy of institutional racism. Thereupon, the four plaintiffs appealed the case to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (which heard appellate oral arguments in the case on August 8, 1995).

Nearly two years after the original trial, on March 18, 1996, the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion, which was authored by Circuit Judge Jerry E. Smith. The court held that "the University of Texas School of Law may not use race as a factor in deciding which applicants to admit in order to achieve a diverse student body, to combat the perceived effects of a hostile environment at the law school, to alleviate the law school's poor reputation in the minority community, or to eliminate any present effects of past discrimination by actors other than the law school." Judge Jacques Weiner concurred in the judgment. Rehearing was denied on April 4, 1996.

Represented pro bono by noted constitutional law scholar and Harvard University professor Laurence Tribe, the University appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, which declined to review the case on July 1, 1996. In an opinion on the denial of certiorari, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice David Souter, noted that the issue of the constitutionality of race in admission was "an issue great national importance."^[4]. However, Justice Ginsburg explained that the University was no longer defending the specific admissions policy that had been at issue in the lawsuit and was rather attempting to justify only the rationale for maintaining a race-based admissions policy. Accordingly, because the Supreme Court reviews judgments and not opinions, Justice Ginsburg stated that it "must await a final judgment on a program genuinely in controversy before addressing the important question raised in this petition." Thus, the Hopwood decision became the final law of the land with respect to the use of race in admissions in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas (the three states over which the Fifth Circuit maintained jurisdiction).

[edit] The reaction

University officials were not pleased with the opinion. Shortly after the opinion's release, UT President Robert Berdahl predicted "the virtual resegregation of higher education," while UT System Chancellor William Cunningham noted that administrators were "saddened by the 5th Circuit's sweeping determination that Bakke is no longer the law of the land and that past discrimination and diversity no longer justify affirmative action in admissions."^[5]. Without a doubt, the Fifth Circuit's opinion catalyzed a discussion of race in admissions on campus. Faculty and students protested. For the next several years, the case was a very popular topic of discussion and debate in The Daily Texan, the University's student newspaper. The campus debate on the issue became much more heated when, on September 10, 1997, UT law professor Lino Graglia remarked that "[b]lacks and Mexican Americans are not academically competitive with white students because they have a culture where failure is not looked upon in disgrace." Graglia's controversial statement drew national attention at time when the University was attempting to craft race neutral mechanisms for the recruitment and retention of minority students in the post-Hopwood era. On September 16, 1997, Jesse Jackson appeared at a rally of students and faculty at the UT Main Building to condemn Graglia's statments and Hopwood. At the event, Jackson argued that Graglia's remarks represented a "struggle for America's definition of itself."

[edit] Later developments

On January 15, 1997, William P. Hobby, Jr., former Lieutenant Governor of Texas and then chancellor of the University of Houston System, sought a clarification of the application of Hopwood from then Texas Attorney General Dan Morales. Specifically, Hobby questioned how the new federal jurisprudence would affect financial aid at institutions of higher education in Texas (and in particular, its effect on specific programs at the various University of Houston campuses). On February 5, 1997, Morales issued his formal opinion in response to Hobby's request. Morales found that ". . . Hopwood's restrictions would generally apply to all internal institutional policies, including admissions, financial aid, scholarships, fellowships, recruitment and retention, among others."^[6] Thus, under the Morales interpretation, Hopwood was extended to prevent the consideration of race in areas beyond admissions.

On June 23, 2003, the Supreme Court abrogated Hopwood in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) in which the high court found that the United States Constitution "does not prohibit the law school's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body." The ruling means that universities in the Fifth Circuit's jurisdiction can again use race as a factor in admissions (as long as quotas are not used, per Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)).

[edit] Trivia

Hopwood was not the first occasion that a federal court struck down the University of Texas School of Law's admissions policy. On June 5, 1950, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Sweatt v. Painter, in which it found that a newly-established state law school for African Americans did not meet the separate but equal provisions of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Although the court did order that Sweatt be admitted to the University's law school, this opinion was not a total victory for him. He had wanted the court to abandon the "separate but equal" doctrine altogether, but instead, the court used the doctrine to give victory to him. Arguing the case for plaintiff Heman Marion Sweatt was Thurgood Marshall (who would later become a Supreme Court Justice and consider the Bakke case which was central in Hopwood).

David Rogers, one of the four Hopwood plaintiffs, would later become the political campaign manager of his former Hopwood attorney, Steven Wayne Smith. Rogers oversaw Smith's 2002, 2004, and 2006 campaigns for the Texas Supreme Court (only the first of which was ultimately successful).

[edit] References

1. ^ Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (altering jurisprudential landscape on affirmative action so that Hopwood is no longer valid precedent)
2. ^ Burka, Paul. "Law - Cheryl Hopwood." Texas Monthly (Sept. 1996).
3. ^ Hopwood v. State of Tex., 861 F.Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994)
4. ^ Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996)
5. ^ Merle, Renae. "Court rules against affirmative action at UT law school." Daily Texan. March 19, 1996.
6. ^ Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. LO-97-001, Mr. William P. Hobby (1997)