Hideki Tojo

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Hideki Tojo
40th Prime Minister of Japan
In office October 18, 1941 – July 22, 1944
Preceded by	Fumimaro Konoe
Born	December 30, 1884 Tokyo, Japan
Died	December 23, 1948 Tokyo, Japan

Hideki Tojo (Kyūjitai: 東條 英機; Shinjitai: 東条 英機; Tōjō Hideki (help·info)) (December 30, 1884 – December 23, 1948) was a General in the Imperial Japanese Army and the 40th Prime Minister of Japan; he served as prime minister during much of World War II, from October 18, 1941 to July 22, 1944. He was sentenced to death for war crimes after the war and executed by hanging.

Contents 1 Biography 2 Military service 2.1 Rise to office of Prime Minister 2.2 General Tojo, diplomatic actions and politics 2.3 The growth of Japanese military dominance in East Asia 2.4 Invasion of Australia 3 Postwar legacy 4 Footnotes 5 External links

[edit] Biography

Tojo was born in Tokyo, Japan in 1884. He was the third son of Hidenori Tojo, a Lieutenant General in the Japanese Army. Tojo's two older brothers died before his birth. In 1909 he married Katsuko Ito, with whom he had three sons and four daughters.

In 1905 he graduated from the Imperial Military Academy and entered service as a Second Lieutenant in the infantry. He rose through the ranks of the Army, graduating with top grades from the Army College in 1915. After graduation, he taught at the school and served as an infantry officer.

During the 1920s, Tojo was also member of the Tosei-Ha ("Control Group", so-called by its rivals) along with Kazushige Ugaki, Gen Sugiyama, Koiso Kuniaki, Yoshijiro Umezu, and Tetsuzan Nagata. They attempted to represent the more conservative moderates in opposition to the extremist group Kodaha (Imperial Benevolence Group) led by Sadao Araki. Both factions derived from the Double Leaf Society, a 1920s militaristic group with fanatical ultranationalistic beliefs.

By 1935, Tojo was a major general commanding the Kempeitai of the Kantogun (also known as the Kwantung Army) in the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, and by 1937, he was Chief of Staff of that force. In 1938, Tojo served as Vice-Minister of War. From December of 1938 to 1940, Tojo was Inspector-General of Army Aviation. He was also in charge of the Japanese Secret Service before and during the Pacific War, and was in direct contact with Koki Hirota, leading the Black Dragons and other secret societies.

During the 2-26 Incident, Tojo and Shigeru Honjo, a noted supporter of Sadao Araki, came out against the Kodoha-inspired coup attempt. Emperor Hirohito himself was outraged at the attacks on his close advisors, and after a brief political crisis, and stalling on the part of a sympathetic military, the rebels were forced to surrender. In the aftermath, the Toseiha was able to purge the Army of radical officers, and the coup leaders were tried and executed. Following the purge, Tosei and Kodo elements were unified in their conservative but highly anti-political stance under the banner of the Kodoha military clique. With Tojo in a leadership position, Kodoha would help push Japan into the Second World War.

During Tojo's tenure at the Home Ministry, he led the Keishicho (Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department). Appointed War Minister in 1940, he was instrumental in leading Japan into the Axis Alliance with Germany and Italy. In July 1940, he was appointed War Minister in the second Fumimaro Konoe Cabinet, and remained in that post in the third Konoe Cabinet. When Prime Minister Konoe was unable to secure an agreement with the United States, Tojo's faction drove him into retirement. In 1941, Tojo was appointed Prime Minister by Emperor Hirohito and took command of the entire Japanese military.

Late in the war, in February 1944, Tojo assumed the post of Chief of the Army General Staff. However, following a series of military disasters, culminating in the fall of Saipan, he was abandoned by his backers and forced to resign on July 18, 1944. He retired to the first reserve list and went into seclusion.

Tojo's nickname was "Razor" (Kamisori).

[edit] Military service

Tojo became the Commander of the 24th Infantry Brigade in August 1934; the Commanding General of the Military Police in the Kantogun in September 1935; Lieutenant General in December 1936; Chief of Staff of the Kantogun in March 1937; the Vice-Minister of War in May 1938 (during the first Konoe Cabinet); and the Inspector General of Army Aviation in December 1938.

In July 1937, he personally led the units of the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade in Operation Chahar. When the China Incident occurred, the section stationed in Manchukuo moved to Hopei and fought near Peking against Chinese forces. Then the Brigade was ordered to participate in the offensive in Chahar Province. The Brigade marched via Chengde and Dolonnor and reached Zhangbei in five days. The distance of this march was 700 km. Units were assigned to certain infantry divisions.

[edit] Rise to office of Prime Minister

As German forces surged through Europe, the Japanese Army likewise pushed for war. Tojo was one of the advocates of war, but Emperor Hirohito preferred to keep negotiating with the U.S. in hopes of avoiding conflict. The prevailing opinion within the Japanese Army at that time was that continued negotiations could be dangerous. The U.S. had cut off Japan's oil supply, but Emperor Hirohito thought that he might be able to control extreme opinions in the army by using the charismatic and well-connected Tojo. At the time, Tojo was said to be the only person who could control the Army, and Emperor Hirohito considered him a loyal retainer. Emperor Hirohito summoned Tojo to the Imperial Palace one day before Tojo took office. Tojo wrote in his diary, "I thought I was summoned because the Emperor was angry at my opinion."

The signal for war in the Pacific was given on August 26, 1941, at a session of the Black Dragon Society in Tokyo. At this meeting, War Minister Hideki Tojo ordered that preparation be made to wage a total war against the Armed Forces of the United States, and that Japanese guns be mounted and supplies and munitions concentrated in the Marshall and Caroline Islands (Japanese mandates since World War I) by November, 1941. Approving Tojo's war orders, former Foreign Minister Koki Hirota, head of the Black Dragons' secret service, discussed the advantages and consequences of a conflict with the United States. Many of those at the meeting considered December 1941, or February 1942, the most suitable time for Japan to attack.

During September 1941, the situation worsened with continued sanctions imposed against Japanese trade and became irreversibly worse in October when Lieutenant-General Hideki Tojo became Japanese Prime Minister with the support of the nation's powerful military establishment.

Tojo was given one order from the Emperor: To keep negotiating no matter what. According to Japanese records, the Emperor said, "Keep negotiating even if the U.S requires Japan to withdraw her soldiers from China to Manchuria." Tojo accepted this order, and pledged to obey. With that, Tojo became Prime Minister.

Tojo did his best to keep negotiating. However, the results were not encouraging. For Japan, the Hull Note was the last straw. On the night of December 7, Tojo was said to have sat on a futon with his back straight and his knees together, sobbing. He might have regretted his move to go to war, or his failure to obey the Emperor.

On 5 November, Prime Minister Tojo revealed to his inner circle plans for a war that he felt was increasingly certain to happen. The eventual plan drawn up by Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff envisaged such a mauling of the Western powers that defense perimeter lines--operating on interior lines of communications and inflicting heavy Western casualties--could not be breached.

In addition, the Japanese fleet which attacked Pearl Harbor was under orders from Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto to be prepared to return to Japan on a moment's notice, should negotiations succeed.

Numerous theories about political forces at work during this process include conspiracy theories about a concerted effort within the military-industrial complex of Japan and the right wing to derail negotiations and forge ahead with plans for colonialism and war.

[edit] General Tojo, diplomatic actions and politics

Japanese leaders had come to believe that the wars in Europe had so weakened Western imperial forces that the Empire could expand into East Asia at will. The Japanese military hierarchy planned a line of defense based on islands stretching from Rabaul in the Bismarck Archipelago to the Kuriles north of Japan, intending to swallow the insular possessions of France, Britain, Netherlands, Australia, the Portuguese, and the United States, while also forcing China's acquiescence in the decades-long conflict that began with the notorious "Twenty-One Demands".

The East Indies were central to the Japanese strategy. Without it, embargoes would bankrupt the country. Japan only had two years' worth of oil reserves for non-military use, one year's worth if she went to war.

[edit] The growth of Japanese military dominance in East Asia

The Japanese Empire's main problem lay in that rapid industrial expansion had turned Japan into a major manufacturing center requiring raw materials that could only be obtained overseas. Hence Japan's swift advance in securing those areas, bringing Japan into immediate conflict with the Western powers, who also had considerable political and economic interests in the Far East. The Japanese move into French Indo-China and diplomatic discourse with Siam (Thailand) constituted a threat to the security of British Malay, the American Philippines, Dutch East Indies, and the southern lands of Australia and New Zealand.

On Sunday 7 December the Imperial Japanese Navy hit the American military base at Pearl Harbor with an aerial onslaught. The elements of total war were clearly revealed by the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Itself in line with the practices of total warfare, was also in the Japanese military tradition, for they had begun other wars previously the same way.

On 16 February 1942, the British diplomats secretly proposed a peace deal with Japan.^{[citation needed]} A possible agreement was that if Great Britain formally recognised the authority of imperial Japan over northern mainland China and Manchuria, the Japanese would give Britain sovereignty over the Malay Peninsula and Singapore.

At the same time as this diplomatic movement, a political confrontation was in progress between the Toho kai party and the Toseiha party. This was possibly the last internal political power struggle in the government before the Midway and Coral Sea defeats in 1942, which sent the Japanese military reeling.

The ultranationalist Toho kai party was led by Nakano Seigo who appeared to have some political influence at the time and expressed his outright support and confidence for Japanese Navy. He anxiously awaited the approval of the peace talks, so as to stabilize the recent conquests in Southeast Asia. Seigo also wanted to prevent any further sacrifices by the Japanese people towards the war effort, and pressured the government to halt the ambitious conquest of Asia.

On the other side was the largely pro-Imperialist faction, which represented the military interests of Japan, was led by Tojo. He displayed a completely different perspective over the issue. He reasoned that the successes in recent campaigns in Southeast Asia were extremely rapid, and continuation of the conquests could lead to gaining most of Asia and Australia before the United States and the Allies could react to further develop the so-called Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.

General Tojo rejected any form of peace processes in the conquered lands and gave authorization for more conquests. This angered and frustrated the Toho Kai until Seigo finally committed suicide on October 27, 1943. When Japan rejected such peace agreements, the imperial empire lost the opportunity to maintain their new territories in Southeast Asia. In the long term Japan was unable to reinforce the defensive infantries, which allowed the United States to launch counter-offensives by 1943.

Elated by these early successes Admiral Yamamoto, the Chief of the Combined Fleet, convinced his superiors to expand further including the objectives of Midway, the Aleutians, and the Solomons, expanding the thin line of sea communications dangerously thinner. Individual Japanese commanders of the new Rising Sun Empire of Asia would go off on wild hunts to enhance their name after easy conquests unrelated to any overall strategic plan and was categorised as "victory disease" by the Japanese people.

[edit] Invasion of Australia

Prime Minister Tojo was concerned that there were no contingency plans for Yamamoto's invasion plan for Australia. Tojo believed Japanese merchant and transport fleets were extended to their limits and the Americans could readily divert their B-17 Flying Fortresses to Sydney to destroy the invading forces.

Emperor Hirohito decided to postpone the invasion plan until Japanese forces had taken Burma and joined forces with the rebel Indian Nationalists. The outcomes of the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway ensured the invasion plan for Australia never took place.

General Tojo was an ardent supporter of the North Strike Group and declared his intention to realize operations from Manchuria and nearby areas against the Russians in the Soviet Far East, Outer Mongolia and Siberian lands, as well as against the Kwantung Army. He was a fanatical anticommunist since his time leading Kempeitai forces in Manchuria.

[edit] Postwar legacy

After Japan's unconditional surrender in 1945 Tojo shot himself in the chest in a suicide attempt. He survived and was arrested. After recovering from his injuries, Tojo was moved to the Sugamo Prison. He was tried by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East for war crimes and found guilty of the following crimes:

• count 1 (waging wars of aggression, and war or wars in violation of international law)
• count 27 (waging unprovoked war against the Republic of China)
• count 29 (waging aggressive war against the United States)
• count 31 (waging aggressive war against the British Commonwealth)
• count 32 (waging aggressive war against the Netherlands (Indonesia))
• count 33 (waging aggressive war against France (Indochina))
• count 54 (ordering, authorizing, and permitting inhumane treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) and others)

He was sentenced to death on November 12, 1948 and executed by hanging on December 23, 1948.

Tojo is often considered responsible for authorizing the murder of more than 8 million civilians in China, Korea, the Philippines, Indochina, and other Pacific island nations, as well tens of thousands of Allied POW's. Tojo is also implicated in government-sanctioned experiments on POW's and Chinese civilians (see Unit 731). Like his German colleagues, Tojo often claimed to be carrying out the orders of the Emperor, who was granted immunity from war crimes prosecution. The culpability of the Showa Emperor himself is a subject of some controversy.

Tojo's commemorating tomb is located in a shrine in Hazu, Aichi, and he is one of those enshrined at the controversial Yasukuni War Shrine. He was survived by a number of his descendants, including his granddaughter, Yuko Tojo, a right-wing activist who claimed Japan's was a war of self-defense and that it was "unfair" that her grandfather was judged a Class-A war criminal. Tojo's second son, Teruo Tojo, who designed fighter and passenger aircraft during and after the war, eventually served as an executive at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.

It is interesting to note that under current Japanese law, Tojo is not considered a war criminal.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Footnotes

[edit] External links

• National Diet Library photos and biography
• Hideki Tojo Biography.
• Hideki Tojo Quotes
• Trial Watch
• Address by Tojo Hideki, Premier of Japan

IJA special research units
Unit 100 | Unit 200 | Unit 516 | Unit 543 | Unit 731 | Unit 773 | Unit Ei 1644 | Unit 1855 | Unit 2646| Unit 8604 | Unit 9420

Preceded by Shigenori Togo

Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan 1942

Succeeded by Masayuki Tani

v • d • e	Prime Ministers of Japan
Itō · Kuroda · Yamagata · Matsukata · Itō (2nd) · Matsukata (2nd) · Itō (3rd) · Okuma · Yamagata (2nd) · Itō (4th) · Katsura · Saionji · Katsura (2nd) · Saionji (2nd) · Katsura (3rd) · Yamamoto · Okuma (2nd) · Terauchi · Hara · Takahashi · To. Kato · Yamamoto (2nd) · Kiyoura · Ta. Kato · Wakatsuki · G. Tanaka · Hamaguchi · Wakatsuki (2nd) · Inukai · Saito · Okada · Hirota · Hayashi · Konoe · Hiranuma · N. Abe · Yonai · Konoe (2nd) · Tojo · Koiso · K. Suzuki · Prince Higashikuni · Shidehara · Yoshida · Katayama · Ashida · Yoshida (2nd) · Hatoyama · Ishibashi · Kishi · Ikeda · Sato · K. Tanaka · Miki · Fukuda · Ohira · Z. Suzuki · Nakasone · Takeshita · Uno · Kaifu · Miyazawa · Hosokawa · Hata · Murayama · Hashimoto · Obuchi · Mori · Koizumi · S. Abe

Persondata
NAME	Tojo, Hideki
ALTERNATIVE NAMES	東條 英機 (Kyūjitai); 東条 英機 (Shinjitai); Tōjō Hideki (transliteration)
SHORT DESCRIPTION	Prime Minister of Japan
DATE OF BIRTH	December 30, 1884
PLACE OF BIRTH	Tokyo, Japan
DATE OF DEATH	December 23, 1948
PLACE OF DEATH	Tokyo, Japan