Hard problem of consciousness
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The term hard problem of consciousness was coined by David Chalmers [1], when he distinguished between "easy problems" of explaining the ability to discriminate, integrate information, report mental states, focus attention, etc.; and contrasted them with the "hard problem" of explaining why we have qualitative phenomenal experiences.
Various formulations of the "hard problem":
- "Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all?"
- "How is it that some organisms are subjects of experience?"
- "Why does awareness of sensory information exist at all?"
- "Why do qualia exist?"
- "Why is there a subjective component to experience?"
- "Why aren't we philosophical zombies?"
[edit] References
- ^ The Place of Mind, ed. Brian Cooney
[edit] See also
- Article Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness by David Chalmers
- Article Commentary on Chalmers: Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness by Daniel Dennett
- Article The Objective Consciousness Revisited - Understanding the Nature of Consciousness by Robert G. Heyward