Hard problem of consciousness

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The term hard problem of consciousness was coined by David Chalmers [1], when he distinguished between "easy problems" of explaining the ability to discriminate, integrate information, report mental states, focus attention, etc.; and contrasted them with the "hard problem" of explaining why we have qualitative phenomenal experiences.

Various formulations of the "hard problem":

  • "Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all?"
  • "How is it that some organisms are subjects of experience?"
  • "Why does awareness of sensory information exist at all?"
  • "Why do qualia exist?"
  • "Why is there a subjective component to experience?"
  • "Why aren't we philosophical zombies?"

[edit] References

  1. ^ The Place of Mind, ed. Brian Cooney


[edit] See also

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