Talk:Greco-Italian War

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I have moved Miskin's evidence from Keitel to the "Military insights from the war section", which is more appropriate for a discussion of the effects of the war than the "Results" section --Mike Young 22:11, 19 Jun 2005 (UTC)


(aniv of march on Roma)started the campaign in the begining of winter

Did the invasion fall on this date as a coincidence, or did Mussolini purposely pick this day to launch the war?K... 09:08, 10 October 2005 (UTC)

Contents

[edit] Duplication in Battle of Greece

The Battle of Greece article contains some of the same material that we see here, only with fewer details, but better formatting. I would like to propose that these two articles be merged, but I don't know which name is better for the result. Jamie 02:32, 28 October 2005 (UTC)

Following discussion on Talk:Battle of Greece it seems that these two articles should be separated at the point of German intervention. This means there is a lot of material here which should be moved to that article. Also this article's battlebox needs more information of casualties and commanders. Jamie 10:05, 1 November 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Effect of the war on Barbarossa

The Military Insights section states: 'It has been argued that the Balkan Campaign decisively delayed the German invasion of Russia. For example, during the Nuremberg trials after WWII, Hitler's Chief of Staff Field Marshall Keitel stated that "The unbelievable strong resistance of the Greeks delayed by two or more vital months the German attack against Russia; if we did not have this long delay, the outcome of the war would have been different in the eastern front and in the war in general, and others would have been accused and would be occupying this seat as defendants today". On the other hand, it may have been the Russian weather, not the contingencies of subsidiary campaigns, which determined Barbarossa’s launch date.'

Neither assertion is correct. German forces that participated in the Balkans campaigns had sufficient time to return home and refit before Barbarossa. In addition, the weather in the USSR did not delay the invasion. Neither of these factors show up in German high command documents relating to Barbarossa, despite Keitel's Nuremberg testimony after the war. Instead, the Germans embarked on a massive expansion of their armed forces in the autumn of 1941, expanding the number of divisions by half, so that they would have enough forces to simultaneously invade the USSR while occupying western Europe. It turned out that German industry was not able to produce sufficient equipment in time for these forces (even though the Germans used considerable amounts of captured weapons and vehicles), and this was the cause of the delay. Even as late as early June 1941, a number of the critically important panzer and motorized divisions had not received their equipment.

All this and more is covered in "The German attack on the USSR: the Destruction of a Legend," M. van Creveld, European Studies Review, Jan. 1972.

The assertion must be considered as correct as Germany never intended to have to deal with occupying Greece himself, the Greeks held out longer than any other nation had. The battle of Crete and the thousands of soldiers killed there as well as in mainland Greece meant that Hitler delayed his plans to invade Russia at least 3 months late. Given the history of Russia and its winter it cannot be denied that this was a vital and unanticipated campaign and is seen as many as a turning point in the war

[edit] Okhi Day

Responding to the request to discuss merge box in the article page: I think that Okhi Day should stay as a complete but short article, with basically only the first and last paragraphs, and a "see also Greco-Italian War" comment. The middle of the Okhi Day article describing overations should be removed, or any useful parts merged into Greco-Italin War here. And this article should have something to the effect of "— still celebrated as Okhi Day in Greece &mdash" added in. Any comments or objections? Herostratus 16:41, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

I think Okhi day shouldn't be merged because it is a different a subject to the Greco-Italian War. --Kyriakos 02:46, 14 January 2006 (UTC)

Between this and talk on Okhi Day I'm calling it consensus not to merge.
I believe that Okhi day should remain, but focus only on the events of Oct. 28 (i.e. remove most of the information about the ensuing operations). It can also be appended with information about how the day is celebrated TheArchon 11:06, 22 April 2006 (UTC)


[edit] Summary of Campaign section

I think this section is redundant and should be deleted. I will delete it in a couple of days if noone has any objections. Periklis* 01:51, 11 October 2006 (UTC)

I removed this section and restructured the article a bit. I added a "Naval Ops" section, where the - all too frequently ignored - RHN actions in the Adriatic, together with the concurrent RN-Regia Marina confrontations are to be added.
PS. Apart from needing sources and a bit fleshing out the separate stages of campaign, I feel this article is rather short on the Italian perspective. If anyone has relevant knowledge or relevant sources, please contribute! Cplakidas 22:46, 12 October 2006 (UTC)
I agree that info about naval actions should be included. Especially the raid on Taranto in Southern Italy and Volana in Albania. Maybe add some info about the submarine Papanikolis. Regarding the lack of the Italian perspective, one way of adding it would be to add eyewitness accounts to get their views in. Periklis* 04:00, 14 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] An Italian war crime and boorish racism

On August 15, 1940 -more than two months before the Italian attack to Greece (Oct. 28, 1940)- the Italian submarine "Delfino" (Cap. Aicardi)sunk the coastal Greek cruiser "Helli" in front of the Tinos island during a Greek religious ceremony. Just to provoke Greece! The true reason of the Italian defeat in November 1940 was boorish racism: Italy considered Greece "a little, poor, inferior Nation" and a few of Italian divisions were "enough to defeat it". Badoglio said: "Those Greeks`ll get the lesson what they deserve!"

[edit] Stalemate

It states several times that just prior to the German invasion, both sides lacked the strength to attack one and other, which resulted in a stalemate. It also states that the entire Greek army was sent to face the Italians, leaving all other borders stripped. It stands to reason then that this was a stalemate, not a victory by either side. Also, had the war continued without the intervention by the Germans or the Allies, Italy could have used it's full strength against Greece, and conquered it from the South upward, as it was left basically defenseless. This is attested to by the rapid conquest of Greek held islands that Italy conquered. They had no defenses, because all of the defenses were on the Albanian front. It is resonable to assume that this could and would have been case with most of mainland Greece as well. - Izzo

Well, up to the final surrender to the Axis, on April 1941, the Greeks were certainly winning over the Italians. Even after the surrender to the Germans, on April 20-21, the Italian attacks on the Greek front were beaten back. The situation is correctly summed up as a Greek tactical victory, but a strategic stalemate. Italy was already deploying 35 divisions against 16 Greek ones in Albania by the end of March, and still unable to make headway. How many more divisions did they have to send? The Italians also failed in carrying out what you say, and what the Greek High Command feared - attacks on Greek islands, especially the Ionian islands or Crete. For whatever reason, they did not carry these operations out in November 1940, when they had the forces available for it, and it is doubtful they would attempt it later, with their surface fleet unable to support them after Cape MAtapan and the RN's Taranto raid. The islands they "conquered" they did so only after the Germans had already overrun the Greek mainland. As for what would have happened without intervention, it's anyone's guess, but it belongs to the realm of alternate history, not in Wikipedia. Regards, Cplakidas 12:34, 12 November 2006 (UTC)
If you read what was written here on the later stages of the war, no one was winng the war. Certainly, the Greeks had insurged into Albania, but lacked the strength to move foreward by any means. Also, the Italians found themselves dug in not able to attack the Greeks, but not in danger of losing any more territory to the Greeks either. This situation is remenescent of World War I France, where the Germans were dug in in French held territory, while the French were dug in as well. Neither side was able to successfully break the others lines at that point. That is a stalemate. Therefore, the Italian Campaign in Greece would also be a stalemate. Also, when you consider that the Germans were able to just walk into Greece and face no opposition, the Axis campagin in Greece was a great success. With the whole Greek Army tied up on the Albanian border, the Germans, and other allies, face to resistance. I am making no argument about the war itself, I am merely stating that from a historical point of view, it's true that it was a stalemate. If it were a "tatical Greek victory" Greece would have beaten the Italians, not stalemated them, as well as having their army free to fight invading Germans and Bulgarians. With both sides dug in, neither attacking the other successfully, then it is a stalemate situation, no matter which nation has more territory from the other. As for supposition, your right, it is not meant for wikipedia, I only offered it as my personal oppinion. - Izzo
You are quite right in what you are saying. However, the campaign was certainly a tactical victory for the Greeks, for the simple reason that they repulsed the Italian invasion, staged a successful counterattack, and moved the battle into Italian "home territory" (if that can be said of Albania), remaining unbeaten by the Italians until final surrender to the Germans. The fact that they ultimately lacked the strength to achieve a decisive outcome does not mean that it was not a victory. If on April 6, instead of a German invasion, an agreement had been brokered (most likely of return to "status quo ante"), the war would have gone down as a definite Greek victory. I am however adding the "strategic stalemate" to the article's infobox, to correctly reflect the historical outcome. BTW, it would be nice if we had more of the Italian perspective in the article. If you can help, please do so. Regards, Cplakidas 12:41, 14 November 2006 (UTC)
I agree. Both titles (Tactical victory, stalemate) correctly sum up the situation of this war. I believe it was unique because of the fact it had no real winner. I'll try to put more perspective from Italian people into to the article. Thanks for your help on the issue. Best wishes. - Izzo

Someone has reverted the edits once again, so I will have to reset them. - Izzo

I may nominate this page for protection, as people keep vandalizing the "result" section, and refuse to join the debate here or stop the reversions. I am not about to get into an edit war, so if this continues I'll request protection for this page and a ban for the reverter. - Izzo