Gheorghe Tătărescu
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- For the artist, see Gheorghe Tattarescu.
Gheorghe Tătărescu | |
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In office January 3, 1934 – December 28, 1937 November 25, 1939 – July 4, 1940 |
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Preceded by | Constantin Anghelescu Constantin Argetoianu |
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Succeeded by | Octavian Goga Ion Gigurtu |
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In office October 2, 1934 – October 9, 1934 February 11, 1938 – March 29, 1938 March 6, 1945 – December 29, 1947 |
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Preceded by | Nicolae Titulescu Istrate Micescu Constantin Vişoianu |
Succeeded by | Nicolae Titulescu Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen Ana Pauker |
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Born | 1886 Târgu Jiu, Romania |
Died | March 28, 1957 Bucharest, Romania |
Political party | National Liberal Party National Liberal Party-Tătărescu |
Profession | lawyer |
Religion | Romanian Orthodox |
Gheorghe Tătărescu (also known as Guţă Tătărescu, with a slightly antiquated pet form of his given name; 1886—March 28, 1957) was a Romanian politician who served twice as Prime Minister of Romania (1934-1937; 1939-1940), three times as Minister of Foreign Affairs (interim in 1934 and 1938; appointed to the office in 1945-1947), and once as Minister of War (1934). He was also the President of the Romanian Delegation to the post-World War II Peace Conference in Paris. His brother, Colonel Ştefan Tătărescu, was at some point the leader of a minor Nazi grouping, the National Socialist Party.
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[edit] Early politics
Born in Târgu Jiu, he worked as a lawyer in Bucharest.
After joining the National Liberal Party (PNL), Tătărescu stood among its "young liberals" faction (as they were colloquially known), supporting free trade and a more authoritarian rule over the country around King Carol II, and opposing both the older generation of leaders (who tended to advocate protectionism and a liberal democracy) and the dissident group of Gheorghe I. Brătianu (see National Liberal Party-Brătianu).[1]
Undersecretary in the Interior Affairs Ministry under several PNL cabinets (beginning with that of Ion I. C. Brătianu in 1922-1926), he first became noted as a collaborator of Ion Duca. In 1924-1936, in contrast to his post-World War II agenda, Tătărescu was a noted anti-communist, and reacted vehemently against the Romanian Communist Party (PCdR, later PCR)[2] — recommending and obtaining its outlawing (citing its adversity to the concept of Greater Romania, and arguing that the Comintern-supported Tatarbunary Uprising was evidence of "imperialist communism").[3]
[edit] First cabinet
[edit] Context
Tătărescu became leader of the cabinet in January 1934, as the fascist Iron Guard had assassinated Prime Minister Duca on December 30, 1933 (the five-day premiership of Constantin Anghelescu ensured transition between the two governments). His was the second PNL cabinet formed during Carol's reign, and the latter's failure to draw support from the mainstream group led to a tight connection being established between Carol and the young liberals, with Tătărescu backing the process leading to the creation of a royal dictatorship.[4] One of Tătărescu's first measures was a decisive move to end the conflict between the National Liberal executive and the Mayor of Bucharest, Dem I. Dobrescu (who was backed by the National Peasants' Party) — making use of his prerogative, he removed Dobrescu from office on January 18.[5]
The brief period constituted a reference point in Romanian economy, as the emergence from the Great Depression, although marked by endemic problems, saw prosperity more widespread than ever before.[6] This was, in part, the contribution of new economic relations which Tătărescu defended and encouraged: the state transformed itself into the main agent of economic activities, allowing for prosperous businesses to benefit from its demands, and, in time, leading to the creation of a camarilla (dominated by the figures of industrialists such as Aristide Blank, Nicolae Malaxa, and Max Auschnitt).[7] In this context, Tătărescu's allegedly subservient position in front of Carol was a frequent topic of ridicule at the time.[8] According to a hostile account of the socialist Petre Pandrea:
"Tătărescu was ceremonious in order to cover his menial nature. When he was leaving audiences [with the King], he pressed forward on the small of his back and returned facing backwards from the desk to the door, not daring to show his back. [...] Watching over the scene [...], Carol II excaimed to his intimate assistants:
— I don't have a big enough tooshie for all the politicians to kiss!"[9]
Among other services rendered, he intervened in the conflict between Carol and his brother, Prince Nicholas, asking the latter to renounce either his marriage to Ioana Dumitrescu-Doletti (considered a misalliance by Carol, it had not been recognized by Romanian authorities) or his princely prerogatives — Nicholas chose the latter alternative in 1937.[10]
Inside his party, Tătărescu lost ground to Dinu Brătianu, elected by the traditional Liberal elite as a compromise in order to ensure unity; upon his election in 1934, the latter stated:
"This time as well, I would have gladly conceded, if I were to believe that anyone else in the party could gather voter unanimity."[11]
The issue remained debated for the following two years. The party congress of July 1936 eventually elected Tătărescu to the second position in the party (that of general secretary).[12]
[edit] European politics
In his foreign policy, Prime Minister Tătărescu balanced two different priorities, attempting to strengthen the traditional military alliance with Poland which was aimed at the Soviet Union, and reacting against the growing regional influence of Nazi Germany by maintaining the relevancy of the Little Entente and establishing further contacts with the Soviets.
In August 1936, he renounced the services of Nicolae Titulescu as Foreign Minister, replacing him with Victor Antonescu. This caused an uproar, with most of Romania's diplomatic corps voicing their dissatisfaction; over the following months, virtually all of Titulescu's supporters were themselves recalled (including Constantin Vişoianu, the ambassador to Poland, Constantin Antoniade, Romania's representative to the League of Nations, Dimitrie Ghyka, the ambassador to Belgium, and Caius Brediceanu, the ambassador to Austria) while Titulescu's adversaries, such as Antoine Bibesco, were returned to office[13] (Bibesco subsequently campaigned in France and the United Kingdom, in an attempt to reassure Romania's main allies that the move did not signify a change in Romania's priorities).[14] Tătărescu was later blamed by his own party for having renounced the diplomatic course on which Romania had engaged.[15]
In early 1937, Tătărescu rejected the proposal of Józef Beck, Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs, to withdraw Romania's support for Czechoslovakia (the following year, Romania did just that, after indicating that it could not guarantee Czechoslovakia's fronteers before the Munich Agreement) and attempt a reconcilliation with Hungary.[16] This was accompanied by Czechoslovak initiatives to establish close contacts between the Little Entente and the Soviets: a scandal erupted in the same year, when the country's ambassador to Romania, Jan Šeba, published a volume calling for Soviet-Entente military cooperation (despite the Soviet-Romanian conflict over Bessarabia) and expressing the hope that the Soviet state would extend its borders into Western Byelorussia and Ukraine.[17] Kamil Krofta, Czechoslovakia's Foreign Minister, received criticism for having prefaced the book, and, after Tătărescu paid a visit to Czechoslovak Prime Minister Milan Hodža, Šeba was recalled to Prague.[18]
[edit] Facing the Iron Guard
In combating the Iron Guard, Tătărescu chose to relax virtually all pressures on the latter (while mimicking some of its messages), and instead concentrated again on curbing the activities of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR).[19] In April 1936, he and the Minister of the Interior Ion Inculeţ allowed the a youth congress to gather in Târgu Mureş, aware of the fact that it was masking a fascist gathering; delegates to the congress, travelling in a special train commissioned by the government, engaged vandalized Ion Duca's memorial plate in Sinaia train station, and, upon their arrival in Târgu Mureş, made public their violent anti-Semitic agenda.[20] It was probably there that death squads were designated and assigned missions, leading to the murder of Mihai Stelescu, a former associate, in June of the next year.[21]
In February 1937, an intense publicity campaign by the Guard, begun with the ostentatious funerals of Ion Moţa and Vasile Marin (killed in the Spanish Civil War) and culminating in the physical assaulting of Traian Bratu, rector of the University of Iaşi, by Guardist students, provoked the premier's order to close down universities throughout the country.[22]
Later in that year, the collaboration between monarch and premier, coupled with the fact that Tătărescu had successfully attracted nationalist votes from the Iron Guard, led to the signing of an electoral agreement between the latter, the National Peasants' Party (the main democratic opposition group), and the National Liberal Party-Brătianu — the pact was meant to prevent all attempt by Carol to manipulate the votes in elections.[23] (A secondary and unexpected development was that the illegal PCR, which had decided to back the National Peasants' Party prior to the elections, eventually supported the electoral pact.)[24] Tătărescu's own alliance policy rose the anger of his opponents inside the PNL, as he signed collaboration agreements with the fascist Romanian Front and German Party.[25]
The elections led to an unprecedented situation: although the PNL and Tătărescu had gained the largest percentage of the vote (almost 36%), they fell short of being awarded majority bonus (granted at 40% of the vote).[26] As the far right had gathered momentum (the Guard, running under the name of "Everything for the Fatherland Party", had obtained 15.6 of the vote),[27] Carol was faced with the threat of an Iron Guard government, which would have been one deeply opposed to all of his political principles: he called on a third party, Octavian Goga's National Christian Party (coming from the anti-Semitic far right but deeply opposed to the Guard) to form a new cabinet in December of that year.[28]
Consequently, Tătărescu renounced his offices inside the party, and, while keeping his office of general secretary, he was surpassed by the readmitted Gheorghe I. Brătianu — who was elected to the new office of PNL vice president on January 10, 1938.[29]
After the failure of Goga's policies to curb the rise of their competitors, the king, backed by Tătărescu, resorted to dissolving all political parties on May 30, 1938, creating instead the National Renaissance Front.[30]
[edit] Second cabinet
In this context, Tătărescu chose to back the regime, as the PNL, like the National Peasants' Party, remained active in nominal clandestinity (as the law banning it had never been enforced any further).[31] Having personally signed the document banning opposition parties, he was expelled from the PNL in April 1938, and contested the legitimacy of the action for the following years.[32] Allegedly, the measure was inspired by Iuliu Maniu, leader of the National Peasants' Party's and future political ally of Dinu Brătianu.[33] Alongside Alexandru Vaida-Voevod and Constantin Argetoianu (whom he succeeded as Premier), he became a dominant figure in the group of maverick pro-Carol politicians.[34]
After a bloody crackdown on the Iron Guard, the Front attempted to reunite political forces in a national government that was to back Carol's foreign policies (in view of increasing threats on Romania's borders after the outbreak of World War II). In 1945, he stressed his belief that authoritarianism benefited Romania, and supported the view that Carol had meant to keep Romania out of the war.[35]
Tătărescu's second cabinet was meant to reflect that, but it did not draw any support from traditional parties,[36] and, in April 1940, Carol, assisted by Ernest Urdăreanu and Mihail Ghelmegeanu, began talks with the (by then much weaker) Iron Guard.[37] Tătărescu remained in office throughout the rest of the Phony War, until the fall of France, and his cabinet saw the crumbling of Romania's alliance with the United Kingdom and France. The cabinet was brought down by the cession of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union (effects of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), as well as by Carol's attempt to appease German hostility by dissolving it, replacing Tătărescu with Ion Gigurtu, and recreating the Front as the totalitarian Party of the Nation.[38]
[edit] World War
After the Second Vienna Award (when Northern Transylvania was lost to Hungary), confirming Carol's failure to preserve both the country's neutrality and its territorial integrity, Romania was taken over by an Iron Guard dictatorial government (the National Legionary State). Speaking five years later, Dinu Brătianu placed the blame for the serious developments on Tătărescu's own actions, addressing him directly:
"I remind you: [...] you have contributed directly, in 1940, in steering the country towards a foreign policy that, as one could tell even then, was to prove ill-fated and which led us to the loathsome Vienna settlement, one which you have supported inside the Crown Council [...]."[39]
On November 26, 1940, the Iron Guard began a bloody retaliation against various political figures who had served under Carol (following a late investigation into the 1938 killing of Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, the movement's founder and early leader, by Carol's authorities). Tătărescu and Constantin Argetoianu were among the second wave of captured politicians (on November 27), and were destined for arbitrary execution; they were, however, saved by the intervention of regular police forces, most of whom had grown hostile to the Guardist militias.[40]
Retired from political life during the war, he was initially sympathetic to Ion Antonescu's pro-German dictatorship (see Romania during World War II) — Dinu Brătianu, who remained in opposition to the Antonescu regime, made mention an official visit to Bessarabia, recovered after the start of Operation Barbarossa, when Tătărescu had accompanied Antonescu, "thus making common cause with his warmongering action".[41]
In the end, Tătărescu became involved in negotiations aimed at withdrawing Romania from the conflict, and, while beginning talks with the Romanian Communist Party (PCR), tried to build foreign connections to support Romania's cause following the inevitable defeat; he thus corresponded with Edvard Beneš, leader of the Czechoslovak government in exile in England.[42] Beneš, who had already been discussing matters involving Romania with Richard Franasovici and Grigore Gafencu, and had agreed to support the Romanian cause, informed the Allied governments of Tătărescu's designs.[43]
Tătărescu later contrasted his diplomatic approach with the strategy of Barbu Ştirbey (who had only attempted an agreement with the Western Allies in Cairo, instead of a opening relations with the Soviets).[44] Initially meeting with the refusal of Iuliu Maniu and Dinu Brătianu (who decided to invest their trust in Ştirbey), he was relatively successful after the Cairo initiative proved fruitless: the two traditional parties accepted collaboration with the bloc formed by the PCR, the Romanian Social Democratic Party, the Ploughmen's Front, and the Socialist Peasants' Party, leading to the formation of the short-lived and unstable National Democratic Bloc (BND) in June 1944.[45] It overthrew Antonescu in August.
[edit] Alliance with the Communists
Tătărescu returned to the PNL later in 1944 — after the Soviet Red Army had entered Romania and the country had become an Allied state, political parties were again allowed to register. Nevertheless, Tătărescu was again opposed to the party's leadership (Dinu Brătianu and Gheorghe I. Brătianu), and split to form his own group in June-July 1945.[46] Brătianu convened the PNL leadership and formally excluded Tătărescu and his partisans, citing their support for dictatorial regimes.[47]
As the PCR, which was growing more influent (with the help of Soviet backing) while generally lacking popular appeal, sought to form alliances with various forces in order to increase its backing, Tătărescu declared his group to be left-wing (and Social liberal), and attempted to preserve a middle course in the new political setting by pleading for close relations to be maintained with both the Soviet Union and the Western Allies.[48] N. D. Cocea, a prominent socialist who had joined the PNL, represented the faction in talks for an alliance with the Communists.[49]
Tătărescu became Foreign Minister and vice president of the government in the cabinet of Petru Groza when the latter came into office after Soviet pressures in 1945 (his faction had been awarded leadership of two other ministries — Finance, with Alexandru Alexandrini, and Public Works, with Gheorgh Vântu).[50] He indirectly helped the PCR carry out an electoral fraud general election in February by failing to reply to American proposals for organizing fair elections.[51] At the Paris Conference,[52] where he was accompanied by the PCR leaders Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, he aknowledged the dissolution of Greater Romania under the provisions of the new Treaty (1947).[53]
[edit] 1947 and after
Tensions between his group with the PCR occurred when the former founded itself as a party under the name of National-Liberal Party (commonly known as the National Liberal Party-Tătărescu), and, in June-July 1945, proclaimed its goal to be the preservation of property and a middle class under a new regime.[54] Of himself and his principles, Tătărescu stated:
"I am not a communist. Taking in view my attitudes towards mankind, society, property, I am not a communist. Thus, the new orientation in external politics which I demand for my country cannot be accused of being determined by affinities or sympathies of doctrine."[55]
Speaking in retrospect, Gheorghiu-Dej indicated the actual relation between his party and Tătărescu's: "we have had to tolerate by our side a capitalist-gentry political group, Tătărescu's group".[56]
Tătărescu himself continued to show his support for several PCR policies: in the summer of 1947, he condemned the United States for having protested against the repression of forces in the opposition.[57] Nevertheless, at around the same time, he issued his own critique of the Groza government, becoming the target of violent attacks initiated by Miron Constantinescu in the PCR press.[58] Consequently, he was singled out for negligence in office when, during the kangaroo trial of Iuliu Maniu (see Tămădău Affair), it was alleged that several employees of his ministry had conspired against the government.[59] Scînteia, the official voice of the PCR, wrote of all National Liberal Party-Tătărescu offices in the government: "The rot is all-encompassing! It has to be removed!".[60]
Tătărescu resigned his office on November 6, 1947, and was replaced by the Communist Ana Pauker. For the following two months, he was sidelined in his own party by PCR pressures,[61] and removed from its leadership in January 1948 (being replaced with Petre N. Bejan — the party was subsequently known as National Liberal Party-Petre N. Bejan).[62] One of his last actions as cabinet member had been to sign the document officially rejecting th Marshall Plan.[63]
After the proclamation of the People's Republic of Romania on December 30, 1947, the existence of all parties other than the PCR had become purely formal, and, after the elections of March 28, the single-party state was confirmed by legislation.[64]
One of his last appearances in public was his stand as one of the prosecution's witnesses in the 1954 trial of Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, when he claimed that the defendant had been infiltrated into the PCR during the time when he had been premier (Pătrăşcanu was posthumously cleared of all charges).[65]
Tătărescu died in Bucharest at the age of 71.
[edit] Notes
- ^ Hitchins, p.380, 385, 412; Ornea, p.16; Scurtu, "Politica...", p.16-17; Veiga, p.212
- ^ Cioroianu, p.36
- ^ Tătărescu, 1926 speech
- ^ Hitchins, p.412; Scurtu, "Politica...", p.16
- ^ Zănescu et al., p.83
- ^ Veiga, p.211
- ^ Gallagher, p.102-103; Veiga, p.212-213
- ^ Gallagher, p.102; Pandrea
- ^ Pandrea (Pandrea's italics)
- ^ Scurtu, "Principele Nicolae..."
- ^ Brătianu, in Scurtu, "Politica...", p.17
- ^ Scurtu, "Politica...", p.17
- ^ Potra, Part I, Part II
- ^ Potra, Part II
- ^ Ţurlea, p.29
- ^ Hitchins, p.432-433
- ^ Otu
- ^ Otu
- ^ Cioroianu, p.43, 113-118; Frunză, p.84, 102-103; Veiga, p.223-224
- ^ Ornea, p.304-305; Veiga, p.233
- ^ Ornea, p.305, 307
- ^ Veiga, p.234
- ^ Hitchins, p.412-413; Ornea, p.302-303, 304; Veiga, p.234-235; Zamfirescu, p.11
- ^ Veiga, p.235
- ^ Scurtu, "Politica...", p.17
- ^ Hitchins, p.413
- ^ Hitchins, p.413; Zamfirescu, p.11
- ^ Hitchins, p.414
- ^ Scurtu, "Politica...", p.17
- ^ Hitchins, p.415, 417-418; Pope Brewer
- ^ Hitchins, p.416; Veiga, p.247-248
- ^ Scurtu, "Politica...", p.18
- ^ Scurtu, "Politica...", p.18
- ^ Argetoianu
- ^ Pope Brewer
- ^ Hitchins, p.418
- ^ Hitchins, p.419; Ornea, p.323-325; Zamfirescu, p.11
- ^ Argetoianu; Hitchins, p.419
- ^ Brătianu, in Ţurlea, p.29
- ^ Veiga, p.292, 309
- ^ Brătianu, in Ţurlea, p.29
- ^ Tejchman
- ^ Tejchman
- ^ Pope Brewer
- ^ Tejchman
- ^ Hitchins, p.502; Ţurlea, p.29
- ^ Ţurlea, p.29
- ^ Hitchins, p.502, 506; Ţurlea, p.30, 31
- ^ Frunză, p.147
- ^ Cioroianu, p.97; Frunză, p.187, 308
- ^ Hitchins, p.517
- ^ The delegation he headed included 13 members: Florica Bagdasar, Mitiţă Constantinescu, General Dumitru Dămăceanu, Richard Franasovici, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Horia Grigorescu, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, Lothar Rădăceanu, Simion Stoilow, Elena Văcărescu, Şerban Voinea, and Ştefan Voitec. ("Documente inedite. România...", p.16)
- ^ Hitchins, p.526; Ornea, 312
- ^ Frunză, p.121; Hitchins, p.510-511, 515, 538; Ţurlea, p.31
- ^ Tătărescu, in Ţurlea, p.31
- ^ Gheorghiu-Dej, February 1948, in Frunză, p.121
- ^ Hitchins, p.533
- ^ Cioroianu, p.96-97
- ^ Frunză, p.307-308; Hitchins, p.538
- ^ Scînteia, November 6, 1947, in Frunză, p.121
- ^ Hitchins, p.538
- ^ Frunză, p.357; Hitchins, p.538
- ^ Cioroianu, p.74
- ^ Frunză, p.357
- ^ Cioroianu, p.228; Ioniţoiu
[edit] References
- (Romanian) Memoria.ro: 1926 speech related to the events in Tatarbunary, held by Tătărescu as under-secretary for Internal Affairs
- "Documente inedite. România la finalul celui de-al doilea război mondial în Europa" ("Unpublished Documents. Romania at the End of the Second World War in Europe"), in Magazin Istoric, June 1995
- (Romanian) Constantin Argetoianu, "Pleacă Tătărescu, vine Gigurtu" ("Exit Tătărescu, Enter Gigurtu"), fragment from his Memoirs, in Jurnalul Naţional, September 23, 2006
- Adrian Cioroianu, Pe umerii lui Marx. O introducere în istoria comunismului românesc ("On the Shoulders of Marx. An Incursion into the History of Romanian Communism"), Editura Curtea Veche, Bucharest, 2005
- Victor Frunză, Istoria stalinismului în România ("The History of Stalinism in Romania"), Humanitas, Bucharest, 1990
- Tom Gallagher, Outcast Europe: The Balkans, 1789-1989, from the Ottomans to Milošević, Routledge, London, 2001 ISBN 0415270898
- Keith Hitchins, România, 1866-1947, Humanitas, Bucharest, 1998 (translation of the English-language edition Rumania, 1866-1947, Oxford University Press, USA, 1994)
- (Romanian) Cicerone Ioniţoiu, "Procesul Pătrăşcanu" ("The Pătrăşcanu Trial"), in Morminte fără cruce. Contribuţii la cronica rezistenţei româneşti împotriva dictaturii ("Unmarked Graves, Contributions to the Chronicle of Romanian Anti-Dictatorship Resistance"), Vol. II
- Z. Ornea, Anii treizeci. Extrema dreaptă românească ("The Thirties: the Far Right in Romania"), Ed. Fundaţiei Culturale Române, Bucharest, 1995
- (Romanian) Petre Otu, "Cazul Şeba" ("The Šeba Case"), in Magazin Istoric, April 2002
- (Romanian) Petre Pandrea, "Carol II-Madgearu-Manoilescu", in Magazin Istoric, July 2001
- Sam Pope Brewer, "Romanian Defends Pre-Armistice Acts. Vice Premier Tatarescu [sic] Says He Backed Carol's Policies but Did Not Aid Nazis", in The New York Times, October 22, 1945
- (Romanian) George G. Potra, "Reacţii necunoscute la demiterea lui Titulescu. 29 August 1936: O «mazilire perfidă»" ("Unknown Reactions to Titulescu's Dismissal. 29 August 1936: A «Perfidious Ousting»"), in Magazin Istoric; Part I, June 1998, Part II, July 1998
- Ioan Scurtu:
- "«Politica: (...) culegi mai multă nedreptate decât răsplată». Rolul politic al Brătienilor în istoria României" ("«Politics: (...) One Reaps More Injustices Than Rewards». The Political Role of the Brătianus in Romania's History"), in Dosarele Istoriei, 1/VI, 2001
- (Romanian) ""Principele Nicolae aşa cum a fost" ("Prince Nicholas as He Was"), in Magazin Istoric
- (Romanian) Miroslav Tejchman, "Eduard Beneš şi opoziţia română (1941-1944)" ("Edvard Beneš and the Romanian Opposition"), in Magazin Istoric, March 2000
- Petre Ţurlea, "Dinu Brătianu înfrânt de Gheorghe Tătărescu" ("Dinu Brătianu Defeated by Gheorghe Tătărescu"), in Dosarele Istoriei, 1/VI, 2001
- Francisco Veiga, Istoria Gărzii de Fier, 1919-1941: Mistica ultranaţionalismului ("The History of the Iron Guard, 1919-1941: Mistique of Ultra-Nationalism"), Humanitas, Bucharest, 1993
- Dragoş Zamfirescu, "Coordonatele unui fenomen politic românesc. Mişcarea Legionară: apariţie şi evoluţie" ("Coordinates of a Romanian Politican Phenomenon. The Legionary Movement: Emergence and Evolution"), in Dosarele Istoriei, 4/II, 1997
- Ionel Zănescu, Camelia Ene, "Doi primari interbelici în slujba cetăţeanului" ("Two Interwar Mayors in Service to the Citizen"), in Magazin Istoric, March 2003