Gare de Lyon train accident
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The Gare de Lyon train accident happened on June 27, 1988 when a commuter train inbound to the Gare de Lyon station in Paris crashed into a stationary train killing 56 people.
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[edit] The disaster
It was a routine trip until the train got to Melun Station when a passenger pulled the e-brake, forcing the train to stop. After about 20 minutes of working the kinks, the train continued on with the journey, but on the way the driver was instructed to continue non-stop to Gare de Lyon. Before the station, there was a yellow signal instructing the driver to slow down, but there was barely any response from the brakes.
Realizing that the train lacked sufficient braking power, the driver tried to send a warning. When the train reached the downward slope to Gare de Lyon, the train sped up, ploughing into the train that was awaiting departure. The driver on the runaway train had evacuated the passengers to the rear of the train, but there was insufficient time to completely evacuate the stationary train. The death toll would most likely have been much higher had it not been for the heroic sacrifice of the driver of the stationary train, André Tanguy, who stayed in the driver's cabin facing the oncoming train ordering the passengers to vacate the train. Tanguy remained in the driver's cabin incessantly ordering the train's evacuation right until he was killed in the collision.
[edit] The inquiry
It was initially feared that the collision was a terrorist atrocity, due to the fact that in the past, many French trains had been bombed in and outside Paris. The theory was supported by the discovery that the brake valve was closed. This component allows air to go into the engines to power the brakes, and when it was closed the brakes were disabled on all cars behind the valve. However it was believed that the only kind of people who could close the valve were those who had a lot of knowledge of the brake system. In the days after the accident there were questions as to why someone pulled the e-brake, but it was discovered that the passenger was in a hurry, which was not suspicious.
After extensive interviews, it was discovered that the driver, who was trying to reset the brake cord accidentally shut the brake valve, but there was confusion as to how the driver started the train again. The design of the train was that if the brake valve was shut, all the brakes would remain on stopping the train from going with little braking power. Procedure was that the driver should have called engineers to inspect the problem, and who may have spotted the closed valve, but trying to stay on schedule the driver disabled the brakes by releasing air from the system, believing there was an 'air lock', but although the brakes were free there was only 1/3 of the braking needed in the system.
Even with most of the brakes disabled, there was still opportunities to stop or slow the train. First, there was one more station, Vert De Maison, before Gare De Lyon which would have given the driver plenty of time to stop the train, but before reaching the station the driver was instructed to travel pass through Vert de Maison without stopping and proceed directly to Gare de Lyon. Second, an additional electric brake system on the train could have slowed or stopped the train. This back-up brake was easily accessible, but in the confusion, the driver forgot the brake was there and the last chance was lost.
The driver called in a warning and activated an emergency alarm to signal that his train was in trouble, but he forgot to identify himself. The emergency alarm forced all trains on the network to stop and wait for instructions, and several other drivers called the controller for an explanation for the stoppage. The station staff tried to divert the train to an empty track, but without an identity for which train was in distress, and with calls coming in from several drivers, the task was more complicated for the controller.
The signallers had pre-programmed the tracks so that the runaway train would go into Platform 1 which was empty instead of Platform 2 where the delayed train was. Crashing into an empty platform might have wrecked the train, but with the passengers evacuated into the last carriages, casualties would have been limited. but when the driver of the runaway train activated the alarm, the signallers had to turn all signals to red, but the pre-programming of tracks were disabled causing runaway train to go into Platform 2 instead of Platform 1.
[edit] Consequences
The driver was released after serving six months of a four year manslaughter sentence. The guard aboard the train, who assisted the driver in disabling the brakes on the train, was also sentenced to prison on the same charge. Legal proceedings were brought against the Gare de Lyon supervisor, who failed to evacuate the station, and the passenger who activated the e-brake, but were unsuccessful.
[edit] Media
The accident was featured on the National Geographic Channel documentary series Seconds From Disaster in the program Runaway Train.