Fullilove v. Klutznick

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Fullilove v. Klutznick

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued November 27, 1979
Decided July 2, 1980


Full case name:	H. Earl Fullilove, et al. v. Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce, et al.

Citations:	448 U.S. 448; 100 S. Ct. 2758; 65 L. Ed. 2d 902; 1980 U.S. LEXIS 8; 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P31,026; 27 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) P80,496

Prior history:	Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Holding

The Court held that the U.S. Congress could constitutionally use its spending power to remedy past discrimination. The case arose as a suit against the enforcement of provisions in a 1977 spending bill that required 10% of federal funds going towards public works programs had to go to minority-owned companies.

Court membership

Chief Justice: Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices: William J. Brennan, Potter Stewart, Byron White, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Franklin Powell, Jr., William Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens

Case opinions

Majority by: Burger
Joined by: White, Powell
Concurrence by: Powell
Concurrence by: Marshall
Joined by: Brennan, Blackmun
Dissent by: Stewart
Joined by: Rehnquist
Dissent by: Stevens

Laws applied

U.S. Const.

Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)^[1], was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that the U.S. Congress could constitutionally use its spending power to remedy past discrimination. The case arose as a suit against the enforcement of provisions in a 1977 spending bill that required 10% of federal funds going towards public works programs had to go to minority-owned companies.

The Court was deeply divided as to both the rationale for the decision and the outcome. Five separate opinions were filed, none of which commanded the support of more than three members of the Court. Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices White and Powell (although Powell also wrote a separate concurrance); Justice Marshall wrote a concurrance with an entirely different basis in law, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun.

The Court held that the minority set-aside program was a legitimate exercise of congressional power. The Court found that Congress could pursue the objectives of the minority business enterprise program under the Spending Power. The plurality opinion noted that Congress could have regulated the practices of contractors on federally funded projects under the Commerce Clause as well. The Court further held that in the remedial context, Congress did not have to act "in a wholly 'color-blind' fashion."

Two dissenting opinions were written, one by Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, and the other by Justice Stevens.