Foreign relations between China and Japan
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China and Japan have had a long official and non-official relationship. China strongly influenced Japan, through its writing system, architecture, culture, philosophy, and religion. This influence, however, was not matched by political and economic interaction, until the Western industrial civilization came to the East towards the end of the nineteenth century. Japan's invasion and war crimes in China in the 1930s was a major component which affects China-Japan relations.
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[edit] Timeline
[edit] The arrival of the Europeans and Americans
European nations and the United States were looking to trade with East Asian countries. Japan was one of the more willing to accept this opportunity, while China was initially most resistant to foreign impact.
Friction between Japan and China arose from Japan's control over the Ryūkyū Islands from 1870, annexation of Taiwan after the First Sino-Japanese war of 1894, and came to the declaration of war on China in 1937. Japan was soon able to gain control over all Chinese outlying territories. [1]
The period between the Mukden Incident in 1931 and the official beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 involved constant regional armed resistance to Japanese advances in Manchuria and North China, and the Nanjing's efforts in stopping further encroachments through diplomatic negotiations. This era was turbulent for the Nationalist government, as it was mired in a civil war with the Chinese Communists and maintained an uneasy truce with remnant warlords, who nominally aligned with Chiang Kai-shek, following the Northern Expedition. This period also saw the Nationalist government's pursuit in modernizing its National Revolutionary Army, through the assistance of Soviet, and later German, advisors.
The Republic of China (ROC) reassumed control of Taiwan after Japan's unconditional surrender in 1945, following decision of the Allied Powers at the Cairo Conference in 1943. The ROC and Japan concluded the Treaty of Taipei in 1951.
[edit] 1950s
After the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, relations with Japan changed from hostility and an absence of contact to cordiality and extremely close cooperation in many fields. Japan was defeated and Japanese military power dismantled, but China continued to view Japan as a potential threat because of the United States presence there. One recurring PRC's concern in Sino-Japanese relations has been the potential remilitarization of Japan. On the other hand, some Japanese fear that the economic and military power of the PRC has been increasing.
The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance included the provision that each side would protect the other from an attack by "Japan or any state allied with it," and China undoubtedly viewed with alarm Japan's role as the principal United States base during the Korean War. The security agreement between Japan and the United States signed in 1951 also heightened the discouragement of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Japan pushed dissension between the two countries even further by ending a peace treaty with China and establishing diplomatic relations with the Taiwanese government.
Like most western nations at the time, Japan continued to recognize the Republic of China government in Taipei as the sole legitimate Chinese government. Initially, neither country allowed its political differences to stand in the way of broadening unofficial contacts, and in the mid-1950s they exchanged an increasing number of cultural, labor, and business delegations.
Although all these things complicated the relationship between the two countries, the Chinese government orchestrated relations with Japanese non-governmental organizations through primarily the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA). The CPIFA would receive Japanese politicians from all parties, but the Japanese left-wing parties were more interested in the Chinese initiatives. In 1952, the Chinese Commission for the Promotion of International Trade was able to get a trade agreement signed by the Japanese Diet members. Liao Chengzi, the deputy of directors of the State Council’s Office of Foreign Affairs, was able to arrange many other agreements “such as the repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war with the Japanese Red Cross (1954), and the Fishery Agreement with the Japan-China Fishery Association (1955).” [1] Although during this time, the relationship between the two countries were primarily non-official, the agreements were essential in bringing together a more amalgamated environment.
China began a policy of attempting to influence USA through trade, "people's diplomacy," contacts with Japanese opposition political parties, and through applying pressure on Tokyo to sever ties with Taipei. In 1958, however, China suspended its trade with Japan-- apparently convinced that trade concessions were ineffective in achieving political goals. Thereafter, in a plan for improving political relations, China requested that the Japanese government not be hostile toward it, not obstruct any effort to restore normal relations between itself and Japan, and not join in any conspiracy to create two Chinas. After the Sino-Soviet break, economic necessity caused China to reconsider and revitalize trade ties with Japan.
[edit] Trade resumes (1960s)
The Soviet Union suddenly withdrew Soviet experts from China in the 1960’s, which resulted in a major economic crisis for China. China was left with few options one of which was to have a more official relationship with Japan.
Tatsunosuke Takashi, member of the Liberal Democratic Party and of the Diet and Director of the Economic Planning Agency of the Japanese, went to China in order to sign a memorandum that would further the trade relations between the two countries, better known as the Liao-Takasaki Agreement. Under its terms, Chinese purchases of industrial plants were to be financed partly through medium-term credits from the Japan Export-Import Bank. The accord also permitted the PRC to open a trade mission in Tokyo and in 1963 paved the way for Japanese government approval of the export to mainland China of a synthetic textile manufacturing plant valued at around US$20 million, guaranteed by the bank. Subsequent protest from the ROC caused Japan to shelve further deferred-payment plant exports. The PRC reacted to this change by downgrading its Japan trade and intensified propaganda attacks against Japan as a "lackey" of the United States.
Sino-Japanese ties declined again during the Cultural Revolution, and the decline was further exacerbated by Japan's growing strength and independence from the United States in the late 1960s. The PRC was especially concerned that Japan might remilitarize to compensate for the reduced United States military presence in Asia brought about under president Richard Nixon. As the turmoil subsided, however, the Japanese government — already under pressure both from the pro-Beijing factions in the LDP and from opposition elements — sought to adopt a more forward posture.
[edit] Official relations and Friendship treaty (1970s)
A turnaround began in the early 1970s, when the US officials shocked Japanese officials by developing a relationship with China. A new school of thought developed within Japan to consider having better relations with China. This strategy, which happened soon after the Cold War, “reflects the sense of uncertainty and anxiety among the Japanese about China’s future course, given the country’s sheer size and robust economic growth, as well as the fact that a considerable portion of the fruit of that growth is allocated for defense.” [2] The Japanese soon followed American’s lead, by also deciding to change its policies towards China. In December 1971, the Japanese and Chinese trade liaison offices began to discuss the possibility of restoring diplomatic trade relations. “The retirement of Premier Sato in July 1972 and the arrival of Kakuei Tanaka at the helm paved the way for a change.” [1] The visit to Beijing of Japan's newly elected prime minister, Tanaka Kakuei, culminated in the signing of a historic joint statement (Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China) on September 29, 1972 that ended nearly eighty years of enmity and friction between the Japan and China, establishing diplomatic relations between the states.
“On that occasion the Chinese negotiators tabled three principles as the basis for normalizing relations between the two countries: (a) the government of the People’s Republic is the sole representative and legal government of China; (b) Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic; and (c) the treaty between Japan and Taiwan is illegal and invalid and should be abrogated.” [1] In this statement, Tokyo recognized the Beijing government over the Taipei government as the sole legal government of China, stating at the same time that it understood and respected PRC's position that Taiwan was "an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China."
Japan had little leverage in the negotiations, because of China’s relations with the UN and Nixon. But Japan’s most important issue was the continuation of its security arrangements with the United States, which China was implicit about condemning. The Chinese authorities surprised the Japanese by adopting a pacifying attitude on the issue of relations between Japan and the US. A compromise was attained on September 29, 1972, which gives the impression that the Japanese agreed to most of China’s demands, including the Taiwan issue. This caused interaction between the two countries, in terms of trade, to grow rapidly: 28 Japanese and 30 Chinese economic and trade missions visited their partner country.
Negotiations for a Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty also began in 1974 but soon encountered a political problem Japan wished to avoid. The PRC insisted on including in the treaty an antihegemony clause, clearly directed at the Soviet Union. Japan, wishing to adhere to its "equidistant" or neutral stance in the Sino-Soviet confrontation, objected. The Soviet Union made clear that a Sino-Japanese treaty would prejudice Soviet-Japanese relations. Japanese efforts to reach a compromise with China over this issue failed, and the talks were broken off in September 1975.
Matters remained at a standstill until political changes in China after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 brought to the fore a leadership dedicated to economic modernization and interested in accommodation with Japan, whose aid was essential. A changing climate of opinion in Japan that was more willing to ignore Soviet warnings and protests and accept the idea of "antihegemonism" as an international principle also helped lay the groundwork for new efforts to conclude the treaty.
In February 1978, a long-term private trade agreement led to an arrangement by which trade between Japan and China would increase to a level of US$20 billion by 1985, through exports from Japan of plants and equipment, technology, construction materials, and machine parts in return for coal and crude oil. This long-term plan, which gave rise to inflated expectations, proved overly ambitious and was drastically cut back the following year as the PRC was forced to reorder its development priorities and scale down its commitments. However, the signing of the agreement reflected the wish on both sides to improve relations. In April 1978, a dispute rising from the sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (called Diaoyutai in Chinese), a cluster of barren islets north of Taiwan and south of the Ryūkyū Islands, flared up and threatened to disrupt the developing momentum toward a resumption of peace treaty talks. Restraint on both sides led to an amicable resolution. Talks on the peace treaty were resumed in July, and agreement was reached in August on a compromise version of the antihegemony clause. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China was signed on August 12 and came into effect October 23, 1978.
[edit] Development of complementary interests (1980s)
Sino-Japanese relations made considerable progress in the 1980s. In 1982, there was a serious political controversy over revision of Japanese textbooks dealing with the history of imperial Japan's war against China in the 1930s and 1940s. Beijing also registered concern in 1983 about the reported shift in United States strategic emphasis in Asia, away from China and in favor of greater reliance on Japan, under the leadership of the more "hawkish" prime minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, warning anew against possible revival of Japanese militarism. By mid-1983, however, Beijing had decided — coincidentally with its decision to improve relations with the Reagan administration — to solidify ties with Japan. Communist Party of China general secretary Hu Yaobang visited Japan in November 1983, and prime minister Nakasone reciprocated by visiting China in March 1984.
While Japanese enthusiasm for the Chinese market waxed and waned, broad strategic considerations in the 1980s steadied Tokyo's policy toward Beijing. In fact, Japan's heavy involvement in China's economic modernization reflected in part a determination to encourage peaceful domestic development in China, to draw China into gradually expanding links with Japan and the West, to reduce China's interest in returning to its more provocative foreign policies of the past, and to obstruct any Sino-Soviet realignment against Japan.
Many of Japan's concerns about the Soviet Union duplicated China's worries. They included the increased deployment in East Asia of Soviet SS-20 missiles, Tu-22M Backfire bombers, and ballistic missile submarines; the growth of the Soviet Pacific fleet; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the potential threat it posed to Persian Gulf oil supply routes; and an increased Soviet military presence in Vietnam.
In response, Japan and China adopted strikingly complementary foreign policies, designed to isolate the Soviet Union and its allies politically and to promote regional stability. In Southeast Asia, both countries provided strong diplomatic backing for the efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to bring about a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. Japan cut off all economic aid to Vietnam and provided substantial economic assistance to Thailand to help with resettling Indochinese refugees. The PRC was a key supporter of Thailand and of the Cambodian resistance groups. In Southwest Asia, both nations backed the condemnation of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, refused to recognize the Soviet-backed Kabul regime, and sought through diplomatic and economic means to bolster Pakistan. In Northeast Asia, Japan and China sought to moderate the behavior of their Korean partners — South Korea and North Korea, respectively — to reduce tensions. In 1983 both the PRC and Japan strongly criticized the Soviet proposal to redeploy some of their European-based SS-20 missiles to Asia.
Bilateral trade exploded in the 1970s and early 1980s, from US$1 billion in the early 1970s to more than US$8 billion in 1982. Japan became China's largest creditor, accounting for nearly half of the estimated US$30 billion in credit China lined up from 1979 to 1983.
Japan encountered a number of episodes of friction with the PRC during the rest of the 1980s. In late 1985, Chinese officials complained harshly about Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates Japan's war criminals. Economic issues centered on Chinese complaints that the influx of Japanese products into China had produced a serious trade deficit for China. Nakasone and other Japanese leaders were able to reduce these official concerns during visits to Beijing and in other talks with Chinese officials. Notably, they assured the Chinese of Japan's continued large-scale development and commercial assistance. At the popular level in China, it was not easy to allay concerns. Student- led demonstrations against Japan, on the one hand, helped reinforce Chinese officials' warnings to their Japanese counterparts. On the other hand, it was more difficult to change popular opinion in China than it was to change the opinions of the Chinese officials. Meanwhile, the removal of party chief Hu Yaobang in 1987 was detrimental to smooth Sino-Japanese relations because Hu had built personal relationships with Nakasone and other Japanese leaders.
The PRC government's harsh crackdown on prodemocracy demonstrations in the spring of 1989 caused Japanese policymakers to realize that the new situation in China was extremely delicate and required careful handling to avoid Japanese actions that would push China further away from reform. Beijing leaders reportedly judged at first that the industrialized countries would relatively quickly resume normal business with the PRC after a brief period of complaint over the Tiananmen Incident. When that did not happen, the PRC officials made strong suggestions to Japanese officials that they break from most industrialized nations by pursuing normal economic intercourse with the PRC, consistent with Tokyo's long-term interests in mainland China. Japanese leaders — like West European and United States leaders — were careful not to isolate China and continued trade and other relations generally consistent with the policies of other industrialized democracies. But they also followed the United States lead in limiting economic relations notably advantageous to the PRC. In particular, they held back for one year the disbursement of ¥810 billion in aid, which Japan had promised in 1988 to give the PRC in the 1990-95 period.
[edit] 1990s
The 1990s led to an enormous growth in China’s economic welfare. Trade between Japan and China was one of the many reasons China was able to grow in the double-digit amount during this time. Japan was in the forefront among leading industrialized nations in restoring closer economic and political relations with China. Resumption of Japan's multibillion dollar investments to China and increased visits to China by Japanese officials, culminating in the October 1992 visit of Emperor Akihito, gave a clear indication that Japan considered closer ties with China in its economic and strategic interest.
In 1995, China received an official apology regarding World War II by Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, “During a certain period in the not-too-distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology.”
Japan had been investing in China during the early 1990s, and trade decreased during the late 1990s, but resurged at the millennium. The resurgence might have been because of the prospect of China becoming a part of the World Trade Organization (WTO). “By 2001 China’s international trade was the sixth-largest in the world” [2] and over the next several years it will be just under Japan, at number 4.
[edit] Today
Today, Japan is beginning to invest in China less; a growing movement to cease ODA support is beginning to flourish with the Japanese community. There are three essential reasons why Japan is considering ceasing ODA support toward China:
“First, giving China economic assistance is tantamount to subsidizing the massive buildup of its military sector, which increasingly is becoming a threat to Japan’s security. Second, China gives assistance to many other developing countries, and there is no need to assist any country that can afford to assist others. Third, China does not appreciate Japan’s assistance.” [2]
The counter argument for this attack on supporting China, is that by aiding China, they are more likely to play by the rules of the international system. As well as atonement for the damage Japan has done in the pre-war era.
Tension erupted periodically, however, over trade and technology issues, Chinese concern over potential Japanese military resurgence, and controversy regarding Japan's relations with Taiwan. In early 2005, Japan and the United States had issued a joint declaration calling for a "peaceful solution" to the Taiwan issue, a declaration which angered the PRC, which protested the interference in its internal affairs.
[edit] Japanese history textbooks controversy
See main article: Japanese history textbooks controversy
China joined other Asian countries, such as South Korea, North Korea, and Singapore, in criticizing Japanese history textbooks that whiten Japanese war crimes in World War II, claiming that the distortion was evidence of the rise of militarism in Japan.[citation needed] There rises much anti-Japanese sentiment in China because of Japanese history textbooks. This has been exacerbated by burgeoning feelings of Chinese nationalism and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto shrine that honors war dead including 14 Class A war criminals. There also remains the dispute over the Senkaku Islands, which has resulted in clashes between Chinese protesters and the Japanese government. The latest disputes, in April 2005, have erupted to anti-Japanese protests and sporadic violence across China, from Beijing to Shanghai, later Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Shenyang. [1] Although Koizumi openly declared — in a statement made on April 22, 2005 in Jakarta — "deep remorse" over Japan's wartime crimes (the latest in a series of apologies spanning several decades), many Chinese observers regard the apology as insufficient and not backed up by sincere action, with more than 80 Parliament members and a Cabinet minister making a pilgrimage to the Yasukuni Shrine just hours earlier.[citation needed]
[edit] China's military expenditure
- Main article: China's military expenditure.
Japan is increasingly worried about China's motives behind its increase in military spending.
[edit] Reparation of War
During the Chinese modern history, one of many factors contributing to the Qing government fall into bankruptcy was payment of war reparations. Despite the weakness of the Qing dynasty, the Chinese constantly paid huge amounts of silver to western powers including Japan. It indicates how much the Qing government as the “loser” paid to reparation of wars to the “winner.” Japan had been one of the recipients of compensation after the wars, such as Sino-Japan Amity Treaty, Treaty of Shimonoseki, Treaty of 1901, and Liaodong Returned Treaty.
After the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95, according to the Chinese scholar, Jin Xide, the Qing government as the “loser” paid a total of 340,000,000 taels silver to Japan as the “winner” for both the reparations of war and war trophies, equivalent to (then) 510,000,000 Japanese yen, about 6.4 times the Japanese government revenue. Similarly, the Japanese scholar, Ryoko Iechika, calculated that the Qing government paid total $21,000,000 (about one third of revenue of the Qing government) in war reparations to Japan, or about 320,000,000 Japanese yen, equivalent to (then) two and half years of Japanese government revenue. Among the payments of the Qing government, 38.2 percent was used to expand the Naval Force, 21.6 percent allocated by Ad Hoc military forces expenses, 15.6 percent paid to expand of the Army Force, and 8.2 percent billed for the subsidy to the Naval battle ships, were spent by the Japanese government. However, Japan as the “loser” in the WWII did not pay a penny to China as the “winner.”
On 3 September 1995, Jiang Zemin, the core-leader of the 3rd generation of the CCP, states, “China suffered economy loses directly about $100,000,000,000 and about $500,000,000,000 indirectly by the Japanese military invasion" (Iechika 2003, p. 18). Given these facts, when Japan normalized relations with Taiwan, Jiang Jieshi (or Chiang Kai-shek) waived reparations for the Second World War. Similarly, when Japan normalized relations with mainland China in 1972, Mao Zedong waived Japan’s reparations for WWII (see Article 5 of Sino-Japanese Joint Statement in 1972). According a Japanese Sinologist calculation Japan would have to pay 52 trillion yen (note: Today's Japanese annual budget (2006 data) is about 80 trillion yen (about 40 trillion yen tax revenue + 40 trillion yen "red" national debts), with Japan’s GDP about 9.4 trillion yen in 1971. However, when the Qing dynasty lost the war in 1894-95 and Boxer Rebellion in 1900, According to Yabuki Susumu, China paid a total 289,540,000 taels (1 tael = 38 grams or 1 ⅓ ounces) of silver to Japan, despite the weak economy of the Qing dynasty. Even though Japan had great economic power in 1972 (GNP $300 billion), Japan did not pay any money to China for the war. To be sure, war reparations are a constant thorn aggravating Sino-Japanese relations today.
[edit] Bibliography
- ^ a b c d Barnouin, Barbara, Changgen, Yu (1998). Chinese Foreign Policy During the Cultural Revolution. New York: Columbia University Press, 113-116. ISBN 0-7103-0580-X.
- ^ a b c Kawashima, Yutaka (2003). Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Challenges and Options for the Twenty-First Century. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0-8157-4870-1.
- Hunt, Michael H. (1996). The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-10311-5.
- Stegewerns, Dick (Ed.) (2003). Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan. New York: RoutledgeCurzon. ISBN 0-203-98905-8.
- Jian, Sanqiang (1996). Foreign Policy Restructuring as Adaptive Behavior: China’s Independent Foreign Policy 1982-1989. Maryland: University Press of America.
Hunt, Michael H. (1996). The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy. New York: Columbia University Press.
Iechika, Ryoko. (2003). Nitchu Kankei no Kihon Kozo [The Fundamental Structure of Sino-Japanese Relations]. Tokyo: Koyo Shobo.
Kawashima, Yutaka. (2003). Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Challenges and Options for the Twenty-First Century. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Barnouin, Barbara and Yu Changgen. (1998). Chinese Foreign Policy During the Cultural Revolution. New York: Columbia University Press.
Stegewerns, Dick (Ed.). (2003). Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan. New York: RoutledgeCurzon.
Jian, Sanqiang. (1996). Foreign Policy Restructuring as Adaptive Behavior: China’s Independent Foreign Policy 1982-1989. Maryland: University Press of America.
Jin, Xide. (2004) 21 Seiki no Nitchu Kankei [21st Century of Sino-Japanese Relations]. Tokyo: Nihon Chohosha.
Yabuki, Susumu. (1988). Posuto Toshohei [After Deng Xiaoping]. Tokyo: Sososha.
[edit] See also
- Foreign Relations of China
- Foreign Relations of Japan
