Fleet in being

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In naval warfare, a fleet in being is a naval force that extends a controlling influence without ever leaving port. Were the fleet to leave port and face the enemy, it might lose in battle and no longer influence the enemy's actions, but by simply remaining safely in port the enemy is forced to continually deploy forces to guard against it. A fleet in being can be part of a sea denial doctrine but not one of sea control.

The term was first used in 1690, when Lord Torrington, commander of the Royal Navy forces in the English Channel, found himself facing a stronger French fleet. He proposed avoiding a sea battle, except under very favourable conditions, until he could be reinforced. By thus keeping his 'fleet in being', he could maintain an active threat which would force the enemy to remain in the area and prevent them from taking the initiative elsewhere.

A more modern example is the stand-off between the German High Seas Fleet and the British Grand Fleet during World War I. Other than the inconclusive engagement at the Battle of Jutland, both Britain and Germany preferred to keep their fleets intact rather than taking the risk of losing an engagement.

In World War II, actions of the Italian Regia Marina in 1940 also demonstrate the idea of a 'fleet in being'. After a number of minor battles against the Royal Navy that were generally lost or drawn, the fleet was left in Taranto, where it could sortie very quickly against any British attempt to reach Malta. The effort was so successful that the British instead decided to attack their fleet at anchor during the famed Battle of Taranto. This attack, however, was very successful. Realising that the Taranto harbour was no longer safe, the Italians relocated the undamaged ships to ports further away. Since fleet-in-being is not very effective at a distance, from that point on the Italians were forced into combat, and hence suffered repeated attrition over the next two years.

Even more so than other surface vessels in the Kriegsmarine, the German battleship Tirpitz served her entire career as a 'fleet in being'. Although she never fired a shot at an enemy ship, her mere presence forced the Royal Navy to allocate powerful warships in defending Arctic convoys.

The entire concept is based on the assumption that the fleet is relatively safe in port, even a port near the enemy. After Taranto and Pearl Harbor, however, it was obvious that a fleet is at least as vulnerable in such a port as it is at sea. Therefore it could be argued that the concept of fleet-in-being is now obsolete. If a port is sufficiently far away from the enemy to make the fleet there safe, the fleet is too far from the enemy to be much of a threat to him.

The term "fleet-in-being" is limited to naval warfare. However, it is not necessarily so for the basic logic behind the concept of fleet-in-being. A fortress under siege is essentially an army-in-being, which ties up enemy forces without leaving the fortress or doing much fighting. During the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein used his air force with an operational doctrine analogous to fleet-in-being ^[1]; its mere presence forced the coalition to act cautiously, and escort all its bomber sorties. When the Iraqi aircraft shelters proved vulnerable to allied precision bombing, Hussein ordered most of his air force to Iran.

Rudyard Kipling wrote a series of articles about the British Channel Fleet, collectively entitled A Fleet in Being and published in 1898; however, he used the term in more of a literary than a technical sense.

[edit] References

^ Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademien avd III (Swedish Royal War Academy) May 23, 2000 by Colonel Bertil Wennerholm and Colonel Stig Schyldt, page 13, which in turn refers to Keaney and Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis 1995, page 48.