Talk:Fashionable Nonsense

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More to come later. It must be pointed out that Sokal and Bricmont's findings of "incorrect" usage of scientific concepts is not contested and is perfectly NPOV. What their opponents denounce is the importance of those "incorrections" and S&B's alleged motivations. David.Monniaux 21:23, 3 Apr 2004 (UTC)

  • Huh? The discussion below proves otherwise. 21:39, 23 Apr 2005 (UTC)
  • David, I must disagree. I'm most familiar with their discussion of Lacan, but within that section I've found numerous problems with their arguments. There's a pretty lively debate about the content of the book and it's dishonest to claim otherwise. I deleted the claim that "Neither the quotes, neither the incorrect usage of scientific concepts that they showed, were contested." Deleuze 14:10, 15 May 2005 (UTC)
  • agreed with deleuze/utc. in fact, Badiou specifically contests that claim with respect to his own work in the preface to the english translation of Being and Event Jimmyq2305 08:44, 14 August 2006 (UTC).

Contents

[edit] Honesty--Bias

"They ultimately dropped a planned critique of Jacques Derrida from the book because they found that Derrida rarely ever talks about science, and does not generally use scientific imagery in his work. This, of course, points to their honesty rather than dishonesty."

The second sentence here needs to go. The first sentence does not directly point to "their honesty." Claiming that it does reveals a strong bias.

[edit] References to Fashionable Nonsense in other articles

I deleted the mentions of Fashionable Nonsense in the articles of some of the individuals that Sokal attacks, as a heads up. Without substantive treatment of opposing views, it didn't seem NPOV to only mention Sokal - particularly when, within the intellectual context that Kristeva, Lacan, et al were working, Sokal really has very little respect. Snowspinner April 18, 2004

Why did you also delete the Bouveresse link? Also, I don't think that "particularly when, within the intellectual context that Kristeva, Lacan, et al were working, Sokal really has very little respect" is a valid argument. In the intellectual context that Sokal and many others are working, Kristeva, Lacan and al. often enjoy fairly little respect. Also, the Fashionable Nonsense book got much media attention, contrary to most academic controversies. David.Monniaux 10:34, 19 Apr 2004 (UTC)
Because in the articles on specific thinkers, I think that referencing totally separate fields of study is silly. I mean, we do not mention people who disbelieve cause and effect in every single article on a scientific concept. Major attacks on specific thinkers that come within the field of study is one thing, but I think that the context just isn't there otherwise. As for Boveresse, the controversy surrounding Sokal is sufficently large that I thought one mention of a specific supporting or opposing view was so inadequate as to be POV - especially when that author lacks an entry as well. If someone wants to do a proper bibliography of responses to Sokal, that's one thing, but as it stood, I felt that the article looked better without the information than with. Snowspinner 17:31, 19 Apr 2004 (UTC)
"I mean, we do not mention people who disbelieve cause and effect in every single article on a scientific concept." Well, if there had been a major controversy on a scientific concept (major being measured as "susciting many columns in the general press), then I'd think it'd be worth mentioning. For instance, we mention the controversies arising from Darwin's assertions on evolution, even though most people involved in the debates have no qualifications in biology. Furthermore, I think that the issue here is not whether Derrida, Lacan et al. respect the canons of postmodernist philosophy, but whether postmodernist philosophy deserves to be considered an academic subject worthy of an official position in universities - that surely involves an external judgment, doesn't it? David.Monniaux 18:05, 19 Apr 2004 (UTC)
I think that, in that case, the discussion is better suited to a general article on postmodernism than on specific pages for concepts and figures within postmodernism. If you wanted to add a paragraph or two about Sokal to Postmodernism that would be a different matter - I would consider that a worthwhile endeavor, and if there's not one already there, I may go add it if there's nothing else interesting to Wiki atm. But individual and specific pages within a field of study can safely assume that the field is accepted. Debate on the validity of field ought to occur on the highest possible level of subdivision. For reference, although Evolution acknowledges Creationism, Punctuated equilibrium does not. Similarly, Lacan ought not mention a challenge to post-modernism at large, which is what Sokal's work is.Snowspinner 18:54, 19 Apr 2004 (UTC)

[edit] Usage of the word "intellectual"

I'm a bit unsure about the part on "leading intellectuals". First, there's this fairly annoying way of talking of some circles in the humanities and journalism where "intellectual" is a synonym for some kind of humanities professor that makes philosophical statements. When you look in a dictionary, an "intellectual" is a person who uses his/her mind creatively; an engineer or a scientist are intellectuals too. Second, I'm not really sure whether the cited people are so "leading". I'd settle for "leading academics". What do you think about it?

Leading academics works for me. Snowspinner 18:48, 19 Apr 2004 (UTC)~
The word 'intellectuals', unquoted, does exhibit a ridiculous point of view, which equates "intellectuals" with media-savvy academics working in the humanities. Usage of 'intellectuals' to denote this meaning is journalistic speech contributing to an aggrandized vision of the importance of the work of those academics with respect to Thought, in general. David.Monniaux 19:20, 19 Apr 2004 (UTC)
Quoting it, on the other hand, makes the active claim that they are so-called intellectuals. Academics is a suitably neutral term, and I can accept its use, but, honestly, I object strongly to the anti-humanities bias being displayed here. Creationism and astrology seem to get more respect here than the humanities, despite the fact that departments of English and Philosophy are generally among the largest departments at a given university. Snowspinner 19:24, 19 Apr 2004 (UTC)
I'm not sure about the last statement you make (even by replacing "English" by "literature", which is less culture-dependent). :-) Besides, I don't think that the argument that something should deserve respect because many people adhere to it is valid. In many countries, astrology is considered valid by a sizeable part of the population (far bigger than the part holding a degree in the humanities, by the way), yet that does not make it a respectable discipline. The fastest growing discipline in French universities is sports techniques, should it mean that sports techniques are a fundamental field that is above criticism?David.Monniaux 19:43, 19 Apr 2004 (UTC)
While potentially valid, those concerns are all very POV. Wiki's job is to present the disciplines' best points and claims alongside with the best claims of their critics, and some accounting of how the arguments of the two sides are responded to. That necessarily means that terms like "scholar", "intellectual", "academic", and others are going to be used broadly, and that not everyone classified as one is going to be agreeable to everybody. These things happen. Snowspinner 19:57, 19 Apr 2004 (UTC)
There is a difference between saying something is above criticism and saying that we shouldn't make snide use of quotation marks. -Seth Mahoney 19:49, 19 Apr 2004 (UTC)
The abuse of the word 'intellectual' is also very contemptuous, with the underlying assumption that there's nothing intellectual out of the narrow field of academic philosophy and associated areas.David.Monniaux 20:11, 19 Apr 2004 (UTC)
I suppose it doesn't help to note that a number of postmodernist scholars appear on Richard Posner's list of public intellectuals?Snowspinner 20:32, 19 Apr 2004 (UTC)
"Public intellectual" would probably be better, since it emphasizes the importance of the mediatic treatment of the person with respect to his or her status. Note that some have noted that Posner's definition of "intellectual" excludes many people whose work can definitely be called intellectual.David.Monniaux 20:47, 19 Apr 2004 (UTC)
I think since we all agreed on academic, this debate is itself, shall we say, academic. =) Snowspinner 20:53, 19 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I removed a good deal of crud from the article. Good lord, that was not NPOV! There probably should be a section an the political elements of the book, but it should sound less like some right-wingnut saying "Even the leftist Sokal says that postmodernism is crap."

Second it's "the strong programme of science studies". There is no

No, it's the strong program of Postmodernism, according to S&B. David.Monniaux 19:27, 2 May 2004 (UTC)

"strong programme in postmodernist philosophy". There isn't even a postmodernist programme. Science Studies does not form a part of postmodernism. Frankly, most of the time they don't even like each other. S&B are guilty of more than a bit of bait and switch in the book because they attack what they call postmodernist thinkers for misusing science, and then attack science studies people as if they were one and the same. It is fundamentally important to make this distinction, one which S&B do make, although not nearly strongly enough.

In fact, S&B never attack the "science studies" per se in their book. David.Monniaux 19:27, 2 May 2004 (UTC)
Then what is that whole chapter on Latour? I can't find a single reference to a "strong programme in postmodernist philosophy" on the net, while I am quite familiar with "the strong program in the sociology of science", which dates back to David Bloor at Edinburgh and is closely linked to people like Latour who have very little to do with postmoderninsm or critical theory. Furthermore, a check of reviews of Fashionable Nonsense finds plenty of references to the strong programme in the sociology of science or in science studies. I changed the subhead to "The Postmodernist conception of Science" because I think it is important to distinguish S&B's critique of postmodern science abuse from their complaints about the striong programme. Diderot 20:18, 2 May 2004 (UTC)

Derrida is not even discussed in Fashionable Nonsense because he never writes about science. Sokal quoted Derrida grotesquely out of context in the Sokal Hoax article.

If I'm not mistaken, Derrida IS cited in Fashionable Nonsense. David.Monniaux 19:27, 2 May 2004 (UTC)
As follows: "Bien que la citation de Derrida reprise dans la parodie de Sokal soit assez amusante, elle semble être isolée dans son oeuvre; nous n'avons donc pas inclus de chapitre sur Derrida dans ce livre."
It was in an interview where Derrida wasn't talking about science, and where the interviewer prompted him to make a judgement about scientific concept which he was clearly unfamiliar with. See [1] Diderot 20:18, 2 May 2004 (UTC)

At any rate, I removed the material that struck me as too POV. I've probably made the article sound too POV against S&B now, so someone ought to add a bit more to it or edit it. But if you're going to talk about the strong programme, you have to know what it is.

Diderot 13:23, 2 May 2004 (UTC)

I should dig out the book to re-read the parts on Bruno Latour. David.Monniaux 19:27, 2 May 2004 (UTC)

I'm sure there are better uses of one's time than reading anything about Bruno Latour. Snowspinner 21:46, 2 May 2004 (UTC)
Well, I should say I used to read columns from Bruno Latour in some magazines (I think it's La Recherche) and I wasn't impressed. However, this is a problem of factual accuracy. :-) David.Monniaux 08:20, 5 May 2004 (UTC)

I removed the part about Sokal and Bricmont ceasing to discuss such matters, as if it were a sign that they were wrong. Both of them are paid to do physics, not philosophy. It is my experience with scientific colleagues who got into the news that writing books and answering journalists is a full-time occupation, which wears out people not accustomed to it. David.Monniaux 19:27, 2 May 2004 (UTC)

Other than the small change I made to one header, I'm okay with the article now. Diderot 20:18, 2 May 2004 (UTC)

[edit] Pricks

To whoever left the HTML comment "<!-- you know, this argument makes S&B sound like elitist pricks -->" in the source after the item:

  • the authors [whom Sokal and Brickmont quote] cannot claim to be using those concepts as valid metaphor or imagery, since these are advanced scientific concepts that few in their readership are likely to understand. Imagery is normally used for explanations by illustrating some unfamiliar notion by a more familiar one, not the reverse.

I wonder if you've actually read the book. Many of the ideas they're referring to are, in fact, advanced scientific concepts allusions to which someone without an advanced degree in the subject would probably not understand. So their argument makes perfect sense. It's kinda like how a heuristic path-integral approach indicates a duality between background-free string theories and generally covariant gauge theories, with the loop transform relating the two. (No, I don't know what that means, but I found it on the web. :) - dcljr 03:17, 16 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Imagine if someone from religious studies bitched about Maxwell's demon, claiming that physicists who use this construct to make a point about thermodynamics are clearly blitheringly ignorant of Christian religious symbolism, and that their use of elements of a subject as complicated as European demonology showed a contempt for religous studies and a false erudition about its contents. You might claim that they were being idiots about science, since Maxwell's demon is a construct intended to make a point and is not intended to have any religous content. You might also suggest they were pricks if they thought that demonology was beyond the abilities of anyone without an advanced degree in religious studies. You might suggest that their complaints about references to Maxwell's demon in scientific literature, which do not place it in a framework of standard theological thinking about demons are just a crock of extrement. Then, imagine that they turned around and said they weren't interested in defending religous studies from scientists, they were trying to defend the Left from scientific ignorance of religion. You might well consider such sentiments laughable, and I would hardly blame you for doing so.

That would be roughly my feelings towards S&B.

It makes S&B sound like pricks to bitch about writers in the social sciences, claiming that a non-scientist audience surely can not understand the difficult scientific notions they are using. Even when true - and it is almost universally false in science studies - it is still an awfully elitist thing to say and hardly something likely to elicit sympathy for them.

On the other hand I believe Richard Dawkins said "there are no relativists at 30,000 feet" - a statement as demonstrative of pure ignorance of philosophy as any S&B have cited. And yet, people in the humanities seem unfazed by the use and abuse of notions from the humanities by many, many scientists who engage philosophy. Dawkins, of course, tends to shoot his mouth off a lot, as do a few big names in critical and social theory. And yet, I don't think anyone would be impressed if I suggested that scientists are generally too ignorant of the philosophy of knowledge for its concepts to be meaningful to them. I suspect scientists would be quite dismissive of me if I were to say that the principles and problems of critical theory are too difficult for them to understand without an advanced degree in the humanities. But this is exactly how S&B are treating academics outside of the hard sciences.

And yes, I have read the book, in both English and French, and I have a degree in Physics and another in Computer Science, and three years of grad school in the humanities. I am, in fact, in the target audience of some of those authors, and I do think I generally understand references to the hard sciences, and when I don't I generally have the brains to figure out where to look them up.

Don't make such assinine assumptions about people in the humanities. It's bad enough that Sokal and Bricmont do.

Diderot 13:02, 16 Aug 2004 (UTC)

I disagree. You don't have to understand demonology to understand Maxwell's demon - you just have to know that the "demon" is some kind of powerful creature that manipulates a trapdoor. In comparison, to understand a comparison with notions of mathematical topology like compacity, you have to have some familiarity with these notions.
It would have been ok if the cited people had used "compact" (or other concepts) as some kind of everyday word (much as you can use "demon" without knowing the details of European demonology). It's not ok if they claim to make a valid comparison to topology. Words like "compact", "open", "closed" designate concepts that have a faint resemblance to the familiar meanings of these words.
Another over-used concept is Gödel's theorem. It's perfectly acceptable to talk informally of certain systems of thoughts and say that their bases must be external, much as coherency cannot be proved in formal systems containing Peano's arithmetic according to Gödel's theorem. However, it is fundamentally wrong to discuss some informal concept and declare, by an argument of authority, that Gödel's theorem proves this concept "incomplete". David.Monniaux 09:16, 17 Aug 2004 (UTC)
You mean people without degrees in physics or math shouldn't use the word "chaos"? Like the way Sokal trash Deleuze and Guattari for using the words "the limits of chaos" claiming that they are holding forth on Chaos Theory when they are not talking about chaos theory at all. [2] The word "chaos" long predates chaos theory. I don't think physicists can claim ownership.
Or Luce Irigaray, talking about borders in the context of some very fuzzy sorts of social phenomona - quoted in Fashionable Nonsense - and briefly dismissing set theory as probably not very useful to her pursuits because it has little to say about sets with indistinct bounds. This rhetorical device - of little more significance than suspecting that demonology has little to do with thermodynamics - is true as far as it goes. I doubt differential topology has much to offer a discussion of the culturally fixed borders of behaviour, which are fluid, indistinct and for all that not terribly hard to formalise. Yet to hear S&B talk about it, she is making grand statements about topography. Perhaps you think there is a sociological significance to set theory?
Nor do I see the great sin in Lacan using the Moebius strip as a metaphor for what he is trying to say about psychology - even if I find Lacan's reinvention of Freud pretty silly on its own merits. It's not as if Moebius strips are terribly hard to make or understand. The notion that "cut" could appear in the same sentence as "Moebius strip" without meaning the same thing that it does in geometry never seems to occur to S&B. We might be able to judge for ourselves with some context. But I'll bet you you've never read a Lacan book.
And those are just the examples I scammed from Gabriel Stolzenberg. None of the concepts evoked are specialised to the sciences or math. Nor do they involve especially advanced concepts, nor contain claims about math or science. They don't even include the profoundly stupid things S&B had to say about science studies.
Sokal carefully mislead the editors of a scholarly journal, people who assumed that he would at least know physics, people who asked him to remove some of the more obtuse content of his hoax article - which he refused to do. [3] It should hardly seem surprising when an article in a journal of critical theory does not get sent off to a physicist to peer review. It got published much later in a special edition on science studies, where the opinions of a scientist might be expected to be of interest to readers regardless of the physics in them. Then, Sokal goes and publishes his gotcha in another journal. He blames the victims of his hoax for trusting him. I'm sure none of them will trust a scientist again. And people are supposed to trust anything Sokal says after this?
Then, he and Bricmont write a book on it, claiming to show that the humanities are full of empty suits. To do this they grossly and intentionally misread quotes taken woefully out of context. They declaim any real background in philosophy, and then hold forth on why everyone who deviates from strict scientific realism are just a bunch of fakers and charletans, never actually asking why people might have problems with that philosophy. They never engage the questions that the bodies of theory they deride tried to answer. They then peddle this heap of crap to a bunch of arrogant science geeks - which at the time was a category I fell under - who have never read anything written by Derrida, or Guattari, or Irigaray, and who never will.
And I am supposed to stand aside and take it up the ass when someone claims that humanities people aren't smart enough to use the word "chaos", or that scientific concepts are incomprehensible without an advanced degree? For Christ's sake, Goedel's theorem is not that hard. Computer science students - who are not the most mathematically sophisticated kids out there - learn it as a side effect of trying to understand the halting problem. I explained it to my mother once, and she's an elementary school teacher.
If I sound angry, it's for a reason. When I first read S&B I agreed with them. I'm pissed off at them for passing such crap off on ignorant science students who are all too willing to agree with their conclusions - which reinforce their own sense of superiority - and will never bother to listen to someone else's point of view of them. And I'm doubly pissed off that I was one of them.
Diderot 19:56, 17 Aug 2004 (UTC)

In response to the very touchy Diderot (note: I'm not responding to the comment immediately above this one, as I have not read it yet): "You might claim..." Actually, I would not make any of the claims you mention, except perhaps that the sentiments of those hypothetical religious studies people would be "laughable". It is true that many of the concepts S&B cite as being "abused" can be explained to a non-scientist/mathematicians, and S&B cite several failed attempts to do exactly that — attempts that leave doubt as to whether these astute authors themselves understand the concepts they're alluding to. And it is true that (potentially) valid comparisons between the concepts can be made if the audience is familiar with both the mathematical/scientific meaning of the terms being used and the non-math/sci ideas being discussed. IMO this is not what most of these authors (that S&B cite) are doing. They're either just just "name dropping", or they're trying to talk about novel concepts in terms of technical terminology from a completely unrelated field. Forget Maxwell's Demon, it's more like trying to "introduce a romance into the proof of the Pythagorean theorem", or however Woody Allen put it. How this makes any sense to anyone is beyond me. (Lacan, in particular, seems to be talking complete nonsense.) As for "scientists who engage philosophy", I think there's a lot of "reaching" going on there, too. But I wouldn't call any social scientists who (would) take them to task for it "idiots" or "pricks". Finally, regarding your resume, I'm somewhat surprised that with all that sheepskin, you (apparently) don't see the ridiculousness of a lot of the examples they cite. Obviously I agree with S&B's main point; if you don't, then fine. But calling people pricks isn't going to enlighten anyone. - dcljr 20:19, 17 Aug 2004 (UTC)

After reading Diderot's latest remarks: I have nothing more to add. - dcljr 20:24, 17 Aug 2004 (UTC)

I agree that Gödel's theorem is not that hard.

I disagree. As you say below, it takes some work and hard thought before even understanding precisely what the statement of it is (1st or 2nd). Revolver 23:41, 11 Oct 2004 (UTC)

However, it definitely takes some work for a person who has no ideal of formal logic to understand what Gödel's theorem means. Similarly, compacity is not a very difficult mathematical concept - if I remember well, it can be done in the first year of college math studies. But it requires some basic definitions and work on topology.

I don't know what it is studied in "first-year college math" where you are...here in the U.S., it's usually calculus or linear algebra. Even so, compactness requires a knowledge of a number of various definitions before the definition can be precisely understood: a topological space is compact if every open cover has a finite subcover. Understanding this definition requires understanding the following terms:
Each of these, in turn, requires knowing a similar list of definitions, including e.g. topology, open set. I can certainly give a "rough definition" to someone not familiar with geometry, say, "A compact set is one that is 'small' is a certain sense, or well-behaved with respect to processes that occur in/on it." But that's quite vague. The precise definition requires knowing these definitions. And this is what bothers science/math people about what they call "abuse" of science/math (and which was not expressed or shed light on much by Sokal, I don't think) — it is not the use of the ordinary English or natural language definitions of these terms in philosophy that angers science/math people, nor is it the use of the rough, vague definitions and explanations meant to shed light on real science/math concepts (hell, math/science people do this all the time amongst themselves!!). Rather, it is the use of these terms with the implication that their precise mathematical or scientific meaning is intended, when the author clearly has no understanding of that precise definition. Maybe some of this comes from the difference between the two general areas — in humanities and philsophy, it's never quite possible to precisely define something. In math esp., it is fundamental. What I disagree with Sokal on is criticism of things like using the Mobius strip as an analogy for whatever...obviously, it's visualisable by anyone, and so why shouldn't they talk about it? I didn't read that the particular usage of it was intending to make use of the mathematical definition or mathematical properties. Similarly for other things. Also, science/math people are not immune from misusing philsophical terms they don't understand. Revolver 23:41, 11 Oct 2004 (UTC)

That's really not the point. The point is that those concepts have a technical meaning of which most people out there, including the vast majority of people in the humanities, don't have the faintest idea. I fail to see how they can be used as enlightening metaphors.

The authors cited by Sokal and Bricmont are by far not the only authors guilty of using abstruse concepts when they're not really warranted. My opinion is that there's a certain academic industry in mathematics and theoretical computer science where simple ideas are described in the most abstract and confusing way so as to make hollow ideas sound deep; a favorite of this tendency is the (ab)use of category theory. One difference is that people who indulge in this bad tendency tend to understand the definitions of the terms they use.

I also beg to disagree with your attack on "ignorant science students who are all too willing to agree with their conclusions". Should I put myself in that category? It's all too easy to dismiss entire groups of people as "immature". David.Monniaux 21:59, 17 Aug 2004 (UTC)


Dcljr - I did not say in the comment that S&B were elitist pricks. I said that that line makes it sound like they are. My point in leaving that comment was in hopes that someone who is more sympathetic to S&B might reword it to make them sound less like S&B are holding themselves up as judges of what sorts of concept are and aren't within the grasp of people outside the hard sciences. In that, I have clearly failed.

For example, one might say that S&B believe that discussions of the contents of scientific theories ought to begin with a clear understanding of how scientists understand those concepts. That would lend the reader to believe less that S&B have an elitist conception of the knowlege of non-scientists and might lend someone to think their intentions were good, even if they think their project is foundationally unsound. As it stands, they sound pretty elitist, more so than I think they would like.

As for seeing the foolishness in S&B's examples, I have ask if you have read any of those authors in a context outside of Fashionable Nonsense?

(For the record: No. - dcljr)

David, my big complaint about S&B's interpretations are that in every case I have investigated, I can easily construct far better interpretations of those remarks by the simple expedient of placing them in context, and then making the plausible assumption that the authors - rather than holding forth on the contents of scientific theories - are actually talking about the subjects they claim to be talking about.

The world is a big place, and I would not claim that no one, ever, in any of the humanities, has ever said anything stupid about the sciences. But S&B's conclusion is that these are affectations designed to impart a patina of knowledgability. This strikes me as a false conclusion. The reuse of terms - giving them meanings within a different body of theory - is a widely deployed method in parts of critical theory. This strategy has serious drawbacks, but it is not the same as saying foolish things about the hard sciences.

If I can not trust S&B on science studies, and I can not trust them on Derrida, Irigaray, Lacan or Deleuze, can I really trust them on any of their other examples?

As for dismissing science students as ignorant, they are on the whole ignorant of exactly the elements of critical theory S&B are addressing, as are S&B. There are, in all likelihood some exceptions. But they are few. My brother's engineering department used to sell a T-shirt labeled "After graduation." On it were two images, one labelled "Engineering Department", which showed a man looking over a blueprint. The other, labelled "English Department", showed a man working the counter at a fast fodd restauarant, asking "Do you want fries with that?" This perspective is pretty common in the hard sciences. You may not share those values, but I doubt very strongly that you haven't been exposed to them, or that you are so resistant to intellectual flattery. Very few people are - I'm not - and I am sceptical of others who claim they are.

As for finding obfuscation outside of the humanities, the field I work in now - linguistics and cognitive science - is notorious for just such nonsense. I'll take Derrida over Chomsky any day. As you point out, obfuscation as an industry exists in quite a few places, including parts of physics. But it is not quite so easy to tell obfuscation from talking about things that are slippery and difficult.

I work in applications of information theory to translation theory. The first is a very specific domain in mathematics, the second the most anti-scientific of the humanities, a field that rejects mainstream linguistics, and has even less to with math. If I were to resist using notions form math and sciences in fields where they are not well understood - if I did not take the chance that conflating one thing with another might produce interesting results - I would not be able to do my work.

[edit] Is this also missing the point?

After reading the Sokal Affair and now this article, I still can't find a clear statement of "the problem". That is, as I see it, the key reason that Sokal (or any of the other people involved, and there are a few) even bother to comment. For the basis of discussion I will start with this:

To the outside observer, postmodernist writing, and deconstructionalist crit-lit in particular, appears to be an algorithm-based essay writing contest. Authors are given marks for picking a famous "text" to work from, dropping names, making remarks about hidden sexism/racism/agism etc., and using key words. The value of this effort appears, to the observers, to be very close to zero.
Due to the nature of postmodernism and its rejection of absolutes and truth, the sciences are often a target of these writings. Using the same algorithm on scientific topics often leads the authors to make rediculous sounding statments, that appear to demonstrate they really have no idea what they are talking about.

Now maybe you agree or disagree with this statment, but I'm pretty sure this is what Sokal's real complaint it. There are two important issues involved: 1) the sciences write about crit-lit very infrequently, the opposite is not the case, and 2) the statements offered in evidence really do seem to match his complaint. I'm sorry, but I think most people would consider the claims of sexism in E=mcc to be laughably stupid.

But the article does not contain any comment on the setup, and I think that does it a disservice. Sokal is not interested in all of postmodernism, sociology or philosophy, he is interested in a particular and somewhat defined area, and I think that needs to be pointed out.

Does anyone agree? Should I take a stab at this?

Maury 13:30, 25 Nov 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 19:37, 25 Nov 2004 (UTC)) Having once read the book, and just now browsed the article, I don't quite see whats wrong with its current statement of "the problem", which seems clear enough. But if you really want to write about the book, shouldn't you read it, rather than just guessing?


[edit] clarity

"While the utility and validity of this perspective may well be debatable, neither is it so ignorant of science or so unsophisticated."

What does this mean? The language seems puffed up with cliché and does not flow - possibly the result of an incomplete edit?

[edit] Balance

I just wondered upon this article when I wanted to know what the book was about - As a wikipedian, I am disappointed that over 1/2 the article discusses crticism of the book rather than a more complete summary of the author's arguments. Since I know nothing other than this book being sited as a reference, I am not in a position to correct this but if anyone more knowledgeable is watching this page I would appreciate a more complete summary. Additionally, a more complete summary seems more NPOV than the current state of the article which implies that the book has been discredited since the criticism section is so long - thanks for those that have provided the external references, etc so I can continue my research. Trödel|talk 04:04, 6 Mar 2005 (UTC)

Same here. David.Monniaux 14:59, 7 Apr 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Alleged lack of honesty???

(William M. Connolley 15:05, 21 Apr 2005 (UTC)) To me, this para appears badly broken.

Sokal and Bricmont's own honesty has come under fire in recent years. They ultimately dropped a planned critique of Jacques Derrida from the book because they found that Derrida rarely ever talks about science, and does not generally use scientific imagery in his work.

Why is this supposed to have any bearing on their honesty, except to indicate that they are?

Some, however, have claimed that this points to their honesty rather than dishonesty, but this claim is compromised by the aggression to which Derrida is nonetheless subjected.

There is no evidence for this latter assertion.

The use of Derrida in Sokal's original hoax drew primarily on a recycling of quotes drawn unreasonably out of context (according to Gabriel Stolzenberg, Sokal professed himself to be inspired by one book in a series of previously misconceived critcisms of Derrida), and these were not withdrawn but used to argue for the general integrity of both the hoax and the co-authored book.

Where? Who by? All this stuff is just vague allusions.

One may on this basis assess the honesty and authority of Sokal and Bricmont's study not simply on what they concede to be the infrequency of Derrida's objectionable uses of science but whether the instance cited supports their arguments in the first instance. Sokal and Bricmont's vague allusion to Derridas alleged nonsensical use of the "Einsteinian Constant" has been considered as being symptomatic for their unscholarly carelessness towards the context of particular quotes. In this case Derridas discussion on the place of "concepts" within linguistic structuralism, a field of study of which Sokal and Bricmont show no evidence having any knowledge. It is debated whether this was a one-time offense or undermines Sokal and Bricmont's critique in general for being flawed by the very inaccuracy they are critisising many authors in the humanities of having.

And that last para is just a rant.

Well, no. The Stolzenberg essay linked at the end of the article elaborates on the issues and should be directly sourced. The question raised is generally sustainable, although I haven't caught up with edits made earlier today which seem on first reading a little too emphatic in peddling a conclusion. (Disclosure: I wrote the first sentence, the rest was very recently added.) Derrida has a fairly strong case for saying that Sokal and Bricmont don't have a leg to stand on with him, and, further, that what they are standing on isn't particularly theirs in the first place, which makes the argument that Derrida wasn't an extensive abuser less than sustainable. 15:48, 21 Apr 2005 (UTC)
I must agree that this is vague illusions and needs to be clarified. It is currenlty not understandable enough. Trödel|talk 21:13, 21 Apr 2005 (UTC)
The entire section on "alleged lack of honesty" is utterly incomprehensible. I cannot figure out what the allegations are. I'd rather see the whole damn section deleted than read such confusing prose.
I would try to clean it up myself, but I honestly don't know what the main points are. Could someone please revisit it with an eye to simplicity? Much thanks. Phiwum 19:37, 4 October 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Godwin's Law probably applies to Lenin as well

I removed the following link from the Links section:

This is blatantly unfair and ad hominem. Including it does not add anything of value to the article, regardless of what your opinions on the matter are.

  • I agree completely. And Lenin's "materialist"-bent philosophy of science was hardly unique to him. --Fastfission 14:38, 22 July 2005 (UTC)
  • Alan Sokal wrote to me "That is a very interesting and clever quiz!". In addition it is listed in Mozilla directory and Looksmart directory.--Mikhail Simkin

[edit] Derrida and honesty

I removed the section under the heading "Alleged lack of honesty". It circles about one specific accusation made by Stolzenberg, concerning a statement by Derrida that was taken out of its context. It is one of the many episodes of the Science Wars, but it has hardly any connection with Fashionable Nonsense (Derrida plays almost no role in this book) and has nothing to do with S&B's honesty or dishonesty. The statement was taken out of context by Gallo, and then by Gross and Levitt. Sokal was aware of the the full context. He deliberately put it into a completely fabricated context as part of his hoax. This is not an attack against Derrida. (Sokal also quoted Heisenberg and Bohr in the parody article. Has anyone ever accused him of attacking Heisenberg and Bohr?) Even if Derridas statement makes sense, Sokal still makes his point with the hoax, since he has proven that the editors of Social Text didn't have the faintest idea what Derrida meant (otherwise they would have easily spotted the hoax).

Steven Weinberg surely never accused Sokal of attacking Heisenberg. But he did seem to believe that Sokal's quoting what Weinberg called the "dreadful examples of Heisenberg's philosophical wanderings" constituted a well deserved attack on the great German physicist. (See Weinberg's "Sokal’s hoax" NYRB pp 11-15, August 8 1996.) Gabriel Stolzenberg 01:08, 9 December 2005 (UTC)

Here's the removed section:

Sokal and Bricmont's own honesty has come under fire in recent years. They ultimately dropped a planned critique of Jacques Derrida from the book because they found that Derrida rarely ever talks about science and does not generally use scientific imagery in his work. Some have claimed that this points to their honesty rather than dishonesty, but this claim is compromised by the aggression to which Derrida is nonetheless subjected. The use of Derrida in Sokal's original hoax drew primarily on a recycling of quotes drawn unreasonably out of context (according to Gabriel Stolzenberg, Sokal professed himself to be inspired by one book in a series of previously misconceived critcisms of Derrida; see [4], also cited below), and these were not withdrawn but used to argue for the general integrity of both the hoax and the co-authored book. One may on this basis assess the honesty and authority of Sokal and Bricmont's study not simply on what they concede to be the infrequency of Derrida's objectionable uses of science but whether the instance cited supports their arguments in the first instance.
In an interview on NPR, Sokal said that he was inspired by reading Higher Superstition. And to illustrate what he found so inspiring, he read aloud from the one paragraph of the book devoted to the Derrida quote (p.79), almost all of which is devoted to ridiculing it. Gabriel Stolzenberg 01:08, 9 December 2005 (UTC)

I also removed the following sentence, which followed immediately afther the section above, under the same chapter heading:

Furthermore, their attacks on Bruno Latour have proven considerably less defensible than they believed, in part because Latour, who is explicitly a researcher in science studies, might well expect his audience to be familiar with scientific concepts.

It is out of context here, and it has nothing to do with "alleged lack of honesty". S&B criticised some philosophers' use of scientific concepts as methaphors, even when their audience is unfamiliar with these concepts. (Which means that the metaphors are obscuring, not enlightening). But S&B never specifically accused Latour of doing this. Either general accusations should be treated in general, or, when one is defending Latour, one should refute the specific accusations made against Latour. --Zumbo 18:41, 20 July 2005 (UTC)

Seems OK to me. William M. Connolley 19:09:10, 2005-07-20 (UTC).
When you say that there is "hardly any connection with Fashionable Nonsense (Derrida plays almost no role in this book)", you are obliquely acknowledging the following claim in the introduction that refers back to the Social Text article: "Bien que la citation de Derrida reprise dans la parodie de Sokal soit assez amusante, elle semble être isolée dans son oeuvre; nous n'avons donc pas inclus de chapitre sur Derrida dans ce livre." (I have quoted this in French as Sokal and Bricmont offered it in response to a letter from Derrida to Le Monde.) They do not simply quote Derrida but offer a characterisation of his remark. This is definitely being offered as a criticism, despite your claims. Stolzenberg elsewhere quotes Plato to remark on Thomas Nagel laughing at Irigaray: "Socrates: What’s this, Polus? You’re laughing? Is this yet another kind of refutation which has you laughing at ideas rather than proving them wrong?"

Your remarks about the treatment of Heisenberg and Bohr as being equivalent by virtue of simple citation is accordingly misleading. Stolzenberg's account is that Sokal and Bricmont stand by the previous claim in Fashion Nonsense, and they repeated it again in their letter to Le Monde responding to letters from Derrida and Max Dora. The qualifier they introduce is that the abuse is not "systematic" and their treatment of it accordingly minimal. The appearance of the remarks in the book and their content is verifiable.

Stolzenberg claims that this remains a misrepresentation because the incident in question should not be taken as an abuse of scientific or mathematical terminology of any sort and that passing it off as even an isolated example of nonsense is dishonest; his claim is not that Derrida claims scientific expertise and seeks to demonstrate it in his impromptu exchange with Hyppolite but that the remark does not have obviously contradict a reasonable understanding of relativity physics if read in context ("the very concept of the game which, after all, I was trying to elaborate").
Stolzenberg also points out that they reference Plotnitsky's criticisms in Fashionable Nonsense" and that the reference is abusive, as is the logic they apply to rebut it. Sokal and Bricmont, as quoted by Stolzenberg:
For an amusing attempt, by a postmodernist author who does know some physics, to come up with something Derrida’s words could conceivably have meant that might make sense, see Plotnitsky (1997). The trouble is that Plotnitsky comes up with at least two alternative technical interpretations of Derrida’s phrase “the Einsteinian constant”, without providing any convincing evidence that Derrida intended (or even understood) either of them.
Stolzenberg's comment: This is bad reasoning. Such evidence is not needed to refute an alleged justification of such a charge. Think of the case of mathematics. To refute an alleged proof of a claim, it is sufficient but not necessary to refute the claim itself. As far as giving people a possible measure of Sokal and Bricmont's scholarly honesty, I should think this can be argued to be indicative. It is certainly verifiably part of the book. Although you say that Sokal was aware of the full context, there is agreement that failure to referency constancy and systematic play in their relevance to Derrida's essay and therefore the line of questioning indicates that the context in which the quote is offered by Sokal was misleading. If Sokal is aware of the full context, he does not say so but could be argued to be misleading us if he did not explicate the context in returning to Derrida's remark. In any case, to the extent that the quote is simply cited without adequate context, even that use would be dishonest. After all Stolzenberg's interest in the matter arose largely from his view that he could not judge the quote in the limited context of its citation by Sokal.
In the preceding sentence, "by Sokal" should be replaced by "in Higher Superstition." My interest in this matter began when a colleague who was a fan of Higher Superstition shoved the quote in front of my nose and said "Read it, it's important." I did, reluctantly, and immediately saw that he expected me to say that it was gibberish. Instead, I told him that I had no idea what it meant and added, "Derrida is a hard read." But he remained morally certain that the quote was gibberish. Gabriel Stolzenberg 01:08, 9 December 2005 (UTC)
Stolzenberg is outraged to hear Sokal on NPR reading the quote without providing a context or attempting to explicate it. He simply reads it and pauses in anticipating laughter from the interviewer.
Actually, I wasn't outraged. I was surprised. Several years earlier, I had investigated the treatment of the Derrida quote in Higher Superstition enough to conclude to my satisfaction that the authors could not back up what they had said and that, moreover, they probably didn't care. So, imagine my surprise at hearing, several years later, a physicist offering this very passage on the radio as his one example of the inspiration he derived from the book. Gabriel Stolzenberg 01:08, 9 December 2005 (UTC)
Roger Hart offered the following concession to Stolzenberg about such a lack of reasoned argument:
You are, of course, absolutely correct that assertions that Derrida's statement is "an error of scientific fact" or "nonsense" require an argument: the burden of proof must be on the person who makes any such assertion; it is inadequate simply to claim that one does not understand Derrida. You have convinced me that these assertions have been made by dismissing Derrida without offering any argument whatsoever, and shown that I too was guilty of dismissing Derrida's statement without evaluating whether or not it might be correct under a charitable interpretation.
Any defensible interpretation, charitable or not, requires a reasonable evaluation of context. There is no question that the claim in question appears in the book or, perhaps more importantly, that it came to play a role in critical discussion, so there is a basis for asserting relevance. The point is certainly not that Sokal is somehow vindicated because Andrew Ross did not demonstrate that he understood the Derrida quote as miscontextualised (which is quite different in any case from the proof you claim to discern). The matter of honesty does not come down to deciding whether a claim was important to larger arguments. If this were the case, one might begin by noting that Sokal and Bricmont chose to remark on a transcript of an impromptu exchange on the subject of a Derrida lecture with no apparent connection to science and was therefore not a reasonable target in the first place. They have, however, over objections stood by remarks that are of questionable validity, and in so doing attached their credibility and that of their book to it. Buffyg 00:28, 21 July 2005 (UTC)
S&B don't want to "prove" anything about Derrida. They don't claim to offer any new insights on his work and they don't refute any part of his philosophy. They just think this remark is amusing, and they can't make any sense of it. Finding a remark amusing is not something one has to justify or to prove, and it has nothing to do with honesty. Not understanding Derrida can hardly be considered a major offense, either. (It would be a valid point of criticism if they had made a serious attempt to refute Derrida.)
S&B have studied Physics and they can't understand Derrida's reference to the theory of relativity. Sokal commented it in a totally absurd way, submitted it to Social Text, and the editors didn't object. Plotnitsky tried to defend Derrida by simply guessing what he meant (which again shows that Derrida hadn't made himself very clear). Given all this evidence, S&B could safely assume that the remark didn't make sense. Even if they're wrong, this doesn't show that they're dishonest, it just shows that they don't understand Derrida.
When I wrote "Sokal was aware of the full context", I meant that he knew that Derridas remark was an oral response to a question by Jean Hyppolite. Hyppolite's question is quoted in Fashionable Nonsense, therefore, the context is not left out. If, by "full context", you mean "as much of Derrida's phliosophy as is necessary to understand this remark", then Sokal wasn't aware of it. But since he already came to the conclusion that Derrida hadn't much to say about science, and therefore he [Sokal] hadn't much to say about Derrida, it makes perfect sense that he stopped studying Derrida. This case is much different from all the other cases, where S&B gave a much larger context and analyzed the scientific meaning (or lack thereof). Therefore, the Derrida quote is a very bad starting point for trying to refute the book's thesis. --Zumbo 21:02, 23 July 2005 (UTC)
Sorry, Zumbo, but I don't think we've agreed to the terms of this discussion.
The issue here is not whether Sokal and Bricmont are trying to "refute" Derrida, whether anyone is attempting to refute their arguments, whether Plotnitsky's interpretation of Derrida incorrectly assumes Derrida's advanced understanding of relativity physics, whether you believe it permissible to lack understanding of one's object of criticism, or whether the editors of Social Text failed to catch misuse of Derrida's work. Sokal and Bricmont still use Derrida as an example. Perhaps this is not an example of Derrida's work in any larger sense, but they do claim it is part of a larger series of examples of what happens in treatment of science and mathematics outside of departments dedicated to those subjects. The point is whether this example, which they cite again in reply to Derrida, is such an example in the first place and to scrutinise the criteria they applied in making this determination. The argument here is not about the soundness of propositions advanced in the book, it is a question of their intellectual integrity in the way they have used source materials. Let's say that this is in part a verifiability problem: Stolzenberg decides to track down some examples cited and doesn't believe that readings in reasonable context allow the claims made by Sokal and Bricmont. This leads him to raise questions of integrity.
As far as verifiability and context go, it is dishonest to say that the reference is Derrida's. Hyppolite made the reference, and Derrida replied in those terms to indicate that the example of the relation between time and space in relativity physics does not support the notion of structure necessary to structuralism but the notion of play that he had elaborated in his lecture. Insofar as one needs to indicate an understanding of that essay and the use of terms like "play" and "structure" to establish context, I would agree with Stolzenberg that Sokal's efforts are wholly insufficient. Plotnitsky's clearly says that he does not impute to Derrida the understanding of relativity physics required for his analysis. The point necessary to refute Sokal and Bricmont's use of this quote is simply to demonstrate that one can find interpretations consistent with an understanding of relativity physics once one assumes such consistency, whereas Sokal and Bricmont assume inconsistency and accordingly find it. Plotnitsky's reading doesn't necessarily settle the matter of how to interpret Derrida by providing a single reading, but providing at least one would be sufficient to rule out Sokal and Bricmont's attempt and allows one to specify a source of error in that attempt. (Stolzenberg further points out that Sokal and Bricmont are derogatory toward Plotnitsky's reading without actually arguing why it is wrong.)
Sokal and Bricmont do not simply say that they find the quote amusing. They also say that it is nonsensical ("gibberish") and that it is apparent to them that Derrida does not know what he is talking about. Those are specific claims that require support. This returns to the Plato quote about laughter substituting for argument where argument is necessary; I am not aware of any field of scholarship where it is credited as defensible scholarship to make claims about examples without demonstrating competence in their sources or clearly confessing one's lack of competence. Is such not the essence of Sokal and Bricmont's work on science studies? (And I do write that with deliberate irony; it is this ironic sense I take as consistent with Derrida's designating them unserious and censorious and their inability or unwillingness to understand him as a thorough critic.) My point is that others have shown that, with greater patience and attention to context, the quote appears sensible and Derrida minimally competent (in that there is no obvious contradiction between Derrida's reply and relativity physics). This speaks again to a reliance on assumption that looks an awful lot like bad faith and bad scholarship. Previously Sokal read the quote on NPR to get laughs and establish his point without any argument. What's honest about that? Do serious critics of advanced scientific hypotheses go on the radio, read a difficult passage, and wait for laughter? How defensible is that as a critical protocol in any advanced field of scholarship?
The editors of Social Text have nothing to do with this. Andrew Ross and Bruce Robbins explained themselves by saying that they claimed no competence in some of the humanities work cited and that they did object in any case to Sokal's text on numerous point. (I am not attempting to use that as justification; I am simplying clarifying that they made lesser claims of authority in some of these materials than Sokal and Bricmont have since.) Their understanding of Derrida is accordingly immaterial or at least nothing like the point you want to award to Sokal.
You can try to object that their use of Derrida is not essential to their larger arguments. My point again is that Sokal and Bricmont do not apply that criteria in deciding whether they ought to comment on Derrida or anyone else. Accordingly I do not see how you can rule out further consideration of this example without introducing a double standard. You can reasonably say that much else of this is arguable; what you haven't established is that it is irrelevant. Absent that, I think the section ought to go back in. Buffyg 17:17, 24 July 2005 (UTC)
I still fail to see the connection of this discussion to S&B's honesty and integrity. They were quoting a sentence that has been around in the science wars for some time. In the entire discussion, Stolzenberg seems to be the first to indicate how to interpret Derrida without assuming that he was trying to say something about relativity that he didn't unterstand. Prior to this, all the evidence S&B had simply pointed in the other direction. This isn't a criminal charge against Derrida, and "innocent until proven guilty" doesn't apply here. From a scientific point of view, you just go with the hypothesis that has the highest probability, and that's what S&B did. They might have misunderstood Derrida, but I see no evidence that they have *deliberately* misunderstood him, and only in this case you could make claims about their honesty and integrity. You might claim that they didn't try hard enough to understand Derrida, but again, it was just a piece of anectotal evicence they offered, and not a crucial proof for their claims, so why should they have spent more time with this issue?
All the evidence? The only evidence Sokal offered that the quote was gibberish was that he couldn’t make sense of it and it made him laugh. Also, although it is true that “innocent until proven guilty” doesn’t apply here, neither does “guilty until proven innocent.” Finally, from a scientific or any other point of view, we often don't go with any hypothesis. If we see no compelling reason to choose one, we may prefer to wait and perhaps seek more information. (This, of course, runs counter to Yogi Berra’s famous dictum, “When you come to a fork in the road, take it.”) Gabriel Stolzenberg 01:08, 9 December 2005 (UTC)
If you want to reinsert the section, I'm not strictly against it, but then it has to be rewritten. For instance, S&B didn't "drop" the chapter on Derrida, they simply never wrote it, so the question whether this poins to their honesty or not is moot. And they didn't use this quote "to argue for the general integrity of both the hoax and the co-authored book". It's Stolzenberg who argues that the integrity of the book depends on S&B's interpretation of Derrida, and that's certainly a POV which needs to be indicated as such. For Stolzenberg, the Derrida quote seems to be the Achilles' heel of the book, and to me, this rather looks like he found no way to attack any of the central theses in the book and therefore decided to dwell upon a minor point. --Zumbo 22:08, 24 July 2005 (UTC)
Zumbo seems to think that I tried to write a critique of Fashionable Nonsense. I didn’t. I wrote a critique of Thomas Nagel’s review of Fashionable Nonsense (The New Republic, October 12 1998). It is true that I didn’t attack the central theses of the book. But I did attack the arguments and evidence on which these theses are based. As for the Derrida quote, less than two pages are devoted to what Nagel did and didn’t say about what Sokal and Bricmont did and didn’t say about it. By contrast, more than five pages concern statements about history and philosophy of science from a chapter that passed Nagel's inspection but which, on my readings, range from the banal to the bizarre. Etc. Gabriel Stolzenberg 01:08, 9 December 2005 (UTC)

I don't reckon you've spent much time reading Stolzenberg, or you wouldn't insist that, "only in this case you could make claims about their honesty and integrity". Please have a look at the links here. Stolzenberg provides arguments of the cases of Deleuze and Guattari, Latour, Irigaray, and Lacan. I further reckon you are hitting the snooze button and encouraging others to do the same when you say that Derrida isn't innocent until proven guilty. Logic and the demands of evidence are not so completely different between science and mathematics and all other disciplines. This is what Roger Hart concedes to Stolzenberg (see quote above): a positive assertion must be justified rather than made to appear possible, probable, or likely unless one aims at these levels of certainty and admits as much. What you're arguing when you say, "From a scientific point of view, you just go with the hypothesis that has the highest probability, and that's what S&B did," (let's leave aside whether what we're doing here should be considered strictly "from a scientific point of view") ought not contradict Ockham's Razor: the simplest explanation is preferable. Why? To make the fewest assumptions possible, which is not what Sokal and Bricmont have done in the face of what is beyond verification. Why assume what you can establish and verify, including context? As others have pointed out, the length of a quotation is not what allows one to argue that one has preserved context, particular where an argument is long-standing and developed across a number of sources that must be taken into account. Making more substantial representations without such protocols is not simply misunderstanding: it is bad scholarship and misrepresentation. When it became clear that Michael Bellesiles misrepresented evidence and occasionally could not demonstrate where he sourced elements of his research in Arming America, the need to consider his assertions was sharply reduced, and Bellesiles eventually resigned his tenured position. I don't say this to imply that Sokal and Bricmont are at that level, but I do say it to indicate that a demonstrable pattern of abusing sources is distinct from refutation of an argument and can even obviate the apparent need for such a level of argument. (Again: I don't yet mean to imply that we're at a point where that seems justified, but I do mean to established that a different critical avenue from what you've acknowledged is available on these terms.) When misrepresentation of examples (and doesn't much of what we're talking about come down to the status of examples?) is repeated in the face of contradictory evidence, it raises matters of honesty and integrity. The more I read Stolzenberg, the more inclined I am to believe that there may be a pattern of dishonesty. Buffyg 00:22, 26 July 2005 (UTC)

[edit] More nonsense removed

I also removed this section:

Sokal and Bricmont as well as their supporters reply that the view that the successes and the failures of a scientific theory should also be attributed to social causes is exactly the anti-scientific, irrational viewpoint that their book was attacking. One might reasonably expect that most scientists would agree with Sokal and Bricmont were the matter put to them in this manner. One may, however, reasonably ask whether a history of science would be possible on the terms to which one would then be reduced.

This is nonsense. In the book, S&B explicitly support the (trivial) idea that science is influenced by social factors. They only reject the idea that science is purely social and that nature has nothing to do with the outcome of scientific debates. --Zumbo 19:00, 20 July 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Michel Callon

I think the distinctions made in Michel Callons review "Whose Imposture? Physiscists at war with the third person" should be included in the article her. Besides a harsh general critizism of Sokal and Briemont's arguments, it also shows that they fail to distinguish between postmodernist theory using scientific concepts as metaphor etc and for instance Latour's social studies of science. Zumbo's statement above here shows that he too, after reading the book may be confused when it comes to this matter. Social studies of science in general and Latour in particular does NOT claim that "nature has nothing to do with the outcome of scientific debates", as S&B seems to believe. I would recommend that some competent reader should try to mention some of Callon's key points in the article here. (It could also be mentioned here that he implicitly argues that S&B actually seems to understand less of the theory of relativity than Latour.) But the most important is their lack of distinction between studies of science and postmodern philosphy in general.

[edit] what does this sentance mean?

"Properly speaking the work attacks post-structuralism and the application of critical theory to science, with the work of Jacques Lacan and others basing their work on Lacan being a particular focus."

i get the first part... but did Lacan base his work on his work? or did sokal etc particularly focus on lacan's work? i don't know. i'd change it but i haven't read the book

I think this sentence is innacurate. Of those mentioned in Fashionable nonsense, only Lacan himself, Kristeva Irigary and Badiou could be said to be "basing their work on Lacan". Lacan and the strong program, lacan and postmodernism, postmodernism and critical theory, critical theory and the strong programme and postmodernism and the strong programme are all pairs of things that have very little to do with each other, except for having taken place in roughly the same timeframe. Jimmyq2305 18:08, 17 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Criticism section - yuk

The "Criticism" section of this article is very poorly written and basically useless. Much of it shows the deleterious effect of repeated insertion and deletion of opinionated sentences in random order. Almost none of the actual critics are named. They should be identified and quoted, with Sokal and Bricmont's reply also quoted. NO allegations should appear as our own opinions; we have to report the opinions of the involved parties, not argue the case ourselves. Unprovable claims like "Most scholars of science studies" should be avoided (unless a reference to where the survey establishing this as a fact is added). McKay 13:20, 11 June 2006 (UTC)

Shouldn't "inaccuracy of charges" be added to the criticism section? The way it is now, it seems like no one has even attempted to refute the charges of misuse of scientific terminology that S + B make. The way fink's response is presented (and the way it probably is, im unfamiliar with Lacan to the Letter), it seems that he is saying that their criticisms are irrelevant. In several cases, there have been specific responses to the charges of misuse that S+B allege (Stolzenberg responded to charges made against Latour, Lacan and Derrida, and Latour responded to charges made against himself, as did Badiou) and this should, IMHO be added to criticisms. Jimmyq2305 18:05, 17 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Political arguments

What text is it a summary of? How is this a criticism of the book? I'm honestly at a loss on both of these - it does not strike me as a sensible criticism of an attack on postmodernism that the attack is political. With no source of the criticism, and no sense to the criticism, I have trouble grasping why it shuold be included - it seems to be original research. 128.227.82.250 19:38, 10 July 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Bricmont and Sokal refuted? Mmmm... I'm not so certain ==

I would like to react to prof. Stolzenberg, and more specifically to parts of his texts “Reading and Relativism - An introduction to the science wars” and “A Physicist Experiments with Scholarly Discourse”. References to these texts are made in this discussion.

I'm uneasy about posting this long reaction here, but I'm doing it because readers of this discussion page may get the impression that prof. Stolzenberg has refuted a number of claims by Bricmont and Sokal. While I think his critique of “Fashionable Nonsense” sometimes is correct, I also think it is far less convincing than it seems to be. In one case, he gives a statement by Bricmont and Sokal the opposite meaning of what it says, and then concludes Bricmont and Sokal don't understand Irigaray. In the case of Latour, he actually (and perhaps contrary to his intention) helped me to better understand why Bricmont and Sokal are justified in their critique of Latour.

To laugh is a philosophical activity (sometimes)

Prof. Stolzenberg quotes Socrates: “What’s this, Polus? You’re laughing? Is this yet another kind of refutation which has you laughing at ideas rather than proving them wrong?”

Prof. Stolzenberg is angry that Bricmont and Sokal find some things funny. I don’t understand why. Laughing can be a significant philosophical act.

Let’s take as an example Maxwell’s Demon from Statistical Mechanics (prof. Stolzenberg refers to it somewhere in this discussion) and Lacan's use of topology to describe psycho-analytical phenomena (as mentioned in "Fashionable Nonsense"). Assume you’re a physicist. Convince yourself that Demons are risible nonsense. Laugh very hard – and then look at the Maxwell’s Demon again. Was your view on its physical content changed by your fun? No, it wasn’t. Whether you believe in Demons or not, the physical value of the argument stands. Make Maxwell’s argument a bit funnier by changing “Demon” to “Clever Martian with Green Ears” or “My Uncle’s Karma” – the physical message stands.

Now take Lacan. This time you’re a psycho-analyst. Convince yourself that mathematical topology is nonsense, utter silliness, “not even wrong” like Wolfgang Pauli used to say. Laugh very hard – and then look at Lacan again. Did your fun change your view on the psycho-analytical value of his words? Yes, it did. Suddenly you start to wonder why Lacan claims that ridiculous things describe psycho-analytical phenomena. Change “Klein’s Bottle” in Lacan’s writings into “My Uncle’s Karma” – does the psycho-analysis stand?

There are many variants of this experiment. One can also assume that Demons are real but Maxwell got his Demonology so wrong it’s ridiculous, and that topology is correct but Lacan is so ignorant about it that he’s funny. How did that change the physical (Maxwell) and psycho-analytical value (Lacan) of their writings? Etc., etc. A good laugh can be good philosophy.

Lacan

I accept that one doesn’t need differential topology to describe the mathematics Lacan is using. Bricmont and Sokal are probably misleading here. Prof. Stolzenberg argues quite convincingly that Lacan was referring to simpler approaches of mathematical topology. Lacan may have understood them well enough to apply them in his approach to psycho-analysis.

But even if this were correct, it stays unclear why these mathematical structures serve to Lacan as more than metaphorical evocations of something, rather as accurate descriptions of a mind – and that’s what Bricmont and Sokal are questioning.


Latour

Prof. Stolzenberg suggests that one can interpret Latour statements about actors in such a way that they do not contradict the physics of Special Relativity. But to me it seems that the source of his interpretation is the same as the source of Bricmont and Sokal’s alleged mis-interpretation: the lack of clarity by Latour.

Moreover, prof. Stolzenberg’s interpretation rests on a starting point that’s controversial. Latour mentions third parties (reference frames or actors, I don’t know). Prof. Stolzenberg points out that Latour, contrary to what Bricmont and Sokal seem to think, is not necessarily talking about distinct third parties. Prof. Stolzenberg writes “As a mathematician, when I talk about ‘three things,’ for example, the three roots of a cubic equation, I don’t necessarily mean three distinct things. It depends on the context.”

This is an enlightening comparison. The cubic equation “x cubed is equal to zero” has three roots that are identically zero. But why talk about three roots when they are identical? Because in general, a cubic equation can have three distinct roots (and never more than three). Therefore the expression “x cubed is zero has three roots” refers to the context of more general cubic equations. It just happens to be so that in this special case, these roots are identical (or, like mathematicians say, they have “multiplicity three”).

But now let’s consider quadratic equations. They never have three or more distinct roots. Therefore, a mathematician never says that a quadratic equation has three roots. To do so would not be wrong strictu sensu – the mathematician could always claim that two of these roots are identical. But this is out of the context of quadratic equations. Consider somebody who writes about these equations and gives a “third root” an important place in his text. I think this a strong argument that he misunderstood the mathematics involved, or at least that he is not writing about mathematics as we know it.

Now what is the context in Special Relativity? In the physics of Special Relativity one never needs a distinct third party (reference frame or actor). To me, Latour’s third party is akin to the famous third solution of a quadratic equation. Introducing it is not wrong strictu sensu – Latour can always claim that two of these three parties are identical or attached to the same reference frame. But the introduction of a third party is out of the physical context, and therefore misleading.

But perhaps Latour wasn’t writing about physics. Perhaps Latour’s third party is a sociological or didactical device. It may therefore be useful within a sociological or didactical context. But even then, one has to be very cautious introducing it. If one is not writing for a public of physicists, one should make clear that this third party goes against the physical context. Does Latour offer this clarity? Even prof. Stolzenberg has doubts. He writes: “Finally, in criticizing Sokal’s misreadings of Latour’s essay, I do not mean to suggest that it does not merit criticism. On the contrary, the very passages that Sokal quotes make me wonder whether Latour mistook things that Einstein has his cartoon observers do in order to explain the theory of relativity for what real physicists do when they use that theory.”

I think that Bricmont and Sokal are justified in their critique of Latour’s use of actors, if only because of the physical context.


How to quote

Prof. Stolzenberg writes

“Michael Harris’s wickedly perceptive observation about a related conceit of Sokal and Bricmont applies to Weinberg’s without significant change.

‘In some cases, we have quoted rather long passages, at the risk of boring the reader, in order to show that we have not misrepresented the meaning of the text by pulling sentences out of context. (Sokal and Bricmont 1998: 17.)’

This may satisfy those who imagine that the context of page 50 is pages 48-52, say, but if the context is an ongoing literary debate or an entire culture's orientation to mathematics and science, then the length of the quotations is irrelevant. To paraphrase remarks made by David Bloor, Sokal and Bricmont are ‘as it were, coming into the middle of a conversation that has been going on for some time.’”

But prof. Stolzenberg himself is guilty of some misdemeanours in this respect. He is for example misrepresenting Impostures Intellectuelles’ part about “locations” in the chapter about Latour.

“Consider next Sokal’s claim that Latour ‘somehow got the idea that relativity concerns the problems raised by the relative location (rather than the relative motion) of different observers.’ It is impossible to read Latour’s essay about relativity without noticing that it is dominated by a consideration of two reference frames in relative motion—the two discussed above. But perhaps Sokal forgot this when he came upon the following passage from Latour’s essay, which is the evidence he offers for his accusation.”

With this last sentence, prof. Stolzenberg is misleading the reader. In my (French) version of “Impostures Intellectuelles”, many more examples are offered of Latour talking about locations where velocities would be more appropriate physically. The evidence is not based on one passage. But let’s go on with that “following passage from Latour’s essay”:

“Provided the two relativities [special and general] are accepted, more frames of reference with less privilege can be assessed, reduced, accumulated and combined, observers can be delegated to a few more places in the infinitely large (the cosmos) and the infinitely small (electrons), and the readings they send back will be understandable. His [Einstein’s] book could well be titled: “New Instructions for Bringing Back Long- Distance Scientific Travellers.”

Einstein’s book is about Special Relativity. A ‘Long Distance’ is not necessary for Special Relativity to enter the scene – but a high relative velocity is. Therefore, it is odd that somebody who understands Special Relativity suggests this as a title for Einstein’s book. Prof. Stolzenberg is indignant because Sokal and Bricmont do not leave open the possibility that for Latour these Travellers have a high relative velocity. However, from a logical point of view Latour writes “… Long-Distance Scientific Travellers (whether they are rapidly moving relative to each other or not)” I agree with Sokal and Bricmont: this suggests Latour didn’t understand the physical content of Special Relativity.


On goats and humans

Prof. Stolzenberg quotes Sokal:

“Anyone who believes that the laws of physics are merely social conventions is invited to try transgressing those conventions from the windows of my apartment. (I live on the twenty-first floor.)” (Sokal 1996)

Prof. Stolzenberg then goes on:

“What is funny is the idea that knowledge of the relevant laws of physics has anything to do with why people and goats normally do not jump out of windows.”

This is a remarkable misunderstanding of Sokal. He doesn’t say that precise knowledge of physical laws is relevant for the outcome of his experiment nor for the willingness of people to jump out of windows.

Prof. Stolzenberg writes as well that there are social constructions one cannot do something about. But it is unclear to me what this says about Sokal’s experiment. To take another experiment, that is superficially similar to Sokal’s but that more clearly involves social constructions. Try driving 100 mph on the wrong side of the road in Brussels for an hour. Even Sokal wouldn’t do it, I assume, because it is as deadly as jumping from the 21th floor. But to me Sokal’s real question is: why will you die when you do these experiments? Social aspects may explain why one does not jump out of 21th floor windows or drive on the wrong side of the road. But what is the actual reason you die from heavy collisions, be it with a pavement or with another motorized vehicle? Does prof. Stolzenberg claim this reason is a social construction?

By the way, the inclusion of “goats” in prof. Stolzenberg’s quote is intriguing. Is a goat’s reality socially constructed as well? How does it work? In principle it’s possible to raise a goat in isolation from other goats and in such a way that it never sees any living being drop dead from a fall. Would it be easier to convince it to jump from the 21th floor? It’s an interesting experiment.


Irigaray

Prof. Stolzenberg quotes Sokal and Bricmont on Irigaray’s idea that E = Mc2 is “sexed”. They write:

“Whatever one may think about the ‘other speeds that are vitally necessary to us,’ the fact remains that the relationship E = Mc2 between energy (E) and mass (M) is experimentally verified to a high degree of precision, and it would obviously not be valid if the speed of light (c) were replaced by another speed.” (Sokal and Bricmont in “Fashionable Nonsense”)

Prof. Stolzenberg reacts as follows:

“This shows especially poor judgment. If Sokal and Bricmont think that something that is privileged can easily be replaced, there is little reason to suppose that they have any idea of what Irigaray is talking about.”

Sokal and Bricmont are saying that E = Mc2 is an accurate description of reality. Replace “c” by any other velocity and the description isn’t accurate anymore. Sokal and Bricmont clearly DON’T think it can be replaced easily. Prof. Stolzenberg gives here an interpretation that’s the opposite of what they write.

Sokal and Bricmont quote Irigaray in their book:

“In mathematical sciences (…) They concern themselves very little with the question of the partially open, with sets that are not clearly delineated [ensembles flous], with any analysis of the problem of borders [bords]… “ (Irigaray)

They point out that this is not a correct description of mathematics. However, prof. Stolzenberg barely sees a reference to mathematical topology in this quote. I find this puzzling. Borders, open, partially open etc. are all studied in topology, at least in the topology I learned. Irigaray writes by her own admission about mathematics. Therefore, Bricmont and Sokal are correct to point out that Irigaray is wrong, and that mathematics does study partially open sets and the problem of borders. It does so, for example, in algebraic topology and differential geometry. It couldn’t have been too difficult for Irigaray to find that out. Perhaps she wasn’t thinking about these branches of mathematics, but they are part of the mathematical sciences she’s is talking about. So what is wrong with Bricmont and Sokal’s critique? Besides, in “Impostures Intellectuelles”, Bricmont and Sokal offer more examples to show that Irigaray misrepresents the mathematics and physics she’s writing about.

Prof. Stolzenberg suggests that Irigaray wanted to say that topology is of questionable use to analyse some non-mathematical questions about borders. I suspect – but I do not know for sure – that many physicists find this statement sensible. I also think this is a weak defence of Irigaray. First of all: to see the above quote in this light doesn’t make the incorrect description of mathematics go away. But secondly, by referring to Kundera, prof. Stolzenberg suggests that Irigaray is not only talking about mathematical borders. Perhaps she isn’t even talking about mathematical borders in the first place, except to mention that they are of little use. But why then does she dress up her statement with awkward references to mathematics? Mathematics does study borders, but does that change that it may be of little use?

Deleuze and Guattari

In my version of "Impostures Intellectuelles" Bricmont and Sokal do not claim Deleuze and Guattari are writing about chaos theory. Perhaps Sokal once claimed they were, and perhaps that was a mistake, but the mistake is not in "Impostures Intellectuelles". Then why is this mistake by Sokal mentioned in this discussion?

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