Failing badly

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Failing badly and Failing well are concepts in systems, security and network security. Describing how a system reacts to failure, they have been popularized by Bruce Schneier, a cryptographer and security consultant.[1]


  • A system that fails badly is one that fails catastrophically once failure occurs. A single point of failure can thus bring down the whole system. Examples could be:
    • Credit-card databases (or any database) protected by a password only. Once this security is breached, all data can be stolen.
    • Buildings depending on a single column or truss, whose removal would cause a chain reaction collapse under normal loads.
    • Security checks which concentrate on establishing identity, not intent (thus allowing, for example, suicide attackers to pass).
    • Internet access provided by a single provider. If the provider's network fails, all Internet connectivity is lost.


  • A system that fails well is one that compartmentalizes / contains failure. Examples could be:
    • Databases which do not allow downloads of all data in one attempt, limiting the amount of compromised data.
    • Structurally redundant buildings conceived to resist loads beyond the normally expected, or even when damaged.
    • Concrete structures, which show cracks long prior to breaking under load, thus giving early warning.
    • Armoured cockpit doors on airplanes, which confine a potential hijacker within the cabin.
    • Internet connectivity provided by more than one vendor or discrete path, known as dual-homed connectivity.

[edit] References

  1. ^ Homeland Insecurity, Atlantic Monthly, September 2002