Fact-value distinction
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The fact-value distinction is a concept used to distinguish between arguments which can be claimed through reason alone, and those where rationality is limited to describing a collective opinion. In another formulation, it is the distinction between what is (can be discovered by science, philosophy or reason) and what ought to be (a judgment which can be agreed upon by consensus). The terms positive and normative represent another manner of expressing this. Positive statements make the implicit claim to facts (i.e. water is made up of two hydrogen and one oxygen atoms), whereas normative statements make a claim to values or to norms (i.e. water ought to be protected from environmental pollution).
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[edit] Hume's Skepticism
The fact-value distinction emerged in philosophy during the Enlightenment; in particular, David Hume (1711-1776) argued that human beings are unable to ground normative arguments in positive arguments, that is, to derive 'ought' from 'is'. Hume was a skeptic, and although he was a complex and dedicated philosopher, he shared a political viewpoint with previous Enlightenment philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John Locke (1632-1704). Specifically, Hume, at least to some extent, argued that religious and national hostilities that divided European society were based on unfounded beliefs; in effect, he argued they were not found in nature, but a creation of a particular time and place, and thus unworthy of mortal conflict. Thus Hume is often cited as being the philosopher who finally snuffed out nature as a standard for political existence. For instance, without Hume, Jean Jacques Rousseau’s (1712-1778) 'return' to nature would have not been so revolutionary, inventive and fascinating.
[edit] The Naturalistic Fallacy
The fact-value distinction may also be called the naturalistic fallacy. Presently, the naturalistic fallacy is open to debate in ethical and moral philosophy. G. E. Moore believed it was essential to all ethical thinking. However, more recent contemporary philosophers like Phillipa Foot have called into question the validity of such assumptions. Others, like Ruth Anna Putnam, a feminist by some definitions, have argued even the most ‘scientific’ of disciplines are affected by the ‘values’ of the men and women who research and practice the vocation. Nevertheless, the difference between the naturalistic fallacy and the fact-value distinction is derived from the manner in which the fact-value distinction, and not the strict naturalistic fallacy, has been used by modern social science to articulate new fields of study and create academic disciplines.
[edit] Nietzsche's Table of Values
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) in Thus Spoke Zarathustra said that a table of values hangs above every great people. In the section “On a Thousand and One Goals” Nietzsche claims the Jewish people were “mighty and eternal” because the Jews honoured their father and mother "to the very roots of their soul". Nietzsche asserts that what made a people great was not the content of their beliefs, but the act of valuing. Thus the values a community strives to articulate are not as important as the collective will to see those values come to pass. The willing is more essential than the intrinsic worth of the goal itself, according to Nietzsche. There are "a thousand and one goals," says Zarathustra, one no more worthy than the next. This idea became a core premise in modern social science. Max Weber and Martin Heidegger absorbed it and made it their own. It shaped their philosophical endeavor, as well as their political understanding.
[edit] The Fact-Value Problem
The problem of the unexamined acceptance of the fact-value distinction is two-fold. Firstly, the idea itself is not self-sufficient. The concept required great genius to arise, and there were particular political and historical conditions which contributed to its emergence. Therefore, is it true? Secondly, the blind use of the concept distorts the very tradition from whence it came. Thus the origin of 'facts' and 'values', or philosophy, is obscured from view. An example is found when Plato is examined by modern philosophers.
In a contemporary study by the American philosophy Professor Daryl Rice, it is claimed that Plato did not understand the fact-value distinction. To make his point he declares that water has two hydrogen atoms for every one oxygen atom. Rice calls this a fact. He says a chemistry professor who stated that this was unjust would be making a 'value' statement, an absurd normative argument since the 'fact' is a fact. But is it? Moreover, Rice says that Plato thought values were facts, and cites Plato's strict censorship of music and poetry in The Republic.
Yet upon closer inspection, one might argue the supposed 'fact' of H2O is a product of a 'value'; the scientific or philosophical 'value' that originated in Ancient Greece before Socrates and was made possible for human beings through the life and work of Thales, Socrates, Plato et al. The 'value' -- to look at water in a scientific way, to discover its molecular composition as opposed to drinking it or using it as an aspect of a religious ritual such as baptism -- is the philosophic 'value'. In fact, one might argue Plato understood the fact-value distinction and rejected it. Plato tried to define philosophy as a search for truth, a search for what is; this 'value' precedes any 'fact'.
[edit] See also
[edit] Bibliography
- Hume, David. Treatise of Human Nature. First published 1739-1740.
- Hume, David. Enquiry concerning Human Understanding.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Translated by R.J. Hollingdale. New York: Penguin, 1969.
- Putnam, Ruth Anna. “Creating Facts and Values." Philosophy 60, 1985
- Putnam, Ruth Anna.“Perceiving Facts and Values." Philosophy 73, 1998
- Rice, Daryl H. Guide to Plato's Republic. Oxford University Press, 1997.
