User:Fabartus/scratchpads/Bat of PortArthur
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- This is a speculative version of the articile that did not standup to references, brought out of Talk:Battle of Port Arthur at this time. It drew no comment, despite solicitation of such. User:Fabartus || Talkto_FrankB 23:58, 26 Jun 2005 (UTC)
Battle of Port Arthur | |||
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Conflict: Russo-Japanese War | |||
Date: February 9, 1904 | |||
Location: Near Port Arthur, China | |||
Outcome: Inconclusive | |||
Combatants | |||
Japan | Russia | ||
Commanders | |||
Heihachiro Togo Shigeto Dewa |
Oskar Stark | ||
Strength | |||
15 battleships and cruisers with escorts | 12 battleships and cruisers with escorts | ||
Casualties | |||
90 seamen and slight damage | 150 seamen and four ships | ||
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Contents |
[edit] Strategic and Tactical Setting
The Battle of Port Arthur (February 9, 1904) was the opening battle of the Russo-Japanese War. It was inconclusive and was followed by the long Siege of Port Arthur (and other land battles) and later in August, the decisive Battle of the Yellow Sea (aka. The naval Battle of Shantung). While military historians commonly rank this battle as indecisive (or equivilently inconclusive) a large percentage of the Russian Fleet was so severely damaged (esp. from running aground) that they had to be left behind as floating batteries during the blockade breakout seven months later on August 10th, the genesis of the Battle of Shantung, wherein the Russian forces were badly outnumbered and outgunned.
Nearing the strategic ice-free (then) Russian port of Port Arthur (Today: part of the large city Dalian, known then as 'Darien') on the Manchurian penninsula, Admiral Heihachiro Togo commanded the combined Japanese fleet made up of the 'First' and 'Third' Imperial Japanese Fleets which were to keep close company during a stealthy night approach. Admiral Togo initially sent in a dawn torpedo attack by a flotilla of fast torpedo boats and a squadron of torpedo-boat destroyers on the harbor anchorages as planned.
[edit] Making Enemy Contact (When Plans Fail)
As Dawn broke, Togo became aware that the 'Third Fleet' was far off from 'close company', as they were out of sight. Admiral Shigeto Dewa, who commanded the Japanese cruiser squadron, suggested that the Japanese ships attempt to attack the Russian ships on the heels of the torpedo attack instead, because the Russian fleet sheltering under the cover of harbor-defense land batteries and army artillery at Port Arthur anchorage seemed to be in total confusion after the torpedo volley and had showed no inclination to chase his flotilla.
Dewa's actual orders had been to lure the Russian ships toward the Japanese Capital ships, the iron fist of Combined Fleet, those of the 'First Fleet' being under the direct command of Adm. Togo. But the Third Fleet was just then steaming over the horizon, about an hours transit time away. So eschewing hesitation, Adm. Togo reluctantly agreed to his subordinates aggresive suggestion. Dewa's reconnaissance efforts and knowledge that confusion is a great force multiplier seemed promising enough despite the presence of harbor defenses, so he acquiesed to the attack even though that meant the Russian naval forces alone had him outgunned and outnumbered.
[edit] Progression of the Battle
Dewa's reconnaissance, however, had been somewhat incorrect, probably because he was more than three nautical miles away from the Russian fleet when he and his heavy cruiser flagship made their closest approach in rather poor visibilty common to coldwater regions. His initial evaluation hadn't been in error for the initial dawn torpedo attack had caused such confusion in the confined waters of the harbor that twelve Capital ships (battleships and cruisers) had run aground and some of those which freed themselves had suffient bottom damage and flooded spaces (i.e. internal comparments) to be listing to greater or lesser extent. Meanwhile the screening vessels (torpedo-boat destroyers, torpedo boats, gunboats, and Minesweepers ) were in great disarray (no coordinated formation). However, the Russians had recovered from the state of 'total surprise', and were not as vulnerable as they would have been had the gunnery dual immediately followed the torpedo volley. By the time Dewa had sold his recommendation to Adm. Togo, all of the Russian ships had sorted themselves out somewhat and were ready and waiting, attempting to raise full-steam (from overnight 'one boiler' for lighting status), with their battle flags up, which standards were not visible to Dewa, and to make matters worse, the land artillery was ready as well because of the wild affairs evident in the harbor.
The Japanese Third Fleet had started in the distant rear so Togo ordered them to interdict and destroy any Russian ship attempting to break out and so became a ready reserve which took no part in the subsequent fighting. While the First Fleet steamed closer, the Russians gradually worked themselves into mutually supporting defensive formations under the shelter of the shore batteries consisting of both naval rifles and army artillery. The Japanese ships of the First Fleet concentrated their heavy gun fire on the land batteries protecting the anchorage, while lobbing six and eight inch shells (secondary guns) at the Russian ships. However, after about thirty minutes of inconclusive fighting, Togo, decided to make a highly dangerous move: he turned his ships around and retreated in a manuever known as 'tacking in succession', in full range of the artillery and Russian ships. Thus each Japanese ship made a turn over the same place above the ocean floor, giving the naval rifles of the defenders plenty of time to concentrate their fire and bracket the spot. That didn't matter, however tactically controversial it was in subsequent war college ciricula, the poor Russian gunnery or leadership let Admiral Togo escape with acceptable but significant damages which probably played a large part in his decision to not press home the attack later with the combined fleet.
As the Japanese ships reached their most vulnerable point, the Russian ship Novik fired a salvo of torpedoes at the Japanese armored cruisers in the van, which returned fire, hitting the Novik below the waterline inflicting heavy damages, but in turn causing Adm. Togo to abort the attack because of the heavy fire encountered, and the higher state of readiness than previously assumed. Admiral Togo, after surveying First Fleets wounds, decided not to use the Third Fleet in a combined re-attack, and retreated completely leaving Third Fleet in blockade. The 'Novik' never left Port Arthur.
[edit] Battle Outcome
The Japanese had suffered no more than 90 casualties, with no seriously damaged ships, while the Russians suffered about 150 casualties, with the capital ships Bayan, Askold, Diana, and Novik having relatively serious damage. None of these made it to the later battle of Shantung and were used as floating batteries until sunk by Japanese siege artillery Dec 6th-9th. The Japanese immediately blockaded the port, establishing a headquarters and homeport in the (South) Korean city of Pusan (Busan), and started a land campaign to invest the city itself that lasted six to seven months concluding with the Siege of Port Arthur. Dewa's half-hearted reconnaissance had underestimated the Russian fleet's state of readiness, and Togo's reluctance to press for a decisive conclusion was justified in the face of the combined Russian land and naval artillery protecting the port.
[edit] Impact on History
One of the Japanese generals in command was Maresuke Nogi, who lost both of his sons; later Nogi would be one of the most important influences on the young Emperor Hirohito. However he wished to commit ritual suicide after the attack, which killed so many young Japanese soldiers. Emperor Meiji forbade this act, but after Meiji died in 1912 the Nogi commited seppuku.
After the naval battle, the Japanese engaged Russian land forces in a long campaign of minor skirmishes and major land battles (See: Battle of Yalu River, Battle of Darien, Russo-Japanese War), concluding battle near Port Arthur in the horrificly bloody battle called the Siege of Port Arthur. These affairs were fought in trenches with machine guns and artillery, involved tens of thousands on both sides in massed charges, and foreshadowed pre-tank conditions much like those of the Western Front during World War I ten years later. Western leaders failed to assimulate and understand the lesson - looking down on both Eastern Powers with disdain and contempt born of predjudice, while simultaneously not appreciating the lethal implications of machine guns and rapid fire artillery (Howitzers); these failings jointly lead to [WW-I]'s casulty lists.
Finally, a large Japanese army, which had dug assault trenches perpendicular to either side's lines, emerged from the trenches and took the Russian lines by brute force, and Port Arthur fell to the shock and consternation of the world's (both white and racist) powers. This outcome resulted in Theodore Roosevelt approaching (secretly) both sides and offering to act as an 'honest broker'. Other Western powers were variously busy arguing over Africa, the Balkans, or the Middle East or were simultaneously percieved by one beligerent or the other as an ally of the other disputant ('Japan and Gr. Britain' vs. 'Russia and France or Germany') and so were unavailable to act as diplomatic intermediaries. The Japanese responded favorably to overtures, then offically but secretly requested the US to approach Russia. Tsar Nicholas II, was much worried about a loss of face might lead to a much feared domestic revolution, the autocrat resisted even entertaining negotiations for some months while Roosevelt pulled strings and twisted arms, and the Japanese continued to prevail in contests of arms.
Russian fears were so strong, that in the eventual peace conference, Roosevelt had to strong arm the Japanese to accept a peace without reparations, these being a pre-condition of the Japanese for sitting at the table, and a precondition for the Tsar in the opposite way - he wouldn't send a plenipotentiary without an understanding that Russia would pay neither reparations, nor give up Shaiklin Island. Roosevelt finessed these mutually conflicting demands using a trick he'd learned settling a major coal strike cum violence in 1903, more to the dissatisfaction of the Japanese. The percieved 'loss of face' lead to widespread rioting in Japan, and a feeling that grew over the following decades that Japan had been maltreated ('dishonored') as 'the losing power' of the war, despite their uniformly successful military actions. Both powers were indeed exhausted by the war, so Japan accepted the peace with much resentment, so much so, that they made this point explicitly in their 'infamously late' communique declaring war on the USA -- delivered 'officially' about an hour after the attack on Pearl Harbor 7 December 1941.
[edit] References
- Edmund Morris, 'Theodore Rex', The Modern Library, pb.,2002; ISBN: 0-8129-6600-7 (div. of Random House, hc,2001)