Talk:European Coal and Steel Community

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[edit] Expansion of article

"pool coal and steel resources" - what does this vague and ambiguous phrase translate to in practice. Surely what the practical effect of the treaty was is the most important part of a treaty - but this is entirely missing from this article ! Ensuring that there was not another war by signing a treaty would surely have had no effect whatsoever unless the treaty actually had practical results - so what were those results. Point made, I think. --jrleighton 05:42, 28 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Iron?

I'm doing my dissertation on the ECSC at the moment, and have noticed that a few academics (Including Alan Milward) refer to the European Coal, Iron and Steel community. Anyone else ever noticed this? Vanky 13:40, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Reasons?

Steel had played an important part in arms production in World War Two and was a fundamental resource of the western European states. The aim was therfore a common program of post-war production and consumption of steel and coal. The project was also intended to show some cooperation and reconciliation between France and Germany in the aftermath of the war. There was a desire to unite the countries by controlling steel and coal which were fundamental to war industries.

This is too bland. As I understand it, from what I've read, the main reason for the community was French fears of German rearmament. The French would have prefered to stick with their first choise, to take full control over the Saar and Ruhr coal-mines, and use this coal to fuel the French industry, leaving nothing for Germany. Se:

In 1947 France removed the Saar from Germany and turned it into a protectorate under French economic control. The area returned to German administration in 1957, but France retained the right to mine from it's coal mines until 1981.

In the early occupation the U.S. supported these policies, as it was "innoficially" implementing the basic economic policy behind the Morgenthau Plan.

By taking control of the German economy away from the German authorities, and then applying a "hands off" policy, it was hoped that the German economy would sink, as it infact did. Meanwhile at the Potsdam agreement the U.S. had set common policies for all the occupation zones. Large parts of German industry to be dismantled, and a lid put on how much the remaining industry was allowed to produce. Se this discussion at the U.K War cabinet:

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/cab_195_4_transcript.pdf


C.M. 89(46). 21st October, 1946.

1. India.

P.M. Read terms of proposed message to Viceroy – congratulations. on formation of interim Government. Agreed.

2. Parliament.

H.M. Business for the week. [Exit W.W. Enter G.T. & F.W.B. & O.S.

3. Germany.

E.B. H.M.’s memo. covered in principle: & H.D.’s met: by my memo. Haven’t considered J.S.’s. Hampered in B. Zone –

a) by Russian refusal to treat G. as economic whole. They have taken heavily from current production & will continue up to $10 billions
b) U.S. policy was pastoralising (Morgenthan) until Stuttgart speech. They supported Russian & French case – to point of reducing steel production to 5.8 m. tons. And during Loan talks, couldn’t oppose them too strongly.
c) French. policy – detach Ruhr: & decline any agreement without prior consent to that. Now generally realised our policy on that was correct.
d) At outset, I took the line – let’s get in & put the Zone on self-supporting. basis. Was told this would Spell disaster for Western Europe.


Looking back, not sure it was right to let this political consideration outweigh the economic arguments. I refer to coal exports from Ruhr. Looking back it’s obvious this policy would rundown economy of B. Zone. In Paris, at CFM time, tried to get B. Zone on self-supporting basis. France then wouldn’t play because of c) above. Then announced that., failing agreement to treat Germany as a whole, we should be forced to make our Zone self-supporting. Next Day, U.S. agreed we couldn’t be expected to go on making contn at £80-100 m. p.a. They forced us to 5.8 m. – but all experience has shown we were right on APW Cttee in our figure of 11 m. Molotov then said they would. accept increase of level of industry – but subject to unacceptable conditions. U.S. proposal to merge Zones. We knew it would. cost us more for a time. When estimates worked out, figure was larger than assumed. Conference held in Paris – after long discussions have now submitted memo. Before this was completed I had seen Byrnes (before Stuttgart speech) & asked whether this meant he would overthrow Morgenthau policy. He said yes – with Truman’s authority.

Byrnes made his speech in September 1946, after 1.5 years of occupation. The speech was the turning point. U.S policy was no longer to be influenced by the Morgenthau filosofy.

But the directive JCS 1067 still remained in effect until July 1947, although gradualy softened by reinterpretation. Eventually they even got around to do the currency reform, something which was expresedly forbidden by the directive. The reform took place in 1948, and marked the turningpoint for the german economy. At least 2, possibly 3 years had been lost though, with much missery and according to some historians many deaths as result.

For more info on the switch from Morgenthau policy to Marshall policy, se Talk:Marshall_Plan#Motivation and effectiveness and following headings. Basically it was caused by the sudden realisation that without Germany and it's heavy industry, with Germany turned into a pastoral and light industry nation, the economy of the rest of europe would crash and burn, making it easy pickings for the communists. This article made for intresting reading: * Pas de Pagaille! Time Magazine article from Jul. 28, 1947. ""France wants more coal and is entitled to it, but will not permit the necessary industrial production to feed and supply the German miners to produce more coal. Britain, which wants both greater coal and industrial production, wants both under her control and socialization program."

But whatever the official switch, due to the agreements signed by the U.S. with the other victorious Allied occupation nations in Germany, and the harm already done, things were prety bad in germany for a long time-period. The French and the Russians, and to some degree the Brittish, were not intrested in a switch of policy. Neither were some of Morgenthaus boys in the administration. Former U.S. president Herbert Hoover actually felt it necessary to make this outright warning in one of the situation reports he wrote in his oficial factfinding mission to Germany (the mission was comissioned by President Harry Truman).

'There are several illusions in all this "war potential" attitude.

a. There is the illusion that the New Germany left after the annexations can be reduced to a "pastoral state". It cannot be done unless we exterminate or move 25,000,000 people out of it. This would approximately reduce Germany to the density of the population of France.
...' [1]

The report was writen as late as 1947.

Meanwhile, the industrial dismantlement went on well into 1950, albeit at an increasingly slower rate.

  • Letter from Ernest Bevin to Robert Schuman (30 October 1949) Brittish and French foreign ministers. Bevin argues that they need to reconsider the Allies' dismantling policy in the occupied zones

In the end, the coal and steel union was a compromise between Germany and France, The French allowed the Germans to get the Ruhr back into operation, and mainly under their control, and the Germans paid for this by allowing themselves to be submerged in the union, thus giving France some level of control over German heavy industry.

I've simplified in my description, and cut some corners, and skipped some parts, but basically I believe I've shown that the background to the community was a lot more intresting than what this article makes it out to be.

Stor stark7 18:00, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] germanophobia

this articel is a farce. the real, even obvious reasons for that "community" was France's (&friends) urge to control the massive coal+steel industrie of the german Ruhrgebiet. it was the motor of germany economy and they wanted control over it, thats it. it really makes me SICK to read about all nonsense but not even the slightest mentioning of this motivation in the article. wikipedia will never ever be able to compete with normal lexica, the wiki users are just little trolls who write their own fantasy history that favors their POV, ugh, makes me SICK!!

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