Dolan v. City of Tigard
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Dolan v. City of Tigard, , more commonly Dolan v. Tigard, was a United States Supreme Court case argued before the Court in 1994. It was a landmark case regarding the practice of zoning and property rights, and served to establish limits on the ability of cities and other government agencies, to use zoning and land-use regulations to compel property owners to make unrelated public improvements.
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[edit] The Case
Petitioner Dolan, who operated a plumbing store in the city of Tigard, Oregon, applied for a land-use variance to permit her to expand the store and pave the parking lot of her store. The city planning commission granted conditional approval, dependent on Dolan dedicating land to a public greenway along an adjacent creek, and developing a pedestrian and bicycle pathway in order to relieve traffic congestion. The decision was appealed to the Oregon State Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), alleging that the land dedication requirements were not related to the proposed development, and thus constituted an uncompensated taking of her property, which is disallowed by the Fifth Amendment. LUBA found a reasonable relationship between the development and both conditions of the variance, as the larger building and paved lot would increase runoff into the creek, and the impact of increased traffic justified the requirement for the requirement of a pathway. The decision was subsequently affirmed by the Oregon State Court of Appeals and the Oregon State Supreme Court.
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. Arguments were heard March 23, 1994, and a decision reached on June 12 of the same year.
[edit] The bench
[edit] The opinion
- Written by: Chief Justice Rehnquist
[edit] Dissenting
- Written by: Justices Stevens, with Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg joining.
- Written by Justice Souter.
[edit] The decision
The Supreme Court overturned the state Land Use Board of Appeals and the Oregon appellate courts. The Court held that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, a government agency may not require a person to surrender constitutional rights in exchange for discretionary benefits, where the property sought has little or no relationship to the benefit conferred. A two-prong test was applied: Whether or not there is an "essential nexus" between the permit conditions and legitimate state interest, and whether or not the degree of the exactions required by the permit condition bears the required relationship to the projected impact of the proposed development.
In the present case, the Court held that the first condition had been satisfied. However, the Court ruled that the City failed to make an individualized determination that the required dedications are related, in both nature and extent, to the proposed impact. Further, the Court held that the requirement for a public greenway (as opposed to a private one, to which Dolan would retain other rights of property owners, such as the right of exclusive access), was excessive, and that the City failed to meet its burden of establishing that the proposed pathway was necessary to offset the increased traffic which would be caused by the proposed expansion.
[edit] External links
[edit] See also
- This article incorporates text from an abstract written by the Reporter of Decisions for the U.S. Supreme Court--a document created by a U.S. government official acting within his/her official capacity, and thus in the public domain.
