Direction of fit

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[edit] In speech act theory

Perhaps the first to speak of "direction of fit" was the philosopher J. L. Austin.

In an extensive discussion[1] of the issues involved with the differences between, say, (a) wrongly calling a triangle a square (something which, he said, was committing an act of violence to the language) and (b) wrongly describing a triangular object as being a square (something which, he said, was committing an act of violence to the facts), Austin distinguished between what he termed:

  • "the onus of match": in the case of one wanting to match X and Y, the distinction between the matching of X to Y and the matching of Y to X; and
  • "the direction of fit": in the case of naming something, the difference between the fitting of a name to an item, and the fitting of an item to a name.

The concept of direction of fit can also apply to speech acts: e.g., declarations have word-to-world direction of fit, whilst commands and promises have a world-to-word direction of fit.

John Searle and Daniel Vanderveken[2]assert that there are only four possible "directions of fit" in language:

1. The word-to-world direction of fit.
In achieving success of fit the propositional content of the [utterance] fits an independently existing state of affairs in the world.
2. The world-to-word direction of fit.
In achieving success of fit the world is altered to fit the propositional content of the [utterance].
3. The double direction of fit.
In achieving success of fit the world is altered to fit the propositional content by representing the world as being so altered.
4. The null or empty direction of fit.
There is no question of achieving success of fit between the propositional content and the world, because in general success of fit is presupposed by the utterance.

Searle used this notion of "direction of fit" to create a taxonomy of illocutionary acts.[3]

Although Elizabeth Anscombe never employed the term "the direction of fit", Searle has strongly argued[4] that the following passage from her work Intention was, by far, "the best illustration" of the distinction between the tasks of "[getting] the words (more strictly their propositional content) to match the world… [and that of getting] the world to match the words":

§32. Let us consider a man going round a town with a shopping list in his hand. Now it is clear that the relation of this list to the things he actually buys is one and the same whether his wife gave him the list or it is his own list; and that there is a different relation where a list is made by a detective following him about. If he made the list itself, it was an expression of intention; if his wife gave it him, it has the role of an order. What then is the identical relation to what happens, in the order and the intention, which is not shared by the record? It is precisely this: if the list and the things that the man actually buys do not agree, and if this and this alone constitutes a mistake, then the mistake is not in the list but in the man's performance (if his wife were to say: “Look, it says butter and you have bought margarine”, he would hardly reply: “What a mistake! we must put that right” and alter the word on the list to “margarine”); whereas if the detective's record and what the man actually buys do not agree, then the mistake is in the record.[5]

[edit] In philosophy of mind

According to Velleman, when used in the domain of the philosophy of mind, the concept direction of fit represents the distinguishing feature between two types of intentional mental states:

Facta (singular factum, states that currently exist) are states with a mind-to-world direction of fit.
Examples include beliefs, perceptions, hypotheses, and fantasies. In the event of a mismatch between the mental state and the world, the mental state is in some sense false or wrong and should perhaps be changed.
Facienda (singular faciendum, states that are yet to exist) are states with a world-to-mind direction of fit.
Examples include intentions and desires. If there is a mismatch between the mental state and the world, the world is in some sense wrong and should perhaps be changed.

In some forms of mind-body dualism, a matching factum and faciendum must be present in a person's mind in order for him to act intentionally. If a person has the belief that action (A) will lead to state (S), and has the desire that state (S) obtain, then he will perform action (A). The action is directly caused by simultaneous presence of the two mental states; no further explanation is needed.

According to Velleman:

The term "direction of fit" refers to the two ways in which attitudes can relate propositions to the world.
In cognitive attitudes [such as belief], a proposition is grasped as patterned after the world; whereas in conative attitudes [such as desire], the proposition is grasped as a pattern for the world to follow.
The propositional object of desire is regarded not as fact -- not, that is, as factum, having been brought about -- but rather as faciendum, to be brought about: it's regarded not as true but as to be made true.[6]

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ Austin (1953), p.234)
  2. ^ Searle & Vanderveken, (1985), pp.52-53.
  3. ^ See Searle (1975/1976/1979).
  4. ^ Searle, 1985, p.3.
  5. ^ Anscombe, 1963, p.56
  6. ^ Velleman, (1992), p.8.

[edit] References

  • Anscombe, G.E.M., Intention (Second Edition), Basil Blackwell, (Oxford), 1963 (first edition 1957).
  • Austin, J.L., How to Do Things With Words: The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University in 1955, Oxford University Press, (Oxford), 1962.
  • Austin, J.L., "How to Talk: Some Simple Ways", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol.53, (1953), pp.227-246.
  • Searle, J.R., "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts", pp.1-19 in Searle, J.R., Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge), 1979. (N.B. This is a reprint of the same paper that was published twice, in 1975 and 1976, under two different titles: (a) Searle, J.R., "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts", pp.344-369 in Gunderson, K. (ed.), Language, Mind, and Knowledge, University of Minnesota Press, (Minneapolis), 1975; and (b) Searle, J.R., "A Classification of Illocutionary Acts", Language in Society, Vol.5, (1976), pp.1-24.)
  • Searle, J.R., Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge), 1985.
  • Searle, J.R. & Vanderveken, D., Foundations of Illocutionary Logic, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge), 1985.
  • Velleman, J.D., "The Guise of the Good", Noûs, Vol.26, No.1, (March 1992), pp.3-26.

[edit] See also

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