Direct Air Support Center

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Overhead shot of a DASC setup

The Direct Air Support Center (DASC) is the principal United States Marine Corps aviation command and control system and the air control agency responsible for the direction of air operations directly supporting ground forces. It functions in a decentralized mode of operation, but is directly supervised by the Marine Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) or the Navy Tactical Air Control Center (NTACC). During amphibious or expeditionary operations, the DASC is normally the first MACCS agency ashore and usually lands in the same category (i.e.,scheduled or on call wave) as the Ground Combat Element's (GCE's) senior Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC). The DASC's parent unit is the Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS) of the Marine Air Control Group (MACG).

1 Role
2 Tasks
3 Current Units
4 History
5 References
6 External links

[edit] Role

The DASC processes immediate air support requests; coordinates aircraft employment with other supporting arms; manages terminal control assetssupporting GCE and combat service support element forces; and controls assigned aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and itinerant aircraft transiting through DASC controlled airspace. The DASC controls and directs air support activities that effect the GCE commander's focus on close operations and those air missions requiring integration with the ground combat forces (close air support [CAS], assault support and designated air reconnaissance). The DASC does not normally control aircraft conducting deep air support (DAS) missions as detailed coordination of DAS missions are not required with ground forces. However, the DASC will provide battle damage assessments (BDAs) and mission reports (MISREPs) from DAS missions to the GCE's senior fire support coordination center (FSCC) and TACC when required.

[edit] Tasks

Receive the Air Tasking Order(ATO) from the TACC(Marine or Navy)and coordiantes preplanned direct air support.
Receive, process and coordinate requests for immediate direct air support.
Adjust preplanned schedules, divert airborne assets, and launch aircraft as necessary when delegated authority by the aviation combat element (ACE) commander and in coordination with the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)force fires coordination center (FFCC) or GCE senior FSCC.
Coordinate the execution of direct air support missions with other supporting arms through the appropriate FFCC/FSCC and, as required, with the appropriate MACCS agencies.
Receive and disseminate pertinent tactical information reported by aircraft performing direct air support missions.
Provide aircraft and air control agencies with advisory and threat information to assist in the safe conduct of flight.
Monitor, record and display information on direct air support missions.
Maintain friendly and enemy ground situation displays necessary to coordinate direct air support missions.
Provide direct air support aircraft and other MACCS agencies with information concerning the friendly and enemy situation.
Refer unresolved conflicts in supporting arms to the FFCC/FSCC fire support coordinator (FSC).

[edit] Current Units

[edit] History

[edit] World War II

"Okinawa was the culmination of the development of air support doctrine in the Pacific," declared Colonel Vernon E. Megee, commander of the Landing Force Air Support Control Units (LFASCU) during the campaign. "The procedures we used there were the result of lessons learned in all preceding campaigns, including the Philippines." Indeed, Marine aviation at Okinawa operated across the spectrum of missions, from supply drops to bombing an enemy battleship. The early forerunners of today's Tactical Air Control Party units were the Air Liaison Parties that accompanied the front-line divisions and served to request close air support and direct (but not control — the front was too narrow) aircraft to the target. Coordination of lower-echelon air requests became the province of three Marine LFASCUs. During the course of the battles they controlled 10, 506 close air support missions and only recorded 10 incidents of friendly fire casualties. This is a remarkably low figure especially when considering that close air support techniques were still in their infancy. ^[1]

Also during the Battle of Okinawa the Marines made great strides towards refining supporting arms coordination. Commanders established Target Information Centers (TICs) at every level from Tenth Army down to battalion. The TICs functioned to provide a centralized target information and weapons assignment system responsive to both assigned targets and targets of opportunity. Finally, all three component liaison officers — artillery, air, and naval gunfire — were aligned with target intelligence information officers. As described by Colonel Henderson, the TIC at IIIAC consisted of the corps artillery S-2 section "expanded to meet the needs of artillery, naval gun fire (NGF), and close air support CAS on a 24-hour basis . . . . The Corps Arty Fire Direction Center and the Corps Fire Support Operations Center were one and the same facility — with NGF and air added."

From these early innovations it is easy to see the groundwork that was laid for today's units such as the DASC, FSCC, MEF Force Fires and the Intelligence Tactical Fusion Cell.

Photo of the Air Support Section of the 1st Marine Division at Hagaru-ri during the Battle of Chosin Reservoir. This was the precursor to today's DASC

[edit] Korean War

Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 (MTACS-2), the precursor to today's MASS-2 operated an Air Support section and conducted operations during the Korean War at the Pusan Perimeter, Battle of Inchon, Battle of Seoul, Battle of Chosin Reservoir, the East Central Front, and the Western Front.

[edit] Vietnam

In April 1965, MASS-2 and MASS-3 deployed to the Republic of Vietnam as part of the III Marine Amphibious Force and provided two Direct Air Support Centers and five Air Support Radar Teams (ASRTs) in support of ground combat units. From 1966-1971, MASS-3 ASRTs controlled more than 38,010 AN/TPQ-10 missions, directing more than 121,000 tons of ordnance on 56,753 targets.(10:1) By the end of the war, the DASCs and ASRTs participated in virtually every major Marine combat operation. ^[2]

Requesting and controlling fixed-wing air support was a complex but increasingly efficient process. For all missions but those employing sorties withheld for landing zone preparation and other special purposes, or the extra sorties above the one-per-day allocation to Seventh Air Force, control centered in Horn DASC. This combined U.S. Air Force/US. Marine/Vietnamese Air Force direct air support control center had been established at Camp Horn, then III MAF Headquarters, in 1968 as the senior tactical air control agency for I Corps. Horn DASC could divert any fixed-wing mission assigned to I Corps/MR 1, and it could launch aircraft held on alert for tactical emergencies. The 1st MAW air control system, consisting of a Tactical Air Direction Center at Da Nang Airbase, a Tactical Air Operations Center on Monkey Mountain, and a Direct Air Support Control Center at 1st Marine Division Headquarters, worked in close cooperation with Horn DASC. Until March 1970, DASC Victor at Phu Bai, subordinate to Horn DASC, controlled air support assigned to XXIV Corps units. Marine ground units submitted requests for preplanning air support 24 hours in advance to the 1st Marine Division Air Officer. The consolidated requests from the division then went to III MAF, which combined them with air support requests from other MR 1 forces and transmitted them to the MACV Tactical Air Support Element (TASE) and the Seventh Air Force Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC) at Saigon. After the change of command in MR 1 on 9 March 1970, XXIV Corps, now at Camp Horn, took over the transmitting function and DASC Victor was dissolved. Under MACV supervision and general direction, Seventh Air Force apportioned available sorties among the corps areas, normally assigning 1st MAW to missions in I Corps. These assignments came to the wing in the form of a daily "frag" order, to which the wing could add the special mission and surplus sorties that it still directly controlled. For 1st Marine Division support missions, the 1st MAW TADC informed the DASC of the schedule of flights ordered and the number, type, ordnance loads, radio call signs, and time of arrival on station of the aircraft assigned. The DASC had responsibility for establishing communication with the aircraft as they came into division air-space and for turning them over to ground forward air controllers (FACs) or airborne forward air controllers (FAC(A)s) who directed the actual strikes.

If fixed-wing airpower were needed to meet a sudden tactical emergency, the DASC would receive the request from the ground unit or forward air controller. On its own authority, the DASC could divert preplanned flights already assigned to the division. If no such flights were in the area, the DASC would ask the TADC for additional strikes. The TADC then could "scramble" any available Marine aircraft or pass the request on to either Horn DASC or Saigon. With the slowing tempo of ground combat during 1970-1971, the Marines found it possible to rely more on preplanned missions and less on emergency scrambles. An officer of the wing TADC reported: "We have . . . gone much more in-country to pre-fragged missions and reduced our scramble rate."

While complicated, the system by 1970 usually delivered air support when and where Marine ground troops needed it. According to a FAC (A) with VMO-2, "You can expect [emergency] fixed-wing support on station within 30 minutes, in almost all cases, unless the weather or some emergency situation should arise, or the aircraft should go down [suffer mechanical failure] on the ground …. Thirty minutes is generally soon enough to do the job."

All aircraft furnishing direct support to Marine ground forces had to be controlled by a ground or airborne forward air controller, or by an air support radar team. Marine battalions each had a tactical air control party to transmit air support requests and control strikes, but ground FACs had proved to be of only limited usefulness in the obstructed terrain and scattered small-unit actions characteristic of the war in Quang Nam. Airborne FACs, usually flying in OV-10As in the air over the division TAOR, conducted visual and photographic reconnaissance, or spotted for artillery when not controlling strikes. In emergencies, one of these OV-10As, diverted by the division DASC, was the first aircraft on the scene. The forward air controller, riding in the backseat of the OV-10, established contact with the ground unit, determined what type and amount of air support was required, requested it through the DASC, and then controlled the responding aircraft.

To support ground forces and conduct bombing missions at night and in bad weather, the Marines developed two sophisticated and effective electronic air strike control systems. In 1968, they brought the Radar Beacon Forward Air Control (RABFAC), commonly known as the "Beacon," to Vietnam for use with the A-6A. The heart of this system was a six-pound, battery-powered radar transponder, or beacon, carried by a ground forward air control party. The beacon emitted a distinctive signal which the Intruder's radar picked up as the aircraft came within range of the unit to be supported. By radio, the ground FAC informed the pilot of his location and that of the friendly troops, provided the bearing of the target in relation to the beacon, and stated the target type and desired direction of the bombing run. Once fed this data, the A-6A's attack-navigation system could guide the plane to the objective and automatically release its ordnance. Since the FAC rarely could determine the bearing between himself and the target with complete accuracy, beacon strikes usually had to be adjusted like artillery fire, with the A-6 dropping one or two bombs on each pass and the FAC sending course corrections, but normally the plane would be on target by the third run.

During 1970-1971, Marine A-6A squadrons regularly flew as many as a dozen beacon sorties per day on missions fragged directly by 1st MAW. Units of the Amer-ical and the 101st Airborne Divisions; the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized); and the 5th Special Forces Group, as well as the 1st Marine Division, were equipped with beacons. According to Colonel Walter E. Sparling, the 1st MAW G-3, the Army units "like [the beacon] even better, they say, than an Arc Light. They know there's complete secrecy in a beacon [and] greater accuracy . . . ."

In November 1970, to increase exploitation of the beacon and furnish more close air support during the monsoon season, the 1st MAW introduced "Buddy Bombing." It began sending A-4s, F-4s, or A-6s with nonfunctioning electronic systems to accompany each Intruder on a beacon flight. The "Buddy" aircraft would follow the beacon guided plane on its run, releasing its ordnance at the command of the lead pilot.

While useful, the beacon system had its limitations. Ground units in heavily populated areas rarely could employ it for lack of political clearance for strikes. Radio equipment failures often prevented the infantry from contacting the supporting aircraft, and the elaborate electronic systems of the Intruder were also difficult to keep in working order. General Armstrong summed up: "There's too damn many things to go wrong ... in the beacon. The airplane system goes down, beacon doesn't work properly, or you don't have reliable air-ground communications. Our mission completion rate was only about 50 percent ... in a long period of months."

Much more reliable than the RABFACs were the Marine AN/TPQ-10 radar course directing centrals, operated by the air support radar teams (ASRT) of MASS-3. These devices, each a combination of radars and computers, located at strategic points throughout Military Region 1, could track aircraft at ranges of up to 50 miles and direct them to targets. An ASRT normally received target assignments from the DASC it was supporting and was subordinate to the DASC. When a strike aircraft came into range, the ASRT took over as final controller of the attack. The ASRT would determine the aircraft's position in relation to that of the TPQ-10. With this information, and with the position of the target already known, the team then worked out a course and bomb release time for the aircraft and directed it to the objective by radio. Using the AN/TPQ-10, the air support radar teams could deliver ordnance accurately under the worst weather conditions, day or night. ASRTs during 1970 controlled 5,421 Marines, Air Force, Army, and Navy missions. They also positioned aircraft for flare and supply drops, photographic reconnaissance runs, and medical evacuations. In early 1971, the Da Nang ASRT and HMM-262 successfully used the system, combined with a beacon, to guide helicopters to pre-selected landing zones in the field. The application of air support radar devices to helicopter operations enhanced the wing's ability to resupply ground units and move them when rain and fog had previously made helicopter support operations prohibitive. With the ASRT, the Marine Corps made a unique contribution to the air war; no other Service had facilities comparable in both accuracy and displacement ability.

At the beginning of 1970, MASS-3 had five ASRTs deployed, at Quang Tri, FSB Birmingham near Phu Bai, Da Nang, An Hoa, and Chu Lai. As part of the Keystone Robin Alpha redeployment in mid-1970, III MAP prepared plans to withdraw most of the personnel of MASS-3 and all of its ASRTs except the one at Da Nang. This plan met strong objection from XXIV Corps, which relied heavily on the Quang Tri ASRT to support the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) and Birmingham ASRT to control air strikes for the 101st Airborne Division in northern MR 1. The Army so valued the AN/TPQ-10 that, according to General Armstrong, "If the Army commanders had had their way, our AN/TPQ-10 would have been out there until they left." After extensive discussions, the Marines agreed to remove MASS-3 from the Keystone Robin Alpha troop list and keep three ASRTs at Quang Tri, Birmingham, and Da Nang. These ASRTs continued in operation until the final Marine redeployment in May 1971.

[edit] Gulf War

During Operation Desert Storm the DASC was operational for 984 hrs. They controlled 4948 fixed wing missions and 839 rotary wing missions. During this time they received 375 immediate joint tactical air requests (JTARs), 114 immediate air support requests (ASRs) and 153 immediate medevacs.

[edit] Operation Iraqi Freedom

The first DASC Marines to arrive in theater were from Marine Air Support Squadron 3. They arrived in Kuwait at the end of October 2002 and were billeted at Camp Commando along with other key units and planners from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. Follow on forces began to arrive in January of 2003. They included the remainder of Marine Air Support Squadron 3 and significant detachments from Marine Air Support Squadron 1 and Marine Air Support Squadron 6.

The plan called for the DASC to be broken up into a main echelon (DASC Main) and a forward echelon (DASC Fwd). The main would be attached to the Main Headquarters of the 1st Marine Division while the forward would be attached to the Division "Jump Command Post (CP)." Air support Marines also provided a smaller DASC for Task Force Tarawa, staffed a DASC(A) Detachment out of Al Jaber Air Base in Kuwait and provided Air Support Liaison Teams (ASLTs) to all of the Regiments within the 1st Marine Division.

After billeting at LSA Matilda for the week prior to the war, the DASC Fwd, in conjunction with the Division jump CP, pushed to the northern Kuwaiti desert in the final days before the invasion. Crossing the border on the morning of the 20th of March, they pushed forward into the Rumallayah oil fields and took over operations from the DASC Main. From there they moved in trace of the 1st Marine Division operating from just north of An Nasariyah, next to the hasty airstrip at Hontush, on Highway 6 about 10k SE of Baghdad, in a former airborne training facility in Eastern Baghdad and as part of Task Force Tripoli in Tikrit. The 1st Marine Division DASC used the MASS-3 squadron callsign "Blacklist" throughout the initial invasion while the Task Force Tripoli DASC used the callsign "Presley" in honor of Presley O'Bannon and also to distinguish itself from "Blacklist" which was still operational during that time.

[edit] References

United States Marine Corps Portal

^ Sherrod, Robert. (1952). History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II. Combat Forces Press. ISBN 0-933852-58-4.
^ United States Marine Corps (1986) Controlling Air Support - US Marines in Vietnam, 1970-1971: Vietnamization and Redeployment. Chapter 15.