Deterrence theory
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Deterrence theory is a military strategy developed after say and used throughout the Cold War and current times. It is especially relevant with regard to the use of nuclear weapons, and figures prominently on current United States foreign policy regarding the development of nuclear technology in North Korea and Iran.
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[edit] Strategy
There are two forms of deterrence: deterrence by punishment or deterrence by denial.
Deterrence by punishment is a strategy by which governments threaten an immense retaliation if attacked. Aggressors are deterred if they do not wish to suffer such damage as a result of an aggressive action. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) is a form of this strategy, which characterizes relations between the United States and former Soviet Union as well as present day Russia.
Deterrence by denial is a strategy whereby a government builds up or maintains defence and intelligence systems with the purported aim of neutralising or mitigating attacks. Aggressors are deterred if they choose not to act, perceiving the cost of their action to be too high in relation to its likely success.
Deterrence is viewed by some as the opposite of appeasement, where an expansionist government is allowed to absorb some territory to reach a negotiated settlement, (for example, the Munich Agreement prior to World War II). Deterrence can be based on either WMD's, conventional weapons strength, economic sanctions, or any combination of these.
[edit] History
United States policy of deterrence during the Cold War underwent significant variations. The early stages of the Cold War were generally characterized by ideology of Containment, an aggressive stance on behalf the states especially regarding developing nations under their sphere of influence. This period was characterized by numerous proxy wars in most of the globe, particularly Africa, Asia, Central America, and South America. The most notable of these conflicts was the Korean War. In contrast to general opinion, George F. Kennan, who is taken to be the founder of this ideology in the famous Long Telegram, asserted that his ideas had been misinterpreted, and that he never advocated military intervention, merely economic support.
With the US defeat in Vietnam, the normalization of US relations with China, and the Sino-Soviet Split, the policy of Containment was abandoned and a new policy of détente was established, whereby peaceful coexistence was sought between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although all factors listed above contributed to this shift, the most important factor was probably the rough parity achieved in stockpiling nuclear weapons with a clear capability of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Therefore, the period of détente was characterized by a general reduction in the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States and a thawing of the Cold War, lasting from the late 1960s until the start of the 1980s. The doctrine of Mutual Nuclear Deterrence characterized relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during this period, and present relations with Russia.
A third shift occurred with President Ronald Reagan's arms build-up during the 1980's. Reagan attempted to justify this policy in part due to concerns of growing Soviet influence in Latin America and the new republic of Iran, established through the revolution of 1979. Similar to the old policy of Containment, the United States funded several proxy wars, including support for Saddam Hussein of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, support for the mujahideen and Taliban in Afghanistan, who were fighting for independence from the Soviet Union, and several anti-communist movements in Latin America such as the overthrow of the democratically elected Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The illegal funding of the Contras in Nicaragua led to the Iran-Contra Affair, while overt support led to a World Court ruling against the United States in Nicaragua v. United States. The United States refused to obey the ruling of the International Court of Justice and refused to pay the fine.
With the break up of the Soviet Union and the spread of nuclear technology to other nations beyond the United States and Russia, the concept of deterrence took on a broader multinational dimension. The US policy on post-Cold War deterrence was outlined in 1995 in a document called "Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence". [1] This document explains that while relations with Russia continue to follow the traditional characteristics of Mutual Nuclear Deterrence, due to both nations continuing Mutually Assured Destruction, US policy of deterrence towards nations with minor nuclear powers should ensure through threats of immense retaliation (or even preemptive action) that they do not threaten the United States, its interests or allies. The document explains that such threats must also be used to ensure that nations without nuclear technology keep from developing nuclear weapons and that a universal ban precludes any nation from maintaining chemical or biological weapons. The current tensions with Iran and North Korea of their nuclear programs is due to the continuation of this policy of deterrence.
[edit] Criticism
Some argue that Deterrence Theory is flawed since a government can misunderstand the rationale of their opponent. A peaceful country with unpopular politics can be unfairly seen as a threat. Also, an isolationist nation that imposes draconian rule over its people can be ignored since it does not directly threaten its neighbors.
The arms race during deterrence might escalate the risk of accidental deployment possibly leading to war, as illustrated in the movies WarGames and Dr. Strangelove. The arms race is inefficient in terms of optimal output; all countries involved have to expend resources on armaments which would not be necessary if the others had not expended resources. This could be considered a form of positive feedback.
Finally, a country's military build-up risks massive budget deficits, restrictions on civil liberties, the creation of a military-industrial complex, and other repressive measures that sometimes result from a protracted or endless war. See Garrison State.
Proponents insist that the theory is flexible to different situations and allows for changes of strategy.
[edit] Psychology and deterrence
A new form of criticism emerged in the late 1980s with detailed analysies of the actions of individual leaders and groups of leaders in crisis situations (historical and theoretical).
A number of new or nuanced criticisms of "traditional" deterrence theory emerged. One was that deterrence theory assumed that both sides had common rational peaceful goals. In some real-life situations, such as the Yom Kippur War, leaders felt that internal or external political considerations forced a conflict. One of the essays in [1] regarding the internal military and political discussions within the Egyptian high command in 1973 indicates that senior civilian leaders including Anwar Sadat believed that they had to fight a war in order to have enough internal political support to negotiate for peace.
In another miscalculation, Israel rationalized that the Israeli military dominance would deter any attack, and believed that no rational Syrian or Egyptian leader would attempt such an attack. Sadat felt unable to avoid a war, and Syria's leadership misjudged the military situation and believed they could be victorious. Israel was assuming rational and well informed opponents, and assuming a set of goals for its opponents, and its deterrence failed.
Another observation was that crisis situations can reach a point that formerly stabilizing actions (such as keeping military units at bases, and low alert levels) can be seen as a sign of weakness, and that perceived weakness can then induce an opponent to attack during the perceived time of advantage. Thus, an inversion point exists, after which some formerly stabilizing actions become destabilizing, and some formerly destabilizing actions become stabilizing.
Finally, studying the specific group psychology of several leaders and leader groups, including the Israeli and Arab leaders in 1973, and the Kennedy Administration during the Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis events, indicated that in many cases leader groups use bad decision making techniques and improperly assess available information. These errors can and often do preclude truly rational end behavior in deterrence situations.
[edit] External links
- [2] The text version of the unclassified document "Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence", 1995.
- Revisiting Nuclear Deterrence Theory by Donald C. Whitmore - March 1, 1998
- Nuclear Deterrence, Missile Defenses, and Global Instability by David Krieger, April 2001
- Bibliography
- Maintaining Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century by the Senate Republican Policy Committee
- Nuclear Files.org Description and analysis of the nuclear deterrence theory
- Nuclear Files.org Speech by US General Lee Butler in 1998 on the Risks of Nuclear Deterrence
- Nuclear Files.org Speech by Sir Joseph Rotblat, Nobel Peace Laureate, on the Ethical Dimensions of Deterrence
[edit] References
- ^ Psychology and Deterrence, Ed. Robert Jervis, ISBN 0-8018-3842-8, The Johns Hopkins University Press; Reprint edition (April 1, 1989)
