Death by dangerous driving
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In English criminal law, the offence of causing death by dangerous driving is currently defined by the Road Traffic Act 1991 but, following Adomako (1995) 1 AC 171, the offence of motor manslaughter may now be the preferred charge.
[edit] Definitions
Road Traffic Act 1991, s 1, defines the offences of causing death by dangerous driving and dangerous driving:
- A person who causes the death of another person by driving a mechanically propelled vehicle dangerously on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.
- A person who drives a mechanically propelled vehicle dangerously on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.
A person is to be regarded as driving dangerously if and only if:
- (a) the way he drives falls far below what would be expected of a competent and careful driver; and
- (b) it would be obvious to a competent and careful driver that driving in that way would be dangerous.
A person is also to be regarded as driving dangerously if it would be obvious to a competent and careful driver that driving the vehicle in its current state would be dangerous which includes considering anything attached to or carried on or in it, and to the manner in which it is attached or carried.
In this context, "dangerous" refers to danger either of injury to any person or of serious damage to property; and in determining what would be expected of, or obvious to, a competent and careful driver in a particular case, regard shall be had not only to the circumstances of which he could be expected to be aware but also to any circumstances shown to have been within the knowledge of the accused. In Attorney General's Reference (No 4 of 2000) (2001) 2 Cr. App. R. 417 Woolf CJ said at p 422:
- "The essential limbs, as is common ground, do not require any specific intent to drive dangerously. Section 2A sets out a wholly objective test. The concept of what is obvious to a careful driver places the question of what constitutes dangerous driving within the province of the jury."
Thus, whereas the underlying test of dangerousness is objective, a test based on the concept of "obviousness" considers the extent of knowledge as to causation. This test is hybrid, drawing both on the actual subjective knowledge that the accused had in his or her mind at the time the actus reus of driving occurred, and on the knowledge that would have been in the mind of a reasonable person (see mens rea and criminal negligence for discussion on the nature of these tests and the scope of the reasonable person). Although limited to the issue of dangerousness, the case of DPP v Mark Scott Milton (2006) EWHC 242 (Admin) involved a police officer and the holder of a Grade 1 advanced driving certificate who drove a police vehicle at speeds of up to 150 mph to practise his driving skills on a vehicle with which he was unfamiliar, as he had been instructed to do in the course of his police training. At the time, the weather was fine, visibility was good, and the roads were more or less deserted. There was no evidence that any other road user was in fact endangered by the manner of the officer's driving. The Crown argued that, assessed objectively, driving at speeds in excess of twice the speed limit is dangerous whatever the context. A "competent and careful" driver will not significantly exceed the relevant speed limits because that driver would, at least should, recognise that speed limits are set at the maximum speed up to which, depending on the conditions, one should safely drive. To drive a little above the limit will, or may, not per se be dangerous driving in the sense that it would not fall far below what is to be expected of a competent and careful driver. But the greater the excess, the further below that standard one falls. To drive at twice the speed limit ought to be recognised, objectively, as being too far below acceptable standards. As to "obviousness", this required more than that the danger would have been foreseeable to the competent and careful driver. It required that the danger would be obvious to the competent and careful driver. On appeal, the court accepted that driving at these speeds on public roads without any warning by sounding the siren or flashing lights in these conditions, however good and however skilled the driver, amounted to a prima facie case of dangerous driving. But that did not require the defendant to be convicted of dangerous driving. That would mean that any driver of an emergency vehicle, driving at twice the speed limit, whatever the road conditions, however much warning was given to other road users, would be guilty of dangerous driving per se. That could not be right. The case was remitted for a retrial. However, there is a distinction between an officer using a vehicle on police business exceeding the speed limits, and an officer merely practising his skills or familiarising himself with a new car. An officer does not need to drive a car at 150 mph to familiarise himself with it. Thus, whether the officer will be convicted will depend on a policy balancing exercise. Advanced police drivers must indeed practise at least some of their high speed skills on public roads. If this kind of practice is stopped, traffic officers may be thrown into emergency situations with relatively little experience. But such practice should not unduly expose other road users to danger, and the failure to use the lights or siren may prove decisive.
For a less serious form of the offence, see aggravated TWOC.
[edit] New offences
The Road Safety Act 2006 will create two new offences, of "causing death by careless, or inconsiderate driving" and a distinct offence for causing (any) death by driving when unlicensed, or disqualified
