David Elazar
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David "Dado" Elazar (1925 - 1976), was the ninth Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, serving in that capacity from 1972 to 1974. He was forced to resign in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War.
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[edit] Early life
Born in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and of Sephardic heritage, Elazar immigrated to Palestine in 1940 with the Youth Aliyah program, and settled on kibbutz Ein Shemer. He soon joined the Palmach, and fought in many important battles during Israel's War of Independence, including the Battle of San Simon Monastery in Jerusalem. As a soldier, he advanced through the ranks, eventually serving as commander of the famous HaPortzim Battalion of the Harel Brigade.
Elazar remained in the army after the war, transferring to the armored corps following the 1956 Sinai campaign. He served as deputy to the commander of the corps, Chaim Bar Lev, taking over as commander of the armored corps in 1961. He remained in this position until 1964, when he was appointed Chief of the Northern Command. He served in this position during the Six-Day War of 1967, and oversaw Israel's capture of the strategic Golan Heights from Syria in just two days. This led to a rapid ceasefire with Syria and the end of the war.
After the war, Elazar served as the chief operations officer on the general staff. On January 1, 1972, he was appointed Chief of Staff.
[edit] Chief of General Staff
The first months of his tenure were spent combating terrorism. On May 9, 1972, Israel released the hijackers of a Sabena aircraft as part of a prisoner exchange, but just three weeks later, on May 30, terrorists belonging to the Japanese Red Army killed 25 civilians and wounded 71 more at Lod Airport, Israel's leading transportation hub (see: Lod Airport Massacre). On 5 September of that year, another group of terrorists attacked Israeli athletes at the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich. The attack became known as the Munich Massacre. In response to these attacks, Elazar ordered what was, until then, the largest strike against terrorist bases in Syria and Lebanon. Three Syrian jets were downed, and dozens of terrorists killed in a heavy artillery barrage. In Operation Spring of Youth, which took place on the night of April 9-10, 1973, dozens more terrorists, including several key terrorist leaders were assassinated in Beirut by the IDF.
One of the most painful decisions made by Elazar during his tenure was the decision to down a Libyan passenger jet that strayed into Israeli airspace and refuse to identify itself. The plane was shot down by the Israeli Air Force over the Sinai Peninsula under direct orders from Elazar, killing over 100 civilians. Only later was it discovered that this was a civilian aircraft that had made a navigational error.
On 27 May 1973, the IDF announced a state of emergency and reserve troops were called up in response to a movement of Egyptian troops. The state of emergency was cancelled when it became clear that this was only an exercise. This event had a major impact on the General Staff, as it led them to believe that the Egyptian forces were not preparing for war, later that year, on Yom Kippur. After the war however, it became apparent that these frequent maneuvers carried out by the Egyptians were part of an elaborate ruse meant to induce complacency in the Israelis regarding the true intentions of Egyptian troop movements at the time the actual attack took place.
On 13 September, Israel shot down thirteen Syrian fighter jets, which had attempted to down Israeli aircraft.
[edit] The Yom Kippur War
[edit] Events leading up to the war
On 1 October 1973 the armies of Egypt and Syria were placed on alert. Due to an erroneous intelligence assessment and poor decisions by the Israeli military, the IDF responded with only limited measures, few reserve units were called up, and it was determined that war was "unlikely." In the early hours of October 6 (on Yom Kippur, the holiest of the Jewish holidays), Elazar finally became convinced that war would indeed break out that same day, even though the Chief of Military Intelligence Major General Eli Zeira and the Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan still stuck to their belief that this was highly unlikely. Dayan's conviction had two major consequences:
- Dayan refused to approve Elazar's request for a general call-up of the reserves (Elazar nevertheless eventually decided independently on a limited call-up, beginning on 5 October).
- Dayan refused to approve Elazar's recommendation that the IDF engage in a pre-emptive air strike, planned for 11:00 a.m. on Yom Kippur (the airforce was ready for the strike, but its jets never took off).
[edit] The war
At 2:00 p.m. on Yom Kippur, the armies of Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated attack against Israel. In many ways, this came as a surprise to the IDF and its command.
After a series of fierce battles to block the invading armies, a failed counter-offensive in the Sinai, and heavy losses to Israel's airforce and ground troops alike, the incursion was finally halted. On 11 October, fighting in the north was pushed back across the Syrian frontier, and on 16 October, Israeli troops crossed the Suez Canal under the command of General Ariel Sharon. This was the first time an Israeli army had waged war on the continent of Africa.
In the early days of the fighting, Elazar was one of very few Israeli commanders who managed to keep his cool and even maintain an optimistic view of where events were heading. This was in especially sharp contrast with the political leadership, most notably Moshe Dayan, who spoke of the "destruction of the Third Jewish Commonwealth." At the same time, the war highlighted sharp personal differences among the top military brass, particularly along the Southern Front -- some of these differences have yet to be resolved. At one point in the fighting, Elazar was forced to replace the Chief of the Southern Command, Major General Shmuel Gonen (known as "Gorodish") with the former Chief of General Staff Chaim Bar-Lev. He also enlisted the help of generals Rehavam Zeevi and Aharon Yariv, both of whom had recently retired from the IDF, as his special advisers.
By the end of the war, the IDF had penetrated deep into Syrian territory. Mount Hermon, which had been taken from Israel at the start of the war, returned to Israeli control. On the Southern Front, the Egyptian Third Army was surrounded in the Sinai, and Israeli troops had occupied the western bank of the Suez Canal fighting with the unconventional tactics of General Ariel Sharon. Nevertheless, despite these military achievements, Israel paid dearly in casualties.
[edit] The aftermath
The high casualty rate and the fact that Israel was caught unprepared, in terms of both intelligence and operations, led to a wave of public protests throughout the country.
On 21 November, as soon as the war ended, the Agranat Commission was set up to investigate why the IDF was so poorly prepared for the war. The commission met for several months. It held 140 sessions and listened to dozens of witnesses before releasing its interim report on 1 April 1974, calling for Elazar to be removed as Chief of Staff. The report stated that "Elazar bears personal responsibility for the assessment of the situation and the preparedness of the IDF" and recommended that he and the chief of military intelligence Eli Zeira be removed from their posts.
Elazar immediately submitted his resignation to the government, claiming that he had been mistreated, especially since the report suggested no sanctions against the country's political leadership. He also complained that his actions during the war were never considered, nor did the commission recognize that the war ended in victory.
On 15 April 1976, he died of a heart attack while swimming. Many believed that he died of a broken heart after the Agranat Commission blamed him for the military fiasco. He is buried on Mount Herzl, Jerusalem.
[edit] Legacy
David Elazar, popularly known as "Dado," remains a controversial figure in Israel to this very day. The conclusion made by the Agranat Commission that he was personally responsible for the failure to prepare for war was not fully accepted by the public. It is obvious that Elazar, the country's senior military officer, was still trapped in the belief (or the "conception," as it later became known in Israel) that the Arab states would never attack Israel again after their defeat in the Six Day War, and that if they did attack, "We will break their bones." (He made this comment, which was severely criticized, at a press conference on 8 October, while the IDF was still mired in a failed counter-offensive on the southern front facing Egypt.) Nevertheless, many argued that the government, particularly prime minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, should also be held accountable, and by and large the Israeli public agreed with this point. The result was that strong public pressure eventually forced Meir's and Dayan's resignation, despite the fact that they were not officially implicated in the Agranat Commission's report. Many also cite the fact that Elazar was able to maintain his cool during the difficult early days of the war as one of the leading factors that eventually led to Israel's victory. The subject is still being debated.
| Preceded by: Chaim Bar-Lev |
Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces 1972-1974 |
Succeeded by: Mordechai Gur |
[edit] See also
[edit] Further reading
- Dado, 48 years and 20 days, Bartov, Hanoch, Maariv Book Guild, 1981 (trans. from the Hebrew).
