Cyprus Reunification Negotiations
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[edit] Peace Negotiations, 1974-1994
On April 28, 1975, Kurt Waldheim, the UN Secretary-General, launched a new mission of Good Offices. Starting in Vienna, over the course of the following ten months Clerides and Denktash held discussed a range of humanitarian issues relating to the events of the previous year. However, attempts to make progress on the substantive issues – such as territory and the nature of the central government – failed to produce any results. After five rounds the talks fell apart in February 1976. In January 1977, the UN managed to organise a meeting in Nicosia between Makarios and Denktash. This led to a major breakthrough. On February 12, the two leaders signed a four point agreement - 1977 High Level Agreement - confirming that a future Cyprus settlement would be based on a federation made up of two states (bi-zonal) and two communities (bi-communal). The size of the states would be determined by economic viability and land ownership. The central government would be given powers to ensure the unity of the state. Various other issues, such as freedom of movement and freedom of settlement, would be settled through discussion. Just months later, in August 1977, Makarios died. He was replaced by Spyros Kyprianou, the foreign minister.
In May 1979, Waldheim visited Cyprus and secured a further ten-point set of proposals - 1979 High Level Agreement - from the two sides. In addition to re-affirming the 1977 High Level Agreement, these also included provisions for the demilitarisation of the island and a commitment to refrain from destabilising activities and actions. Shortly afterwards a new round of discussions began in Nicosia. Again, they were short lived. For a start, the Turkish Cypriots did not want to discuss Varosha, which was a key issue for the Greek Cypriots. Secondly, the two sides failed to agree on the concept of ‘bicommunality’. The Turkish Cypriots believed that the Turkish Cypriot federal state would be exclusively Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriot state would be exclusively Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots believed that the two states should be predominantly, but not exclusively, made up of a particular community.
[edit] Turkish Cypriot Unilateral Declaration of Independence
In May 1983, an effort by Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the then UN Secreatary-General, foundered after the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all occupation forces from Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots were furious at the resolution. They threatened to declare independence in retaliation. Despite this, in August, de Cuellar gave the two sides a set of proposals for consideration that called for a rotating presidency, the establishment of a bicameral assembly along the same lines as previously suggested and 60:40 representation in the central executive. In return for increased representation in the central government, the Turkish Cypriots would surrender 8-13 per cent of the land in their possession. Both Kyprianou and Denktash accepted the proposals. However, on 15 November 1983, the Turkish Cypriots took advantage of the post-election political instability in Turkey and unilaterally declared independence. Although the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC) was soon recognised by Turkey, the rest of the international community condemned the move. Within days the Security Council passed a resolution making it clear that it would not accept the new state and that the decision disrupted efforts to reach a settlement. Denktash denied this. In a letter addressed to the Secretary-General informing him of the decision, he insisted that the move guaranteed that any future settlement would be truly federal in nature.
In September 1984 talks resumed. After three rounds of discussions it was again agreed that Cyprus would become a bizonal, bicommunal, non-aligned federation. The Turkish Cypriots would retain 29 per cent for their federal state and all foreign troops would leave the island. In January 1985, the two leaders met for their first face-to-face talks since the 1979 agreement. However, while the general belief was that the meeting was being held to agree to a final settlement, Kyprianou insisted that it was a chance for further negotiations. The talks collapsed. In the aftermath, the Greek Cypriot leaders came in for heavy criticism, both at home and abroad. After that Denktash announced that he would not make so many concessions again. Undeterred, in March 1986, de Cuéllar presented the two sides with a Draft Framework Agreement. Again, the plan envisaged the creation of an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, bi-zonal state in Cyprus. However, the Greek Cypriots were unhappy with the proposals. They argued that the questions of removing Turkish forces from Cyprus was not addressed, nor was the repatriation of the increasing number of Turkish settlers on the island. Moreover, there were no guarantees that the full three freedoms would be respected. Finally, they saw the proposed state structure as being confederal in nature. Further efforts to produce an agreement failed as the two sides remained steadfastly attached to their positions.
[edit] The Set of Ideas
In August 1988, de Cuellar called upon the two sides to meet with him in Geneva in August. There the two leaders - George Vasiliou and Rauf Denktash - agreed to abandon the Draft Framework Agreement and return to the 1977 and 1979 High Level Agreements. But the talks faltered when the Greek Cypriots announced their intention to apply for EU membership, a move strongly opposed by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. Nevertheless, in June 1989, de Cuellar presented the two communities with the 'Set of Ideas'. Denktash quickly rejected them as he not only opposed the provisions, he also argued that the UN Secretary-General had no right to present formal proposals to the two sides. The two sides met again, in New York, in February 1990. However, the talks were again short lived. This time Denktash demanded that the Greek Cypriots recognise the existence of two people in Cyprus and the basic right of the Turkish Cypriots to self-determination.
On 4 July 1990, Cyprus formally applied to join the European Community (EC). The Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, which had applied for membership in 1987, was outraged. Denktash claimed that Cyprus could only join the Community at the same time as Turkey and called off all talks with UN officials. Nevertheless, in September 1990, the EU member states unanimously agreed to refer the Cypriot application to the Commission for formal consideration. In retaliation, Turkey and the TRNC signed a joint declaration abolishing passport controls and introducing a customs union just weeks later. Undeterred, de Cuellar continued his search for a solution throughout 1991. He made no progress. In his last report to the Security Council, presented in October 1991, he blamed the failure of the talks on Denktash, noting the Turkish Cypriot leader's demand that the two communities should have equal sovereignty and a right to secession.
On 3 April 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the new UN Secretary-General, presented the Security Council with the outline plan for the creation of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation that would prohibit any form of partition, secession or union with another state. While the Greek Cypriots accepted the Set of Ideas as a basis for negotiation, Denktash again criticised the UN Secretary-General for exceeding his authority. When he did eventually return to the table, the Turkish Cypriot leader complained that the proposals failed to recognise his community. In November, Ghali brought the talks to a halt. He now decided to take a different approach and tried to encourage the to sides to show goodwill by accepting eight Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). These included reducing military forces on the island, transferring Varosha to direct UN control, reducing restrictions on contacts between the two sides, undertaking an island-wide census and conducting feasibility studies regarding a solution. The Security Council endorsed the approach.
On 24 May 1993, the Secretary-General formally presented the two sides with his CBMs. Denktash, while accepting some of the proposals, was not prepared to agree to the package as a whole. Meanwhile, on June 30, the European Commission returned its opinion on the Cypriot application for membership. While the decision provided a ringing endorsement of the case for Cypriot membership, it refrained from opening the way for immediate negotiations. The Commission stated that it felt that the issue should be reconsidered in January 1995, taking into account the ‘the positions adopted by each party in the talks.’ A few months later, in December 1993, Glafcos Clerides proposed the demilitarisation of Cyprus. Denktash dismissed the idea, but the next month he announced that he would be willing to accept the CBMs in principle. Proximity talks started soon afterwards. In March 1994, the UN presented the two sides with a draft document outlining the proposed measures in greater detail. Clerides said that he would be willing to accept the document if Denktash did, but the Turkish Cypriot leader refused on the grounds that it would upset the balance of forces on the island. Once again, Ghali had little choice but to pin the blame for another breakdown of talks on the Turkish Cypriot side. Soon afterwards Denktash relented. He would be willing to accept mutually agreed changes. But Clerides refused to negotiate any further changes to the March proposals. Further proposals put forward by the Secretary-General in an attempt to break the deadlock were rejected by both sides.
[edit] Deadlock and Legal Battles, 1994-97
At the Corfu European Council, held on 24-25 June 1994, the EU officially confirmed that Cyprus would be included in the Union's next phase of enlargement. Two weeks later, on July 5, the European Court of Justice imposed restrictions on the export of goods from Northern Cyprus into the European Union. Soon afterwards, in December, relations between the EU and Turkey were further damaged when Greece blocked the final implementation of a customs union. As a result, talks remained completely blocked throughout 1995 and 1996. The situation took another turn for the worse at the start of 1997 when the Greek Cypriots announced that they intended to purchase the Russian-made S-300 anti-aircraft missile system. Soon afterwards, Turkey announced that it would match any military build-up. However, Turkey was now starting to come under increasing pressure from several sides. In December 1996, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) delivered a landmark ruling that declared that Turkey was an occupying power in Cyprus. The case - Loizidou vs Turkey - centred on Titina Loizidou, a refugee from Kyrenia, who was judged to have been unlawfully denied the control of her property by Turkey. In addition to being a major political embarrassment for Ankara, the case also had severe financial implications as the Court later ruled that Turkey should pay Mrs Loizidou US$825,000 in compensation for the loss of use of her property. Ankara rejected the ruling as politically motivated.
After twenty years of talks, a settlement seemed as far off as ever. However, the basic papameters of a settlement were by now internationally agreed. Cyprus would be a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. A solution would also be expected to address the following issues:
- Constitutional framework
- Territorial adjustments
- Return of property to pre-1974 owners and/or compensation payments
- Return of displaced persons
- Demilitarisation of Cyprus
- Residency rights/repatriation of Turkish settlers
- Future peacekeeping arrangements
[edit] EU Accession and the Settlement Process, 1997-Present
In 1997 the basic parameters of the Cyprus Dispute changed. A decision by the European Union to open up accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus created a new catalyst for a settlement. Among those who supported the move, the argument was made that Turkey could not have a veto on Cypriot accession and that the negotiations would encourage all sides to be more moderate. However, opponents of the move argued that the decision would remove the incentive of the Greek Cypriots to reach a settlement. They would instead wait until they became a member and then use this strength to push for a settlement on their terms. In response to the decision, Rauf Denktash announced that he would no longer accept federation as a basis for a settlement. In future he would only be prepared to negotiate on the basis of a confederal solution. In December 1999 tensions between Turkey and the European Union eased somewhat after the EU decided to declare Turkey a candidate for EU membership, a decision taken at the Helsinki European Council. At the same time a new round of talks started in New York. These were short lived. By the following summer they had broken down. Tensions started to rise again as a showdown between Turkey and the European Union loomed over the island's accession.
Perhaps realising the gravity of the situation, and in a move that took observers by surprise, Rauf Denktash wrote to Glafcos Clerides on 8 November 2001 to propose a face-to-face meeting. The offer was accepted. Following several informal meetings between the two men in November and December 2001 a new peace process started under UN auspices on 14 January 2002. At the outset the stated aim of the two leaders was to try to reach an agreement by the start of June that year. However, the talks soon became deadlocked. In an attempt to break the impasse, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General visited the island in May that year. Despite this no deal was reached. After a summer break Annan met with the two leaders again that autumn, first in Paris and then in New York. As a result of the continued failure to reach an agreement, the Security Council agreed that the Secretary-General should present the two sides with a blueprint settlement. This would form the basis of further negotiations. The original version of the UN peace plan was presented to the two sides by Annan on 11 November 2002. A little under a month later, and following modifications submitted by the two sides, it was revised (Annan II). It was hoped that this plan would be agreed by the two sides on the margins of the European Council, which was held in Copenhagen on December 13. However, Rauf Denktash, who was recuperating from major heart surgery, refused to attend. The EU therefore decided to confirm that Cyprus would join the EU on 1 May 2004, along with Malta and eight other states from Central and Eastern Europe.
Although it had been expected that talks would be unable to continue, discussions resumed in early January 2003. Thereafter, a further revision (Annan III) took place in February 2003, when Annan made a second visit to the island. During his stay he also called on the two sides to meet with him again the following month in The Hague, where he would expect their answer on whether they were prepared to out the plan to a referendum. While the Greek Cypriot side, which was now led by Tassos Papadopoulos, agreed to do so, albeit reluctantly, Rauf Denktash refused to allow a popular vote. The peace talks collapsed. A month later, on 16 April 2004, Cyprus formally signed the Confidence and Security-Building Measuresat a ceremony in Athens.
Throughout the rest of the year there was no effort to restart talks. Instead, attention turned to the Turkish Cypriot elections, which were widely expected to see a victory by moderate pro-solution parties. In the even, the assembly was evenly split. A coalition administration was formed that brought together the pro-solution CTP and the Democrat Party, which had traditionally taken the line adopted by Rauf Denktash. This opened the way for Turkey to press for new discussions. After a meeting between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Kofi Annan in Switzerland, the leaders of the two sides were called to New York. There they agreed to start a new negotiation process based on two phases: phase one, which would just involve the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, being held on the island and phase two, which would also include Greece and Turkey, being held elsewhere. After a month of negotiations in Cyprus, the discussions duly moved to Burgenstock, Switzerland. The Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash rejected the plan outright and refused to attend these talks. Instead, his son Serdar Denktash and Mehmet Ali Talat attended in his place. There a fourth version of the plan was presented. This was short-lived. After final adjustments, a fifth and final version of the Plan was presented to the two sides on 31 March 2004.
[edit] The UN plan for the reunification of Cyprus (Annan Plan)
Under the final proposals, The Republic of Cyprus would become the United Cyprus Republic. It would be a loose confederation composed of two component states. The northern Turkish Cypriot constituent state would encompass about 28.5% of the island, the southern Greek Cypriot constituent state would be made up of the remaining 71.5%. Each part would have had its own parliament. There would also be a bicameral parliament on the federal level. In the Chamber of Deputies, the Turkish Cypriots would have a minimum of 25% of the seats. Numerically the split between the island's two communities is 88% or 642,600 Greek Cypriots to 12% or 87,400 Turkish Cypriots (in 2002 based on RoC figures). The Senate would have consisted of equal parts of members of each ethnic group. Executive power would be vested in a presidential council. The chairmanship of this council would rotate between the communities. Each community would also have the right to veto all legislation.
One of the most controversial elements of the plan concerned property. During Turkey's military intervention/invasion in 1974, many Greek Cypriots (who owned 90% of the land and property in the north) were forced to abandon their homes. (A large number of Turkish Cypriots also left their homes.) Since then, the question of restitution of their property has been a central demand of the Greek Cypriot side. However, the Turkish Cypriots argue that the complete return of all Greek Cypriot properties to their original owners would be incompatible with the functioning of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal settlement. To this extent, they have argued compensation should be offered. The Annan Plan attempted to bridge this divide. In certain areas, such as Morphou (Guzelyurt) and Famagusta (Gazimağusa), which would be returned to Greek Cypriot control, Greek Cypriot refugees would have received back all of their property but the Turkish Cypriots who were currently occupying it would have been allowed to continue using it indefinitely unless they could find somewhere else acceptable for them to live. In other areas, such as Kyrenia (Girne) and the Karpass Peninsula, which would remain under Turkish Cypriot control, they would be given back a proportion of their land (usually one third assuming that it had not been extensively developed) and would receive compensation for the rest. All land and property (that was not used for worship) belonging to businesses and institutions, including the Church the largest property owner on the island, would have been expropriated. While many Greek Cypriots found these provisions unacceptable in themselves, many others resented the fact that the Plan envisaged all compensation claims by a particular community to be met by their own side. This was seen as unfair as Turkey would not be required to contribute any funds towards the compensation.
The plans legality was highly questionable and in order to cover himself Annan inserted a clause which asked the leaders of the two communities to sign an attached letter which asked the European Court of Human Rights to dismiss all pending cases regarding property rights and to bar all new cases from being allowed. The Greek Cypriots resented this clause since it would prevent them from having any form of legal redress and the Republic of Cyprus president Tassos Papadopoulos stated that he was barred from signing such a document by the constitution.
Other controversial issues existed. According to the plan the number of Greek Cypriots who would be allowed to return to the north and stay would be restricted to 18% of the population after 19 years on a village by village basis which meant that it would be extremely difficult if not impossible for the Greek Cypriots to bring up and educate their children. This restriction would have had no impact on the Turkish Cypriots wishing to return to the south since they made up less than 18% of the population anyway. Greek Cypriots who returned to the north would not have been given full democratic rights by the constitution of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state. They would not have been allowed to vote in elections for the state assembly unless they spoke fluent Turkish and restrictions were allowed to be placed on the formation of political parties.
Apart from the property issue, the freedoms of movement and settlement and democratic rights, there were many other parts of the plan that sparked controversy. For example the plan envisaged only a gradual reduction in the number of Turkish troops on the island to 6,000 after six years. This would fall to 600 after 19 years or when Turkey joined the EU. Greece would have been allowed to maintain 1,200 troops on the island and the Cypriot National Guard would have been completely disbanded. This fell short of Greek Cypriot demands for complete demilitarisation and for all foreign troops to be seedily withdrawn from the island before any constitutional changes took effect. The Greek Cypriots feared that Turkey would not comply since it was not party to any formal agreement and if any Turkish troops remained on the island they could be used to gain a bridgehead as the had done in 1963 and 1967. There was also a considerable degree of debate about the decision to retain the Treaty of Guarantee. This treaty, which was an integral part of the 1960 constitution, gave Britain, Greece and Turkey a right to unilaterally intervene military in the island's affairs. Such intervention would contravene Article 2 Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter and the Greek Cypriots had demanded that the Treaty be altered so that any intervention must first have to be authorise by the UN Security Council. Most Turkish Cypriots felt that a continued Turkish military presence was necessary to ensure their security. Another element of the plan the Greek Cypriots objected to was that it allowed up to 120,000 Turkish citizens who had been brought to the island to remain. (The exact number of Turkish settlers is highly disputed. Some argue that the figure is as high as 200,000 or as low as 80,000. The generally accepted figure is 120,000 based on the Turkish Cypriots own figures given to the UN.) They are seen as settlers illegally brought to the island in contravention of international law. The Greek Cypriots also argued that since the vast majesty of these colonists had been given paramilitary training they would pose a considerable threat to their security. However, while many accepted Greek Cypriot concerns on this matter, there was a widespread feeling that it would be unrealistic to forcibly remove every one of the these settlers, especially as many of them had been born and raised on the island.
[edit] Referendums, 24 April 2004
Under the terms of the plan, the Annan plan would only come into force if accepted by the two sides in simultaneous referendums. These were set for 24 April 2004. In the weeks that followed there was intense campaigning in both communities. However, and in spite of opposition from Rauf Denktash, who had boycotted the talks in Switzerland, it soon became clear that the Turkish Cypriots would vote in favour of the agreement. Among Greek Cypriots opinion was heavily weighted against the plan. Tassos Papadopoulos, the president of Cyprus, in a speech delivered on 7 April called on Greek Cypriots to reject the plan. He position was supported by most of the small parties. His coalition partner AKEL, one of the largest parties on the island, chose to reject the plan because it did not provide sufficient security guarantees. Support for the plan was voiced by Democratic Rally (DISY), the main right-wing party, and the United Democrats, a small centre-left party led by George Vasiliou, a former president. Glafcos Clerides, now retired from politics, also supported the plan. Prominent members of DISY who did not support the plan split from the party and formed a new party "For Europe" which opposed the plan.
The United Kingdom (a Guarantor Power), the United States came out in favour of the plan. Turkey also signalled its clear support for the plan. The Greek Government decided to ramian neutral. However, Russia was troubled by an attempt by Britain and the US to introduce a resolution in the UN Security Council supporting the plan and used its veto to block the move. This was done as they felt that Britain the US were trying to put unfair pressure on the Greek Cypriots.
In the 24 April referendum the Turkish Cypriots endorsed the plan by a margin of two to one. However, the Greek Cypriots resoundingly voted against the plan, by a margin of three to one.
Referendum Results:
| Areas of the Republic of Cyprus | Yes | No | Turnout |
|---|---|---|---|
| Turkish Cypriots and Turks from mainland Turkey | 64.90% | 35.09% | 87% |
| Greek, Maronite and Armenian Cypriots | 24.17% | 75.83% | 88% |
[edit] The Cyprus Dispute after the Referendum
On 1 May 2004, a week after the referendum, Cyprus joined the European Union. Under the terms of accession the whole island is considered to be a member of the European Union. However, the terms of the acquis communautaire, the EU's body of laws, have been suspended in the north.
Despite initial hopes that a new process to modify the rejected plan would start by autumn, most of the rest of 2004 was taken up with discussions over a proposal by the European Union to open up direct trade with the Turkish Cypriots and provide 259 million euros in funds to help them upgrade their infrastructure. This has provoked considerable debate. The Republic of Cyprus has argued that there can be no direct trade via ports and airports in Northern Cyprus as these are unrecognised. Instead, it has offered to allow Turkish Cypriots to use Greek Cypriot facilities, which are internationally recognised. This has been rejected by the Turkish Cypriots. At the same time, attention turned to the question of the start of Turkey's future membership of the European Union. At a European Council held on 17 December 2004, and despite earlier Greek Cypriot threats to impose a veto, Turkey was granted a start date for formal membership talks on condition that it signed a protocol extending the customs union to the new entrants to the EU, including Cyprus. Assuming this is done, formal membership talks will begin on 3 October 2005.
Following the defeat of the UN plan in the referendum there has been no attempt to restart negotiations between the two sides. While both sides have reaffirmed their commitment to continuing efforts to reach an agreement, the UN Secretary-General has not been willing to restart the process until he can be sure that any new negotiations will lead to a comprehensive settlement based on the plan he put forward in 2004. To this end, he has asked the Greek Cypriots to present a written list of the changes they would like to see made to the agreement. This has been rejected by President Tassos Papadopoulos on the grounds that no side should be expected to present their demands in advance of negotiations. However, the Greek Cypriots were be prepared to present their concerns orally. Another Greek Cypriot concern centres on the procedural process for new talks. Mr Papadopoulos has said that he will not accept arbitration or timetables for discussions. The UN fears that this would lead to another open-ended process that could drag on indefinitely. Although there have been indications that the UN is reviewing the situation, as of the end of May 2005 the general feeling is that there appears to be little likelihood that new talks will begin any time soon.
In talks which took place in New York with then UN Under Secretary General Mr Kieran Prendergast on 20th May 2005 the Greek Cypriots made known their 16 principle demands which include the following.
1. The formation of necessary mechanisms and the guaranties of foreigners' that will secure the implementation of the solution by Turkey;
2. the lifting of the guarantor forces' unilateral rights to intervene;
3. the expansion of the guarantor forces with the joining of European Union (EU);
4. the total withdrawal of all the soldiers from Cyprus;
5. the fixation of the exact number of people Turkish of origin that will stay in Cyprus and provide security for the rest to depart;
6. making arrangements for the ones that will come from Turkey in the future;
7. the shortening of the schedules concerning the restoration of land to the Greek Cypriot Administration and the return of the Greek Cypriots under Turkish administration;
8. the detailed negotiation and re-planning of the items of the Annan Plan related to possessions.
9. Providing of the unitary economy and unitary monetary policies;
10. putting to referendum the logic of equity in the administration of the shared state associations. It is claimed that the right to veto in the decision taking procedure will make the state mechanism unable to work.
11. The clear fixation of the continental shelf of Cyprus in all neighboring countries (both with Turkey and Israel) on the basis of international agreements.
(Source zaman.com Saturday 21, 2005)
